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Secretary Kissinger's Trip to the Middle East [1 of 4]
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Secretary Kissinger's Trip to the Middle East [1 of 4]
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Henry A. Kissinger's (HAK) Office Files
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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
1
memcon
Hassan, HAK et al.
11/5/13
B
DECLASSIFIED perttr 6/18/2012
2
memcon
Hassan, HAK, et. al
11/6/73
B
SANITIZED
per Hr 6/18/2012
3.3(b)(1)
3
memo
Scowcroft to the President
11/9/73
B
DECLASSIFIED per Hr 6/18/2012
4
memcon
Faisal, HAK, et. al.
11/8/73
B
DECLASSIFIED per Hr. 6/18/2012
5
memcon
HAK, Saqqaf, et al.
11/8/73
B-
DECLASSIFIED per Hr 6/18/2012
6
memcon
Fahd, HAK, etal.
11/8/73
B
DECLASSIFIED per Hr. 6/18/2012
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
HAK
139
FOLDER TITLE
Ls
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
*U.S.GPO;1989-235-084/00024
NA 14021 (4-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
NUMBER
TYPE
I
memcon
Hassan, HAK, et. al.
11/5/73
B
2
memcon
Hassan, HAK, et. al.
11/6/73
B
3
memo
Scowcroft to the President
11/9/73
B
4
memcon
Faisal, HAK, et. al.
11/8/73
B
5
memcon
HAK, Saqqaf, et. al.
11/8/73
B
6
memcon
Fahd, HAK, et. al.
11/8/73
B
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
HAK
139
FOLDER TITLE
5
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
*U.S.GPO; 1989-235-084/00024
NA 14021 (4-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
A. TRIP REPORT
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
HAK TRIP TO MIDDLE EAST
NOVEMBER 5 - 10, 1973
A. TRIP REPORT
B. HAK MEMCONS (DAILY REPORTS TO THE PRESIDENT)
1. HAK/Hassan - Rabat
November 5 - 6
2. HAK/Bourguiba - Tunis
November 6
3. HAK/Sadat = Cairo
November 7
4. HAK/Hussein - Amman
November 8
5. HAK/Faisal, Fahd, Saqqaf -
Riyadh
November 8
6. HAK/Shah - Tehran
November 9
7. HAK/Bhutto - Rawalpindi
November 9
C. RELATED MEM CONS
1. Sisco/Saunders Briefings in Tel Aviv
November 8
2. Sisco Briefings - Mideast, Europe
November 10 - 16
3. Newsom - Addis Ababa
November 8
D. PRESS COVERAGE
1. HAK, McCloskey Briefings
2. FBIS - Arab Coverage
SECRET - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY. HENRY A. KISSINGER
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
1120
19NOV
7321862
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
From Henry A. Kissinger
Subject: Summary Report on Middle
East Trip
Supplementing my reports to you on individual stops
during the Middle East portion of my trip, I want to summarize
what I see as the principal accomplishments and what lies
ahead in our search for Middle East peace.
Ceasefire and POW Exchange
When I left Washington, the immediate need was to
stabilize the ceasefire on the Egyptian-Israeli front, a
problem which in turn had become linked to an Egyptian-
Israeli POW exchange. The groundwork had been laid in my
talks in Washington with Foreign Minister Fahmi and Prime
Minister Meir, but the positions of the two sides were still
far apart.
The initial breakthrough came in Cairo, with the announce-
ment of the resumption in principle of U.S. -Egyptian diplomatic
relations and President Sadat's agreement to a six-point
proposal that represented about ninety-five percent of what
Mrs. Meir had told me Israel wanted. Most importantly for
Israel, it finessed the issue of an Israeli return to the
military positions they occupied west of the Canal when the
October 22 ceasefire went into effect and before they
completed their encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army
and the town of Suez. The agreement simply provides that
this thorny question will be discussed between the two sides
in the context of discussions on the disengagement and
separation of forces, thus providing a means for subsuming
it in the broader issues at an early peace conference.
Israel also got agreement on a full Egyptian-Israeli POW
exchange.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
XGDS-1
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
The main benefit for Sadat was the establishment of
UN-supervised arrangements for the non-military resupply
of the Third Army and for meeting the essential civilian
supply needs of the Suez inhabitants. While Sadat was
unwilling to include specific reference to lifting the
undeclared Egyptian blockade of the southern entrance to
the Red Sea at Bab al-Mandab, he agreed that the blockade
would quietly be relaxed.
I sent Joe Sisco from Cairo to Israel the same day to
explain the proposal to Mrs. Meir and her colleagues,
including Sadat's assurance about relaxing the blockade,
and to obtain their approval. Both sides cooperated in
expediting Sisco's travel; the Egyptians gave him a special
plane to Cyprus, where the Israelis picked him up and flew
him to Tel Aviv. In Israel, Sisco concluded a confidential
Memorandum of Understanding with the Israelis, designed
primarily to meet their concern about participating in
the inspection of non-military cargos destined for the
Third Army once they had turned over their checkpost on
the Cairo-Suez road to the UN. Having after some difficulty
obtained Israeli agreement, Sisco made an unprecedented
direct flight from Israel to Saudi Arabia in one of our
MAC airlift planes and rejoined me in Riyadh.
Over the next three days, as I went from Saudi Arabia
to Tehran, Islamabad, and on to Peking, Israeli and Egyptian
military representatives met regularly in the presence of
the UN commander at Km. 101 on the Cairo-Suez road to work
out the detailed arrangements for supplying the Third Army
and Suez town and for beginning the POW exchange. I was
in frequent contact with both Foreign Minister Fahmi and
Prime Minister Meir as various difficulties came up but
held firmly to the position that these had to be ironed
out in the direct negotiations between their military
representatives in coordination with the UN commander.
The agreement was finally signed on November 11. There
followed more differences over its implementation between
Israel on the one hand and Egypt and the UN on the other,
related largely to Israel's desire to limit the UN presence
and to maintain a more visible control and use of the
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
3
segment of the Cairo-Suez road in the area they occupy
than was acceptable to Egypt. On November 14, however,
the Israeli position became markedly more flexible, and
on the 15th the turnover of Israeli checkposts to the UN
took place and the POW exchange began.
I find encouraging the progress made over the past
two weeks in stabilizing the Egyptian-Israeli ceasefire.
The fact that Egyptians and Israelis are talking directly
and pragmatically with each other at the military level is
a hopeful sign psychologically for the forthcoming political
negotiations. Furthermore, both sides clearly reflected a
willingness to reach accommodations on the ceasefire and
POW issues in order to move to the next stage of a peace
conference.
While negotiations related to the six-point ceasefire
agreement were a principal preoccupation and produced the
most concrete results during my Middle East trip, I also
concentrated on two other matters.
Arab Oil Pressures
On the question of Arab oil pressures, I made the point
in each Middle Eastern capital that the Arabs need our help
if they are to get a fair settlement, and that continuation
of such pressures will make effective help from us impossible.
As I reported to you earlier, King Hussein was in full agree-
ment and said he has been making the same point to other
Arab leaders. The key country in this regard is, of course,
Saudi Arabia. While Faisal made no commitment to relax the
oil restrictions, he clearly feels himself in an agonizing
dilemma. I gave him considerable food for thought, and I
have reason to believe I made some headway with his key
advisors and ministers. Much will depend on whether we
can keep up the momentum already established.
Peace Conference
With that in view, I also explored--particularly in
Cairo and Amman--the question of how to get a peace conference
launched. In Cairo, Foreign Minister Fahmi and I came to a
tentative understanding on the following largely procedural
points:
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
4
1. During the week of November 19, 1973, the United
States and the Soviet Union will inform the United Nations
Secretary General and others about the modalities of the
conference.
2. The United States and the Soviet Union will
arrange for a meeting of the Security Council, and the
United States will declare that according to its under-
standing Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Syria have agreed to
attend the first stage of negotiations dealing with
disengagement and other related matters for a peace
agreement.
3. Furthermore the parties agreed that this conference
will be convened under the auspices of the United Nations
with the participation of the Secretary General in the
opening phase of the negotiations.
4. They furthermore agreed that the conference will
be under the co-chairmanship of the United States and the
Soviet Union.
5. The conference will be convened on December 8 or
9, 1973 in Geneva. The opening session will be at the
Foreign Minister level.
6. The question of the participation of the Palestinians
and Lebanon will be discussed during the first stage of the
conference.
Assuming I receive Fahmi's confirmation, which I
requested from Tokyo, that the foregoing still represents
the way Egypt wants to proceed, I shall begin this next
week to seek the views of others concerned including the
Soviets. The objective is to get the parties engaged in
a negotiating process that will relieve pressures both for
a new recourse to the Security Council and for a resumption
of the fighting. Once a conference is underway, our aim
will be to get it to focus on the question of disengagement
of Egyptian and Israeli forces as a first step, and to avoid
seeking to come to grips at the outset with the fundamental
issues of territory and the Palestinians, which would lead
to an immediate deadlock.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
5
Realistically, there can be no progress in any peace
conference until after Israel's December 31 elections, but
the appearance of negotiations even without the substance
will be helpful on the Arab side. Once substantive negotia-
tions begin, moreover, we must expect a series of impasses
which will require us to work behind the scenes with Egypt
and Israel, and probably with Jordan and Israel as well,
to try to overcome them. As we get into the substantive
negotiating phase early next year, we can anticipate some
difficult times with the Israelis. For this, we will need
capital in the bank with them. The fact that we achieved
a ceasefire agreement for them with Egypt largely on Israeli
terms, that we earlier had achieved Soviet and Egyptian
agreement to negotiations which Israel has sought for twenty-
five years, and that we are continuing our military and
economic support will all help in this respect.
While my efforts to date have focussed largely on the
Egyptians, Jordanians, and Israelis, I am seeking to establish
an ongoing dialogue as well with the Syrians. They have come
a long way but still promise to be the most difficult factor
in any negotiation. And, unlike the Egyptian-Israeli front,
no agreement has been reached or is in prospect between
Syria and Israel to stabilize the ceasefire and exchange
POWs.
Finally, we have filled in the Europeans on the results
of my Middle East trip and in a general way on our thinking
about the future. I intend to keep them reasonably briefed
as we go along, in order to minimize to the extent possible
their inclination to take unhelpful initiatives which can
have a negative impact on our own efforts.
Future Prospects
In assessing future prospects we can, I think, be
cautiously optimistic about getting peace negotiations
started. Sadat has apparently decided to take a chance
on us and to be accommodating with respect to the ceasefire
agreement in order to enlist our help once negotiations are
underway. The Israelis are reasonably reassured of our basic
commitment to their security, but with a bit of underlying
nervousness that we may seek to press them to modify their
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library:
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
6
negotiating positions at the peace conference. The
Jordanians are ready for negotiations, although worried
that Egyptian and Palestinian interests may be accommodated
at their expense. The Palestinians, in fact, are in some
confusion, with sentiment growing for them to abandon
their opposition to dealing with Israel and join the
negotiations in order not to be left with nothing in the
end. The Lebanese also want in at an early date.
Finally, the Soviets are playing an ambivalent role.
On the one hand they want to work with us in arranging
joint U.S.-Soviet auspices, and we are being careful to
consult generally with them while pursuing our more
substantive efforts bilaterally with the parties. At
the same time, they have adopted a harder line than the
Egyptians on restoration of the October 22 ceasefire
positions and seem to be encouraging the Palestinians to
play a more active role, which could greatly complicate
the job of getting meaningful negotiations started.
As we move into the complex situation that lies ahead,
the next month or so promises to be one of the most important
periods in the search for peace in the Middle East since the
Six-Day War of 1967.
November 17, 1973
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Distribution approved
by LSE in S, 12/04/73
5
7322860
THE WHITE house
WASHINGTON
DC
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
November 9, 1973
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, President of Pakistan
Abdul Hafeez Parzada, Minister of Law
Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs and Defense
Agha Shahi, Foreign Secretary
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Sidney Sober, US Charge d'Affaires
Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State
Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff
OPIES TO:
DATE AND PLACE:
Friday, November 9 in the Conference Room
of Prime Minister Bhutto's Residence in
SC
Rawalpindi, Pakistan
EA
ODIS
Bhutto:
We are delighted to have you here. This is a most
Files
important visit, and we wish you every success--you
personally, your government and your people. We would
like to see the US play the primordial part in a settlement
in the Middle East.
Kissinger:
We are grateful to you for some of the exchanges we have
had during the war. Your links to your friends in the Arab
world are extremely helpful. Our strategy is very close to
what you put in your letter to the President.
Bhutto:
Would you like to tell us about your trip so far?
Kissinger:
We believe time is ripe for a major effort to achieve peace
in the Middle East. The way I have been putting it in my
talks in the Middle East is that, while the Soviets can supply
weapons, only the US can bring peace. The Soviets are not
in a strategic position to provide the outcome that the Arabs want.
XGDS - 1
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET/NODIS at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
- 2 -
Kissinger:
You, Mr. Prime Minister, are not unfamiliar with some
of the issues which this situation poses in the United States,
although there have been some interesting paradoxes in
positions that some of our Senators have taken. One
Senator, for instance, who had been extremely critical of
the secret bombing in Cambodia, suggested that we give
weapons to Israel secretly. Others who, in 1971, had
supported the principle that the US should back India because
it is the larger power in South Asia immediately during
the Middle East war cited the principle that Israel was vastly
outnumbered and therefore should be defended.
More seriously, you will recognize, Mr. Prime Minister,
that whatever the origins of the war, some of the principles
were not so dissimilar from those in South Asia in 1971.
Particularly, a victory for Soviet arms would have catas-
trophic consequences for world peace. This is one of the
principal reasons why, after a major Egyptian mistake in
not accepting our original proposal for a ceasefire, the US
had no choice but to maintain the military balance when the
Soviets began a massive airlift of equipment to Egypt and
Syria.
Now we are in the situation where President Sadat feels
that this war cannot end with just another armistice. We
will have inevitable differences with our friends in Israel
as we proceed. Let me tell you what it is we are trying
to do.
The first phase of our efforts has been to try to help
stabilize the ceasefire. We have now achieved agreement
between Egypt and Israel on some general principles for
establishing the ceasefire in a more stable way. Here is
the text of the six points which we worked out. [The Secretary
handed the Prime Minister a copy, and the Prime Minister
indicated that he had seen it. ]
The way we presented the issue was that all of us faced a
choice. Either we could spend two months arguing for the
October 22 lines and maybe get Israel to withdraw to them,
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
- 3 -
or we could take a more farsighted view and stabilize
the ceasefire now, meeting the necessary humanitarian
requirements for the Egyptian Third Army. If the latter
course were chosen, then most of our effort could be
concentrated on a broader program of disengagement.
I was quite well impressed with President Sadat. He
showed wisdom in accepting something that was less
than all of what he wanted--or even all of what he was
entitled to.
This agreement has been published today and in the next
day or two the two sides will begin negotiations to work
out the details of implementation. There will be diffi-
culties in this process. Assuming good will, however,
we hope it will be possible to proceed.
Once the ceasefire is stabilized, it will then be possible
to move on to the next phase--the peace talks. In the
first stage of those talks, we envision that the participants
would be Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Israel and that they
would discuss a broader program of disengagement of
forces. Later, the participation might be expanded to
include Lebanon and some Palestinian representatives.
Our hope is that the first phase of the talks could begin
in the first half of December, but no date has yet been set.
We all must recognize that there are a number of realities
in the situation which will have to be overcome. For one
thing, Israel has always moved forward, not back. Although
Israel probably has no need to stay on the West Bank of the
Canal, any withdrawal will be difficult. Moreover, the
balance between security and legitimacy will not easily be
established.
A second problem is Arab romanticism and impatience.
I have personally found it moving and worrying suddenly
to be a heroic figure in the Arab world. They assume that
my past successes will produce miraculous new successes
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
- 4 -
in the Middle East. But the problem is that the Arabs
look at the last week of other negotiations I have conducted
and they want to start with those results in the first week
of their negotiations. They forget that each past success
took months if not years to achieve.
In other negotiations that we have conducted, the US has
controlled some of the assets. That is not the case in
this negotiation.
Our Arab counterparts must learn some patience. They
must learn to think specifically about how we get from here
to there.
Finally, we must consider our domestic situation. It is
not possible to say, on the one hand, that the US supports
Israel for domestic reasons and then to say, on the other
hand, that if we just flicked a finger, Israel would obey.
The very factors which produce conditions which provide
our influence, also produce the conditions which make it
difficult for us to use that influence. The Arabs must give
us some time to organize domestic support. Already, the
press is accusing us of having somehow harmed Israel in
the agreement that was worked out this week. Yet, we have
not done anything yet. We must prevent the merging of the
complex of domestic issues that are called "Watergate" and
the pressures that can be mobilized on behalf of the Zionist
community.
One subsidiary problem we face is the Arab oil boycott.
This is not so much an economic issue for us. Originally,
there was some utility in the boycott because it underlined
the goals of the Arab world and the fundamentals of the
energy problem. Now, it has assumed negative dimensions.
It is not crippling. If it were, a great country like the US
could not accept it. But it is extremely annoying. And if it
continues, it will be used in our intense domestic debate
first by those who seek any weapon to use against the
President and then by those who are opposed to an Arab-
Israeli settlement and will claim the US should not submit
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
- 5 -
to Arab blackmail. The only way we can position our-
selves toward this problem is to say that an Arab-Israeli
settlement is in the national interest and in the interest
of world peace. We do not want repeated in the Middle
East what was done in the subcontinent. We do not want
the Soviets to increase their prominence in the Middle East.
We are prepared to make a move toward peace if the Arabs
can show patience and let events mature. But to do this,
we need their cooperation. We need to do what must be done
as an act of free will. Before we will yield to blackmail,
we will join with the Soviets and impose a settlement.
From my last few days in the Middle East, I am happy to
report that there is a great deal of good will. What I cannot
judge at this early time is the staying power or how the Arabs
will handle the pressures on them. Having spent two long
evening discussions with Prime Minister Meir, I assure
you there will be very tough going on that side. When
Mr. Sisco went to Israel the other day, all he did was to
take to the Israelis a proposal they wanted, and even that
was difficult. It is in Israel's interest to bring about a
situation where the Arabs are disillusioned with us, With
your knowledge of the US, perhaps you can give the Arabs
some insight.
Bhutto:
Thank you. Your confidence in making these remarks will
be respected.
First, I do not want to tell you what your own interests are.
I want you to know that, as Prime Minister of one of the
largest Muslim states, I have very good relations with the
Arabs, with Turkey, and with Iran. Pakistan is committed
to a policy of friendship with those countries--but above all
with the US.
In 1956, Pakistani public opinion became, as now, spon-
taneously worked up. In 1967, the same thing happened.
We tried, but it was impossible to keep feelings under control.
I came back from the US with every intention of consolidating
relations. Then the war broke out and there was great concern
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant. to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
- 6 -
for the Arab countries and for what the US was doing for
Israel. Our response was to give assurances that we were
being helpful. Several days after the war began, we were
being badgered with requests from Syria and Egypt for
support. We have pilots in Syria, Jordan, and the Persian
Gulf. They wanted to use our pilots but I refused initially.
Finally, I said that they could fly if they volunteered, but
privately I sent them instructions not to be in a hurry to
volunteer, so they gave excuses. Finally, they pressed for
arms and pilots, and we did send some pilots. I want to
tell you exactly what happened. I do not want to be in a
position of not telling you the truth.
Kissinger:
It will be a new day in diplomacy when everyone tells truth.
Bhutto:
The Egyptians and Syrians as well as the other Arab countries
deeply appreciate what we did.
The Tunku then came to us and proposed an Islamic settlement.
He showed me a call for a summit which stated as one objective
of the conference strong criticism of the US role. I want to
sponsor such a conference, but I told him that the objective
would have to be differently stated. So he had the letter
changed and on that basis, I agreed. He has talked to King
Faisal and to the Shah.
Kissinger:
The Shah, after our discussions, concluded that this might
not be the most opportune time for such a conference. The
reason is that the parties to the conference would just inflame
each other. We are in such a delicate phase trying to get
the peace conference started. We recognize that it will
probably deadlock and that it will have to go into secret
channels. This kind of Islamic conference may be better than
an Arab summit, but it would be better a couple of months
from now.
Bhutto:
This is not our initiative. We are not particularly enthusiastic
about it.
Kissinger:
The Shah favored an Islamic to an Arab summit.
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library:
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
- 7 -
Bhutto:
Well, we will not press this now. Going back to the
main point, we want a settlement, and we recognize there
will have to be give and take to achieve this. We are
happy to help promote what you are doing.
Kissinger:
The Arabs will not get all they want. We will take the
liberty to keep you informed.
Bhutto:
President Sadat and the Syrian President may visit here
soon. I am trying to help get them closer together.
Kissinger:
Tell the Syrian President for me that we are prepared to
talk at any level he wishes. We recognize that Syria is an
essential component of a peace settlement. I did not go to
Syria this time because the opportunity arose too late.
Bhutto:
I hope you will be the architect of this peace.
Kissinger:
I will make a strong personal effort. We will have to
appoint a negotiator to be at the peace conference full time,
but I will supervise it personally.
Bhutto:
You have overcome the problem of whether there should be
withdrawal first or negotiations first?
Kissinger:
It always pains Joe Sisco to hear me say this, because
he negotiated Resolution 242. But the essence of 242 is that
no one can understand what it means.
Bhutto:
Will Israel insist on a geographical concept of security?
There is no question that the war should have taught them
that this is not a workable concept.
Kissinger:
Their philosophy has been: Why should we pay? We won the
war. The US is not interested in having massive Soviet
intervention, and we stopped it. In one sense, Israel has
lost because a protracted war will wear Israel down even if
it wins every battle. Geographical security is not enough,
especially now that there are surface-to-surface missiles
in the area. Israel has to understand that frontiers alone
do not guarantee security. President Sadat has some ideas
on this score, which, while not entirely acceptable to Israel,
will provide something to work with.
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
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- 8 -
Bhutto:
He is a reasonable man. What about Jerusalem? I assume
you have heard a great deal about this from King Faisal.
Kissinger:
Faisal discussed his philosophy of history with me and the
common interests that exist between Zionism and Communism.
He also discussed the nature of the Jewish conspiracy in the
world. Finally, he described his concern for Jerusalem.
It seems to me that we have to tackle Jerusalem last.
Logically, a solution would be easy because there is no
real security threat to anyone from Jerusalem. It would
be possible to work out arrangements where the city could
be Arab and Jewish alike. Hussein is reasonable. All he
wants is a little stake in Jerusalem.
Hussein feels this will be very difficult. When he said all
he wanted was access to some of the holy places, Israel
would not hear of it. They have their religious parties to be
concerned about it. So the best approach seems to be to put
this issue at the end of the process.
Bhutto:
How does the detente with the USSR hold?
Kissinger:
To the Soviets, it is a tactical device. We need it for our
domestic situation and for peace in a nuclear age. We were
not astonished that the Soviets tried to gain some advantage.
We were surprised at the provocation that produced our alert.
They demanded that we join them in intervening to consolidate
the ceasefire and threatened to intervene alone if we refused.
It was a very strong letter and we had no choice. But for
our own reasons, we will go back to detente.
Bhutto:
We will welcome it if detente works. In September, I had a
emonition that the Soviets might try to get away with
something. One can make two points: One can argue that
detente made it easier to reach a settlement. One can also
argue that without detente there could have been a confrontation
like that over Cuba.
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
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In our own area, the Soviets are showing interest in
Afghan military matters. We have information that a
Soviet military team has been on the Afghan-Pakistani
border. On the other hand, the Soviets have told us that
they are urging restraint in Afghanistan.
Ahmed:
Yes, a team of Soviet military experts did inspect the
border area and observed a series of night exercises.
Kissinger:
We would certainly not look lightly on any outward push
from Afghanistan.
At this point the meeting broke and the Prime Minister and the Secretary
spent twenty minutes alone together before parting to attend Prime Minister
Bhutto's dinner for the Secretary at the Guest House next door to the
residence.
H.A.
Harold H. Saunders
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
INFORMATION
WASHINGTON
November 7, 1973
SECRET/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
B
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Sadat
We have just received a brief report from Secretary Kissinger upon
the conclusion of a three-hour session with President Sadat of Egypt.
Agreement has been reached on the following proposal, which will
be communicated to the Israelis.
1. Egypt and Israel agree to observe scrupulously the
ceasefire called for by the UN Security Council.
2. Both sides agree that discussions between them will
begin immediately to settle the question of the return to
the October 22 positions in the framework of agreement on
the disengagement and separation of forces.
3. The town of Suez will receive daily supplies of food,
water and medicine. All wounded civilians in the town of
Suez will be evacuated.
4. There shall be no impediment to the movement of
non-military supplies to the East Bank.
5. The Israeli check points on the Cairo-Suez road will
be replaced by UN check points. At the Suez end of the road,
an Israeli officer can participate with the UN to supervise
the non-military nature of the cargo.
6. As soon as the UN check points are established on
the Cairo-Suez road, there will be an exchange of all POWs,
including wounded.
SECRET/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
SECRET - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
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SECRET/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
2
There is also an oral understanding which states that Egypt undertakes
to ease the blockade at Bab El-Mandab. Assistant Secretary Sisco
is flying to Tel Aviv now to seek the concurrence of the Israeli
Government.
An oral message has also been transmitted from you to Prime Minister
Meir in advance of Assistant Secretary Sisco's arrival.
Secretary Kissinger has informed me of the agreement he
has worked out with President Sadat and which has been
sent to you for your consideration. In addition, there is
an oral understanding between the United States and Egypt
regarding the blockade at Bab El-Mandab which Assistant
Secretary Sisco will convey to you. Having read the
records of your conversation with Secretary Kissinger, it
is my firm conviction that the agreement reached will be
satisfactory to you.
Agreement has also been reached in principle on the resumption of
diplomatic relations between Egypt and the United States, and the
following announcement will be made by Ron Ziegler at noon today.
The Governments of the United States and of Egypt have
agreed in principle to resume diplomatic relations at an
early date. The two Governments have also agreed that
in the meantime the respective interests sections of the
two countries will be raised immediately to the Ambas-
sadorial level. The Government of Egypt has named
Ambassador Ashraf Ghorbal. The United States has
designated Ambassador Hermann Eilts. They will take
up their posts promptly.
SECRET/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been, determined to be declassified.
Nov. 7, 1973
Revised
1. Egypt and Israel agree to observe scrupulously the
ceasefire called for by the UN Security Council.
2. Both sides agree that discussions between them will
begin immediately to settle the question of the return to
the October 22 positions in the framework of agreement on
the disengagement and separation of forces under the
auspices of the United Nations.
3. The town of Suez will receive daily supplies of food,
water and medicine. All wounded civilians in the town
of Suez will be evacuated.
4. There shall be no impediment to the movement of non-
military supplies to the East Bank.
5. The Israeli checkpoints on the Cairo-Suez Road will
be replaced by UN checkpoints. At the Suez end of the
road, Israeli officers can participate with the UN to
supervise the non-military nature of the cargo at the
bank of the Canal.
6. As soon as the UN checkpoints are established on the
Cairo-Suez Road, there will be an exchange of all POWs,
including wounded.
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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
November 9, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
Secretary Kissinger has sent you the following report of his meeting
with King Faisal:
I met with King Faisal for three hours at the Royal Palace in Riyadh,
late Thursday evening November 8.
First I gave him word of the agreement we had worked out with the
Egyptians and Israelis to stabilize the ceasefire and ensure relief
supplies to the Egyptain Third Army. He was pleased at the news.
I then outlined again the strategy you intended to pursue in the coming
weeks: to prepare the ground carefully in order to move dècisively
in the near future. Faisal was encouraged by this and assured me
several times of his confidence in you and of his friendship for the
United States.
In this context I raised the matter of easing the oil boycott. An
energy crisis in America, I told him, would make your position very
difficult. It would only strengthen the hand of those forces in the U.S.
who were resisting a just settlement and who were seeking to under-
mine Presidential authority generally. I made the point subtelly that
we could handle an oil shortage economically but that its real signifi-
cance was political and psychological as I described.
King Faisal assured me that nothing would please him more than to
be able to maintain and even increase oil supplies to his American
friends. But he emphasized he was under pressure from the radicals.
He pointed out that all Arabs were united on the basic issues and he
hoped we would move as expeditiously as possible toward a settlement.
He did indicate that he would do his best to overcome his dilemma.
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SECRET - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
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Immediately after our meeting the King sent his two principal advisers
one after the other to encourage us in our present course. Prince
Fahd, his Second Deputy Prime Minister, came by for a half hour, and
Foreign Minister Saqqaf then met with me for an hour. Fahd said he
would do his best to get the oil flowing again. The Foreign Minister
said that Saudi Arabia was looking for an excuse to get out of its
uncomfortable position of confrontation with the United States.
Foreign Minister Saqqaf came by again this morning, November 9,
before my departure. He said Saudi Arabia needed some pretext to
change its position. He thought the announcement of the opening of
the peace negotiations (now planned for November 20) could be the
occasion for a formal communication by you to Faisal on the oil boycott.
He thought the result might well be favorable.
I invited King Faisal to Washington on your behalf. He said he could
not come until after some more progress had been made towards peace.
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B. HAK MEMCONS
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TRP SENSITIVE/MISC
S/S-7322239
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS: King Hassan
Secretary Kissinger
Alec Toumayan (Interpreter)
DATE AND TIME: Monday, November 5, 1973 11:00 p.m. to 12:15 a.m.
PLACE: Office of the King
The King's Private Residence
Rabat, Morocco
HIS MAJESTY: Morocco feels very deeply, and I feel it
particularly deeply myself, that your country and President
Nixon are showing a mark of consideration towards us in this
visit that you are now paying our country. Under the present
circumstances this is a gesture that is unforgettable. My
small country will do all it can do to facilitate the task of
the United States. Consider our support as granted to you.
DR. KISSINGER: I appreciate your courteous words very much.
You are aware of the great importance we attach to our rela-
tions to Morocco. I want to express in particular our deep
appreciation for your assistance in setting up the meeting which
General Walters just had and on which he has reported to me
fully.
HIS MAJESTY: We have a number of items on the agenda: our
bilateral relations; the Middle East; Africa and the Medi-
terranean. We can talk about them tonight and tomorrow. How
do you wish to proceed?
DR. KISSINGER: I think we should cover all of these and you
decide the order. Perhaps we could have a preliminary dis-
cussion on the Middle East tonight and go on tomorrow. I also
want to talk about our bilateral relations, and in particular
the plans for Your Majesty's visit to the United States in 1974.
HIS MAJESTY: We shall then talk about the Middle East first.
DR. KISSINGER: I should welcome Your Majesty's impressions.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
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HIS MAJESTY. I will be brief because by now the problems
have become clear. You will encounter three categories of
leaders: those who want peace who have the courage to say so;
those who want peace but will wait for others to speak first;
and those who do not want peace because peace is their domestic
enemy.
DR. KISSINGER: Who falls into each category?
HIS MAJESTY: Those who want peace are first Morocco. Then
Tunisia, Egypt, Syria.
DR. KISSINGER: I'm not going to Syria.
HIS MAJESTY: Also Jordan. In the second category are those
who want peace but will not say so.
DR. KISSINGER: Who, for example?
HIS MAJESTY: Saudia Arabia. But it will follow. Kuwait.
Algeria. But it will follow also. Then there are those
for whom peace will be a problem although they understand
that peace is needed: Iraq and Israel.
Let's take the last point first. In Morocco we are very
tolerant on religious matters. I was brought up that way
by my father, Mohamed V. We were not an independent
country and the Germans wanted us to treat the Jews in
Morocco as they were treated in France, but my father re-
fused. He said the Jews in Morocco were totally Moroccan
citizens. This is our tradition. We were nursed by Jewish
nurses. Some of our associates are Jews. I am very tolerant
myself.
But Israel's problem has become a distinct problem since the
emigration from Socialist countries has penetrated so deeply
into Israel. You see, when Abba Eban speaks in Arabic over
the radio, his Arabic is as good as mine. Moshe Dayan did
not lose an eye fighting the Arabs. He lost an eye in the
British Army. Tomorrow we can sit down together eating the
same food with our fingers, and there will be absolutely no
difference between us. We both respect Jerusalem. We respect
it because of its Mosques. They respect it because of Solomon's
temple. We both respect it because of the Holy Sepulchre of
Christ. But Socialist emigrants do not have this respect and
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understanding. Furthermore, they constitute a danger
to the United States if 30,000 of them come in to Israel,
10 of them will be eligible for a U.S. visa and will come
into your country as spies.
DR. KISSINGER: You feel they are all under Soviet discipline.
HIS cadres. MAJESTY: Yes, I do or, if not all of them, at least the
DR. KISSINGER: We asked ourselves why the Soviets allowed
the emigration to go on even during the war.
HIS MAJESTY: They are in conflict with the Palestinians on
this point. The Palestinians do not agree with them on allow-
ing this emigration. Israel has been at war since it has
existed. It is easy to govern a country at war. It is very
difficult to govern a country in peace time because of the
restriction in customs and attitudes. In war time you see a
Do Not Enter sign and you obey it strictly. In peace time you
look at it and disregard it.
DR. KISSINGER: We see it now in Israel after the cease fire.
Their domestic problems are coming to the fore.
HIS MAJESTY: In 1965 at the Arab leaders meeting in Casablanca,
I told my Arab colleagues, "You can choose between war now or
peace now. If you choose peace, then you must take Israel in
million. This created a scandal.
the Arab " league. They will be four million. You will be eighty
DR. KISSINGER: But you were right.
HIS MAJESTY: I was right and I'm still right today.
DR. KISSINGER: I told Abba Eban that I thought Israel would
join the United Arab Republic. It has a calling as a Middle
East nation, not as an appendage of the United States.
HIS MAJESTY: This is a natural destiny for Israel. But today
Israel is more of a U. S. problem than an Arab problem. Why
do I say that? The Arabs have just had a test against Israel;
the United States will now have a test with Israel.
DR. KISSINGER: I agree with everything you have said SO far.
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HIS MAJESTY: We, as a friend of the United States, want
to help you win that test.
DR. KISSINGER: At this point we need the support of the
Arab leaders who are moderate and who understand the West.
HIS MAJESTY. One must not confess to be moderate rather
than to be wise. I consider myself wise but not moderate.
When you play cards, there is one card called the Joker and
if you have it, you can win the game. I think we have this
card in those who met with General Walters. The Palestinian
issue has always been an aphrodisiac for the Arabs, for Nasser,
for the Syrians, the Iraqis and the Algerians. We have
helped the Palestinians as far back as 1965, but no one has
known of it. We don't need to have it spread about.
DR. KISSINGER: What is your assessment of General Walters'
opening demarche?
HIS MAJESTY: Excellent! He is honest, straightforward, open.
Half an hour after their conversation began, and I had left the
house, one of my officers, Dlimi, (Col. Dlimi, Intelligence
Chief) heard a lot of commotion in the room. He ran back think-
ing they were fighting, but they were clapping one another on
the back and laughing. They acknowledged to me that if they
had listened to me in 1969, they would not have wasted a lot of
time. Then I met with Nahum Goldmann at length; Goldmann asked
me to arrange a face to face meeting with the Palestinians.
They let that opportunity slip and lost much time. At this
meeting General Walters made them happy. In two hours he
created, they told me, a human contact that they had not
attained with Le Duc Tho in a year and a half. I told them
that that was because Le Duc Tho was yellow and Abraham had
created the Arabs, the Christians and the Jews, but not the
yellow race.
General Walters will tell you that the Palestinians want more
contacts after you come back from Peking.
DR. KISSINGER: We will continue to use General Walters for
a while. We have to, so that if it becomes known, we can
say that it is an intelligence mission, not a diplomatic
mission, and we can say we are using him for information, not
for negotiations.
HIS MAJESTY: I repeat that the Palestinian is the Joker in
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the deck of cards. No one will dare do anything against
them. General Walters told them the Russians can give you
weapons but only the United States can give you land.
DR. KISSINGER: I told him to say that to them.
HIS MAJESTY: They understood that very well. General
Walters said there were three conditions. They can have
no dreams such as pushing Israel into the sea. They must
work things out with King Hussein, and they cannot ask the
U.S. to do anything against Hussein. And if there are any
acts of violence, the contacts will be broken. They agreed.
I talked to the Palestinians again and they are greatly
worried that Iraq and Lebanon will now stage actual violence
against the Palestinian leaders to further divide the front
for the benefit of Habash. Iraq is spending some six million
dollars in Beirut. General Walters confirmed that the Russians
are spreading news in Lebanon that the U.S. is about to attempt
something against the Palestinians. The Palestinians said,
in Beirut?" and General Walters said he was giving them his
"Is the United States involved in these goings on against you
he knows you cannot shoot down ideas with bullets.
word as a soldier that the U.S. was not involved. He said that
DR. KISSINGER: We have absolutely nothing to do with this.
HIS MAJESTY: Yesterday I had again information from the two
Palestinians that they feared for their safety in Lebanon. In
Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon the leftists are spend-
ing some six million dollars to wipe them out. If the U.S. can
convince Israel that in law as well as in politics a
arrangement is better than a good trial and a poor peace poor is
better than a good war if the U.S. can demonstrate to the
Palestinians that they can trust the U.S., then no Arab nation
will fail to follow. They all speak of Resolution 242 and of
the Palestinian rights and there is no third condition
Resolution 242 is well known. The Palestinian rights were anymore. not
and known, and if you take that issue out, peace will then slowly
arduously return to the Middle East. It will be a long
process and you and President Nixon will have to be very patient.
For DR. KISSINGER: I fully agree with your analysis, Your Majesty.
that thirty years Israel asked for direct negotiations, and
ested. we are offering them, they do not appear to be inter- now
is Israel faces quite a domestic problem from peace, very and it
difficult for Israel to understand that the U.S. wants to
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make peace. Israel is so used to the U.S. being its un-
conditional ally that the fact that now we want to make
peace comes as a psychological shock for them, and this
is a most important point.
HIS MAJESTY: Let us not be hard; in their place I would
react in exactly the same manner.
DR. KISSINGER: Even if they believe the insanity of an
Arab government, they can see the prospect of Habash ruling
in ten or fifteen years. They always look at the worst pos-
sible consequence. We cannot leave things to go on as they
have been up to 1973. We have need now of some time and con-
fidence on the part of the Arab nations, because if the Arab
nations demand too much too soon, they will get nothing. We
must have time to organize ourselves and take care of our
domestic situation, and I do not mean Watergate. We cannot
tackle the Israeli problem without firming up our domestic
situation. Right now I have no plan. We need a direction in
which to go and a strategy to apply, and then we can set up a
plan. We cannot begin by having a plan.
HIS MAJESTY: You want to be a pragmatist?
DR. KISSINGER: I could go to Cairo with a plan, as Secretary
Rogers did in 1971, and then the plan would be published and
after three months there would be nothing. My tactic is not
to lay down a plan but to organize all the points and then
after that to move very quickly. I could talk about Resolution
242 or 338-these are all generalities. We can resolve the
problem with the cooperation of the Arab countries.
HIS MAJESTY: You can count on two countries, Egypt and Syria.
Sadat has proved himself ready to abandon the Russians. I
have known him for a long time and I know him well. He is a
very serious man and a Moslem. Nasser was an atheist; Sadat
is a Moslem. He will do all he can to help you.
Syria has given even more evidence than Egypt because for two
years it has withstood pressures from the Soviets to sign a
treaty of peace and friendship. My troops and my officers
who have been there have seen those pressures to get Syria to
sign the same kind of treaty as Iraq and Egypt had signed. But
you see Egypt and Syria are capitalist countries, and the in-
telligentsia is capitalist and cannot be leftist. Your problem
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is not that of Dr. Kissinger versus Sadat, or Dr. Kissinger
versus President Assad. Your problem is to make up for lost
time, time that the U.S. has lost. They will believe you,
and they will ask you for the beginning of some evidence from
the U.S. with which they can carry their people.
Egypt has a Communist party, and it has some Maoists. Syria
has the extremist Baathists which want to merge with Iraq.
They need help. If I were the United States I would try to give
them evidence of my good will. I admit that the gap is very
wide--it is not an ideological gap; it is a sentimental gap. It
is therefore both deep and easy to bridge, just as milk boils quickly
and overflows but subsides just as quickly. You have a very small
core to the problem.
DR. KISSINGER: We need about one month to organize ourselves in
the United States. For instance, everyone knows that a convoy is
on its way to the Third Army and that I personally insisted upon
this to Israel. All understand that I talked to Israel about the
principle of October 22. The morning before I left I received
fifteen calls from Congressmen criticizing me.
Your Majesty, we have to choose the battle we want to fight and
when we want to fight it. We cannot expend all our armament.
The strategy of the Egyptians is to pick a small point and wage
an epic struggle, and after three weeks everyone has lost sight
of the issue. We cannot have our energies absorbed in trivia.
Because while the Arabs are thus in a state of confrontation with
us, Israel then makes no concessions at all. We are determined
We not to permit world policies to be shaped by three million people.
want the security of Israel to be insured. We will
Israel to make major concessions and not stay where they press are. I
agree with your assessment that the Palestinian is the Joker in
the deck and that we must carry on that approach very secretly.
Ministers and meeting so I could tell them, "Let us fight Israel
HIS MAJESTY: This was my reason for asking for the Foreign
let us not fight the United States. Israel begins
against the United States.
and if the Arabs do not watch out, Israel will pit the Arabs
flict and then leaves the Arabs in confrontation with the a U.S., con-
DR. in KISSINGER: That is why I say that an oil embargo is
the interests of the Arab countries. I believe we must not
see this tapering off. If houses are cold in the States this now
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winter and people are short of fuel, this will arouse public
opinion against the Arabs.
HIS MAJESTY: If there is no fuel in Europe and the Europeans
do not have their cars to drive, this will certainly provoke
them against the Arabs.
I wish to turn to what I see as a serious domestic problem in
the United States. Since 1942 the United States has not de-
mobilized. You went to war in Europe, then in Korea, then in
Viet-Nam and you have armed the Middle East. For thirty years
the arms industry of the United States has operated at 100 per-
cent of its capacity.
DR. KISSINGER: Let us say about 50 percent.
HIS MAJESTY: Well, 50 to 75 percent. It should be part of your
policy, and President Nixon should say this, that you would tell
your people, "For thirty years we have armed the world; let us
stop being the gendarme wherever a conflict arises. " Perhaps
I am a poet. I recently reread the history of the United States.
It is not your calling to be the world's gendarme. It is your
calling as a nation to welcome men of good will and intelligence
and honesty, and it would certainly help your way of life.
DR. KISSINGER: This is indeed our historical calling, but we
were trapped by the enfeeblement of Europe where in a few years
we had to take the place of the UK and France and Germany and
later of Japan. The rapid transition from isolation to the
first power in the world brought a trauma. I don't think we
can ever go back to the innocence that preceded the two world
wars. But we can indeed reduce our involvement and be
selective in the areas where we want to become involved. If
we look at it now, there is no law of nature that says that the
political future of South Viet-Nam matters to the United States.
But once an American administration had become involved, to
lose was different from never having entered. President Nixon
is attempting to reduce our involvement and will continue to do
Soviet penetration.
so, but we must withdraw very carefully so as not to permit
HIS MAJESTY: The Soviets are attempting right now to gain the
good will of the Palestinians. Yasir Arafat did not come to
the meeting with General Walters because they had just received
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a document from the Soviet Union which tells them that the
Soviet Union will impose their presence and be in effect
their sponsor at the Peace Conference. The Palestinians told
me and General Walters that they can never become a Communist
state. Historically the Palestinian people are the keepers of
the holy places of Jerusalem. It is inconceivable that they
would set up a lay state. They can only set up a Moslem nation,
and they will never go over to the Russians. On Jerusalem, they
told me this morning that at the very least, they would want to
retain the former Arab Jerusalem and would let the Israelis
keep the Jewish Jerusalem. This means that the Mosque of el-
Aqsa, the Holy Sepulchre, would be under the Palestinians, and
the Israelis would have Jewish Jerusalem.
DR. KISSINGER: Jerusalem is the most difficult issue of all. I
used to think it would be easy to give up a Mosque, but it is
almost impossible for the Israelis to give it up.
HIS MAJESTY: This will create a very serious problem. A number
of African countries have already broken with Israel because
of Egypt, which is an African nation. If Israel maintains itself
in Jerusalem, the entire Moslem world will focus on this and will
develop a fixation. The Shah of Iran will say, "I don't know
the Arabs and I don't know the Palestinians, but I do know
Jerusalem," and this will spread all the way to Nigeria.
This will become a much more serious problem because it is a
religious problem, not a political problem. In the Twentieth
Century it is a shame to continue to have wars of religion.
The Israelis will find this is more serious than fighting inch
by inch for a border and they will lose a great deal of support-
not only the Shah of Iran who claims to be a descendant of
Darius and therefore an Aryan, but they will also lose the
Moslem populations of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia, of
India, Pakistan and Indonesia, and the so-called Moslems of the
Philippines; add the Black Muslims to this, perhaps, and you
have total turmoil.
Israel says that it wants secure borders, but does half of
Jerusalem constitute a secure border?
DR. KISSINGER: The point is that the religious orthodox
Jewish party has the balance in their congress and has an
obsession on this point. I used to think the Jerusalem
problem was easy; now I'm convinced that Jerusalem is the
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most difficult problem and should not be taken up first.
HIS MAJESTY: Let us look at it from another angle. We will
settle the problem with Israel when it has leaders who belong
to our generation.
DR. KISSINGER: I fully agree with you.
HIS MAJESTY: I can talk to an Israeli of my age and we under-
stand each other. So the problem is inside Israel. Golda
Meir, Moshe Dayan--their generation is the obstacle.
DR. KISSINGER: Once the peace process is in motion I feel that
Golda Meir will leave.
HIS MAJESTY: I emphasize the Jerusalem problem because you
are going to encounter it everywhere and in particular will
you encounter it with great rigidity from King Faisal and sub-
sequently from the Palestinians themselves.
DR. KISSINGER: We have to begin with one big step. The Israelis
cannot give up one inch. We have to get a big step to begin.
HIS MAJESTY: We need enough oxygen to sustain us throughout
that period and have a period of calm.
DR. KISSINGER: I advocate starting up the negotiation process
in December and having the negotiations begin in January.
HIS MAJESTY: The important thing is to put your foot in the
stirrup and be up in the saddle. Once you saddle up, your on
your way. For years I have had the experience of negotiating
with the French and the Spanish, and it was not easy.
DR. KISSINGER: Your country is the first Arab country that I
visit. Will Sadat understand the strict need for secrecy and
confidence?
HIS MAJESTY. With your pledge to him, he will.
DR. KISSINGER: But can he keep quiet? Because my guarantee
1S useless if he repeats it. I have consistently said I will
not promise what I cannot do. I will therefore promise less
than the Russians promise, but we will deliver on what we promise,
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and I have never broken my word.
But my promises cannot
be broadcast over Cairo Radio.
HIS MAJESTY: I was surprised to see that in his press con-
ference Sadat broke the news about your coming two days in
advance of the date, the Thursday, on which it had been agreed
to announce your coming. Of course, Sadat is carrying a
heavy legacy, Nasser's legacy. But I respect Sadat, and I
did not respect Nasser. With King Faisal I don't know how
things will go for you. He has changed much in the last two
years.
DR. KISSINGER: King Faisal has it in his power to destroy
everything, because if he persists in his attitude, we will
withdraw our diplomacy. We cannot expose ourselves to black-
mail.
HIS MAJESTY: He does not govern alone. He has princes and
advisers; there is a Syrian adviser, Dr. Rashin Pharaon, Prince
Sultan and Prince Fahd. Perhaps you could have them contacted
or reached.
I want to congratulate you on your brilliant strategy in
inviting the Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister to Washington.
For six months, as you know, we have had Moroccan troops in
Syria and our influence has been such that Syria is less
radical now. We had no diplomatic relations before, It is
a difficult, uphill fight for President Assad all the way.
I know that you have studied the Arab world, but you have to
live in it to understand that it is even worse than the tropical
forest in which you hack a path today and it is covered over the
next day so you have to keep it open every day. It is full of
contradictions, where you see a capitalist country going Commu-
nist and a free country following a path of single party and
single trade union regime. All the countries have lied to
their people for fifteen years. They said they would throw
Israel into the sea, and it is hard for them to say now that
they were in error. This can go on for four or five years but
not indefinitely. As Lincoln said about fooling all of the
people all of the time. So we live in a very special world-
I am an Arab myself, I am of this world, and it is very much
like a pilot coming in for a landing and having to execute a
totally different approach to the runway. The approach is
different as you reach Tunisia. It begins to change.
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DR. KISSINGER: Will you be contacting some of the leaders
that I shall meet after I leave you?
HIS MAJESTY: I will do so if you wish.
DR. KISSINGER: If you would, it would be extremely valuable
to impress upon them the necessity not to act out of any
romanticism but to act in a cool, calm, calculated manner.
The Arab leaders believe I can do something. Strangely
enough, they believe that because I am a Jew I cannot be
accused of anti-Semitism and can settle things where others
have not. Perhaps this is true. But they look only at the
last week of negotiations and not at the many months that
preceded the last week of negotiations. You referred to your
own experience of negotiations, Your Majesty, and you know
that it is a very difficult, complicated process.
HIS MAJESTY: I cannot reach Sadat over the telephone because
the lines are tapped. When will you see him?
DR. KISSINGER: Tomorrow night.
HIS MAJESTY: I can cable my ambassador to Cairo, ask him to
seek a meeting with Sadat, and my ambassador will convey the
following message to Sadat: "I have met with Dr. Kissinger.
It is my impression that he is a charming person but on matters
of issue he is very exact and precise; he is not inclined to be
a romanticist or a poet. He wants to look at an issue from the
angle of success, not failure." I will further say that my
impression is that Dr. Kissinger is an honorable man and can be
trusted. I believe this, and I will tell Sadat SO,
DR. KISSINGER: It is essential at this point to build con-
fidence.
HIS MAJESTY: I will emphasize to Sadat that you have told me of
the importance of preserving confidence, and I will tell him
that those are the impressions I have formed after meeting you.
DR. KISSINGER: This would help tremendously.
HIS MAJESTY: This message will go out right away and will get
to Cairo before you arrive.
You must understand that our people are very sensitive to the
lyrical quality of Arab speech. The Germans respond to music,
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the French to perfume and cuisine, the Arabs respond to
lyricism. That is why it is said that nothing can excel
the Koran, because that is the highest point reached by
the language. You can sweep a crowd with a speech. You
can sweep it into the Suez Canal, where they will all sink.
A great deal of will power is needed to restrain oneself from
making speeches. But I know that the hour is late and the
jet lag makes itself felt after a long trip. Tomorrow, as
I have indicated, we shall meet with some of your associates
and some of mine for about fifteen minutes and then we will
resume our tete-a-tete.
DR. KISSINGER: Tomorrow we can talk some more about this
point and then about our bilateral relations and about
Africa.
HIS MAJESTY: I will now walk you back to the villa. It
will give me a little exercise.
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MEMORANDUM
TRP SENSITIVE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
7327134
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS
King Hassan, II
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Alec Toumayan, Interpreter
TIME AND DATE
10 50 a. m. to Noon
Tuesday, November 6, 1973
PLACE
The Royal Palace
Rabat, Morocco
SUBJECT
Second Tete -a Tete Meeting
King Hassan I would like to read to you the text of a message I
will send to President Sadat if you concur
"Following my meeting with Secretary Kissinger, we are
happy to give Your Excellency our first impressions, our first
personal impressions of the man himself. In light of the importance
Secretary Kissinger attaches to our problem, it is my feeling that
he is equipped with considerable goodwill and good intentions. We
are convinced, Your Excellency, that if he reaches the stage of
making a commitment, that he will do all in his power to honor his
commitment. It further appears to us that he does not follow classic
diplomatic intentions and he prefers to remain far from emotions
and imagination, preferring to tackle problems and realities in a
cool, calm and objective fashion. We insist upon our chief impression
that if he gets into a commitment, he will honor it 11
Secretary Kissinger Thank you, Your Majesty, this is extremely
useful.
King Hassan This will go out in three or four hours to my Ambassador
in Cairo with instructions to deliver immediately to President Sadat.
Shall we now talk about the United States and Africa.
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2
Secretary Kissinger The area I know least is Africa. We have not
pursued a very active policy there. It would be helpful if Your Majesty
gave me his thoughts. The African States are like no others. Their
political structure is less clearly defined. Their foreign policy listens
more to emotions. In that part of the world there are more countries
whose origin is accidental than anywhere in the world and I am uneasy
about the emergence of very small states. You have that kind of problem
in your own area with the Spanish Sahara. We have no global policy
towards Africa.
King Hassan. I will be brief. When Africa was becoming independent,
the U.S. suffered 10 or 12 years ago from the acts of its NATO allies
in that U.S. arms were used against liberation movements. The U.S.
lodged protests on this with its own allies also. In those days Nassar
was very active and the Russians used him to penetrate into Africa
and so in 1958-59-60 we faced an Africa in turmoil and an Africa that
was calm. The former were more active than the latter more calm
African countries. Fortunately, we witnessed a few unfortunate
experiments such as Guinea; Algeria, which in four or five years will
face a very difficult economic situation. Tanzania; Mali: and
Congo
Brazzaville becoming Socialists. You must first be rich and then you
become poor again.
Secretary Kissinger: When you visit a Socialist country, you find it
difficult to understand how anyone could become Socialist. They are
dull, boring and poor.
King Hassan But they become cheerful when they leave their countries.
At the UN and at the OAU these countries became very militant but now
there is a reversal in the trend with Africa becoming more aware of the
problems.
In addition, the Chinese play a quiet but powerful role. They are deeply
entrenched in Tanzania, Madagascar and also in Mauritania, where they
occupy a large number of medical positions and, as you know, since we
do not have the confession in our religion, the family doctor becomes the
confessor to whom you tell everything
The Russians are trying, through a system of very flexible loans, but we
are a mature country with thirteen centuries of independence and not
easily deceived by the Russians.
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The U.S has no global policy in Africa. You have traditional relations
with Morocco, Liberia, the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, to a lesser degree
with the Sudan and with Tunisia. But no general context. Once the
Middle East problem is settled, Africa may, because of its geographical
location deserve a more global policy on the part of the United States.
Africa could receive another 200-300 million people.
Secretary Kissinger. How does one conceive a global policy for Africa ?
King Hassan: The U.S. could choose five or six countries in Africa
which are known for their seriousness and their influence and help those
countries which in turn will help the others. The U.S. will not then
appear directly involved. Surely it is not in the interest of the United
States to have Algeria penetrate into Chad, Niger, etc. It is more
traditional for Morocco to do it because if we open a school in Dakar or
in Chad, we are not bringing Communism whereas Algeria exports its
ideas and Algeria has an underdeveloped form of Communism The U S.
can pick four or five countries and cover all Africa from there. The
Russians have also wanted to have a port on the Atlantic and they hope
to do it now with the Algerians.
Secretary Kissinger Besides Morocco, which countries would you advise
us to choose ?
King Hassan: Sudan, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Kenya, which
is a very serious country. It is like having a number of strategic bases.
Secretary Kissinger
What about Zaire?
King Hassan Yes, Zaire is a very important country. Mobutu is a very
good man though very blunt.
Secretary Kissinger Yes, in his case appearances are not misleading.
King Hassan I worry more over Africa because I see both the
Mediterranean and the Atlantic aspects. The future of Europe is not in
Europe, it is in Africa. I am afraid that the Europeans have a nostalgia
for their former colonies, and how will they come back into Africa?
They will come back via Morocco, Algeria,and Tunisia.
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Secretary Kissinger. The Europeans are never farsighted. They
are always very nearsighted. They see only immediate objectives.
They have consistently behaved like scavengers picking up bits falling
from our table.
King Hassan The Europeans are already well-introduced into Africa
because Africa has a shortage of trained personnel and in many independent
African countries English and French cadres remain very active.
When the Europeans asked us to come into the conference on the
Mediterranean, at first I refused. If all the African countries told the
United States and the Soviet Union to get out of the Mediterranean, how
could we enforce our requests? To speak very frankly, it is not in the
interest of Morocco to see the Mediterranean become a bathtub. When
Madison Square Garden is full, it matters a great deal who stands
at the turnstile. When it is empty, it doesn't matter at all. Tunisia
and Algeria went to Helsinki for the Mcditerranean neutralization talks
but the United States and the Soviet Union turned them down. We have
talked to Spain about this, and they agree with us.
Secretary Kissinger: How are your relations with Spain?
King Hassan Very difficult, because it is a very emotional, lover
relationship. The Spaniard is very succes d'estime and has enormous
pride. They have created a fantastic problem about the Sahara. They
must understand that it is an error to create an artificial state.
Secretary Kissinger: I fully agree.
King Hassan I have offered a convention to them on a 50-50 basis for
all the resources. I have even offered to give them two bases for 20-25
years so they can protect the Canaries. I have said, let us have a referendum
and be done with it. The Sahara will revert to Morocco, We will share
the resources on a 50-50 basis and you will have the bases.B ut Spain
refused.
Secretary Kissinger Why?
King Hassan. Because the Spanish Government is a government of very
old men very much set in their ways. Both General Franco and Admiral
Carrero Blanco began their military careers in Spanish Sahara.
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Secretary Kissinger
Why then make it independent and have it
come under the domination of Algeria?
King Hassan It is a psychological problem. Spain after Franco will
never be the same. I tell the Spaniards if they give independence to
Spanish Sahara, there are 30 thousand inhabitants, all
Nomads,
who roam about wherever they find a grass to graze. I can not have
an artificial state like that in my backyard. And I reacted as you did
when the Soviets put missiles in Cuba. This is my Cuba. Have you
met the new Spanish Foreign Minister?
Secretary Kissinger
Only once.
King Hassan: Lopez Bravo was a much better man.
Secretary Kissinger: Does Your Majesty know that Jobert admires you
greatly?
King Hassan: We became good friends. He was born in Meknes and
lived here almost 40 years. He is a very straight man.
Secretary Kissinger: He can not do everything he would like to do. He
does not have my flexibility. I like Jobert very much. There are so
few foreign ministers who are really intelligent.
King Hassan Jobert has always spoken very highly of you. I will tell
him that your feelings toward him are the same.
I understand very well that the first priority for the United States is
to settle the Middle East.
Secretary Kissinger We must settle it but not under Russian pressure.
If there is Russian pressure, we will switch back to Israel because we
must demonstrate that the Soviet Union can not settle the problem. There
is no pressure from the Soviet Union now. For a week we tried not to
do anything. If the Soviet Union had stayed out, we would have stayed
out. When the Soviet Union began sending arms, then it was no longer
an Arab versus Israel conflict. It became a matter of survival of the
reasonable Arab countries.
King Hassan: We could not have survived.
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Secretary Kissinger: Our airlift to Israel was just as much in the
interest of the moderate Arab countries.
King Hassan: Yes, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, trans-Jordania, Morocco,
Tunisia all would be pushed out.
Secretary Kissinger: It is also in the interest of President Sadat,
because he does not want to become like the President of Czechoslovakia.
King Hassan When Sadat asked for the departure of the Russians, his
timing was very poor. Tell him that you regret that he timed it so poorly.
Secretary Kissinger: Can I speak to Sadat frankly or will he repeat
everything to the Soviets?
King Hassan: When Secretary Rogers met with Nassar and then with
Sadat, the fact that Nassar's offices were stuffed with microphones
was discovered by the United States agents sent in advance by Secretary
Rogers. Nassar himself did not know it,and he dismissed his Chief
of Intelligence. You will have to talk to Sadat in a garden or have a
electronic sweep of the premises carried out.
Secretary Kissinger Will he repeat everything to the Soviets ?
King Hassan: Not if you ask him not to. I can call my Ambassador and
ask him to talk to Sadat before you arrive and stress the importance
you attach to confidentiality and the danger of leaks. I can not guarantee
that secrecy will be maintained. You can talk to Sadat because he wants
to give leadership to the Arab world and he can do it only with peace.
Secretary Kissinger I was impressed with his courage, It took courage
to start the war ,and he did not lose sight of the political realities. He
did not try to make the U.S. the villain. Nassar played the Israeli
strategy in making the U.S. into an enemy of the Arabs.
King Hassan The Palestinians have put a problem to me. President
Sadat has been extremely correct with them. If the contact is to remain
secret, they will not talk. But if Sadat has to learn of it, they want to
tell him themselves.
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Secretary Kissinger What is your opinion? As for myself, I will
not tell Sadat.
King Hassan Then we say nothing. The Palestinians are not in a
hurry anyway but it is in the U. S interest to make it known that they
do not ignore the Palestinians (but not to say how or where because
you will encounter demagoguery in the Middle East about the Palestinians
and it is best to clear up that burden).
Secretary Kissinger: King Hussein is our friend. We do not want to
give the impression that we discard him. Politics is hard, but loyalty
is very important.
King Hassan: But the three points that General Walters made to the
Palestinians are
(1) Israel remains Israel.
(2) Nothing must be done against King Hussein.
(3) There must be no acts of violence.
The United States has been loyal towards King Hussein, and he can be
reassured.
Secretary Kissinger That is true. I will talk to King Hussein in very
general terms day after tomorrow and I will communicate with Your
Majesty again. You and I can communicate directly through General
Walters thus insuring total secrecy of communication.
King Hassan: You could tell Hussein that you guarantee his country,
but that it is necessary to have contacts with the Palestinians. I
could send a message to him. It would not be good to have that message
come to him from King Faisal because they are not on good terms, but
with me he is very much at ease. He is my cousin. He knows that I
am fond of him. There is full confidence between us.
Secretary Kissinger I will contact you in two weeks and I will tell you
whether it is desirable to tell Sadat. My instinct is that it is.
King Hassan If you tell Hussein about the contacts, then after that
you must tell Sadat.
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Secretary Kissinger
I will not tell Hussein on this trip.
SANITIZED
King Hassan: So we have a total blackout on that.
3.3(b)(1)
Secretary Kissinger: I will say that we have been approached and I will
ask for his opinion and nothing more. The Palestinians approached us
in Beirut but we ignored it.
Then they called
again to ask if there would be a reply.
King Hassan When was that?
Secretary Kissinger: The first message came on October 10, the second
on the 21st. Each time it came at the same time as the message sent
through you. We preferred to deal with someone we know and trust.
King Hassan. The Palestinian organization is divided into many factions.
Secretary Kissinger. Yes ,but we have confidence in you and in your
contacts and if later on you should form any impressions or arrive at any
conclusions, we would be grateful if you would share them with us.
King Hassan: The Israelis approached us but we told them that it was
too risky and that the timing was wrong. Once the talks began, we said
they could contact us then. Their Rome office contacted us.
Secretary Kissinger What do you think of the contact with Syria now
and of future contacts?
King Hassan. I told you you did extremely well. I think they must
renew diplomatic relations with the United States, and I think I have some
influence on them. As you know, my army was the first Arab army into
Syria and it has been there for four months now. At any Arab summit
meeting Morocco can look anyone straight in the eye and has to make
excuses to no one.
Secretary Kissinger: It is in the interest of Syria to come closer to the
United States and not adopt a posture of hostilities, because this is playing
the Soviet and the Israeli strategy.
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King Hassan
Syria has a very good reason to renew diplomatic relations
with the United States at this time. The ceasefire was brought about
by both the Soviet Union and the United States. Syria can not ignore
half of the ceasefire arbitrator. My Foreign Minister will go to Syria
Damascus, Riyadh and Amman; do you wish me to send a message
to Assad
Secretary Kissinger. You could tell him what you tell Sadat and point
out that we would not refuse their approach. I see Riyadh as the creation
point. We can do without Middle East oil, which only represents 10%
of our imports. We will have to have some rationing. But we will begin
a vast national research project on
coal liquefaction.
The country that put a man on the moon in ten years can turn coal into
gas. We have the technological know-how; it is only a problem of
engineering. Then in three to five years we will be independent of oil
imports. If this looks like the result of Arab blackmail, it will have a
very bad influence on American public opinion. King Faisal has made
his point, he should now relax for about six months. I can assure
Your Majesty that some people in the United States are saying that we
should take the oil by military means and can not allow Abu Dhabi to
blackmail us. Those are our domestic pressures. The Watergate
problems we can handle But with the very strong pressures from the
Jewish Community, which is very powerful in the press, television and
banks, if the impression is created that there is a national crisis
caused by the Arabs, this will create a very difficult situation.
King Hassan
Can you get King Faisal to understand that?
him. Secretary Kissinger I don't know him. I will speak very frankly with
King Hassan Yes, you must. He is an old man and he mixes politics
with mysticism even though in our religion it does not mix. You can
reach him through the advisor I mentioned last night, Rachaid Frahmoun.
I canask Sadat to reach him and he can also be contacted through
Al Achan who is King Faisal's Chief of Intelligence. At this point Sadat
wants very much the friendship of the United States, and he will not do
anything to alienate you.
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Secretary Kissinger: What is the possibility the Russians will not
intervene directly?
King Hassan In Korea, you intervened and the Russians did not. In
Vietnam, the same occurred and in Lebanon also.
Secretary Kissinger Two weeks ago we received a letter from Brezhnev.
He wrote demanding the sending of joint Soviet-U.S. expeditionary forces.
He said you must adhere to this or else WC will act unilaterally and he
also demanded an immediate and urgent reply. Well, first of all, we
sent no reply and,in the second place, we put our troops on alert and then
the Security Council approved the sending of forces excluding Soviet and
U.S. troops. The Soviets will never run the risk of war in the Middle
East. Such a war would be a disaster for the Middle East because the
Soviet Union has never left a country where it has sent troops.
King Hassan: King Faisal is the one who stands to lose the most. There
is no freedom at all in his country, not even trade unions. When
Saudi Arabia blows up, it will be very serious. Right now it is a
pressure cooker. My Foreign Minister will leave tomorrow and he will
begin where you end. He will start with Iran, then go to King Hussein,
King Faisal, Damascus, and Cairo.
Secretary Kissinger The Shah of Iran admires you greatly. He never
fails to state his feelings. He is a remarkable man.
King Hassan He has a great art and is very sensitive. He has a
global vision. I want to go back to what you said about U.S. research
on energy. This is bad for Morocco, which is looking for oil.
Secretary Kissinger: It may take ten years. We have coal reserves
for 300 years. If we learn to liquify it, we will no longer need to import
oil and we also must learn to extract the oil from the oil shale. By 1977
production should begin, and should be well along by 1980 if a massive
effort is made. The final decision has not yet been made. If we are
forced to do it because of what appears to be an Arab campaign, and if
at the same time we bear this costly effort and we are asked to help the
Arabs, this will create a very ambiguous situation for public opinion.
King Hassan If King Faisal decides to hold off, Kuwait will follow suit.
You probably want to get back to the Villa for a short time before long
Secretary Kissinger
I had hoped to gain a quick visual impression of
Rabat.
King Hassan
I will arrange it immediately.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
King Hassan, II
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Alec Toumayan, Interpreter
TIME AND DATE:
After Luncheon Meeting
November 6, 1973
PLACE:
SUBJECT:
Brief After Luncheon Meeting
Secretary Kissinger: Whenever I am in China I conduct a review of world
affairs with Chou En-lai. Although we differ ideologically, we tend to
agree on some things for practical reasons. For instance, on the issue
of Chinese subversion into Iran and the Gulf States, I had told him he
should send his Foreign Minister to Iran and that he should tone down
Chinese subversion in that part of the country. Later on he did that. If
you think it would be helpful, I could give him my evaluation of your
views.
King Hassan: We had excellent contacts wntil the Chinese prohibited
circumcision on the Mosem children, ordered them to burn Koran and forced
them to eat pork publicly. The Chinese are not very wise in Morocco.
They move about a great deal and import considerable amounts of subversive
literature. Mr. Ceausescu who seems to have developed a great deal of
affection for me also advised to balance carefully the Chinese and the
Russians.
Secretary Kissinger: I wish to thank you for the extraordinary courtesy
you have extended to me.
King Hassan: It is an expression of the esteem which we have for you
personally. We feel that you have acquired experience in record time in
what is not an easy task. I am convinced that you have begun this effort
with the will to succeed and furthermore, you represent a man for whom
I have great friendship and esteem.
Secretary Kissinger: I have found my talks with you extremely useful and
I am very happy that I began my trip in the Arab countries with a visit
to you.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROVED:
S - Mr. Eagleburger
Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: November 5, 1973
TIME: 11:00 P.M.
SUBJECT: Conversation with King Hassan
PLACE: Rabat, Royal Palac
PARTICIPANTS:
US
MOROCCO
Secretary Kissinger
King Hassan
Asst. Secretary Newsom
Prime Minister Osman
Asst. Secretary Sisco
Foreign Minister Benhima
Mr. Saunders, NSC
Ambassador Senoussi
Chief of Royal Protocol General
Moulay Hafid al-Alaoni
COPIES TO:
KING HASSAN: We are happy to welcome Secretary and his staff and
to continue frequent contact. We know current problems of President
Nixon and send our warm regards to him. Our common interests dictate
common lines of policy.
You and I have already exchanged views on the Middle East situation.
The last war between the Arabs and Israelis was a test for the Arabs.
The Arabs consider they have succeeded. Now peace is possible with
understanding and a sense of justice. With the interest of the
President and the Secretary, this objective can be achieved. No task
is too difficult. What is difficult is to find justice among so many
tendencies. The situation has changed in the Near East. The Arabs
did not previously accept the existence of Israel. Now they have gone
beyond. The problem now is to find how Israel can live with the
Arabs. The Arabs are strengthened by a unity of religion and a unity
of language, but I am worried about the effect of massive immigration
into Israel on this balance. With the heavy immigration of Jews from
Eastern Europe, Israel will be neither Mediterranean nor American and
will be, therefore, less subject to influences by either. The young
people of Israel will not know the young people of the Arab world.
AF: DNewsom
(Dot office and Officer)
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2.
Israel must become integrated into the Arab community. It could
become one of the richest regions in the world in agriculture and in
industry. The fertile crescent could become a reality. This
marriage will not come easily. The Syrians will be particularly
nervous.
Finally there is the fundamental aspect of the Palestinians. We
noted the special mention of this problem by both President Nixon
and Brezhnev. We are certain that they will give reality to their
word. It is necessary that a Palestinian entity be planted in a
geographic area acceptable to all and with access to Jerusalem.
I appreciated very much the latest message from President Nixon. I
understand he wants to give a new look to relations between Morocco
and the US. I would like to have a meeting at the end of the year
or the beginning of the next with a fixed agenda leading to a
determination of our level of relationship. We will not discuss
this now since you are preoccupied with other problems. You are most
welcome here, and we want you to come back for an official visit of
two to three days. We wish you great success in your current mission.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I appreciate the extraordinary welcome here in
Rabat. I have always considered Morocco friendly, but what had been
a political thought is now a human reality.
Regarding bilateral relations, we are looking forward to your visit
in 1974 at a time we can arrange after my return. You and President
Nixon will find much to talk about. I will try to give a date within
two weeks of my return. President Nixon has great respect for you
and admires your courage. We will seek a date in late spring after
I have consulted the President's calendar.
It is highly desirable to begin talks on our bilateral relations,
and Secretary Newsom is prepared to return at the end of his present
trip for a preliminary exchange and a definition of the agenda. My
instructions to him are that it is essential that it be known that
the US appreciates its friends. We are prepared to cooperate fully
where there are common interests and a constructive spirit. We
should begin to shape the future jointly.
Our views on the Middle East are very similar. Israel may have won
battles, but diplomatically and strategically the situation has
changed fundamentally. The Arabs have restored their dignity and are
now in a position to make peace. We can look at the future not with
slogans but with reality.
Israel must undergo a profound reexamination of its policies. It is
no longer possible for them to depend on strength. For thirty years
Israel has relied on military prowess and the transition to a differe
policy will be difficult, especially because it is sudden and
unexpected. Israel will come to a realization that the negotiations
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it has sought will give it an opportunity to be a part of a wider
community. It is a rare opportunity. It requires patience and
perseverance. Every negotiation goes through difficult periods,
out success is possible when there is a clear view of the ultimate
objective and the confidence of all parties.
I am happy to begin my trip in a friendly country such as Morocco.
I believe Your Majesty can play an important psychological role.
There is no question about the heroism of the Arab world. Its
patience, however, remains to be tested. The Arabs must also under-
stand the delicacy of the problem created by Israel and the US
domestic situation. We agree on the general course proposed by
Your Majesty leaving aside details. A violent onslaught on this
policy is certain to come in the US. It is not for nothing that we
became so closely attached to a small nation of three million people,
seven thousand miles away. These factors cannot be changed over-
night. The existence and security of Israel cannot be negotiated.
What can be negotiated is a just and durable peace. A long-term
peace can be maintained only if both sides believe it to be just.
Our friends can help us to achieve this by pointing out to others
that we are sincere and have decided to make a major effort, but
that we cannot reach a final destintion in one leap. To try in one
leap plays into the hands of those that want no peace. Those opposed
to peace want confrontation between the US and key Arab countries.
Our key mission is to create an atmosphere of confidence.
If peace is to come, and if the US is to play a crucial role, it is
more likely to come through policies followed by Your Majesty than
by pressures and blackmail. We are engaged in this effort. not
because of pressure, but because of our conviction that unless there
is peace the situation will lead to the domination of the area by
outside powers with other interests. If the US is to be treated
as an enemy, we cannot play a role with good will and a determination
to succeed. We have endeavored to tell the truth, to speak frankly
and to keep our promises.
KING HASSAN: Here is one problem which is posed in a brutal and
realistic form. This is the question of defending the rights of
five million Arabs who have no land. The US has ignored the Palestini the
problem for twenty-five years. If the US would make contact with
Palestinians, it would advance the peace. The occupied countries
say, "free our territories first, then help the Palestinians." The
non-occupied countries say the reverse.
The problem is more simple and can be negotiated.
You spoke of internal US difficulties. We consider the internal
difficulties of the US to be artificial. Watergate is too small
matter to be true. I think Watergate is a vast conspiracy against
a the equilibrium of the US and the role of the US. I would suggest
your security services investigate the Senate and others because
this is a plot against the US not against the administration.
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4.
The Arab press has not given much importance to these scandals,
and this is a good thing. I might also say privately that I am
glad Nixon fired Cox because the head of state must control what
he does.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I agree that these internal difficulties
produced by Watergate have been given a prominence out of propor-
tion to the causes. It is true in our country that for a decade
and a half there has been an attack on our institutions. That we
can contain.
There are other internal difficulties produced by a highly
organized minority over a span of thirty years. That internal
difficulty will become very relevant as we proceed to a solution of
the Middle East problem. One mistake in the Arab world is to belive
that the US needs only to give an order and problems can be solved.
We are going to have difficulties in getting even to the point of
making a recommendation. It is a difficulty we can solve, but for
which we must have time. Watergate is a temporary thing, but it
dangerous. could merge with these deeper problems, and that could be
With respect to the Palestinians, we have learned more from Your
Majesty than from any other source. Never before have I heard
friendly. the matter presented by a leader whom we consider wise and
e can form conclusions about the retention of Arab territory, and
ie can affirm in principle the rights of the Palestinians. But if
these rights are defined too extremely, the consequences would be
to push Israel into the sea. You cannot introduce five million
Palestinians into Israel without that result.
KING HASSAN: I did not intend that they should be all settled in
Israel. This is a question one must pass to the Palestinians
and ask them what they propose. If they say a small part of
two or three different countries, this might be a solution.
The King and Secretary adjourned for a private meeting.
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S/S 7322270
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation
DATE November 6, 1973
TIME: 6:30 P.M.
SUBJECT:
Secretary Kissinger's Conversation
with President Bourguiba
PLACE: Carthage Palace
Tunis, Tunisia
PARTICIPANTS:
US
TUNISIA
Secretary Kissinger
President Bourguiba
Asst. Secretary Newsom
Prime Minister Nouira
Asst. Secretary Sisco
Foreign Minister Mohamed Masmoudi
Ambassador Seelye
Director of Cabinet Ali Hedda
Ambassador McCloskey
SecState for Foreign Affairs
Interpreter Alex Toumayan
Abdelaziz Hamzaoui
Tunisian Ambassador to Washington
Salheddime El Goulli
COPIES TO:
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I look forward to your visit to the
United States next year.
PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: I am very grateful to President Nixon for
the gift he sent me, the moonrock with Tunisian flag, that Ambassador
Seelye just brought me. Since we have little time we will begin right
away. I hope your tour of Arab capitals will be fruitful and that
you will succeed in your historical mission and your attempt to find
a solution to bring peace back to the region. I don't know if you
have a plan. I had proposed a plan to the Israelis; it was simple
and correct and involved a great sacrifice on the part of the
Palestinians in returning to the line of 1947. Any other solution
will not be a solution but will keep wars going. The Palestinians
had accepted the '47 line, which takes away 54 per cent of Palestine.
242 and its implementation after '67 will have no result since it
came about as the result of a war between states and makes no
reference to the Palestinians. More and more people come to realize
the importance of the Palestinians. Even today the nine European
countries said that the crux of the problem is Palestine. Having
helped Israel, the United States can pressure it. The war has
AF:DNewsom
(Drafting Office and Officer)
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2.
revealed that the Arab soldier, if properly armed, knows how to
fight and die.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: This is not surprising if you look at the
history of the Arabs.
PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: After '67 no one took them seriously.
They had fled without shoes. But you must tell President Nixon
that after this war the Soviet influence has grown. They are
more and more in the Middle East, the Mediterranean, Egypt, Aden
and Southern Yemen, and they are also in Iraq and Syria and in
India. I am sure that little by little Southeast Asia will fall
prey to yellow communism, as in Cambodia, or Russian communism, as
in Vietnam. We know that behind the iron curtain they hold their
own people very tightly, as witnessed by the Sakharov protest,
and we see it clearly here when cooperation agents from the iron
curtain countries wanted to remain here after their assignments.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Many countries have had that experience.
PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: The United States and the United States
Government being young and enthusiastic trust their partners, but
the Russians are consistently moving forward.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I can assure you that we have no
illusions about Soviet policy.
PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: In the recent Pakistani war when Nixon
sent the Seventh Fleet on a maneuver similar to the Kennedy
missile crisis when Khrushchev pulled back, this time Brezhnev
did not move. The Soviets hold sway over India and Bangladesh,
which owes its life to the Soviets and now Afghanistan sides with
the Russians too. We feel the danger very acutely, having
chosen democracy. I made my own choice back in 1940 through my
friends. US Consul Doolittle gave me a visa to come to the United
States in 1946. It is thanks to him that I am alive.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: We know that you are a long-time friend
of the United States.
PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: When I decorated the officers of the
Sixth Fleet, I told them you do not defend only Southern Europe,
you must also defend North Africa. In World War II, I sent a
letter to the people of Tunisia from jail on August 8, 1942 in
which I said that the Germans would surely lose the war. This
came as a shock to the Tunisian people who suffered from
repression. I was freed from jailoby the Germans. For three
months I was Mussolini's guest in Rome. He wanted my support.
I said there was only one condition, to recognize the independence
of Tunisia. But that's not what they were fighting for. So we
waited for the Allies. Mr. Doolittle came back and told General
Juin that he knewBourguiba and that Bourguiba had been with the
SECRET/NODIS
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DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
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3.
Allies since 1940. So you see it all goes way back. I think
also of the role played by Bob Murphy and the Bizerte Resolution
which passed 66 to zero because no one wanted to vote for France.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I remember it very well. I have followed
with great interest and admiration your entire career and your
more recent declarations on this immediate problem of the Middle
East. You showed great courage in speaking of negotiations at a
time when it was not fashionable.
PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: I was almost torn apart. Dean Rusk
called me and said that my action called for great courage and
not only physical courage. Now they are all saying if we only
had listened to Bourguiba.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The mistake that you never made and
that the Arab world made after '67 was to think that it could gain
through hostility toward the United States.
PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: That was a very poor idea. Since 1946,
when I worked with the joint US-UK commission, I travelled
throughout Palestine and I said that there was no solution except
dezionization of the Jews. We have nothing against the Jews.
We respect all religions. The Koran respects all religions. We
are all monotheists.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: In this phase, the United States is
prepared to make a joint contribution towards peace in the Middle
East and if you analyze the situation you will conclude that only
the United States can do this. Others can give weapons, but only
the United States can give territory. It is important that the
Arab countries show an understanding of our problems as we show
now an understanding of their problems. It is not accidental
that for 30 years the United States has supported a small country
seven thousand miles away with a small population surrounded by
hostile populations.
PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: It is this attitude of hostility which
is a major error committed by the Arabs.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Those factors which produced the United
States' engagement must be taken into account as we attempt now
to conduct a more balanced policy. Nothing would please more
those who are opposed to peace than to create opposition between
the Arabs and the United States. Friendship between the Arabs
and the United States is a natural thing. In this new phase
we need a reasonable amount of time to organize ourselves. The
Europeans can make all the declarations they want, it is pure
rhetoric. The United States alone can produce results. I have
nothing against their declarations, but what we need now is
progress.
SECRET/NODIS
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4.
PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: The Europeans see their oil supply cut
down and prices going up.
SECRETARY KISSINGER! It is not greatest form of heroism that
history has witnessed, but is a fact. One word about oil because
it is double-edged weapon. If at a time when we are making a
major effort to bring peace and we are determined to do this and
we face a serious domestic struggle, if at this same time we are
confronted with rationing and shortages which can be blamed on
the Arabs, it will strengthen our opponents, it will not fortify
our positions We will start an emergency program to substitute
coal for oil through the technology of liquefaction and this costly
program can be blamed by some upon the Arabs. The Arab countries
must attenuate their pressures upon us and give us time to develop
our policy.
PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: I know that Arab oil only accounts for
6 per cent of US consumption.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: 12 per cent and you see it is large
enough to be noticable and annoying, but not large enough to be
decisive. Besides we do not need the pressures of oil because we
are determined to strive toward a just and durable peace.
PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: They use whatever weapons they have. They
would use Phantoms or Migs, but it will have no effect, it may
even have reverse impact.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The danger lies precisely there. We are
acting now not because of oil but because of the reason President
Nixon gave. A continuation of the conflict will mean that
powers external to the area will become dominant, and this is not
in the interest of the world and certainly not in the interest of
the people of the Middle East.
PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: The Soviet Union has already assumed a
position of dominance. Now with Sadat they will have a base in
Alexandria.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: If they have assumed a position of
dominance, then we have no incentive to act.
PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: You see you miscalculated in your efforts
for detente. You did not take the Middle East into account and
as a result those people who for six years had had neither peace
or war decided to strike.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: We did not forget because of detente:
an excess of emotionalism is not one of our characteristics.
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DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
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5.
Being occupied in Vietnam we did not want to handle two crises
simultaneously. We knew that the Middle East could not be settled
without a major crisis. I told many Arab Foreign Ministers with whom
I talked before the war that we intended to take a determined
action after the Israeli elections sometime in November. So it
had been our intention all along to act at about this time, but
the recent war has given even more impetus to our intention.
PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: The Palestinians will never agree to
lose part of their territory by force. This is against inter-
national law, it is against honor. Before the war you thought
the Arabs could not fight.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I never believed this myself. I am a
historian. I know the history of the Arabs. The Koran was
spread by armies not by missionaries. For centuries the Arab
armies inspired fear.
PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: They felt they had a divine mission.
The US knows of the preparations that are made, but they didn't
feel the Arabs would do so well.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: We felt we had more time. We did not
think the crisis would come so fast. It came two weeks after I
became Secretary.
PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: Egypt has made a number of friendly
gestures to the United States but to no avail. It has awarded
the pipeline to US firms.
SECRETARY KISSINGER! I don't think economic considerations
are that important, policies and general philosophy are more
important. During this last war Sadat behaved very wisely, not
like Nasser who focussed hatred upon the United States. Sadat
kept communications open and showed great wisdom.
PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: He got nothing in return for his
gestures.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: When he dismissed the Soviet advisers
the intention was good, but the timing was unfortunate because it
happened during an American electoral campaign and you cannot do
anything in the United States at that time because of the Jewish
electorate. As to how long it will take, the problem is to find
the right moment. If we move too quickly we will obtain nothing.
If we move too slowly there will be another explosion. We must
find a reasonable time, and I do not believe it will take too
long, but we want to move decisively. We think it's a matter of
a few weeks.
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
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6.
PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: I wish you success, but I see no solution
as long as the Arab countries see part of their territory occupied
by the Israelis. This will be a stumbling block with a "no peace -
no war situation. There will only be peace if Israel shows less
greed and accepts what the UN offered it. Each country must
defend its territories. The Palestinians were robbed of their
lands. They agreed with the UN Resolution under which they lose
54 per cent of their lands. If Israel does not yield, it will
behave as Hitler did in grabbing the Sudetenland and Czechoslvakia
under the pretext of securing German borders. That is not a way
out.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I told your Foreign Minister that in
the next few weeks the negotiations can start and that process
will help to define the borders.
PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: The war is not over. Even today each
side accuses the other of violating the cease-fire line which is
a very vague line.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I agree.
PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: But with your satellites you and the Russians
know where the line is.
FONMIN MASMOUDI: The Egyptians know where it is and the
Israelis know where it is and so do you and the Soviets. But the
Egyptians and the Israelis don't want to say where the cease fire
line is.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: On the cease fire line, I know that a
number of people would like to debate that question because it has
no final consequence. We can discuss the line of October 22nd for
six months, and it will only bring a delay for the start of the
real peace negotiations. I spent two evenings with Prime Minister
Golda Meir and we spent 90 per cent of our time on the question
of the cease fire line and where it was. If the Israelis are still
on the line of October 22 in a year then we have failed. If they
are not, then it does not matter where the line is.
PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: When I come to the United States, hope-
fully in May, I will see the President, and I will be ready to give
a press conference.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are sorry to lose Ambassador El Goulli
who has done a fine job in Washington.
PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: I want to reiterate the importance of
the Palestinians. They come to see me, and I talk with them.
They are not an enemy, they are an unhappy people who have been
wronged.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
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7.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: You can be sure we will do our best to
make peace. Our public opinion will be very important and we
must have it with us. It will take us time to prepare that
opinion.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
3
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
4
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE president HAS SEEN
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
November 9, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
Secretary Kissinger has sent you the following report of his meeting
with King Hussein:
I had an extremely cordial and relaxed two and a half hour meeting
with King Hussein in Amman today. He sends you his warmest regards
which I reciprocated on your behalf.
The King explained in some detail the difficult choice he faced in the
recent war and spoke with some satisfaction of the way he had avoided
the twin dangers of full involvement, on the one hand, and isolation
through total non-participation, on the other. He reflected a basic
confidence in his position and in the correctness of his policies. At
the same time he reiterated many of his old underlying concerns:
apprehension about the Soviet position in Iraq, worry that other Arabs
will make separate settlements with Israel which leave him out, and
suspicion that some Arab leaders may be working for a separate
Palestinian state at his expense. He said Sadat had told him even the
U.S. and Soviets favored this -- an idea of which I immediately disabused
him.
The King introduced an interesting new concept with regard to the
Palestinian question; instead of an immediate return of the West Bank
to Jordan following Israeli withdrawal, an international presence would
be introduced in Gaza and the West Bank. A plebiscite would then be
held offering the Palestinians there the choice between independence,
federation with Jordan in a united Arab kingdom, or reintegration into
the Hashemite Kingdom. I told him that we had always envisaged the
Palestinians remaining a part of Jordan but said that his concept was
an interesting one which could be kept in mind as the negotiations proceed.
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I briefed the King fully regarding the proposal I negotiated with Sadat
on the ceasefire and prisoner of war question (Israeli acceptance had
not yet been received at the time I left Amman). I also gave him in
some detail our ideas for getting a peace conference started under
US-Soviet auspices in early December. I assured him that we were
not being taken in by the Soviets and had no secret understandings
with them. Rather, we felt that the joint auspices idea offers the least
difficult and most manageable approach among the available alternatives.
In response to my point that the Arabs could not expect help from us
in bringing about a settlement while we were subjected to pressure on
the oil issue, the King said he fully agreed with me and had said so to
other Arab leaders.
Towards the end of our meeting, the King brought up his need for
additional military assistance. I was frank about the Congressional
limitations on our ability to be helpful but assured him we would do
our best. I was able to convey to him our decision on rapid resupply
of his tank losses in the war, which was helpful, but it is clear that
he has in mind a more ambitious program and more sophisticated
equipment than we have provided Jordan so far. This will be discussed
with his military people next month, and I said I would tell the Defense
Department to be sympathetic.
After the meeting the King hosted a small informal reception laced with
humor, anecdotes and further examples of our common strategic
approach to the Middle East. I reassured him once again that we would
always check with him if and when we talked to the Palestinians. I
noted that Jerusalem would probably prove to be the most difficult issue,
the Israelis showing no sign of give. The Jordanians underlined again
the importance of this question; we both agreed that the city could
ideally serve as a bridge between Israelis and Arabs. The King stated
that he had good relations with such common friends as Iran and Turkey
who share our overall approach to the region.
Once again it was clear from this visit that the King highly values his
relationship with you. He wants to cooperate closely with us to reinforce
our common interests in the area and wants to be sure his policies and
actions meet with your approval. I assured him they did.
The King capped our extremely warm reception by flying me to the airport
in his helicopter, and providing us with a fighter escort.
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation
DATE November 8, 1973
SUBJECT:
Meeting between Secretary Kissinger and King Hussein
PARTICIPANTS:
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Brown, U.S. Ambassador to Jordan
Mr. Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs
King Hussein of Jordan
Crown Prince Hassan
Prime Minister Zaid Rifai
le King opened the conversation with a comment about the an ouncement
of the resumption in principle, at an early date, of diplomatic re-
lations between Egypt and the United States.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: We had always taken the view that we were
prepared to renew relations when Egypt was. We saw no need to
make concessions, and we did not do so. President Sadat has
understood that a hostile attitude toward the U.S. will not achieve
the results he seeks. If he is hostile, he can get arms from
the Soviets, but it won't satisfy his aspirations. The Egyptians
are beginning to understand this as Your Majesty always has.
I believe we have reached a solution of the ceasefire issue,
assuming we get Israeli agreement. (The Secretary then handed
the King a copy of the six-point agreement negotiated in Cairo,
emphasizing that he was doing so on a confidential basis.) This
agreement deals only with the ceasefire. It means an end to the
debate about where the October 22 lines are.
KING HUSSEIN: Does it establish the lines?
NEA ALAtherton, Jr. /hlk/11/19/73
Drajiing Office and Officer)
RM
DS- 1254
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SECRETARY KISSINGER: It does not call for a return to the October
22 lines. What it does is to remove Israel from the checkpoints
on the Cairo-Suez road and provide that the UN will move in.
There will be unlimited non-military supplies to the Third Army.
There will be Israelis at the one checkpoint at the Suez end of
the road, together with the UN, to supervise the off-loading.
There will be an exchange of POWs, and harassment of shipping
in the Red Sea will be relaxed. I think the ceasefire problem
will be resolved.
KING HUSSEIN: This is gratifying. The situation was becoming
dangerous.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: We thought it futile to debate where the
October 22 lines are. If there is a peace settlement soon, this
will be irrelevant.
KING HUSSEIN: How was the visit of Golda Meir?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Your Majesty has had experience in dealing
with her. Flexibility is not her outstanding attitude. Making
peace will be a big adjustment for Israel.
KING HUSSEIN: I agree, but it is a last chance. The Israelis
must put themselves in the position of viewing matters from
the point of view of others.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The history of Israel is a history of
struggle. They are not used to peace.
How shall we proceed?
(The King indicated he had no preference.) I would welcome Your
Majesty's views.
KING HUSSEIN: (Reading from a prepared brief) Ever since the
1967 war Jordan has done all it could to achieve a just and
lasting peace. I warned that unless Israel's position changed
a resumption of the war was inevitable. I expected this last
war and passed on to you information we had about Egyptian and
Syrian plans. I did not know the date, but I knew the situation
was explosive. I hoped that there would be efforts to prevent
it and expected Israel to make some adjustments in its position.
Before this last war Sadat told me his purpose was not to destroy
Israel.
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SECRETARY KISSINGER: If I may interrupt Your Majesty, how long
before the war did he tell you this?
KING HUSSEIN: I was told personally when I was last in Egypt
that something must be done. The situation was changing on
the ground and in the world. Sadat did not tell me when he
would go to war, but I had the impression following the re-
establishment of diplomatic relations between ourselves and
Egypt and the institution of political coordination among us
that any military moves would be coordinated. It did not work
that way, but I had heard from Sadat of his need to improve his
negotiating position.
This tragic deterioration of the situation should not have been
allowed to happen. It put Jordan in a difficult position. I
did not wish to participate in the war but could not remain
entirely out. Jordan is the Arab country most involved in terms
of both land and population. Participation in the war could
have led to the destruction of Jordan and the creation of a
vacuum which radical elements would have filled. Non-participation
could have led to the total isolation of Jordan and to our becoming
the scapegoat. Despite our participation some are still trying to
make us the scapegoat. I have heard this from some on my recent
visit to Arab countries -- for example from been Sadat, Saudi Arabia,
and Kuwait. They said that things would have different if
Jordan had permitted the Fedayeen to operate from its territory
and put pressure on Israel.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: No such comment was made to me by Sadat.
KING HUSSEIN: If we had done this, we would have had to
concentrate on our very survival. Instead, we chose a formula
which avoided both dangers and enabled us to be a counter-
balance to the Israelis in Syria.
I am pleased with the ceasefire and accepted it before the
Syrians did. When Syria accepted, I considered pulling our
troops out of Syria but feared an Iraqi move to take over.
The Iraqis have now withdrawn and Jordanian troops are back to
the third line. I have told the Syrians I need to withdraw
my forces as soon as possible and am waiting to hear from them.
We are now in the post-war period and there is need for a solution
to the problems of the Egyptian Third Army, the POW issue, and
the problem of Israeli occupation of additional Syrian territory.
Obviously we are now facing the battle of peace. I want to
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agree with the United States on where we go and how.
Our situation is different from that of Syria and Egypt, which
are not connected with the Palestinian problem and which already
had international boundaries before the 1967 war. Jordan's
1967 border was the armistice demarcation line. The West Bank
is both Jordanian territory and part of Palestine. The population
is Jordanian and Palestinian. The rights of the Palestinians
have to do not with the West Bank and Jordan but with Israel.
The question is who represents the Palestinians. Our position
is that the West Bank is Jordanian-Palestinian territory
occupied by Israel. It is Jordan's duty to recover that
territory with minor changes on a reciprocal basis. In addition,
we cannot give up responsibility for the Moslem and Christian
parts of Jerusalem which should, however, remain a unified
city.
We are ready for a settlement based on Resolution 242.
Negotiations should be between one Arab side and the Israeli
side. I do not mind if others reach agreement first, provided
the settlement is implemented as a package.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I want to be sure I understood. Is Your
ajesty saying that any implementation must await a settlement
NY all parties?
KING HUSSEIN: This is my preference. Progress in one area should
not impede progress in others. The Syrians feel the same.
On the question of having a Palestinian delegation at the
negotiations, I do not oppose this but they cannot claim to
represent all Palestinians. I would not object provided they
represent those Palestinians outside the West Bank. Some Arab
countries are trying to use the Palestine Liberation Organization
to establish an independent Palestine consisting of the West Bank
and Gaza. I do not accept this. Once the West Bank is returned,
I will give it self-determination provided Israel withdraws to
an international presence.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Could Your Majesty explain?
KING HUSSEIN: I want to give the Palestinians the right for
the second time to say what they want.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: You do not seek withdrawal to Your Majesty's
control?
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KING HUSSEIN
Not immediately. I would give the population a
choice under the supervision of an international presence
between a separate Palestinian state, federation in a united
Arab kingdom, or again becoming part of the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan. The Hashemite Kingdom will respect any choice the
population makes in a free popular expression of its wishes.
It is difficult now to see how a free choice can be made.
There are many tendencies and influences from the Palestine
Liberation Organization and other Arab states. Jordan has
a responsibility to seek to recover its territory; if it is
not returned directly to Jordan, then to some international body.
We need to find the way to lasting peace.
If the Soviet Union gets the Palestine Liberation Organization
to challenge Jordan's claim to the West Bank, this means
Jordan would no longer be a party to the conflict. This would
be dangerous, since a separate peace under such circumstances
would create a new radical entity and violate Resolution 242.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: This is a constructive idea (i.e., a
West Bank plebiscite under an international presence) I
want to tell you in confidence that I have discussed with
adat and with the Soviets the question of auspices for the
egotiations. We think U.S. Soviet auspices would be best.
If we invited the British and French, we must invite China
which would then fight with the Soviets, and the British and
French would fight with us. We have no special love for the
Soviets but think the Israelis are more likely to accept them
than others. Any other auspices would be more complex. The
UN Secretary General could participate or at least preside.
In the first stage, we foresee the participation of Syria,
Jordan, Egypt, and Israel to discuss the disengagement of forces.
I told Sadat that the participation of others, meaning Lebanon
and Palestine, should be discussed during the first stage. We
did this to protect Your Majesty. President Sadat has agreed
to this procedure. This makes Your Majesty a charter member,
and the question does not arise whether Jordan is a party.
Also, we need not face the question of who represents the
West Bank; only Jordan represents them The Palestinians could
be introduced at a later stage. I advise Your Majesty not to
get into this question now.
KING HUSSEIN: The other Arabs want the Palestinians included.
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ECRETARY KISSINGER: That is true, but they know they need us.
With regardito the ultimate disposition of the West Bank, I
have not formed an opinion, but I hold the firm view that
friends of the United States should not be penalized. We have
acted, as in the Indian-Pakistani War, to make clear that our
friends will not be forsaken.
If the disposition of the West Bank becomes an issue, I find
your three-option, international-presence proposal interesting.
But this is not the U.S. position, which remains what it has
been in the past. However, we should keep Your Majesty's idea
in the back of our minds for the negotiations. I have not yet
discussed the question of the peace conference with Israel.
We think, however, that it should start in Geneva around
December 7, 8 or 9.
Incidentally, if there are many more pictures of me with my
arms around Arabs, I will be in difficulty. After this trip,
I won't be able to go to New York.
In my view, this may be the last chance for peace; it is
certainly the best chance. But there are several factors to be
taken into account: (1) Israel cannot make a rational decision
until after its elections; (2) there is the problem of the basic
sraeli position; (3) there is the domestic situation in the
U.S. and some related difficulties of the President; (4) there
is the Arab mentality which has a kind of romanticism about it.
This is attractive, but it leads to impatience. An idea one
day becomes a proposal the next day and a plan the next. I
have been appealing to all to keep in mind that in every
negotiation I have conducted I have recognized the need for
careful preparation. If we push too fast, we can destroy the
opportunity. We recognize the need to make progress. From
the Arabs we need patience and a sense of responsibility,
though I do not need to say this to Your Majesty. We need
trust between the Arabs and ourselves.
I told Sadat there is no way the Arabs can achieve what they
want through hostility toward the U.S. If the Arabs want to
work with us, we are prepared. One problem here is the oil
pressure. I must tell you that under no circumstances will we
accept pressure from the Europeans. They can freeze to death
and we will not yield. Furthermore, we cannot accept the idea
that we can be blackmailed into doing our duty. We want peace
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because the situation in its absence is too dangerous and the
area will be radicalized. But as for the oil pressure, we get
only 12 percent of our oil from the Middle East; the embargo
is a nuisance, but we can manage. But if we have six months
of oil shortages, we cannot also be asked to make a major diplomatic
effort and to take on the Jewish community. If the oil pressures
continue, nothing I have said will hold. We are not asking
for a formal end to the embargo, but we need to have it relaxed.
We need to be given time to conduct our diplomacy.
KING HUSSEIN: On the question of the Palestinians, we are
almost certain of what the results of a plebiscite will be,
given the close feelings between Palestinians and Jordanians.
We feel that any solution must deal with all territory re-
covered, not only the West Bank but Gaza as well. It must
all be under one umbrella. Giving the West Bank and Gaza a
choice about their future will satisfy Jordan.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: We will keep your idea in mind. We have
not discussed a Palestinian solution with the Israelis, and it
affects their interests. We have no objection to self-determina-
tion but will want to discuss the question with Israel. We
have always felt that the best thing for Israel is to keep the
West Bank under Jordanian rule.
KING HUSSEIN: We are thinking in terms of the future. My
concept of giving the Palestinians a choice is offered as an
idea.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Just thinking out loud I doubt that Israel
wants the Palestinians to participate, but at the same time
your offer would ease Palestinian pressures.
ZAID RIFAI: Do you think what His Majesty has been saying
would come in the second stage?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes. The first stage discussions will
deal with military disengagement.
ZAID RIFAI: Would the second stage also include withdrawal?
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SECRETARY KISSINGER: There would be some in the first stage
and some in the second, but the question of participation of
others, by which we mean Lebanon and Palestine, would only be
discussed in the first stage.
I assume that you feel that Iraq should not participate. We are
openminded.
KING HUSSEIN: You should not be.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I was joking.
From the American and Israeli viewpoint the best solution would
be a Jordanian West Bank. This would make it easier to carry
out demilitarization and other measures. But most of the
problems for Your Majesty do not come from the U.S. and Israel
but from the other Arabs.
ZAID RIFAI: Have you discussed settlement terms with the Soviets?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. Of Course the Soviets will seek to
give the impression that we are partners. The Soviets talk
much about detente, but for us this is a practical, not an
emotional question, produced in part by our domestic situation
and by nuclear realities. We think it will be easier to work
with the Soviets than not to do so, but we have made no agree-
ments with them except on the question of auspices. We are
prepared to hold discussions bilaterally with the Arabs. The
U.S. has no interest in the spread of Soviet influence. I
do not need to make this clear in Anman, but I have said this
to Sadat. For a week after the ceasefire Sadat sent his
messages to us through the Soviets. We have told him to send
them directly to us.
KING HUSSEIN: Sadat has said there is a U.S. -Soviet agreement
about a Palestinian state.
SECRETARY KISSINCER: This is not true.
The Soviets have made all kinds of offers: a joint U.N.
emergency force, a joint expeditionary force, joint representa-
tives in Cairo for the ceasefire. But it would be stupid for
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us to cooperate in these ways and thus let the Soviets in.
We intend to work directly with all concerned.
ZAID RIFAI: We are puzzled by something Ambassador Salah
in Washington reported that Mr. Sisco said to him. Salah says
that Sisco asked whom Jordan preferred to have represent it
the U.S. or the Soviet Union. (The Secretary asked Atherton
if he knew about this. Atherton said he was present at the
conversation referred to, and Salah's report was not exactly
what Sisco had said. Sisco had said that he assumed Jordan
would prefer to have the U.S., rather than the Soviet Union,
act as its lawyer.)
ZAID RIFAI: The Soviets would be a nuisance. We want the
U.S. to speak for us.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I agree the Soviets will be a nuisance,
but joint auspices with them are necessary.
KING HUSSEIN. Did Sadat speak for the Syrians when you were
in Cairo?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: We prefer to speak to them directly.
ZAID RIFAI: The Syrians told us that they would have welcomed
a visit by you.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Then we made a misjudgment. Please tell
the Syrians we want to be in touch with them. I will be pleased
to see them when I go to NATO. Tell them to send any high-level
representative and I will be pleased to meet him. I have
already seen Ismail (Syria's Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs).
The Syrians must understand that the U.S. has no animosity
toward them.
KING HUSSEIN: Jordan's interests are parallel with those of
the United States. How do you see Jordan's position in the
area as a whole? Can we rely on the help of the United States?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Our interest in the Gulf has, if anything,
increased. Within the limitations of Congressional restraints
we will be delighted to help.
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.NG HUSSEIN: On the oil question, I have told the other
Arabs that their pressures are a mistake.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: They will backfire. Groups in the
United States who are opposed to the Arabs will say that the
Arabs are all with the Soviets and they (the Arabs) are
responsible for the oil shortage. Many of the Jewish press
people traveling with me have been hostile to our agreement in
principle to resume diplomatic relations with Egypt. The
agreement on the ceasefire and the POWs is favorable to Israel,
but the press people have assumed the worst.
ZAID RIFAI: Has Sadat accepted your line of reasoning?
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, but he says that many of the rulers
of oil-producing states are uncontrollable.
ZAID RIFAI: Sadat is pressing them to use the oil lever. When
you deal with Sadat it is difficult to get an agreement that
sticks.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: He can't get away with it, if he wants
support from us.
ING HUSSEIN: You will have a problem when you go to Saudi
Arabia.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't know whether our personalities
will harmonize.
KING HUSSEIN: You will hear a lecture on Zionism and Communism.
The younger ones in Saudi Arabia, for example Prince Fahd, will
be good ones to see.
CROWN PRINCE HASSAN: I want to say something on the question
of the Palestinians. Jordan has been the only one to put
forward a plan. Most of the Palestinians are in Jordan. We
need to find a way that U.S. help can be channeled to help the
Palestinians, but this is a case where the more that is done
and the less that is said is the better. It is important to
avoid international consortia and public visibility.
KING HUSSEIN: This is a continuation of what the U.S. is doing.
After the Soviet threat in the area, the next threat is from Iraq.
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ECRETARY KISSINGER: I thought I had heard that the Iraqis were
returning to Syria.
KING HUSSEIN: This is not clear. But there is a solid Soviet
presence in Iraq which can create difficulties in the Gulf and
even on the energy question.
I have another problem to raise on the economic side. The war
has affected us adversely. We need to continue to play an
effective role. To do this, we need to take a new look at our
military planning. We were not aware until this war of how
far behind we were in sophisticated equipment. With regard
to our previous planning on deliveries and types of equipment
and in the light of your airlift to Israel, Jordan has a
problem.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are prepared to replace your losses
immediately through delivery of the M-60 tanks and of M-48A3
tanks -- with 32 or 38 of them, I am not sure which. Beyond
that we are sympathetic to discussing any additional requirements
in addition to our previous planning. But we have an almost
uncontrollable Congressional problem resulting in a sharp re-
duction of funds.
AID RIFAI: We need a planeload of TOWs to show our army that
you are taking care of us.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am told we have pretty well run out of
them, but I will look into this --- at least with regard to
sending a token supply.
KING HUSSEIN: We will need to review all of our military planning
in the next talks between our military people.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I will instruct the Defense Department to
be forthcoming.
ZAID RIFAI: Their approach must be different this time. In the
past we have spent three days discussing the delivery of some
items three years in the future.
KING HUSSEIN: Jordan will be helpful to you with respect to
studying Soviet weapons; a new kind of surface-to-air missile --
I think it is a SAM-2D -- landed in our territory from Syria
during the war, and we are cooperating with your team which is
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adying it.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: What is your impression of the Syrian army?
HUSSEIN: They have high morale. Their losses in armor
KING heavy, but these are being replaced. They have a new this class
were of graduating. They did much better in the field it
time pilots than last. Their planning is not as effective as could
be. They have lots of Soviet experts with them with whom
our boys had a chance to discuss military tactics.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Your Majesty, do you have any information
about the presence of Soviet combat forces in Syria?
KING HUSSEIN: We have nothing recently.
(At this point the King and the Secretary continued the discussion
in private.)
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
King Faysal ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud
Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd al- 'Aziz Al Sa'ud, Second
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Interior
'Umar al-Saqqaf, Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs
Dr. Rashad Pharaon, Royal Adviser
Shaikh Ibrahim al-Sowayel, Saudi Arabia
Ambassador to the United States
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Ambassador James Akins
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
Isa Sabbagh, First Secretary, U.S. Embassy,
Beirut (interpreter)
TIME AND DATE:
Thursday, November 8, 1973
8:45 - 10:25 p.m.
PLACE:
The Royal Palace
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
[At the opening of the meeting, the members of the party were introduced
to the King. There was a brief photo opportunity. After the photographers
were dismissed, servants entered and served cups of coffee spiced with
cardamom.]
Faysal: I hope you have had no difficulties on this trip.
Kissinger: No, Your Majesty, I've had a very good trip and a trip I hope
can contribute to peace in the Middle East.
DECLASSIFIED
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Faysal: This is our hope also, that it will lead to peace.
Kissinger: I have had the benefit of some of your reflections on peace in
the Middle East, Your Majesty. I wonder if there are some additional
comments you would care to make that I could transmit to President Nixon.
Faysal: Of course our deepest hope is that peace and stability will reign
in the Middle East, and Your Excellency is aware of my views in the past:
in essence, that there will be no stability and peace unless Israel withdraws
from the occupied territories and the Palestinians go back to their own
homes. And that is why we sincerely hope that it will come about as expedi-
tiously as possible, and that the Arabs will be permitted to return to
friendship with their American friends. And we also hope that this in itself
the restoration of peace and stability, and of friendship will automatically
lead to a shrinking of Communist influence in the area.
Kissinger: Would Your Majesty like me to describe first what we did on
this trip, and then describe where we proceed?
Faysal: As Your Excellency would like.
Kissinger: I remember vividly, Your Majesty, your visit to the United States,
when you pointed out to our President some of the dangers you saw in the
situation. And many of the predictions of His Majesty have come true.
I thought it would be useful if I explained to His Majesty what our thinking
is, so that even if he disagrees with us in some details he can understand
us and perhaps contradict us where we are wrong.
Faysal: Please.
Kissinger: Between 1967 and 1973, Your Majesty, the United States did
not succeed in doing something decisive about the problems in the Middle
East. My predecessor, Secretary Rogers, and Secretary Sisco made an
effort for some two years, but it did not have the full organized power of
the United States behind it which was not their fault. The difficulty for
us, Your Majesty, has been that until this year, most of our domestic
attention was focused on the war in Viet-Nam, and we did not find it easy
to take on the domestic upheaval that it would represent domestically.
After the end of the war in Viet-Nam, Your Majesty, the President
directed me to turn my attention to the Middle East and I must say,
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Your Majesty, that he did this before the way, at the end of August and in
early September.
When I met Your Majesty's Foreign Minister in New York, at the end of
September, I pointed out to him that we would make a major effort at the
end of November, and we discussed how the U.S. could cooperate with
the Arab world. Then the war broke out, and accelerated all developments.
Now the war presented us, Your Majesty, with a particular problem. I
know some of our actions embarrassed some of our old friends. While we
may not gain your approval, perhaps I can explain to you why we acted as
we did.
From the first day we say that the war proved the indispensable necessity
of finding peace. And President Sadat will confirm to you, Your Majesty,
that we exchanged correspondence with him every day, even in the most
bitter days, when we were doing things that were most painful for Egypt.
And we always told President Sadat what I'm saying to Your Majesty --
that when the war is over, the U.S. will use its influence for peace, no
matter what we do during the war.
Our motivation during the war, Your Majesty, was to prevent the increase
of Communist influence. And when the Soviet Union poured arms into the
area, then we believed we had to react to that. I know Your Majesty doesn't
agree with this, but I thought Your Majesty would want to understand our
motivations during the two weeks of war.
But now the war is over. We were instrumental in bringing about a cease-
fire, even though the Israelis wanted to continue fighting. We have been
i nstrumental in fact, we have been decisive - in bringing about the
resupply of the Third Egyptian Army. And when I met with President Sadat
yesterday, he and I agreed on a settlement to the ceasefire problem, which
now has been accepted under great pressure by Israel. This makes
it possible to open peace negotiations.
Incidentally, if Your Majesty wi shes, we can leave a text of the agreement
with your Foreign Minister. It will be announced tomorrow evening.
Faysal: [nods] I am grateful to Your Excellency for these elaborations and
explanations, and I would like to mention the fact that you know - that
in the past I repeatedly explained to President Nixon and Secretary Rogers
the pressing need for the U.S. to bring pressure on Israel to withdraw from
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the occupied territories -- worrying about the inevitable explosion I
foresaw.
Kissinger: His Majesty turned out to be correct.
Faysal: Because the Communists, as you know, would like the situation
to remain as it is, because it is fertile ground to penetrate further. We
know the U.S., throughout its history, has always stood up against the
aggressor. Your Excellency recalls vividly in the last war when the Nazis
cast avaricious eyes and moved against Poland and Czechoslovakia, the
U.S. without hesitation moved against them, with the British and French.
In 1956, the U.S. did not hesitate to line up against the British and French
allied with Israel which committed aggression.
If the United States after the 1967 war had immediately taken steps not
only to stop Israeli advances but to move back to the lines of June 4, 1967,
we wouldn't have seen these recent developments.
As I have explained, Your Excellency, and as I have made it clear to
President Nixon, my thoughts are that unless the Israelis withdraw from
the occupied territories and permit the refugees to return to their homes,
there will be no peace. Once this happens, there will be peace.
I am speaking frankly, of course, as a friend. Actually it saddens me, it
is painful to me to have to take steps which not only cause an imbalance
in our relationship, but harm our friendship.
But as you recall, I read in 1967, events opened up more avenues for the
Communists to advance. And what did they do? They ran around stirring
up trouble, spreading the idea that Saudi Arabia is in cahoots with Israel.
Because the Communists know that we are their biggest obstacle in the
Communists' path in this area, that's precisely why they are ceaselessly
stirring up trouble to remove us.
Kissinger: I agree with Your Majesty on the Communist political and
security purposes.
Faysal: But unfortunately Israel seems to be preparing the ground for
the success of these designs. That is why I say, and I would like to
repeat, that Israel must withdraw from the occupied territories and permit
the return of those who have fled. Without these two practical steps, there
will be no guarantee of peace in the area.
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Saqqaf: I want to point out that some have the impression that His Majesty
doesn't care any more about the issue of Jerusalem. This is, of course,
not true.
Faysal: It is unfortunate that among those of the Jewish faith there are
those who embraced Zionism, and this will be to the detriment of the
Jewish people. Before the advent of Israel, of the Jewish state, there was
nothing to harm the good relations between them. The Arabs had no reason
to resist them. There were many Jews living in Arab countries, we called
them Arab Jews. When the Jews were persecuted in Spain, for example,
the Arabs protected them. In Spain, the Romans also drove the Jews from
these areas, but the Arabs welcomed them.
These are problems created by Israel, aided and abetted by the intrigues
and designs of Israel.
At the Yalta Conference, President Franklin Roosevelt's meeting with
Stalin, the President and Churchill wanted to do something for the Jews, and
it was Stalin who said: "No, we must have a state for them. " And the
Soviet Ambassador at the UN accused the U.S. of placing obstacles to the
creation of the Jewish State.
Af ter 1947, in the ensuing negotiations, Count Bernadotte sent a representa-
tive urging that the territory be rescinded. It was the Soviet Union then
that opposed the ceasefire.
So this points out the Communists' designs. Doubtless, Your Excellency
is aware of all these points. What is needed now, at the risk of repeating
myself, is Israeli withdrawal as soon as possible from the occupied territories,
and allowing the Palestinians to go home. If these two things can be
done, it can happen that peace and stability can be restored.
The U.S. always stands up against the aggressor, and many regard Israel
as the aggressor. From 1958 to 1967, there was never any act of aggress-
ion against Israeli territory, in spite of the fact that after 1949 Israel was
offered a certain defined territory, as you know.
I present this argument for a major effort. I therefore urge my American
friends that they should not abet this tendency in Israel. We actually think
the U.S. has the most of its friends in the Arab world. And we sincerely
hope once the U.S. gives up its out-and-out support for Israel
which
is not even in your country's interest.
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As a friend of the U.S., I hold close to my heart U.S. interests, almost
as close to my heart as my own country's interest.
But unfortunately, and Your Excellency will realize it immediately, it is
inconsistent with your interests. We always want to establish this, and
it is painful also to hear that there are in America elements -- and outside
the Jews -- who support Israeli superiority. There is no reason to continue
this. We feel it is incumbent on the U.S. to realize this.
It is not a question of racism but a question of loving one's patrie. We
deal, even in the Arab world, with people on the same level, whether Jews
or not. There must be established in Palestine, by agreement, a mixed
Jewish-Moslem state. No one refers to the U.S. as a "Christian state. "
They will open it up to all in a democratic process.
How is it conceivable to witness the driving away of an indigenous people
from their homes and territory, and at the same time bring in people
who don't really belong there [but bring them in only] because of their
religion? Now the greatest part of the immigration is from the Soviet
Union. They seem to want to establish a Communist base right in the
middle of this region. As you know, the Communists are against the
beliefs of any kind. All faiths believe in a deity, but the Communists don't.
Kissinger: Your Majesty, the problem the U.S. now faces is how we can
go from the present situation what we recognize is intolerable to the
Arabs -- to a genuine peace.
Faysal: Start by having Israel withdraw.
Kissinger: I agree, Israel has to make withdrawals. But it is a problem
for the U.S. how to bring this about. If you permit me, Your Majesty, I'd
like to put before you our thoughts on this.
Faysal: I must draw your attention to my deepest thought, that Israel
would withdraw the moment Israel saw that you would no longer protect it,
cuddle it.
Kissinger: I have examined His Majesty's thinking on this subject, and I
must say it has considerable merit.
The problem is that the Communists can give arms to the Arabs but only
the U.S. can bring peace for the Arabs. His Majesty pointed out that the
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U.S. can influence Israel to choose a course of peace. I believe His
Majesty is right.
The United States can do it, but it is a very difficult enterprise for the
United States. Because the conditions that produce the American relation-
ship to Israel have a very profound significance within the United States in
certain domestic groups. The reason why in the past many initiatives have
not succeeded is because they were treated as foreign policy problems and
insufficient attention was devoted to handling the domestic situation.
I'm speaking very candidly to His Majesty.
Faysal: I appreciate your frankness and I reciprocate when I say it is
incumbent on the citizens of a country to be loyal to that country.
Kissinger: That may be true, but it is a fact that many people in key
places in our Government, including many in Congress, identify U.S.
interests with Israel's interests.
Faysal: I repeat, we can't see it. What interests does the United States
have? On the contrary, as far as we can see, Israel is a liability to the
Americans, costing you much.
Kissinger: Regardless of the pressures, the important thing is that the
President has now decided to make a major effort to bring about a settle-
ment. Contrary to 1967, the President is prepared to fight the battles
that are necessary to bring this result. I told your Foreign Minister this,
and in honor of His Majesty I confirm it to you today.
Faysal: We are very hopeful that our way of thinking
that you will see
your way to go along with these suggestions.
Kissinger: We want to move in that direction. But I would like His Majesty
to understand certain problems on our side. We have in recent weeks
given considerable proof that we're moving in the direction that His Majesty
indicated: We saved the Egyptian Third Army. And we have brought about
an agreement that will now be signed tomorrow or the day after on
stabilizing the ceasefire. And we have agreed with President Sadat on the
opening of a peace conference and on the direction we will move in a
peace conference. And we are going to establish friendly relations with
every Arab country that is prepared to do it. And His Majesty will
remember that I specifically mentioned Syria at the dinner table.
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Faysal: Incidentally, before I mention Syria, I should say that I asked a
Syrian friend whether Syria would have anything against a visit by you to
Syria. He said instantly, "On the contrary; we would welcome it. "
Kissinger: That was a misunderstanding. The principle of a visit to
Syria is accepted, and we will maintain contacts.
Faysal: This was Syria's reply to my message to our Ambassador in
Syria, and we got an answer back from their Foreign Minister.
Kissinger: We will keep this very much in mind, and I want to make clear
we do not intend to exclude Syria from contact at a very high level on an
equal basis.
Faysal: This is absolutely right, because Syria cannot be ostracized.
Kissinger: I assure Your Majesty that we will deal with Syria with great
seriousness, and any advice His Majesty has on this will be greatly
appreciated.
Faysal: We confirm that the Syrians are anxious to meet with you and
receive you at the highest level.
Kissinger: We will reestablish contact with them immediately on my
return to the U.S. On this trip my schedule was absolutely fixed but, I
repeat, we will establish contact at the highest level. When I come to
Europe in December, perhaps I can use the occasion to meet with the
President of Syria.
Faysal: Yes.
Kissinger: Let me point out some of our problems. We will move in the
direction I indicated but we must be given the opportunity to organize our
domestic situation or our effort will fail. We must prevent the combination
of the attacks already being made on the President from other reasons with
the attacks from certain religious groups from becoming overwhelming.
Therefore, we will begin to organize our support in Congress and in the
newspapers and elsewhere. This will take us some weeks.
Faysal: We wish you every success in this regard, and we hope you will
move as expeditiously as possible.
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Kissinger: I have been told that His Majesty is a man of his word and that
he respects people who act the same way.
Faysal: Of course, I appreciate that, but I also would appreciate and I
would shout it from the rooftops if I could that Americans will become
aware of their interest.
Kissinger: His Majesty will see in the next months that we will make a
major effort to make progress.
Faysal: A few months will be a bit much for the impatient, but let's hope
it can be weeks. To get rid of Communism once and for all.
Kissinger: Let me touch on a subject about which I know nothing and our
Ambassador knows a great deal. This is the question of the embargo on
oil by certain Arab states. We understand the emotions that produced this,
and we are not debating those.
Faysal: This is precisely what makes me red hot with anxiety to expedite
this as fasttas possible, so we can go not only to rescinding the ban but to
increase our production.
It has been almost calamitous to my nerves to have to take this action with
my American friends. My colleagues can confirm that yesterday I nearly
was incapacitated because of my nerves, but I controlled myself and was
able to receive you. Yesterday I received the credentials of your Ambas-
sador, and parenthetically, these two things are not related I nearly
had a nervous breakdown. My doctor told me to rest. Thanks be to God,
I recovered and was able to receive you.
Therefore, I repeat, I am most anxious that this happen most expeditiously,
so that we can not only go back to the status quo but increase our produc-
tion.
Kissinger: But I want to put before His Majesty the following proposition:
The decision has had enormous effect not economic, because we can
handle it economically, but psychologically, coming as it did from an old
friend of the United States.
Faysal: That is precisely why I have suffered even more than you.
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Kissinger: And we take it very seriously. But now we face a new situa-
tion. The strategy of those who oppose peace has been to portray the
Arab world as basically hostile to the United States and therefore to
mobilize public support for opposition to the peace effort. Over the next
period, Your Majesty, we are prepared to move in the direction of peace,
on a course we already discussed with President Sadat. It will be very
difficult if now in America we face a situation where we have to ration gas
and in winter have to limit the heating of our housing. In this situation,
two things will happen: First, President Nixon's authority will be further
weakened, because he will be blamed whatever the reason. And as his
authority is weakened, his ability to act decisively in other fields is
weakened. Second, certain forces will be able to use this to generate
hostility to the Arab world in general. And since these forces have a great
deal of influence on the press and TV anyway, it makes it enormously diffi-
cult. And this is why I wanted to put, for the consideration of Your
Majesty, [the idea] not of reversing the principle, but of limiting its
application. If what I say is not realized, His Majesty will be forced [to
reimpose it]. But what I am suggesting is the possibility of limiting this
difficulty, to ease the task of those moving towards peace.
I've discussed this problem frankly with President Sadat, and he has said
he would not oppose such a decision.
Faysal: Of course it would be a great pleasure to us to be in a position to
rescind it immediately. But you understand the difficulty we are in, and
the embarrassment to us. This decision has been in our mind for a long
time. But in order to come to a happy medium and achieve what you are
asking, it would be for the United States to announce immediately that
Israel must withdraw from the territories and allow the return of the
Palestinians and and this is a new thing that if Israel does not do so,
you will no longer support it.
Kissinger: May I say something, not with the idealism of His Majesty, but
in its practical aspects? If we make a dramatic announcement, we will
create a domestic upheaval. We have to move step-by-step toward a goal.
If I can say something here in strict confidence that will not be repeated
that in the next few days we are planning to end the airlift that was started
during the war.
Faysal: That is something that should be.
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Kissinger: But we can do certain things, but if we announce total programs
it will be very dangerous for us.
Faysal: That is exactly why you are on the right path, and I am urging
only speed.
Kissinger: That is the situation, Your Majesty, and we will move with the
speed that the situation permits. But if I can urge His Majesty to
consider -- not for a decision here but he will want to reflect on it but
to resort not to pressure now but to a way to make our task easier. And
if we don't product results, His Majesty is free to return to the previous
policy.
Our Ambassador, who is an expert on the oil problem, will be able to
confirm to His Majesty that in the next period, when diplomacy will be
most active, the oil restrictions will be annoying but not decisive. But
they can be used by our opponents to mobilize public opinion with the view
that we are yielding to Arab blackmail -- which we can already see in the
newspapers in Israel and certain U.S. papers. And it is important to
what we should see as a common objective.
Faysal: This is our own predicament -- the other side of the coin -- that the
Communists are accusing some Arab elements of going along with U.S.
pressure.
Kissinger: One reason we are having the Soviet Union in the peace confer-
ence is not because they can bring peace but to make it harder for them to
do mischief during the conference.
Faysal: Yes, but I'd also like to forewarn you that they cannot be trusted.
Kissinger: Your Majesty, I can assure you that we have no illusions about
the Soviet Union. I don't have to remind you that the Soviet Union is our
enemy.
Faysal: In essence, I repeat, if we aim at the right path by getting Israel
to withdraw and permit the people to return, then the Soviet Union will have
no leg to stand on.
Kissinger: That is why we want to mobilize support. Your Ambassador can
confirm that it is essential not to further weaken the authority of the Presi-
dent. The President will have to spend all his time explaining why he
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didn't foresee the energy crisis, why there has to be rationing, etc. It
will strengthen our opponents who do not want peace and weaken your
friends who do want peace. And if it doesn't come about, unintentionally,
you can return to your previous policy. That is understood.
Faysal: I offer a ready answer with which to hit those who want to accuse
you of succumbing to Arab blackmail -- it is to say that the only reason the
Arabs are doing this is our support for the enemy of the Arabs.
Kissinger: Your Majesty, it won't work this way. Our best propaganda
in the United States is to say that we are on a responsible course, not
because we are anti-Israel or pro-Arab but because we are interested
in peace in the Middle East and the national interests of the United States.
That's the only argument they will understand. If we debate the
merits of the Arab-Israeli dispute, there will be more people defending
the Israeli side than the Arab side, even if His Majesty is right. That is
why we want to raise the level of argument to the level of the American
national interest, and that cannot be debated.
Faysal: Of course I appreciate your valid explanations. But at the same
time I wish Your Excellency to appreciate the position of Saudi Arabia,
which was a decision not of ours alone but as part of a joint decision. We
are part of the Arab family. What I need is the wherewithal to go to my
colleagues and urge this. Therefore, first I need speed, and second to
announce it [your position] publicly.
Kissinger: We will do this at various stages of the negotiation. But if
we do it before the negotiations, it will defeat itself. If we do it before the
negotiations, we will be less effective in the negotiations.
I have in the past not made promises to Arab leaders because I was not
sure I could deliver anything. Since September I have spoken with many
Arab leaders and I don't want to promise more than I can deliver.
Faysal: We sincerely hope you'll achieve this goal and we wish you
success.
Kissinger: I know His Majesty wouldn't wish to make a decision on this
subject while I'm here. I would just wish that after I've been here, His
Majesty might bear in mind this that pressure could make the task
difficult, or impossible. And I hope His Majesty might consider that the
efforts we have done already -- bringing about a ceasefire, bringing about
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the relief of the Third Army, bringing about stabilization of the ceasefire,
and ending the airlift next week - - would be evidence of the direction in
which we are moving.
Faysal: We pray to Almighty God that He will continue to grant you success
in all these noble efforts. I spoke very frankly to Your Excellency because
I respect your proven ability and wisdom.
Kissinger: I appreciate His Majesty putting his problems before us. Our
Ambassador can pursue this subject at a later period.
Faysal: We will of course welcome discussions with His Excellency the
Ambassador always.
I repeat our supplication to God and our prayers that all these problems
will be removed as expeditiously as possible.
Kissinger: I give His Majesty the assurance that we will make a major
effort, with all the dedication of which we are capable, for our friends in
the Arab world.
Faysal: And I wish you the greatest success.
Kissinger: I don't want to tire His Majesty, but of course I am at His
Majesty's disposal. Should we continue?
Faysal: I appreciate your consideration.
[The meeting then ended at 10:25 p.m. ]
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
1 Umar al-Saqqaf, Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs
Dr Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
James Akins, U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
Isa Sabbagh, First Secretary, U.S. Embassy
Beirut (interpreter)
TIME AND DATE:
Thursday, November 8, 1973
11:03 - 11:57 p.m.
PLACE:
Dr. Kissinger's Suite
Guest House
Riyadh
Saqqaf: I don't think we have much more to say after the long discussion
you had with His Majesty. You both were difficult, as far as I can see.
But this was among friends. You will see results.
Kissinger: I didn't think there could be an answer.
Saqqaf: Secondly, there are some Americans who seem to think he is
not really interested in Palestine but only in Communism and radical-
ism.
Kissinger: Who is SO stupid?
Akins: Jackson said that.
Saqqaf: He makes so many bad statements. He said "They can drink
their oil or swim in it. We don't need it. " This doesn't help
DECLASSIFIED
Kissinger: He's running for President.
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN09-01/11004 Per Hr. 6/18/2012
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Saqqaf: What you said today is true -- that the so-called oil pressure
will help your opponents. But what the King said
Kissinger: Is also true.
Saqqaf: The King has never wanted to hurt the U.S. But he kept saying
this for years. He said it a long time ago.
Isa: He said it to President Kennedy in 1962.
Saqqaf: He said we should let Palestinians return, and end it.
Akins: Eban told Congressmen Steele and Ryan that the boycott
meant nothing, that we didn't need the oil, and that three weeks after
the boycott, Saudi Arabia would be reduced to poverty.
Kissinger: That's not true.
Saqqaf: You said to me the second time I met you in State Department,
"What do the Arabs want? 11 I said, "We're not that powerful. We
can't destroy Israel. All we want to do is shake public opinion. "
It's in your records.
Kissinger: Exactly.
Saqqaf: What the Soviet Union gives them is only drops some
weapons -- then they leave.
The Arabs achieved some thing very great. The complex of always
being defeated is gone
Kissinger: That's good.
Akins: That's very good.
Saqqaf: What Russia sent wasn't the way it was done by the U.S.
They sent it by slow ships, and only small things came in planes.
To punish Syria and Egypt. To show their dependence.
Kissinger: Quite frankly, Mr. Foreign Minister, you and I knew
the Israelis were winning [when the ceasefire was declared].
Saqqaf: Of course. And Aly Sabry would have come in.
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Kissinger: Yes. We stopped Israel from destroying the Third Army.
Saqqaf: You helped that.
Kissinger: But if Arab radicals win with Soviet arms, you yourself
would be threatened.
Saqqaf: But on this issue we are united.
Kissinger: Of course.
Saqqaf: If they win, what happens before is forgotten I saw the people
in the street; they were angry at the ceasefire. Every country's people
was pushing its government to keep fighting So we are paying for it,
not Syria When a Phantom destroys a refinery in Syria, it's we who
pay for it, and Russia who gets the hard currency
Let me tell you what Boumedienne told me. Don't write this down
Boumedienne saw Brezhnev in Moscow. Brezhnev said to him frankly,
"We don't want long-term peace or long-term war. We want things
to erupt, and then calm down. Now we want a ceasefire " That's
what he said. So Boumedienne said: "Why tell me ? I'm not fighting. 11
Brezhnev said, "Tell Sadat. "
"Why should I? said Boumedienne,
''it's not my business. 11
You know Brezhnev is a very nervous type. He was getting up all
the time, and scratching his arm. Then at one point, Boumedienne
said, "We've got some money for you. 11 Immediately Brezhnev
perked up: "We want some arms, 11 Boumedienne said. Brezhnev
immediately had the money in a Soviet bank
They want us to go this way
Kissinger: Will you?
Saqqaf: No There will be no Russian arms in Saudi Arabia. That's
why the King was very ill yesterday He has influenza. It's painful
to him not to defend his country. But when he defends the U.S., he
feels like someone standing alone. Nobody's with you. If I look
with a microscope, only Rhodesia is with you. All of Africa has
cut diplomatic relations I don't know what problems you have, but
we have a problem. Kenya, Ethiopia, who all had good relations
with Israel, cut relations without even approaching them first.
If these countries do this, how can we refuse? We were called to
a meeting in Baghdad; we had to accept the decision. And once we
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give our word we have to keep it.
Iraq refuses to attend the meeting. Do you know why? Because they
had to accept in advance the decision to cut relations with the U.S.
and nationalize companies.
What can we do? We, also, live in a crazy area.
Kissinger: We both have dilemmas.
Saqqaf: The difficult time will come not now, but later.
Kissinger: Three months from now.
Saqqaf: When we get to problems like Jersalem, moving across the
Suez.
Kissinger: That's right
Saqqaf: I understand this is the only way you can do it.
Some of them think it's all solved. I saw Sadat yesterday. He said,
"It's all settled. We have diplomatic relations; the Israelis will
withdraw
11
Kissinger: Really?
Saqqaf: They really think that.
Kissinger: We have to have patience. The Israelis still have to under-
stand what happened to them. They need a few weeks.
Saqqaf: And they have an election. And both sides need to learn that
the other doesn't want to kill them. Now it's a vicious circle.
So we want your help. We want something we can feel.
Kissinger: If you look at what we've done in the last few weeks, it's
quite a lot. And it's preparation for something more.
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Saqqaf: All those who have met you have felt you're sincere. And
you don't say that what you can't do you can do We heard this when
you met King Hassan and when you met President Sadat. We heard
this from Morocco, from Egypt.
Kissinger: That's interesting.
Saqqaf: We heard this from Benhima. But they were all more opti-
mistic than they should be. They told me it was encouraging, I
said, "Let's wait. 11
Sadat said the same thing: You were a wise man, very calm, very
patient to hear, never annoyed, that you never stop anyone from
talking, that you talk at the beginning about what you can do and
what you can't do. But still they are Arab, thinking more than they
should.
Kissinger: And Arabs are romantic anyway
Saqqaf: Yes.
Isa: If you will permit me, this brings to mind a line of Arab poetry.
A poet once said about the triangle of love, about what he was suffering:
"We fell in love with Leila" the lover of that poet -- which is the
USA. "But she was in love with someone else¹¹ -- Israel. "And yet
there is a third party in love with us but we don't want her" -- the USSR.
Saqqaf: There are many sayings like this in Arabic about our relations
with the U.S.
As the King said, we're friends and remain friends.
There was an Iraqi broadcast after the last OAPEC meeting. "Who
can say Saudi Arabia will stop the oil? There must be something to
stop oil to the West; there must be a conspiracy. 11
Akins: Because Saudi Arabia is a tool of the U.S.; therefore the
oil boycott must be a plot to hurt Iraq.
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Kissinger: Amazing
Saqqaf: [takes out paper] These are my talking points. I think
we've covered everything in our talks:
What Saudi Arabia wants.
-- Why the U.S. helps Israel SO much.
- What conditions make Israel so arrogant, SO difficult.
Why America is always silent for 25 years.
It is up to the U.S. to try to straighten out what has gone askew. When
you went all-out to help the Zoinists, what did you get in return?
The Arabs are one hundred percent united on this issue, and Faisal
is way out in front on this. The policy of Saudi Arabia in twenty-
five years has not changed. His Majesty has constantly drawn the
attention of the U.S. to this. I personally never met an American
in this country without spelling it out. We urge you not to consider
that our fear of Communism is a weakness on our part. Sure, we
are against the Communists, but we are also against the Zionist
occupation, and the occupation of the holy places.
We want to dispel the myth that there is no connection between oil
and the problem in the Middle East. Some have come and reiterated
this myth with some audacity. We won't be subjected to threats. We
are familiar with what happened in 1962, when the U.S. was urging
everybody to recognize Yemen. And we were almost alone The
Ambassador here was Hart; he subsequently realized he was wrong.
I wanted to reiterate to you and assure you that there is no desire to
destroy Israel In our country we have people who are from central
Africa; the Middle East is really a kaleidoscopic region. We're not
against Judaism as a religion. No Muslim can be. I could not be
a good Muslim if I maligned Judaism. This isn't my personal opinion;
it's in the Koran. Arab history books are replete with references
to Jewish writers and scholars. We don't want the Nazi complex of
hatred of the Jews to be imposed on us Jewish poets in Arabic are
taught in our schools.
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Akins: There is an Arabic saying "As faithful as Samuel. 11
Saqqaf: Permit me to say this. We've been so rich with promises,
our political wealth is a stack of IOU's. This doesn't refer to you
You told me it before the war S tarted; I told it to my King, and the
Arabs know it. But it is an Arab saying: "I am rich, but my wealth
is promises. 11
We hear threats in the U.S. about grain cereals. We know it's not
U.S. policy.
Kissinger: We should not have a confrontation.
Saqqaf: We are against it. We are your friends Help us.
Kissinger: We say the same thing to you. And on oil, if we don't
keep our promise, we will still need the oil next year.
Saqqaf: We were watching you two from the side; we thought he [the
King] lost.
Kissinger: With all due respect, Mr. Foreign Minister, that I don't
believe!
Saqqaf: Another point: Detente between the great powers should not
be permitted to work to the detriment of the Third World.
Kissinger: Of course Letme assure you the Soviet Union will try
to give the impression that we and they have prearranged it all. It
is not true. It's a game they play
Saqqaf: We say that to the Arabs.
I want to repeat that it's important to have contact with Syria.
Kissinger: We didn't want to be refused. But now that we understand
the situation, we will reestablish contact.
Saqqaf: That's good. I will tell them. I'm going around to different
capitals. They are important to Arabdom. You should see the des-
truction wrought there; it will cost us millions and millions of dollars.
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Akins: And the Russians couldn't possibly havepproduced the ceasefire,
or relief of the Third Army.
Saqqaf: We're aware of that. Since Sadat became President, six
months afterwards, we've been in contact. He's a wise man. He
knows what he can do and cannot do.
Kissinger: He impressed me.
Saqqaf: He knows the limits. He's not ambitious. If Nasser was alive,
he'd be shouting
Kissinger: And he'd fail.
Saqqaf: Of course. The man was never normal -- he'd read a book
and change his style of government completely A semi-educated
officer can't run a state
I don't want to keep you.
Our contact, between us
Kissinger: Let's maintain the channel May I write you for your
opinion?
Saqqaf: Of course.
Kissinger: If you see something I should know, or some thing I should
not have done, please -- seriously -- tell me.
Saqqaf: I've done this on Syria.
Kissinger: That was the first time I understood their position.
Saqqaf: Do you have a copy of the agreement?
Kissinger: Yes. [Tab A]
Saqqaf: Theirs is longer.
Kissinger: This is the six points on the ceasefire Then there are
seven points on negotiation.
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Saqqaf: Yes.
The Arabs have confidence in you and therefore they have confidence
that everything will come out right.
Kissinger: That may be too much. But it shows their good intentions.
Saqqaf: They said there would be negotiations in December.
Kissinger: Yes. December 8 And they wanted the Foreign Ministers
They wanted my personal presence.
Saqqaf: It's some visible movement. It's important.
No country in the Middle East can afford like Egypt to lose six
million pounds every three years.
Kissinger: These six points will be announced tomorrow. The seven
points will be announced about November 20
[The meeting ended with warm handshakes. The Secretary
and the Foreign Minister walked downstairs together, their
arms around each other. ]
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd al-¹Aziz, Second Deputy
Prime Minister and Minister of Interior
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
James Akins, Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
Isa Sabbagh, First Secretary, U.S. Embassy Beirut
(Interpreter)
TIME AND DATE:
Thursday, November 8, 1973
10:35 - 11:00 p.m.
PLACE:
Secretary Kissinger's Suite
Guest House
Riyadh
Fahd: I don't want to overburden Your Excellency by taking up more of your
time, but I want to express appreciation for your visit.
Kissinger: I want to thank you, Your Highness. I was looking forward to
welcoming you to the U.S.
Fahd: I'm very pleased, and still look towards it.
I would like to take this opportunity to express the hope that the
friendship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia which was strong in the past
will remain strong.
Kissinger: This is our hope.
Fahd: And these things that have come between us I would like to consider as
things that are transitory and not permanent in nature.
And of course I appreciate listening to your explaining so brilliantly
to His Majesty the King the difficulties for the U.S. and the particular difficulties
that would not be understood by those who do not know the U.S.
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And I would assure Your Excellency that I for one will be instrumental
among those who will help you on the path you have marked out.
Kissinger: If this cannot be done, my path will be immeasurably more difficult.
Because when the whole atmosphere in the U.S. becomes focused on what will
appear as a domestic problem, it will be impossible to mobilize ourselves
for a difficult foreign struggle.
Fahd: That's actually what I am saying -- that while we feel at ease hearing
you outline the steps you have embarked upon, I feel inevitably the results
will be good. And we appreciate the fact that things cannot be done overnight
and have to be done step-by-step, but expeditiously.
Kissinger: I appreciate your understanding.
Fahd: I'm known for looking at things from a practical point of view, not in
the clouds.
Kissinger: That is the only way to get things solved.
Fahd: And now we are beginning to feel in the air, after a long time, the thread
of a solution that would be acceptable to the Arabs and Israel.
Kissinger: I have the same sense. A year ago I thought the time was not right;
now I feel the time is right.
Fahd: Of course I appreciate that difficulties will be felt by people in Japan
and the United States and Europe. But every cloud has a silver lining the
thread has now appeared.
Akins: I want to emphasize one point that the Secretary said to His Majesty --
that the present effort did not begin when the war started, but before the war
started, and certainly before this boycott. I was with the Secretary in
New York and he said specifically that we would make a major effort.
Kissinger: Thank you.
Fahd: I heard that declaration myself and was very impressed.
The first step, as the Secretary said, was easing of relocation of the
Third Army.
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Kissinger: Right. And it was very difficult.
Fahd: It was very difficult. Because these are exactly the kind of steps that
themselves could be used for telling our friends: Look at what the U.S. has
done, and the U.S. is willing to do more.
Kissinger: Yes.
Fahd: And we hope that at the peace conference that you mentioned will be the
first of next month, a further tangible step will come that will help further.
Kissinger: Inevitably. I'm looking at it from the diplomatic point of view.
But please tell His Majesty that if we are to move effectively at the conference,
it will help if some easing had already taken place. Otherwise it will get
confused in our domestic problem.
Fahd: I appreciate that. I will personally do what I can to bring this about.
Kissinger: It will help tremendously in our common effort.
Fahd: I appreciate that very much.
This is something touching on the situation in Saudi Arabia, and in Iraq
and southern Arabia. We have evidence that keeps coming to us -- certifiable
that there seems to be a pincer movement around Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.
The Chinese from the south, the Soviet Union from Iraq. That is why we
anticipate that once this immediate problem is solved, the Communists will
contrive something to happen in Saudi Arabia.
Kissinger: That is why it is essential that between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia
there be no misunderstanding. You are the principal target. If you isolate
yourselves you are losing one of your best supporters. I told His Majesty at
dinner that we are prepared to be helpful with respect to the threat from the
south. And of course we can cooperate with regard to the threat from the north.
Perhaps when Your Highness comes to the United States we can consult further
on this.
Fahd: In fact we are in dire need to organize our armed forces -- the army,
navy, air force -- not with any aggressive intent but to defend ourselves.
Kissinger: Exactly.
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Fahd: I had intended to talk with President Nixon about our Navy, which is a
special problem.
Akins: They have a money problem.
Kissinger: A money problem!
Akins: We told them first that the program would cost $200 million. Then we
said, "Sorry, there's been a miscalculation. It will cost $650 million. " Then
we said later, "No, it will be $900 million. 11 They think we're not serious.
Kissinger: I don't have the facts. But we take this very seriously. We intend
to strengthen your forces. In fact, we will send our Deputy Secretary of Defense
Clements here, who is a great lover of Saudi Arabia. When do you intend to
visit the U.S.?
Fahd: When you get a chance to relax. I want to give you a chance to relax first.
Kissinger: That may not be so soon!
Fahd: Seriously, when you sense and I feel that things are moving in the right
direction again.
Kissinger: Some time in the next month, then.
Fahd: I don't want to burden you. I will do my utmost to remove the obstacles
to strengthened relations.
Kissinger: I'll do my utmost to work in the direction and spirit that I have
described.
[With warm handshakes, the meeting ended. Secretary Kissinger
accompanied the Prince downstairs to the door, where the
Foreign Minister was waiting.
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