Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense - Subject: Temporary Reinforcement as a Berlin Deterrent (S)
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5. Cost for Sixty-Day Period. Overall cost would be
1
approximately $9,068,305. This includes $1,439,350.
2
for 15 days ANACDUTRA already budgeted but does not include
3
displacement cost for three reserve component divisions,
4
which would have to take ANACDUTRA elsewhere. Estimated
5
net additional cost, including displacement cost, is
6
$7,750,955.
7
IMPLICATIONS
6. With regard to the reserve components, the President
8
(or Congress) must declare an emergency within the meaning
9
of Section 673, Title 10, US Code, before he can order
10
reserve units on fillers for extended active duty, or new
11
authorizing legislation must be enacted.
12
7. The problems of disruption of civilian occupations for
13
a 30-60 day period to include loss of pay and removal from
14
local areas for both National Guard and USAR personnel
15
concerned should be considered.
16
8. In the selection of a particular division, the following
17
factors need to be considered--strength present training
18
status, equipment levels, training areas, equipment pool at
19
training site, morale, etc.
20
9. As a related matter, the improved readiness desired for
21
two reserve component divisions could be assisted through
22
action taken in calling reserve component divisions to duty.
23
Through the device of calling two divisions to duty, each for
24
30 days, providing necessary fillers from the USAR mobiliza-
25
tion reinforcement pool, and providing intensive training for
26
30 days, the combat readiness of these units would be greatly
27
improved. The costs, although not computed in detail, will
28
approximate twice the overall cost of calling one division
29
SECRET
Appendix C
JCSM-385-61
7
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"ocrText": "SECRET\n5. Cost for Sixty-Day Period. Overall cost would be\n1\napproximately $9,068,305. This includes $1,439,350.\n2\nfor 15 days ANACDUTRA already budgeted but does not include\n3\ndisplacement cost for three reserve component divisions,\n4\nwhich would have to take ANACDUTRA elsewhere. Estimated\n5\nnet additional cost, including displacement cost, is\n6\n$7,750,955.\n7\nIMPLICATIONS\n6. With regard to the reserve components, the President\n8\n(or Congress) must declare an emergency within the meaning\n9\nof Section 673, Title 10, US Code, before he can order\n10\nreserve units on fillers for extended active duty, or new\n11\nauthorizing legislation must be enacted.\n12\n7. The problems of disruption of civilian occupations for\n13\na 30-60 day period to include loss of pay and removal from\n14\nlocal areas for both National Guard and USAR personnel\n15\nconcerned should be considered.\n16\n8. In the selection of a particular division, the following\n17\nfactors need to be considered--strength present training\n18\nstatus, equipment levels, training areas, equipment pool at\n19\ntraining site, morale, etc.\n20\n9. As a related matter, the improved readiness desired for\n21\ntwo reserve component divisions could be assisted through\n22\naction taken in calling reserve component divisions to duty.\n23\nThrough the device of calling two divisions to duty, each for\n24\n30 days, providing necessary fillers from the USAR mobiliza-\n25\ntion reinforcement pool, and providing intensive training for\n26\n30 days, the combat readiness of these units would be greatly\n27\nimproved. The costs, although not computed in detail, will\n28\napproximate twice the overall cost of calling one division\n29\nSECRET\nAppendix C\nJCSM-385-61\n7"
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