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your TOP SECRET (5) With prior alert the first aircraft would arrive 1 at Chambley at H plus 17:19 hours and all four squadrons 2 would be in France at H plus 27:32 hours. The squadron 3 for Incirlik would completely arrive by H plus 43:24 4 hours. Without prior notice the first aircraft would 5 land at H plus 23:16 hours and four squadrons would be 6 in France by H plus 49:19 hours. The squadron for 7 Incirlik would be in place by H plus 66:34 hours. 8 8. Second Item - Section C, Item 12. Move the following 9 military forces under cover of rotation and/or scheduled 10 exercise: 11 "b. Elements of 2nd Fleet to war stations, exercising 12 from UK ports and in the Norwegian Sea. 11 13 a. Costs. If this movement were carried out during 14 June or July when 2nd Fleet ships are assembled off the 15 East Coast, no significant additional costs are foreseen. 16 Similarly, in August, if relieved units of the Sixth 17 Fleet are routed to the East Coast by way of the UK and 18 Norwegian Sea, no significant additional costs are foreseen. 19 b. Implications. 20 (1) A movement of this magnitude should be presented 21 to the NAC prior to implementation. 22 (2) Crisis in the Caribbean may preclude the use of 23 either of the concepts stated above. 24 (3) Country consultations with the UK and other 25 nations would be required to effect visits by US ships 26 to foreign ports. If carrier based aircraft are to be 27 exercised, it may be necessary to obtain overflight 28 rights dependent on nature of exercise. 29 TOP SECRET 12 Appendix D JCSM-385-61 SRGRES

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    "ocrText": "your\nTOP SECRET\n(5) With prior alert the first aircraft would arrive\n1\nat Chambley at H plus 17:19 hours and all four squadrons\n2\nwould be in France at H plus 27:32 hours. The squadron\n3\nfor Incirlik would completely arrive by H plus 43:24\n4\nhours. Without prior notice the first aircraft would\n5\nland at H plus 23:16 hours and four squadrons would be\n6\nin France by H plus 49:19 hours. The squadron for\n7\nIncirlik would be in place by H plus 66:34 hours.\n8\n8. Second Item - Section C, Item 12. Move the following\n9\nmilitary forces under cover of rotation and/or scheduled\n10\nexercise:\n11\n\"b. Elements of 2nd Fleet to war stations, exercising\n12\nfrom UK ports and in the Norwegian Sea. 11\n13\na. Costs. If this movement were carried out during\n14\nJune or July when 2nd Fleet ships are assembled off the\n15\nEast Coast, no significant additional costs are foreseen.\n16\nSimilarly, in August, if relieved units of the Sixth\n17\nFleet are routed to the East Coast by way of the UK and\n18\nNorwegian Sea, no significant additional costs are foreseen.\n19\nb. Implications.\n20\n(1) A movement of this magnitude should be presented\n21\nto the NAC prior to implementation.\n22\n(2) Crisis in the Caribbean may preclude the use of\n23\neither of the concepts stated above.\n24\n(3) Country consultations with the UK and other\n25\nnations would be required to effect visits by US ships\n26\nto foreign ports. If carrier based aircraft are to be\n27\nexercised, it may be necessary to obtain overflight\n28\nrights dependent on nature of exercise.\n29\nTOP SECRET\n12\nAppendix D\nJCSM-385-61\nSRGRES"
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