Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense - Subject: Temporary Reinforcement as a Berlin Deterrent (S)
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DEPARTMENT OF
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
RECEIVED
JCSM-385-61
AMERICA
6 JUN 1961
OF
1961.JUN 6 18 22
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OFF SECY OF DEFENSE
Subject: Temporary Reinforcement as a
Berlin Deterrent (s)
1. Reference is made to the memorandum by the Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense, subject as above, dated 29 May 1961, in which
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Assistant
Secretaries of Defense, International Security Affairs, Comp-
troller, Manpower, and Installations and Logistics, were requested
to provide their views and recommendations regarding the capa-
bility for, approximate costs of, and main implications of:
a. An air mobility exercise of about two battle groups
to Germany in June and return within two or three weeks.
b. Movement (air, sea or both) of one STRAC division to
Germany or Italy in July for one or two-month period.
c. Calling one reserve component division to active
service in July for a 30 or 60-day period.
d. Other similar scale activity of ground, naval and air
160 Amount
units which would contribute significantly to the objective
of deterring the USSR from initiating a Berlin crisis.
2. Separate studies on each of the above subjects are cont
tained in Appendices A, B, C and D hereto. In general, each of
these studies concludes that the Services and the unified com-
mands are capable of conducting the operations listed in
Appendices A, B and C. Also, in regard to these three Appendices,
the implications of their implementation go far beyond the pure
military aspects.
3. No judgment is made in this paper as to the desirability
of undertaking any measure considered herein. It is assumed
the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be requested to forward their
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views on implementation and timing of any course of action
proposed by higher authority. In this connection the Joint
Chiefs of Staff desire to emphasize that these operations,
along, will not contribute significantly to the desired objec-
tive; they must be utilized in conjunction with other non-
military measures, such as those contained in the Berlin
"Checklist."
4. The primary implications of Appendices A and B are con-
cerned with NATO consultations and country-to-country negotiations
which would be required if these exercises were to be conducted.
This would be necessary in order to obtain the utmost advantage
to the United States and our Allies and at the same time deter
the USSR from precipitating a crisis over Berlin.
5. The primary implication of Appendix C is the need for the
President to declare an emergency within the meaning of Section
673, Title 10, US Code, before he can order reserve units or
fillers for extended active duty.
6. Appendix D refers primarily to the Checklist of Possible
Military and Non-Military Measures, Berlin Contingency Planning,
which was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on 12 August
1960. This Checklist provides a wide range of actions both mili-
tary and non-military which are responsive to this particular
problem. The Checklist is discussed extensively by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,
subject: "The Status of Berlin Contingency Plans (U)", dated 13
April 1961 and in their memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,
subject: "Berlin (U)", dated 28 April 1961. Included in Appendix
D are examples of actions comparable to those contained in
Appendices A and B. The development of costs and implications
for the implementation of other checklist items could be accom-
plished readily when necessary. In addition, non-military
measures should be considered for implementation concurrently
with military measures.
7. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that the Deputy
Secretary of Defense stated that this study was for planning
purposes only; should not prompt any preparatory activity;
2
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implementation would be a matter for decision at the highest
level; and that it would be assumed that these operations
would be funded above present budgetary levels.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
THOMAS D. WHITE
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Attachment
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3
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APPENDIX A
AN AIR MOBILITY EXERCISE OF ABOUT TWO BATTLE GROUPS
TO GERMANY IN JUNE, AND RETURN WITHIN TWO OR THREE
WEEKS, ON THE ORDER OF LONG THRUST (c)
THE PROBLEM
1. To determine the capability for, approximate costs of,
1
and main implications of conducting a two battle group mobility
2
exercise of two or three weeks duration in Germany during June
3
1961.
4
DISCUSSION
2. Two STRAC airborne battle groups could be deployed by air
5
to Germany and conduct training and field exercises in major
6
training areas. This force would have a strength of 4,216 and
7
would require 224 aircraft sorties to airlift 3,465 short tons
8
of personnel, equipment and supplies.
9
3. The estimated cost to include foreign duty pay, maintenance, 10
facilities and transportation is:
11
a. Army
$ 650,000
12
b. Air Force
$12,100,000
13
Total
$12,750,000
14
4. The STRAC force is prepared to commence movement on one
15
hour's notice. Airlift aircraft deploying to Army assembly points
16
from airborne or ground positions can be in position for onloads atl7
the time initial units of STRAC are prepared to move out.
18
5. On a "crash" basis and using only one point of departure
19
and one point for delivery similar to planning for Exercise
20
LONG THRUST (disregarding peacetime flight restrictions) and
21
from "0" alert, the two battle group force could be airlifted
22
and closed in Germany in 4.5 days. With 24 hours alert this
23
could be reduced to three days maximum.
24
6. Logistical support for the deployed forces would be
25
provided by EUCOM service components.
26
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JCSM-385-61
1
Appendix A
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IMPLICATIONS
7. EUCOM major training area schedule would require changes.
1
8. Overflight clearances would have to be obtained.
2
9. The posture of deployed forces would degrade the US
3
capability to execute wartime or contingency commitments in
4
other areas.
5
10. Major changes would be required in the June programmed
6
airlift support of DOD requirements.
7
11. Commercial air augmentation would be necessary to replace
8
aircraft withdrawn from scheduled MATS operations.
9
12. State Department would have to clear this exercise to
10
include clearance from the Federal Republic of Germany.
11
13% The North Atlantic Council should be consulted on this
12
exercise.
13
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Appendix A
JCSM-385-61
2
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APPENDIX B
MOVEMENT (AIR, SEA, OR BOTH) FOR ONE STRAC DIVISION TO
GERMANY OR ITALY IN JULY FOR A ONE OR TWO-MONTH PERIOD (c)
THE PROBLEM
1. To determine the capability for, approximate costs of,
1
and main implications of deploying by air, sea or both, one
2
STRAC division to Germany in July 1961, for a 30-60 day period.
3
DISCUSSION
4
2. Deployment to Italy is not considered in this discussion
5
because of the lack of adequate facilities, training areas,
6
and logistics support under US control in Italy. If applied
7
to Italy, the statistics concerning Germany are considered to be
8
adequate for planning purposes.
9
3. One STRAC airborne division, could be deployed to Germany
10
in July 1961. The division would have a strength of 11,555 and
11
require lift for approximately 8,213 short tons of personnel,
12
equipment and supplies. The force could be deployed by air or
13
by a combination of air and sea as follows:
14
a. On a "crash" basis, assuming multiple on and off load
15
bases with no simultaneous deployment of other forces, the
16
division utilizing 560 aircraft sorties could be closed in
17
Germany in nine days.
18
b. Estimated cost to include foreign duty pay, maintenance, 19
facilities, transporation and support for 30-60 days is:
20
(1) Army
$ 4,000,000
21
(2) Air Force
$ 30,600,000
22
Total
$ 34,600,000
23
4. To deploy two battle groups by air and the remainder of
24
the division by sea would require 224 aircraft sorties to air
25
lift 4,216 personnel and 3,465 short tons, and three troop
26
transports and three cargo ships to sealift 7,339 personnel
27
and 4,964 short tons (20,314 measurement tons).
28
a. The above force could close in Germany as follows:
29
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JCSM-385-61
3
Appendix B
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FOP SECRET
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(1) Two airlifted battle groups: 4.5 days with zero
1
alert and on a "crash" basis.
2
(2) Sealifted Division (-)
3
Troops
Cargo
Movement to Port and)
4
Loading Time
6 days
6 days
5
Steaming Time
9 days
11 days
15 days
17 days
6
b. Estimated cost to include foreign duty pay, maintenance, 7
facilities, transportation and support for 30-60 days,
8
considering air movement for two battle groups and sea
9
movement for the division minus is:
10
(1) Army
$ 4,000,000
11
(2) Navy
428,500
12
(3) Air Force
12,600,000
13
Total
$17,028,500
14
5. Logisitcal support for the deployed forces would be pro-
15
vided by EUCOM service components with replenishment supplies
16
from CONUS. If the forces were to remain in Germany
17
indefinitely, additional logistical support units would be
13
required.
19
6. Other possible combinations of air and sea movement of
20
airborne or infantry divisions could be accomplished; however,
21.
they are not discussed in this paper.
22
IMPLICATIONS
7. The posture of deployed forces would degrade the US
23
capability to execute wartime or contingency commitments in
24
other areas.
25
8. Major changes in training schedules of CONUS and EUCOM
26
units would be required. This would have a serious effect on
27
those units in Europe which would be displaced at the major
28
training areas.
29
9. There would be a temporary reduction in lift capability
30
to support remaining CONUS based forces which might be required
31.
to execute contingency operations.
32
10. Overflight clearances would have to be obtained.
33
11. Major changes would be required in the July programmed
34
airlift support of Department of Defense requirements.
3!
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JCSM-385-61
4
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Appendix B
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12. Commercial air augmentation would be necessary to replace 1
aircraft withdrawn from scheduled MATS operations.
2
13. To move the division minus by sealift with less than 30
3
days advance notice would require obtaining commercial
4
transportation for scheduled passengers.
5
24. State Department would have to clear this exercise to
6
include clearance from the Federal Republic of Germany.
7
15 It would be desirable to obtain prior approval from the
8
North Atlantic Council. However, if this could not be
9
accomplished, the Council should be informed in advance.
10
16. Domestic repercussions to this exercise could be adverse 11
unless a carefully planned public affairs program were executed 12
prior to or concurrently with the exercise.
13
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JCSM-385-61
5
Appendix B
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SECRET
APPENDIX C
CALLING ONE RESERVE COMPONENT DIVISION TO ACTIVE SERVICE IN
JULY FOR A THIRTY OR SIXTY-DAY PERIOD (U)
THE PROBLEM
1. To determine the capability for, approximate costs of,
1
and main implications of calling one reserve component division
2
to active service in July for a thirty or sixty-day period.
3
DISCUSSION
2. There are 27 National Guard Divisions and 10 USAR Divi-
4
sions which are scheduled for 15 days of annual active duty for
5
training (ANACDUTRA) during the period from June through
6
September. One of those scheduled for training in July
7
could be retained on active duty for a thirty-day or a sixty-
8
day period if directed.
9
3. As these divisions are at an authorized strength which
10
is considerably below their TOE strength, they should be
11
brought up to full strength if they are to be kept on extended
12
active duty. This would permit realization of maximum training 13
and combat readiness benefits. Approximately 4,900 individual
14
fillers from the USAR mobilization reinforcement pool would be
15
required to bring the division which was investigated to full
16
strength. These are available from within the Army area con-
17
cerned. In order to effect call up of USAR fillers, Active Army 18
Corps Headquarters concerned will need a minimum of 30 days to
19
comply.
20
4. Cost for Thirty-Day Period. Overall cost would be
21
approximately $5,142,827. This includes $1,439,350 for
22
15 days ANACDUTRA already budgeted but does not include dis-
23
placement cost for two reserve component divisions which would
24
have to take ANACDUTRA elsewhere. Estimated net additional cost,25
including displacement cost, is $3,763,477.
26
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Appendix C
JCSM-385-61
6
SECRET
5. Cost for Sixty-Day Period. Overall cost would be
1
approximately $9,068,305. This includes $1,439,350.
2
for 15 days ANACDUTRA already budgeted but does not include
3
displacement cost for three reserve component divisions,
4
which would have to take ANACDUTRA elsewhere. Estimated
5
net additional cost, including displacement cost, is
6
$7,750,955.
7
IMPLICATIONS
6. With regard to the reserve components, the President
8
(or Congress) must declare an emergency within the meaning
9
of Section 673, Title 10, US Code, before he can order
10
reserve units or fillers for extended active duty, or new
11
authorizing legislation must be enacted.
12
7. The problems of disruption of civilian occupations for
13
a 30-60 day period to include loss of pay and removal from
14
local areas for both National Guard and USAR personnel
15
concerned should be considered.
16
8. In the selection of a particular division, the following
17
factors need to be considered--strength, present training
18
status, equipment levels, training areas, equipment pool at
19
training site, morale, etc.
20
9. As a related matter, the improved readiness desired for
21
two reserve component divisions could be assisted through
22
action taken in calling reserve component divisions to duty.
23
Through the device of calling two divisions to duty, each for
24
30 days, providing necessary fillers from the USAR mobiliza-
25
tion reinforcement pool, and providing intensive training for
26
30 days, the combat readiness of these units would be greatly
27
improved. The costs, although not computed in detail, will
28
approximate twice the overall cost of calling one division
29
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Appendix C
JCSM-385-61
7
SECRET
for 30 days, or approximately $10,300,000. The net cost,
1
after deducting the amount already budgeted for these
2
divisions, would be approximately $7,500,000.
3
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Appendix C
JCSM-385-61
8
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APPENDIX D
OTHER GROUND, NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITY WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE
TO DETERRING THE USSR FROM INITIATING A BERLIN CRISIS (S)
THE PROBLEM
1. To determine the capability for, the approximate costs
1
of, and the main implications of other similar scale activity
2
of ground, naval and air units which would contribute
3
significantly to the objective of deterring the USSR from
4
initiating a Berlin crisis.
5
DISCUSSION
2. In this study it is assumed that:
6
a. The actions indicated would be of such a nature that
7
they could be executed rapidly either singly, or in
8
conjunction with the actions previously discussed.
9
b. These operations would be funded above present
10
budgetary levels.
11
3. The "Checklist of Possible Military and Non-Military
12
Measures, Berlin Contingency Planning, which was forwarded
13
to the Secretary of Defense on 12 August 1960, provides a
14
wide range of actions which are responsive to this problem.
15
In their memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, subject:
16
"The Status of Berlin Contingency Plans (U)," dated 13 April
17
1961, and in their memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,
18
subject: "Berlin (U), " dated 28 April 1961, the Joint Chiefs
19
of Staff reiterated that the "Checklist," together with the
20
premise of accepting the risk of general war, continues to be
21
a satisfactory initial framework for the development of plans
22
for US and Free World response to any Soviet attempt to take
23
over Berlin or deny Free World access thereto.
24
4. The following points with regard to the Checklist are
25
particularly pertinent to the problem:
26
a. The "Checklist" contains 127 items divided into six
27
groups corresponding with possible developments of a
28
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JCSM-385-61
9
Appendix D
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Berlin situation. These items in the "Checklist" are listed
1
in an ascending order of severity but they may be implemented
2
in any order desired.
3
b. Since the items in this "Checklist" are associated
4
directly with the Berlin problem, their implementation as
5
exercises could contribute significantly to deterring the USSR 6
from initiating a Berlin crisis.
7
C. Many of the measures listed should be taken prior to
8
or concurrent with the actions outlined in Appendices A, B,
9
and C and the actions which will be discussed in this
10
Appendix.
11
d. Non-military measures as well as military measures
12
are listed and coordinated action should be undertaken on
13
both as appropriate.
14
e. A complete discussion of the "Checklist" and current
15
Berlin Contingency Planning is contained in the 13 April
16
and 28 April 1961 memorandums referred to in paragraph 3
17
above.
18
5. Since one of the primary instruments for the selection
19
and timing of counter-reactions is the "Checklist of Military
20
and Non-Military Measures in the Berlin Crisis, " it follows
21
that items selected from this "Checklist" are also appropriate
22
for implementation to deter the USSR from initiating a Berlin
23
crisis.
24
6. Two items from the "Checklist" have been selected as
25
possible military actions which would satisfy the requirements
26
of the problem. While they should be considered as examples
27
only, the cost and implications of other items from the
28
"Checklist" deemed appropriate for execution could be determined
29
readily. It should also be emphasized that many items in the
30
"Checklist" are not military but could have a real deterring
31
effect on the Soviets in context with the Berlin problem.
32
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Appendix D
JCSM-385-61
10
ΓOP SECRET
TWT
TOP SECRET
7. First Item - Section C, Item 12. Move the following
1
military forces under cover of rotation, and/or scheduled
2
exercises.
3
"e. Tactical fighter force of no more than 5 squadrons
4
to Europe."
5
a, Costs. In addition to 5 squadrons of F-100 aircraft,
6
communications and electronic elements, and air base
7
augmentation units would be required in Europe. This
8
would require the following airlift--32 C-130 and 50
9
MATS aircraft. The cost for this operation based on a
10
deployment phase of 21 days is as follows:
11
(1) Per diem
$ 253,000
12
(2) MATS airlift 1,825,000*
13
$2,078,000
14
(*Computed on basis of 100 percent dead-head of MATS aircraft.
15
In the event MATS aircraft remain in the theater on a demurrage
16
basis during the employment phase (21 days), total costs would
17
increase to $2,216,000.)
18
b. Implications.
19
(1) Prior to execution of this movement there should
20
be consultation with NAC and nation-to-nation agreements
21
to include overflight clearances in order that two of
22
these squadrons could be based at Chambley, France,
23
two at Chaumont, France, and one at Incirlik, Turkey.
24
(2) This force, known as TACK HAMMER, has already
25
been carmarked for USCINCLUR in a Berlin crisis. A
26
training exercise for this force would be most beneficial. 27
(3) A majority of MATS capability applied to this task 28
would have to be replaced by commercial augmentation.
29
Availability and costs of commercial augmentation cannot
30
Be determined at this time; consequently, these additional 31
costs are not reflected above.
32
(4) Exercises scheduled by Tactical Air Command would
33
be cancelled or rescheduled for June or July.
34
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Appendix D
JCSM-385-61
11
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(5) With prior alert the first aircraft would arrive
1
at Chambley at H plus 17:19 hours and all four squadrons
2
would be in France at H plus 27:32 hours. The squadron
3
for Incirlik would completely arrive by H plus 43:24
4
hours. Without prior notice the first aircraft would
5
land at H plus 23:16 hours and four squadrons would be
6
in France by H plus 49:19 hours. The squadron for
7
Incirlik would be in place by H plus 66:34 hours.
8
8. Second Item - Section C, Item 12. Move the following
9
military forces under cover of rotation and/or scheduled
10
exercise:
11
"b. Elements of 2nd Fleet to war stations, exercising
12
from UK ports and in the Norwegian Sea."
13
a. Costs. If this movement were carried out during
14
June or July when 2nd Fleet ships are assembled off the
15
East Coast, no significant additional costs are foreseen.
16
Similarly, in August, if relieved units of the Sixth
17
Fleet are routed to the East Coast by way of the UK and
18
Norwegian Sea, no significant additional costs are foreseen.
19
b. Implications.
20
(1) A movement of this magnitude should be presented
21
to the NAC prior to implementation.
22
(2) Crisis in the Caribbean may preclude the use of
23
either of the concepts stated above.
24
(3) Country consultations with the UK and other
25
nations would be required to effect visits by US ships
26
to foreign ports. If carrier based aircraft are to be
27
exercised, it may be necessary to obtain overflight
28
rights dependent on nature of exercise.
29
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JCSM-385-61
12
Appendix D
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"ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nDEPARTMENT OF\nTHE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF\nWASHINGTON 25, D.C.\nRECEIVED\nJCSM-385-61\nAMERICA\n6 JUN 1961\nOF\n1961.JUN 6 18 22\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE\nOFF SECY OF DEFENSE\nSubject: Temporary Reinforcement as a\nBerlin Deterrent (s)\n1. Reference is made to the memorandum by the Deputy Secre-\ntary of Defense, subject as above, dated 29 May 1961, in which\nthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Assistant\nSecretaries of Defense, International Security Affairs, Comp-\ntroller, Manpower, and Installations and Logistics, were requested\nto provide their views and recommendations regarding the capa-\nbility for, approximate costs of, and main implications of:\na. An air mobility exercise of about two battle groups\nto Germany in June and return within two or three weeks.\nb. Movement (air, sea or both) of one STRAC division to\nGermany or Italy in July for one or two-month period.\nc. Calling one reserve component division to active\nservice in July for a 30 or 60-day period.\nd. Other similar scale activity of ground, naval and air\n160 Amount\nunits which would contribute significantly to the objective\nof deterring the USSR from initiating a Berlin crisis.\n2. Separate studies on each of the above subjects are cont\ntained in Appendices A, B, C and D hereto. In general, each of\nthese studies concludes that the Services and the unified com-\nmands are capable of conducting the operations listed in\nAppendices A, B and C. Also, in regard to these three Appendices,\nthe implications of their implementation go far beyond the pure\nmilitary aspects.\n3. No judgment is made in this paper as to the desirability\nof undertaking any measure considered herein. It is assumed\nthe Joint Chiefs of Staff will be requested to forward their\nTOP SECRET\nCopy / of 9 Copies each\nTyntoll\nof 3 pages series \"A\"\nDOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR\nReproduction of this document in whole\nINTERVALS: NOT AUTOMATICALLY\nor in part is prohibited except with\nDECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10\npermission of the issuing office.\nC6/52\nrevimenting (SECDEF HAS SEEN) SecDef Cont. No. 1052\nTOP SECRET\nviews on implementation and timing of any course of action\nproposed by higher authority. In this connection the Joint\nChiefs of Staff desire to emphasize that these operations,\nalong, will not contribute significantly to the desired objec-\ntive; they must be utilized in conjunction with other non-\nmilitary measures, such as those contained in the Berlin\n\"Checklist.\"\n4. The primary implications of Appendices A and B are con-\ncerned with NATO consultations and country-to-country negotiations\nwhich would be required if these exercises were to be conducted.\nThis would be necessary in order to obtain the utmost advantage\nto the United States and our Allies and at the same time deter\nthe USSR from precipitating a crisis over Berlin.\n5. The primary implication of Appendix C is the need for the\nPresident to declare an emergency within the meaning of Section\n673, Title 10, US Code, before he can order reserve units or\nfillers for extended active duty.\n6. Appendix D refers primarily to the Checklist of Possible\nMilitary and Non-Military Measures, Berlin Contingency Planning,\nwhich was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on 12 August\n1960. This Checklist provides a wide range of actions both mili-\ntary and non-military which are responsive to this particular\nproblem. The Checklist is discussed extensively by the Joint\nChiefs of Staff in their memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,\nsubject: \"The Status of Berlin Contingency Plans (U)\", dated 13\nApril 1961 and in their memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,\nsubject: \"Berlin (U)\", dated 28 April 1961. Included in Appendix\nD are examples of actions comparable to those contained in\nAppendices A and B. The development of costs and implications\nfor the implementation of other checklist items could be accom-\nplished readily when necessary. In addition, non-military\nmeasures should be considered for implementation concurrently\nwith military measures.\n7. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that the Deputy\nSecretary of Defense stated that this study was for planning\npurposes only; should not prompt any preparatory activity;\n2\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nimplementation would be a matter for decision at the highest\nlevel; and that it would be assumed that these operations\nwould be funded above present budgetary levels.\nFor the Joint Chiefs of Staff:\nTHOMAS D. WHITE\nChief of Staff, United States Air Force\nAttachment\nTOP SECRET\n3\nrop SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nAPPENDIX A\nAN AIR MOBILITY EXERCISE OF ABOUT TWO BATTLE GROUPS\nTO GERMANY IN JUNE, AND RETURN WITHIN TWO OR THREE\nWEEKS, ON THE ORDER OF LONG THRUST (c)\nTHE PROBLEM\n1. To determine the capability for, approximate costs of,\n1\nand main implications of conducting a two battle group mobility\n2\nexercise of two or three weeks duration in Germany during June\n3\n1961.\n4\nDISCUSSION\n2. Two STRAC airborne battle groups could be deployed by air\n5\nto Germany and conduct training and field exercises in major\n6\ntraining areas. This force would have a strength of 4,216 and\n7\nwould require 224 aircraft sorties to airlift 3,465 short tons\n8\nof personnel, equipment and supplies.\n9\n3. The estimated cost to include foreign duty pay, maintenance, 10\nfacilities and transportation is:\n11\na. Army\n$ 650,000\n12\nb. Air Force\n$12,100,000\n13\nTotal\n$12,750,000\n14\n4. The STRAC force is prepared to commence movement on one\n15\nhour's notice. Airlift aircraft deploying to Army assembly points\n16\nfrom airborne or ground positions can be in position for onloads atl7\nthe time initial units of STRAC are prepared to move out.\n18\n5. On a \"crash\" basis and using only one point of departure\n19\nand one point for delivery similar to planning for Exercise\n20\nLONG THRUST (disregarding peacetime flight restrictions) and\n21\nfrom \"0\" alert, the two battle group force could be airlifted\n22\nand closed in Germany in 4.5 days. With 24 hours alert this\n23\ncould be reduced to three days maximum.\n24\n6. Logistical support for the deployed forces would be\n25\nprovided by EUCOM service components.\n26\nTOP SECRET\nJCSM-385-61\n1\nAppendix A\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nIMPLICATIONS\n7. EUCOM major training area schedule would require changes.\n1\n8. Overflight clearances would have to be obtained.\n2\n9. The posture of deployed forces would degrade the US\n3\ncapability to execute wartime or contingency commitments in\n4\nother areas.\n5\n10. Major changes would be required in the June programmed\n6\nairlift support of DOD requirements.\n7\n11. Commercial air augmentation would be necessary to replace\n8\naircraft withdrawn from scheduled MATS operations.\n9\n12. State Department would have to clear this exercise to\n10\ninclude clearance from the Federal Republic of Germany.\n11\n13% The North Atlantic Council should be consulted on this\n12\nexercise.\n13\nTOP SECRET\nAppendix A\nJCSM-385-61\n2\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nAPPENDIX B\nMOVEMENT (AIR, SEA, OR BOTH) FOR ONE STRAC DIVISION TO\nGERMANY OR ITALY IN JULY FOR A ONE OR TWO-MONTH PERIOD (c)\nTHE PROBLEM\n1. To determine the capability for, approximate costs of,\n1\nand main implications of deploying by air, sea or both, one\n2\nSTRAC division to Germany in July 1961, for a 30-60 day period.\n3\nDISCUSSION\n4\n2. Deployment to Italy is not considered in this discussion\n5\nbecause of the lack of adequate facilities, training areas,\n6\nand logistics support under US control in Italy. If applied\n7\nto Italy, the statistics concerning Germany are considered to be\n8\nadequate for planning purposes.\n9\n3. One STRAC airborne division, could be deployed to Germany\n10\nin July 1961. The division would have a strength of 11,555 and\n11\nrequire lift for approximately 8,213 short tons of personnel,\n12\nequipment and supplies. The force could be deployed by air or\n13\nby a combination of air and sea as follows:\n14\na. On a \"crash\" basis, assuming multiple on and off load\n15\nbases with no simultaneous deployment of other forces, the\n16\ndivision utilizing 560 aircraft sorties could be closed in\n17\nGermany in nine days.\n18\nb. Estimated cost to include foreign duty pay, maintenance, 19\nfacilities, transporation and support for 30-60 days is:\n20\n(1) Army\n$ 4,000,000\n21\n(2) Air Force\n$ 30,600,000\n22\nTotal\n$ 34,600,000\n23\n4. To deploy two battle groups by air and the remainder of\n24\nthe division by sea would require 224 aircraft sorties to air\n25\nlift 4,216 personnel and 3,465 short tons, and three troop\n26\ntransports and three cargo ships to sealift 7,339 personnel\n27\nand 4,964 short tons (20,314 measurement tons).\n28\na. The above force could close in Germany as follows:\n29\nTOP SECRET\nJCSM-385-61\n3\nAppendix B\nWOR SECRET\nFOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n(1) Two airlifted battle groups: 4.5 days with zero\n1\nalert and on a \"crash\" basis.\n2\n(2) Sealifted Division (-)\n3\nTroops\nCargo\nMovement to Port and)\n4\nLoading Time\n6 days\n6 days\n5\nSteaming Time\n9 days\n11 days\n15 days\n17 days\n6\nb. Estimated cost to include foreign duty pay, maintenance, 7\nfacilities, transportation and support for 30-60 days,\n8\nconsidering air movement for two battle groups and sea\n9\nmovement for the division minus is:\n10\n(1) Army\n$ 4,000,000\n11\n(2) Navy\n428,500\n12\n(3) Air Force\n12,600,000\n13\nTotal\n$17,028,500\n14\n5. Logisitcal support for the deployed forces would be pro-\n15\nvided by EUCOM service components with replenishment supplies\n16\nfrom CONUS. If the forces were to remain in Germany\n17\nindefinitely, additional logistical support units would be\n13\nrequired.\n19\n6. Other possible combinations of air and sea movement of\n20\nairborne or infantry divisions could be accomplished; however,\n21.\nthey are not discussed in this paper.\n22\nIMPLICATIONS\n7. The posture of deployed forces would degrade the US\n23\ncapability to execute wartime or contingency commitments in\n24\nother areas.\n25\n8. Major changes in training schedules of CONUS and EUCOM\n26\nunits would be required. This would have a serious effect on\n27\nthose units in Europe which would be displaced at the major\n28\ntraining areas.\n29\n9. There would be a temporary reduction in lift capability\n30\nto support remaining CONUS based forces which might be required\n31.\nto execute contingency operations.\n32\n10. Overflight clearances would have to be obtained.\n33\n11. Major changes would be required in the July programmed\n34\nairlift support of Department of Defense requirements.\n3!\nTOP SECRET\nJCSM-385-61\n4\nTOP SECRET\nAppendix B\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n12. Commercial air augmentation would be necessary to replace 1\naircraft withdrawn from scheduled MATS operations.\n2\n13. To move the division minus by sealift with less than 30\n3\ndays advance notice would require obtaining commercial\n4\ntransportation for scheduled passengers.\n5\n24. State Department would have to clear this exercise to\n6\ninclude clearance from the Federal Republic of Germany.\n7\n15 It would be desirable to obtain prior approval from the\n8\nNorth Atlantic Council. However, if this could not be\n9\naccomplished, the Council should be informed in advance.\n10\n16. Domestic repercussions to this exercise could be adverse 11\nunless a carefully planned public affairs program were executed 12\nprior to or concurrently with the exercise.\n13\nTOP SECRET\nJCSM-385-61\n5\nAppendix B\nTOP SECRET\nSECRET\nAPPENDIX C\nCALLING ONE RESERVE COMPONENT DIVISION TO ACTIVE SERVICE IN\nJULY FOR A THIRTY OR SIXTY-DAY PERIOD (U)\nTHE PROBLEM\n1. To determine the capability for, approximate costs of,\n1\nand main implications of calling one reserve component division\n2\nto active service in July for a thirty or sixty-day period.\n3\nDISCUSSION\n2. There are 27 National Guard Divisions and 10 USAR Divi-\n4\nsions which are scheduled for 15 days of annual active duty for\n5\ntraining (ANACDUTRA) during the period from June through\n6\nSeptember. One of those scheduled for training in July\n7\ncould be retained on active duty for a thirty-day or a sixty-\n8\nday period if directed.\n9\n3. As these divisions are at an authorized strength which\n10\nis considerably below their TOE strength, they should be\n11\nbrought up to full strength if they are to be kept on extended\n12\nactive duty. This would permit realization of maximum training 13\nand combat readiness benefits. Approximately 4,900 individual\n14\nfillers from the USAR mobilization reinforcement pool would be\n15\nrequired to bring the division which was investigated to full\n16\nstrength. These are available from within the Army area con-\n17\ncerned. In order to effect call up of USAR fillers, Active Army 18\nCorps Headquarters concerned will need a minimum of 30 days to\n19\ncomply.\n20\n4. Cost for Thirty-Day Period. Overall cost would be\n21\napproximately $5,142,827. This includes $1,439,350 for\n22\n15 days ANACDUTRA already budgeted but does not include dis-\n23\nplacement cost for two reserve component divisions which would\n24\nhave to take ANACDUTRA elsewhere. Estimated net additional cost,25\nincluding displacement cost, is $3,763,477.\n26\nSECRET\nAppendix C\nJCSM-385-61\n6\nSECRET\n5. Cost for Sixty-Day Period. Overall cost would be\n1\napproximately $9,068,305. This includes $1,439,350.\n2\nfor 15 days ANACDUTRA already budgeted but does not include\n3\ndisplacement cost for three reserve component divisions,\n4\nwhich would have to take ANACDUTRA elsewhere. Estimated\n5\nnet additional cost, including displacement cost, is\n6\n$7,750,955.\n7\nIMPLICATIONS\n6. With regard to the reserve components, the President\n8\n(or Congress) must declare an emergency within the meaning\n9\nof Section 673, Title 10, US Code, before he can order\n10\nreserve units or fillers for extended active duty, or new\n11\nauthorizing legislation must be enacted.\n12\n7. The problems of disruption of civilian occupations for\n13\na 30-60 day period to include loss of pay and removal from\n14\nlocal areas for both National Guard and USAR personnel\n15\nconcerned should be considered.\n16\n8. In the selection of a particular division, the following\n17\nfactors need to be considered--strength, present training\n18\nstatus, equipment levels, training areas, equipment pool at\n19\ntraining site, morale, etc.\n20\n9. As a related matter, the improved readiness desired for\n21\ntwo reserve component divisions could be assisted through\n22\naction taken in calling reserve component divisions to duty.\n23\nThrough the device of calling two divisions to duty, each for\n24\n30 days, providing necessary fillers from the USAR mobiliza-\n25\ntion reinforcement pool, and providing intensive training for\n26\n30 days, the combat readiness of these units would be greatly\n27\nimproved. The costs, although not computed in detail, will\n28\napproximate twice the overall cost of calling one division\n29\nSECRET\nAppendix C\nJCSM-385-61\n7\nSECRET\nfor 30 days, or approximately $10,300,000. The net cost,\n1\nafter deducting the amount already budgeted for these\n2\ndivisions, would be approximately $7,500,000.\n3\nSECRET\nAppendix C\nJCSM-385-61\n8\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nAPPENDIX D\nOTHER GROUND, NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITY WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE\nTO DETERRING THE USSR FROM INITIATING A BERLIN CRISIS (S)\nTHE PROBLEM\n1. To determine the capability for, the approximate costs\n1\nof, and the main implications of other similar scale activity\n2\nof ground, naval and air units which would contribute\n3\nsignificantly to the objective of deterring the USSR from\n4\ninitiating a Berlin crisis.\n5\nDISCUSSION\n2. In this study it is assumed that:\n6\na. The actions indicated would be of such a nature that\n7\nthey could be executed rapidly either singly, or in\n8\nconjunction with the actions previously discussed.\n9\nb. These operations would be funded above present\n10\nbudgetary levels.\n11\n3. The \"Checklist of Possible Military and Non-Military\n12\nMeasures, Berlin Contingency Planning, which was forwarded\n13\nto the Secretary of Defense on 12 August 1960, provides a\n14\nwide range of actions which are responsive to this problem.\n15\nIn their memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, subject:\n16\n\"The Status of Berlin Contingency Plans (U),\" dated 13 April\n17\n1961, and in their memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,\n18\nsubject: \"Berlin (U), \" dated 28 April 1961, the Joint Chiefs\n19\nof Staff reiterated that the \"Checklist,\" together with the\n20\npremise of accepting the risk of general war, continues to be\n21\na satisfactory initial framework for the development of plans\n22\nfor US and Free World response to any Soviet attempt to take\n23\nover Berlin or deny Free World access thereto.\n24\n4. The following points with regard to the Checklist are\n25\nparticularly pertinent to the problem:\n26\na. The \"Checklist\" contains 127 items divided into six\n27\ngroups corresponding with possible developments of a\n28\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nJCSM-385-61\n9\nAppendix D\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nBerlin situation. These items in the \"Checklist\" are listed\n1\nin an ascending order of severity but they may be implemented\n2\nin any order desired.\n3\nb. Since the items in this \"Checklist\" are associated\n4\ndirectly with the Berlin problem, their implementation as\n5\nexercises could contribute significantly to deterring the USSR 6\nfrom initiating a Berlin crisis.\n7\nC. Many of the measures listed should be taken prior to\n8\nor concurrent with the actions outlined in Appendices A, B,\n9\nand C and the actions which will be discussed in this\n10\nAppendix.\n11\nd. Non-military measures as well as military measures\n12\nare listed and coordinated action should be undertaken on\n13\nboth as appropriate.\n14\ne. A complete discussion of the \"Checklist\" and current\n15\nBerlin Contingency Planning is contained in the 13 April\n16\nand 28 April 1961 memorandums referred to in paragraph 3\n17\nabove.\n18\n5. Since one of the primary instruments for the selection\n19\nand timing of counter-reactions is the \"Checklist of Military\n20\nand Non-Military Measures in the Berlin Crisis, \" it follows\n21\nthat items selected from this \"Checklist\" are also appropriate\n22\nfor implementation to deter the USSR from initiating a Berlin\n23\ncrisis.\n24\n6. Two items from the \"Checklist\" have been selected as\n25\npossible military actions which would satisfy the requirements\n26\nof the problem. While they should be considered as examples\n27\nonly, the cost and implications of other items from the\n28\n\"Checklist\" deemed appropriate for execution could be determined\n29\nreadily. It should also be emphasized that many items in the\n30\n\"Checklist\" are not military but could have a real deterring\n31\neffect on the Soviets in context with the Berlin problem.\n32\nTOP SECRET\nAppendix D\nJCSM-385-61\n10\nΓOP SECRET\nTWT\nTOP SECRET\n7. First Item - Section C, Item 12. Move the following\n1\nmilitary forces under cover of rotation, and/or scheduled\n2\nexercises.\n3\n\"e. Tactical fighter force of no more than 5 squadrons\n4\nto Europe.\"\n5\na, Costs. In addition to 5 squadrons of F-100 aircraft,\n6\ncommunications and electronic elements, and air base\n7\naugmentation units would be required in Europe. This\n8\nwould require the following airlift--32 C-130 and 50\n9\nMATS aircraft. The cost for this operation based on a\n10\ndeployment phase of 21 days is as follows:\n11\n(1) Per diem\n$ 253,000\n12\n(2) MATS airlift 1,825,000*\n13\n$2,078,000\n14\n(*Computed on basis of 100 percent dead-head of MATS aircraft.\n15\nIn the event MATS aircraft remain in the theater on a demurrage\n16\nbasis during the employment phase (21 days), total costs would\n17\nincrease to $2,216,000.)\n18\nb. Implications.\n19\n(1) Prior to execution of this movement there should\n20\nbe consultation with NAC and nation-to-nation agreements\n21\nto include overflight clearances in order that two of\n22\nthese squadrons could be based at Chambley, France,\n23\ntwo at Chaumont, France, and one at Incirlik, Turkey.\n24\n(2) This force, known as TACK HAMMER, has already\n25\nbeen carmarked for USCINCLUR in a Berlin crisis. A\n26\ntraining exercise for this force would be most beneficial. 27\n(3) A majority of MATS capability applied to this task 28\nwould have to be replaced by commercial augmentation.\n29\nAvailability and costs of commercial augmentation cannot\n30\nBe determined at this time; consequently, these additional 31\ncosts are not reflected above.\n32\n(4) Exercises scheduled by Tactical Air Command would\n33\nbe cancelled or rescheduled for June or July.\n34\nTOP SECRET\nAppendix D\nJCSM-385-61\n11\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n(5) With prior alert the first aircraft would arrive\n1\nat Chambley at H plus 17:19 hours and all four squadrons\n2\nwould be in France at H plus 27:32 hours. The squadron\n3\nfor Incirlik would completely arrive by H plus 43:24\n4\nhours. Without prior notice the first aircraft would\n5\nland at H plus 23:16 hours and four squadrons would be\n6\nin France by H plus 49:19 hours. The squadron for\n7\nIncirlik would be in place by H plus 66:34 hours.\n8\n8. Second Item - Section C, Item 12. Move the following\n9\nmilitary forces under cover of rotation and/or scheduled\n10\nexercise:\n11\n\"b. Elements of 2nd Fleet to war stations, exercising\n12\nfrom UK ports and in the Norwegian Sea.\"\n13\na. Costs. If this movement were carried out during\n14\nJune or July when 2nd Fleet ships are assembled off the\n15\nEast Coast, no significant additional costs are foreseen.\n16\nSimilarly, in August, if relieved units of the Sixth\n17\nFleet are routed to the East Coast by way of the UK and\n18\nNorwegian Sea, no significant additional costs are foreseen.\n19\nb. Implications.\n20\n(1) A movement of this magnitude should be presented\n21\nto the NAC prior to implementation.\n22\n(2) Crisis in the Caribbean may preclude the use of\n23\neither of the concepts stated above.\n24\n(3) Country consultations with the UK and other\n25\nnations would be required to effect visits by US ships\n26\nto foreign ports. If carrier based aircraft are to be\n27\nexercised, it may be necessary to obtain overflight\n28\nrights dependent on nature of exercise.\n29\nTOP SECRET\nJCSM-385-61\n12\nAppendix D\nTOP SECRET"
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