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{
    "localId": "193676",
    "label": "USSR: Vienna meeting: Background documents, 1953-1961: General",
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{
    "id": "193676",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/193676",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "USSR: Vienna meeting: Background documents, 1953-1961: General",
    "description": "This file contains materials collected by the office of President John F. Kennedy's secretary, Evelyn Lincoln, concerning the Soviet Union. Materials in this file include newspaper articles, background papers on nuclear science and possible cooperative space exploration projects, a summary of a telephone conversation between President Kennedy and French President General Charles de Gaulle, an itinerary for President Kennedy's trip to Vienna, Austria, and copies of a joint statement issued by the President and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev concerning nuclear weapons, disarmament, and Germany following discussions in Vienna. The majority of this file consists of telegrams and memoranda to President Kennedy from Cabinet members and advisors regarding suggested strategies for discussing subjects such as nuclear weapons, disarmament, Berlin, and Laos with Premier Khrushchev.",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/193676",
    "identifierLocal": "JFKPOF-126-001",
    "collections": [
        "Papers of John F. Kennedy: Presidential Papers: President's Office Files",
        "Country Files"
    ],
    "subjects": [
        "Soviet Union",
        "Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich, 1894-1971",
        "International relations"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/76/1936/193676/content/presidential-libraries/kennedy/POF/JFKPOF-126-001/JFKPOF-126-001-p0002.jpg",
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    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/193676",
    "naId": 193676,
    "coverageEndDate": {
        "day": 21,
        "logicalDate": "1961-06-21",
        "month": 6,
        "year": 1961
    },
    "coverageStartDate": {
        "day": 13,
        "logicalDate": "1961-04-13",
        "month": 4,
        "year": 1961
    },
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{
    "seq": 89,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/76/1936/193676/content/presidential-libraries/kennedy/POF/JFKPOF-126-001/JFKPOF-126-001-p0090.jpg",
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    "ocrText": "8\nThe President\n- 3 -\n6-2-61\nprobability that meaningful nuclear tests up to\n150 TNT kilotons in size could cause an earth tremor\nseismic recording of less than 4.75 degrees. Such a\nrecording, being below the threshold of 4.75 degrees\nwould not be in the category which would qualify for\ninspection, as outlined in the United States' proposal.\nThe fact that our proposal does not and can not, with\npresent detection apparatus, protect us from surrepti-\ntious testing in the wide range of small coupled shots\nand large decoupled shots constitutes a basic weakness\nin our position. We view this point with grave con-\ncern based particularly on the growing scientific\nopinion that quantum improvement of seismological de-\ntection apparatus is unlikely.\n3. New U. S. Proposals on Number of Inspections\nMr. Dean discussed this proposal with the Joint Com-\nmittee in advance and we had no objection to it. How-\never, we do believe that it is important for us not to\nsurrender the escalation factor (one additional in-\nspection for every five tremors registering 4.75 or\nmore, above the first sixty tremors) and allow the\nbasic inspection figure of 12 to become the maximum in-\nspection figure.\n4. Time Factor\nAn important factor to keep in mind is that we have had\na voluntary moratorium on all tests for two and one-half\nyears. We face additional months of negotiation. If\na treaty is finally signed, our proposal requires three\nmore years of moratorium, banning all tests, from the\ndate of the treaty signature. If the Soviet tactic is\nto obtain a test ban without controls for five and one-\nhalf years or more, then they will have succeeded.\nOur Committee recognizes that we are faced in Geneva with a difficult\nsituation. The original Conference of Experts at Geneva in August,\n1958, advanced a formula of test detection based on one nuclear ex-\nplosion in one type of earth formation. Two subsequent underground\nnuclear explosions proved the fallacy of their formula. In the mean-\ntime our negotiators had publicly taken a position based on the fal-\nlacious formula. In retrospect this inexcusable blunder of formulating\ncriteria based solely on one experiment has plagued our negotiators\ndown to the present time. The Soviets, because it is to their advantage\nCONFIDENTIAL"
}