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-6- Third, I am directing the Secretary of Defense to expand rapidly and sub- stantially, in cooperation with our Allics, the orientation of existing forces for the conduct of non-nuclear war, para-military operations and sub-limited or unconventional wars In addition, our special forces and unconventional warfare units will be increased and reoriented. Throughout the services new emphasis must be placed on the special skills and languages which are required to work with local populations. Fourth, The Army is developing plans to make possible a much more rapid deployment of a major portion cf its highly trained reserve forces. When these plans are completed and the reserve is strenthened, two combat- equipped divisions, plus their supporting forces, a total of 89, 000 men, could be ready in an emergency for operations with but 3 weeks notice -- 2 more divisions with but 5 veeks notice and six additional division and their supporting forces, making a total of 10 divisions, could be deployable with less than 8 weeks notice. in short, these new plans will allow us to almost double the combat power of the Army in less than two months, compared to the nearly nine months heretofore required. Fifth, to enhance the already formidable ability of the Marine Corps to respond to limited war emergencies, am asking the Congress for 60 million dollars to increase Marine Corps strength to 190,000 meno This will increase the initial impact and staying power of our three Marine divisions and three air wings: and provide a trained nucleus for further expansion, if necessary for self-defense. Finally, to cite one othex area of activities that are both legitimate and necessary as a means of self-defense in an age of hidden perils, our whole intelligence effort must be reviewed, and its coordination with other elements of policy assured. The Congress and the American psople are entitled to know that we will institute whatever new organization, policies, and control are necessaryo VII. Civil Defense One major element of the national security program which this nation has never squarely faced up to is civil defense. This problem arises not from present trends but from national inaction in which most of us have partici- pated. In the past decade we have intermittently considered a variety of programs, but we have never adopted a consistent policy. Public considera- tion have been largely characterized by apathy, indifference and skepticism; while, at the same time, many of the civil defense plans have been so far-reaching and unrealistic that they have not gained essential support. This Administration has been looking hard at exactly what civil defense can and cannot do. It cannot be obtained cheaply. It cannot give an assurance of blast protection that will be proof against surprise attack or guaranteed against obsolescence or destruction. And it cannot deter a nuclear attack. We will deter an enemy from making a nuclear attack only if our retaliatory power is so strong and so invulnerable that he knows he would be destroyed by our response. If we have that strength, civil defense is not needed to deter an attack. If we should ever lack it, civil defense would not be an adequate substitute. But this deterrent concept assumes rational calculations by rational men. And the history of this planet, and particularly the history of the 20th century, is sufficient to remind us of the possibilities of an irrational attack, a MORE

Document source description

Press copy of President John F. Kennedy's urgent message to Congress. In his address the President argues for increased defense spending and support for the nation's space program, and proposes putting a man on the moon before the end of the decade.

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6
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Document data

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193915
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Type
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    "ocrText": "-6-\nThird, I am directing the Secretary of Defense to expand rapidly and sub-\nstantially, in cooperation with our Allics, the orientation of existing forces\nfor the conduct of non-nuclear war, para-military operations and sub-limited\nor unconventional wars\nIn addition, our special forces and unconventional warfare units will be\nincreased and reoriented. Throughout the services new emphasis must\nbe placed on the special skills and languages which are required to work\nwith local populations.\nFourth, The Army is developing plans to make possible a much more rapid\ndeployment of a major portion cf its highly trained reserve forces. When\nthese plans are completed and the reserve is strenthened, two combat-\nequipped divisions, plus their supporting forces, a total of 89, 000 men,\ncould be ready in an emergency for operations with but 3 weeks notice --\n2 more divisions with but 5 veeks notice and six additional division and their\nsupporting forces, making a total of 10 divisions, could be deployable with\nless than 8 weeks notice. in short, these new plans will allow us to almost\ndouble the combat power of the Army in less than two months, compared to\nthe nearly nine months heretofore required.\nFifth, to enhance the already formidable ability of the Marine Corps\nto\nrespond to limited war emergencies, am asking the Congress for 60 million\ndollars to increase Marine Corps strength to 190,000 meno This will increase\nthe initial impact and staying power of our three Marine divisions and three\nair wings: and provide a trained nucleus for further expansion, if necessary\nfor self-defense.\nFinally, to cite one othex area of activities that are both legitimate and\nnecessary as a means of self-defense in an age of hidden perils, our whole\nintelligence effort must be reviewed, and its coordination with other elements\nof policy assured. The Congress and the American psople are entitled to\nknow that we will institute whatever new organization, policies, and control\nare necessaryo\nVII.\nCivil Defense\nOne major element of the national security program which this nation has\nnever squarely faced up to is civil defense. This problem arises not from\npresent trends but from national inaction in which most of us have partici-\npated. In the past decade we have intermittently considered a variety of\nprograms, but we have never adopted a consistent policy. Public considera-\ntion have been largely characterized by apathy, indifference and skepticism;\nwhile, at the same time, many of the civil defense plans have been so\nfar-reaching and unrealistic that they have not gained essential support.\nThis Administration has been looking hard at exactly what civil defense can\nand cannot do. It cannot be obtained cheaply. It cannot give an assurance\nof blast protection that will be proof against surprise attack or guaranteed\nagainst obsolescence or destruction. And it cannot deter a nuclear attack.\nWe will deter an enemy from making a nuclear attack only if our retaliatory\npower is so strong and so invulnerable that he knows he would be destroyed\nby our response. If we have that strength, civil defense is not needed to deter\nan attack. If we should ever lack it, civil defense would not be an adequate\nsubstitute.\nBut this deterrent concept assumes rational calculations by rational men.\nAnd the history of this planet, and particularly the history of the 20th century,\nis sufficient to remind us of the possibilities of an irrational attack, a\nMORE"
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