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Secretary Kissinger's Trip to the Middle East [2 of 4]
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Golda Meir, Prime Minister of Israel
Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister
Moshe Dayan, Minister of Defense
Aharon Yariv, Prime Minister's Office
Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State, NEA
Harold H. Saunders, National Security Council
Senior Staff
Kenneth B. Keating, U.S. Ambassador to Israel
Nicholas A. Veliotes, Deputy Chief of Mission,
American Embassy, Tel Aviv (joined after break)
DATE & TIME:
Wednesday, November 7, 1973, 7:30 p.m. -
Midnight
PLACE:
Prime Minister's Guest House
Herzliyya, near Tel Aviv
Sisco: Well, Madame Prime Minister, I am here to tell you the story.
Allon: In Israel we talk about the oral Torah. You are here to give us
the oral Torah.
Sisco: Since our talks in Washington last week, Madame Prime Minister,
I have tried to do my homework. You are an old school teacher. Let us
see whether we have earned a gold star.
First, let me set aside quickly the announcement that has just
been made that the U.S. and Egypt have decided in principle to resume
diplomatic relations. This means that we will upgrade our Interests
Sections so that they will be headed by men at the ambassadorial level.
Prime Minister: These men have not been appointed ambassadors yet?
Sisco: They have the rank of ambassador but will serve as heads of
the Interests Sections until full diplomatic relations are formally
resumed. Our man in Cairo will be Hermann Eilts. I want to tell you
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
2
that he has a well-balanced view on this problem. That is why the
Secretary picked him. The Egyptian in Washington will be Ashraf
Ghorbal, who was in Washington for five years and is now a counselor
to President Sadat.
Most of the meeting with Sadat concentrated on the proposal
which you have before you [copy attached]. A little time was spent on
the resumption of relations and on ideas for a peace conference.
We put to President Sadat your Saturday night proposal. The
Egyptians agree on all points in every important respect. There is
one point which has taken a somewhat different form, and I will come
to that in a moment.
The proposal calls for each side to observe the ceasefire.
You will note that it avoids mention of any specific UN resolution. We
did that in order not to be so explicit about the issue of the October 22
lines.
The second point, as you suggested, leaves the question of
return to the October 22 lines to the time when you discuss disengagement.
You will note that the word "immediately" is used. The
Egyptians have in mind that the first item on the agenda of the peace
conference will be disengagement. You can slow down that process
between now and the peace conference. We talked in terms of a
conference to begin the first week in December.
Prime Minister: Then what does "immediate" refer to?
Sisco: It refers to the whole paragraph.
The proposal would establish UN checkpoints upon the Cairo/
Suez road. The Egyptians were particularly interested in the check
points at Kilometers 102 and 109.
Prime Minister: The road remains status quo?
Sisco: Your checkpoints are replaced by UN checkpoints. At the
offloading point you would participate in the inspection.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
-3-
Allon: The whole road, then, remains part of the territory we occupied?
Sisco: We did not go into detail on that. We assume that you would be
off the road. But this agreement does not get into the question of where
the lines are.
Prime Minister: Remember our discussion Saturday night. I said that
nothing must change on the road. But I did say that as far as the first
checkpoint is concerned, I was prepared to suggest to the Government
that the UN would make the inspection and that we would be there. At
the unloading point, we would make the inspection and they would be there.
There is no question of handing over the checkpoints completely because
that would amount to handing over the road.
Allon: This will need further clarification.
Sisco: At this point, Ambassador Keating arrived. Ken, I had just begun
to explain this proposal which we are putting forward based on our Saturday
evening conversation. In our judgment, it meets all essential Israeli points.
In essence, return to the October 22 lines is left to the time when the parties
talk about disengagement. The principle of non-military supply is estab-
lished, and UN checkpoints are set up. Then there will be an exchange of
prisoners.
I was just about to make the point that the blockade is not in the formal
proposal but is the subject of an oral understanding. Egypt has under-
taken to ease the blockade at Bab-el-Mandab. This means that ships
will be permitted to go through the strait, but Egypt expresses the hope of
of moderation on the number of ships. Sadat feels he cannot take domes-
tically and in the Arab world making concessions on both the October 22
lines and the blockade. Therefore, he would hope for no publicity on
the easing of the blockade.
We believe this formula meets your essential requirements. Also, the
Egyptians are ready to lift the blockade in the context of an agreement
on disengagement. Both the issue of the October 22 lines and the formal
lifting of the blockade will be considered in the context of the discussion
of disengagement.
We attach great importance to the question of guaranteeing that non-
military cargoes get through to the Egyptian Third Army. We have
given our assurance to Egypt on this point.
Bearing in mind
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
4
the possible terrible alternatives that we discussed Saturday night, we
like you want to avoid giving the Soviets the opportunity to act by them-
selves or in concert with others. I have been asked by the Secretary
to stress the importance we attach to this and to tell you of the assurance
we have given to the Egyptians that non-military cargoes would not be
impeded.
Frankly, as we told you in Washington, the Egyptians are
still fearful that once the prisoners of war are returned there
is no return to October 22 lines--you can shut off the food at will.
They are very concerned about this, and this is one of the reasons
why our assurances were given.
The Egyptians want to talk about disengagement at the first
stage of the peace conference.
If your government agrees to this proposal, we are prepared to
oppose Security Council resolutions on return to the October 22 lines.
From a procedural viewpoint, if this proposal is agreeable to
you, your military representatives would meet with Egyptian
representatives Friday along with a UN officer to put this agreement
into effect. The US would send a letter to the UN Secretary General
informing him of our understanding that the governments of Israel and
Egypt had agreed to this proposal. We would ask him to assure that a
UN representative would meet with the Egyptian and Israeli representa-
tives and receive the confirmation that both sides had agreed. This
agreement would be ratified by the Security Council.
Reaching agreement on this proposal proved a difficult task.
We think we are bringing you what you asked for Saturday evening.
Madame Prime Minister, your persuasive powers are well known.
So are the Secretary's. He used them all today. We think this moment
is to be seized quickly so that we can bring about the ceasefire you and
we want. We hope for your prompt approval.
Most of the time with Sadat was spent on this issue. There
was a little bit spent on the resumption of relations and on the peace
conference. They indicated a desire to meet in the first week of December.
Geneva is agreeable to them. They backed away from the idea of
New York. This seems to be one minor indication that they are serious.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
5
Allon:
They wanted Geneva because the UN is there?
Prime Minister: No, just the UN agencies are there.
Sisco: The composition of the conference would include Syria, Egypt,
Jordan and Israel. Lebanon has indicated some interest in participating.
Whether that is necessary at the outset is a question that can be left to
the Lebanese.
Prime Minister: Do the Syrians want to participate?
Sisco: We didn't get into that. What we are talking about here are
Sadat's ideas.
Prime Minister: Are the Soviets acquainted with this proposal?
Sisco: They will be informed at some point soon in Washington. I
don't recall the exact timing.
Prime Minister: Secretary Kissinger in Washington placed great
stress on his desire to persuade President Sadat to use his influence
on the question of oil.
Sisco: We are confident he will use his influence. Frankly, our first
interest is in gaining acceptance of this proposal and in seizing the oppor-
tunity to stabilize the ceasefire. But we would also like to use the
agreement when we arrive in Riyadh tomorrow afternoon. We would
hope to use this agreement--plus the fact that King Hussein and
King Hassan are being helpful-- to erode the oil boycott. I may be
over-optimistic, but I have the feeling that the Arabs may be slowly
coming to the view that blackmail is not the way to deal with the US.
This is just my personal view, but Sadat seems interested in
disengaging from too close a relationship with the USSR. He insisted
that we come directly to Cairo to know Egyptian positions and not go
through Moscow.
Just to give you one small vignette of Egyptian thinking on this
point, one of the Egyptians was talking today about the possibility of
the US joining the talks between the Egyptian and Israeli military
representatives. But he thought a moment and decided that if the US
were there, it would raise the Soviet question. And he didn't want that.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
6
Allon: Did they tell you how many Soviets are there now? Is the
number increasing?
Sisco: The Soviets sent those 70 observers without telling the
Egyptians. We now have an agreement to provide 36 US and 36 Soviet
observers. The Egyptians are going to send the other 34 home.
Prime Minister: Let me ask you this. Tomorrow at the Cabinet
meeting I will have to understand clearly what the understanding on
the blockade means. What does it mean that the Egyptians hope that
only a limited number of ships will pass?
Sisco: I don't believe the word "limited" was used. I said that the
Egyptians hoped you would be moderate in the number sent through
the strait.
Prime Minister: We don't send boats just to make Sadat unhappy.
There are quite a few that will have to come through. This has to
be very clear. Another thing: If the formal raising of the blockade
will depend on the first phase of discussions in December, what will
happen if they break down? Does that mean another blockade? We
are at the mercy of Sadat. What am I going to say when someone gets up
in the Knesset and asks what I have done about the blockade?
Allon: Word will get out that the ships are getting through.
Sisco: It will become known.
Prime Minister: Then we will be accused of a breach of confidence. A
more serious question is that all we have is an oral promise from the
Egyptians to you. We know this is how things go. We run to you and tell
you our complaint and Sadat will tell you his story. I can't imagine that
we can accept this. So much depends on the freedom of shipments there.
We and Iran have put enormous amounts of money into the flow of oil.
And yet we are leaving this dependent on Sadat. He will stop the flow;
he will find some excuse.
Sisco: There is no limit that he has placed on the number of ships.
He simply expressed the hope that you will be moderate in the number
you send. Some of the points that might be made publicly in dealing
with this issue are that the question of October 22 lines and the formal
lifting of the blockade will be left to later discussion. Second, we
attach importance to the assurance Sadat has given us, and I am sure
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
7
you do also. Finally, the realities on the ground are such that if the
blockade is reactivated, you will have a great deal of leverage since
you have not been forced back to October 22 lines. The other side is
keenly aware of this.
[At this point, a message from the Secretary of State was
delivered to Mr. Sisco saying that new messages were coming and
that he should avoid making any approach until they had been received.
The meeting broke for about an hour and a half while the messages
were awaited and while dinner was served. When the meeting resumed,
Mr. Sisco informed the Prime Minister of the following two messages
from the Secretary in Cairo:
SECTO 34
"1. You should make clear to the Israelis that the
only military movement required under the agreement
is away from the checkpoints. They may stay both sides
of the road and therefore this takes care of Major General
Yariv's concern about cross-country movements.
"2. If the Israelis have trouble with the blockade and
believe it is a difficult issue, you may assure them that I
have no objection to a unilateral statement at the time of
the signing of the document which makes clear that the
ceasefire includes all repeat all military actions on the
part of both parties and therefore includes the blockade
at the straits of Bab El-Mandeb. 11
SECTO 43
'1. Further to Para 2 of SECTO 34 re blockade,
ForMin Fahmi informs us that Egyptian position is as
follows: Since blockade was never declared, it cannot
be formally lifted, but orders for its relaxation have
been issued.
"2. You may use foregoing as additional point to
make with GOI. 11
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
8
He then read the draft letter that we would propose sending to the UN
Secretary General advising him of the Egyptian and Israeli agreement
to the proposal. On the basis of a telephone paraphrase of another
message, he advised the Prime Minister that we wished to change the
word "officer" to the plural in paragraph 5 of the proposal. The
exchange then resumed with the mood visibly relaxed and attention
turned to clarifying various points. ]
Prime Minister: What exactly happens on the road? We are in charge
of the road. At the point where the Egyptians cross to our part of the
road and change drivers to UN drivers, that is now our checkpoint. At
this point the UN inspects with our people there. Then they go on to
the Canal and unload. The inspection there is done by the Israelis
with the UN looking on.
Sisco: Wait a minute, I don't know whether we are talking about the
same thing. I don't want to go into detail about this. Point 4 in the
proposal says that there shall be no impediment to the movement of
non-military supplies to the East Bank.
Allon: That should say "to the Third Army. 11
Prime Minister: That needs to be certain.
Dayan: I can understand why you don't want to get into details. I can
see you only want to deal with matters of principle. But we must be
clear. I would just like you to be aware of some of the complications
involved. For instance, there is one isolated Egyptian position at the
head of Little Bitter Lake. It has received no supplies for the last two
weeks. We expect them to give in. It is part of the Third Army. They
have even asked us to evacuate some of their people. We refused to let
food in.
Sisco: Sadat is sensitive about mentioning the Third Army. The
original language in this paragraph was "the Third Army. "
Dayan: I am not trying to negotiate with you. I just want you to
understand some of the complications.
The second point is that there will be daily supplies going into
Suez City. But the Third Army is on the East Bank. We do not want
the two to be linked. We control the connection only by fire. So if we
open fire to avoid Egyptians establishing a connection, you will understand.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
9
Prime Minister: We have to reach some conclusion on the blockade.
We could make this declaration that is proposed when we sign the
agreement. What happens when Sadat says no, or do you have an
understanding with him?
Dayan: One cannot say that a ceasefire is in force if a blockade is
still maintained.
Sisco: This message indicates that the Egyptians have already given
the order to relax the blockade. They are serious. I think you have to
wait to see how it works.
Prime Minister: Moshe [Dayan] is making the Egyptian point.
Dayan: A ceasefire cannot include a blockade.
Allon: Verbally this is all right. But you should know that although
emotionally the prisoners come first, politically and strategically, the
blockade comes first.
Sisco: What do you mean "politically and strategically?"
Prime Minister: This is not different from Sharm El-Sheikh in 1967,
only worse. It is smothering us.
Sisco: Everything that you wanted in substance, you have.
Allon: If they turn back a ship, it is war.
Sisco: We ought to make that clear to them. If they reimpose the
blockade you are saying that you will have a free hand.
Dayan: I have two technical points and one major one.
First, we need maps agreeing on where each party is. Yet I
fear Egyptians will not feel like putting anything on paper. The Syrians
have done so.
Prime Minister: A map without political implications.
Sisco: Do you really want to get into the process of delineation? This
raises the question of the October 22 lines.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
10
Dayan: Unless it is clear, some Egyptian will come swimming over,
we will fire and there will be no more ceasefire.
Sisco: Can't you make this orally when your representatives meet?
Dayan: Yes, that is what I am saying. Our aim is to prevent the Egyptians
from the Third Army from continuing to try to establish themselves on the
West Bank in hopes of being in place when the UN shows up. If they do
keep up, we shoot and there are problems for the ceasefire.
Sisco: It seems to me the formula is good enough the way it is. The
only military movement required of Israel is to move away from the
checkpoints. I can see you are talking about how to avoid bumping into
each other, but I would be very cautious about drawing lines. All I am
saying is to be careful.
Dayan: The UN is already putting current positions on maps.
Another technical issue is an agreement on supply to the Third
Army. There is no number of trucks yet agreed. Something must be
agreed. For example, we have already agreed to let 7 trucks a day go
to Suez City.
The big point I would like to make is that we should not transfer
the issue of disengagement to the peace conference. We should see two
phases in the present negotiations: agreement about the ceasefire and
resupply; and then from that basis, negotiations about disengagement
only with Egypt. It would be wrong to postpone the talks on disengagement
to the peace conference.
Sisco: But we hope that the question of the October 22 positions will
become academic. The Secretary has put it well to you: if we are able
to discuss the next move, the question of October 22 lines will become
meaningless. If not, there is a serious risk of another war.
Prime Minister: Why not let Yariv talk about disengagement?
Dayan: I am not for leaving this to the peace conference.
Sisco: All we are doing is to suggest that maybe you would want to
slow the process down. It is complicated. I do not have hard views on
the issue. The other side seems to prefer to discuss it at the outset of
negotiations at the conference.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
11
I will say that you and they have one thing in common: you
both want to talk about the subject of disengagement. Let us leave it
at that.
Dayan: Let us let Yariv go on with this subject.
Allon: I support Dayan's position but add this argument: If disengage-
ment becomes the first phase of the peace talks, the presence of the
Soviets and Syrians could kill the negotiations. We have hope that some
agreement might be achieved there.
Sisco: Don't take this too literally.
Prime Minister: The Generals can go on talking about this.
Allon: Some members of the Cabinet who are not as in love with the
Soviets as you might raise a question about involving the Soviets in the
issue of disengagement.
Prime Minister: The Americans are not in love with the Soviets. They
are pursuing a philosophy of detente. But they are not in love.
Allon: Why can't we insist that diplomatic relations between Israel and
the USSR be restored in principle before the Soviets play a role in peace
talks? Otherwise an enemy will be presiding over the talks.
Sisco: If the day comes when relations are restored, it would be a good
thing. We have told the Soviets this.
Prime Minister: It is a good thing to have in mind.
Allon: Wouldn't it be wiser to negotiate with each Arab country separately?
By getting them all together we just compound the problems.
Sisco: We are talking about a broad strategy which would allow separate
negotiations. We envision the initial meeting with Waldheim and all the
parties there. But our notion is that informally the talks would begin to
break down into separate areas. We intend to play an active role, and
we do not want the Soviets, for instance, to play a role in relation to
Jordan. Neither does Hussein. Our formula gives you the flexibility
you want.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
12
Allon: It is important to separate Syria and Egypt.
Sisco: The Egyptians are not anxious to have the Syrians there either.
Allon: You referred to the first week in December. But we will be
on the verge of an election then. The opposition would say we don't
dare negotiate before we have a mandate. Also, I think the prospect
of negotiation is an asset, but if we start too early and get stuck too
early, we are in trouble. This is another argument for giving more to
Yariv's talks. I don't think negotiations should begin before mid-January.
Prime Minister: I don't usually care what the opposition says if I am
not convinced they are right. But in this instance, they have a case.
They will ask how we know we are going to win the election.
Allon: Some of the coalition parties may oppose negotiations.
Prime Minister: Our religious party will say, what about Judea and
Samaria? We will be in trouble. Our difficulty is that they are right.
Sisco: I have two observations. I can appreciate this problem. We
had this in mind and early December does represent a stretching out.
We felt this was the best we could do. But we have to keep in mind that
even if discussions start in early December they could be handled so
that nothing much happens during those first weeks. I will report to the
Secretary but we could not say January.
Prime Minister: I would like on this point to simply have an understanding
between the US and Israel. I just want the Secretary to understand our
predicament. I do not want to make too much of this issue because I do
not want to raise a question in Egyptian minds about our ability to follow
through on the present agreement to stabilize the ceasefire.
Sisco: We will be helpful. Sadat is a very keen political leader. He
understands these things.
Prime Minister: The big question is what can we do about the prisoners
in Syria.
Sisco: We transmitted Yariv's message.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
13
Prime Minister: There is a terrible horror story from Geneva today.
Sisco: When this agreement is announced, if you agree to it, this
could put pressure on the Syrians. Then we could follow up on Friday
with the Soviets if we don't hear from them. I do not think either of
us should play this too eagerly.
Dayan: The Syrians have 15, 000 peasants who left their villages. We
must deal with both of these issues together.
Prime Minister: That must press on them. This may be a political or
economic problem which they are anxious to solve. You might speak to
the Soviets.
Sisco: I feel this agreement will help. If we have not heard from the
Syrians in a few days, we will follow up with the Soviets.
All on: What shall we do about the Cabinet?
Prime Minister: It will meet tomorrow at 10:00 a. m.
Sisco: May I make an out-of-place suggestion? Could it meet at
8:00 a. m.? I had hoped for agreement tonight but I can understand the
need for a Cabinet meeting.
Prime Minister: I promised the opposition leaders I would meet with
them before the Cabinet meeting. I will call them in at 8:00 a. m., and
we can have the Cabinet meet at 9:00 a. m.
Sisco: When do you think I would hear the results?
Prime Minister: 11:00 - 12:00 noon.
Sisco: I am trying to catch up with the Secretary's party in Amman.
Prime Minister: We will call you around 10:30 a.m. and let you know
how things are going. Yariv will arrange for a helicopter to the Allenby
Bridge.
We have one other issue that concerns only one person. When
we put together the list of prisoners we will have to add 10. Nine of
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
14
them are from the war of attrition. Then there is one--Barukh Mizrachi-
who was arrested a year ago in Yemen for intelligence activities. We
have to get him out.
Dayan: There is one other technical point. Perhaps you could urge
the Egyptians to start preparing their lists and machinery for the prisoners
exchange, especially the wounded. The POW exchanges should take place
as soon as possible and preliminary work should be done.
Sisco: I will request the Secretary to pass this to the Egyptians.
Allon: How will the UN ratification of this agreement happen?
Sisco: I will suggest to the Secretary that the Secretary-General consult
informally with the Security Council members and simply report a
consensus. That would avoid debate.
Allon: Can we also expect close cooperation between Jerusalem and
Washington on the terms of a permanent solution?
Sisco: Of course!
Allon: Just to review on the checkpoints. There is one check post at
the entry point into Israeli-administered territory. The UN inspects,
and we are there. We control the road. The second inspection point
is when the unloading takes place.
Prime Minister: When the trucks come to the check post between
Egyptian and Israeli-administered areas, the drivers change.
Sisco: The only two points mentioned to us were those at Kilometers 102
and 109.
Yariv: Those would be inside our territory.
Dayan: It doesn't matter whether they are inside our territory or not.
Where the checkpoints are doesn't effect where the line is.
Sisco: My only caution is don't raise any questions needlessly.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
15
Prime Minister: The one thing that must happen for Sadat's good is that
the first checkpoint that the Egyptians come to is a UN checkpoint. And
we will be there.
Dayan: Wherever the checkpoint is doesn't change the line.
Prime Minister: We must be clear. Instead of making this a UN road,
we will make the first checkpoint under the UN. The UN will make the
first inspection.
Allon: The Egyptians will reject our role in that inspection.
Prime Minister: What is inspection? If there is a tank or artillery
piece then we have a basis for objecting. But we are not going to go
through each truck. When the trucks are unloaded, however, that is
where we want to inspect.
Sisco: How many posts are there?
Yariv: The only one is at the ceasefire line.
Sisco: Then there is one post there and one at the offloading point?
Allon: There is one final problem. The UN Secretary General is
asking us a lot of questions about the role of the UNEF.
Dayan: If we agree about disengagement then there will need to be an
emergency force between.
Prime Minister: Then the UNEF should take a long vacation.
Allon: It is just a point to keep in mind.
Sisco: I found no great desire on Sadat's part for an active role by the
Secretary General. He has shifted the talks from New York to Geneva
and he laughed about the SYG saying that he supposed that he would have
to be there.
Prime Minister: Did you find Sadat different from a couple of years ago?
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
16
Sisco: He has aged. He seems a little more subdued. Two and a half
years ago there seemed to be a wild streak in him, and I do not see that
now. He is serious. He doesn't want to rely on the Soviets.
Sirri, one of the Egyptians you met with, General Yariv,
described what a moving human experience it was for him to shake
Israeli hands and to meet Israelis. He said that if Egyptians and
Israelis could talk they could sort this problem out.
As far as I am aware, Sadat never raised the question of direct
negotiations. He spoke of the peace conference with everybody present.
Sisco: What shall I report to the Secretary, Madame Prime Minister?
Prime Minister: You can tell him that we will meet with the Cabinet
tomorrow morning. I hope we will have no difficulty. If so, we will try
to overcome it. Give him my best and tell him this is a fantastic
achievement.
Sisco: You will remember that he told you he would try.
Prime Minister: But he made my life miserable by telling me that he
did not see aghost of a chance.
Yariv: I won a lunch from the Prime Minister. I said I thought it had a
reasonable chance.
Prime Minister: Yariv was the only one.
[At this point, Yariv received a copy of the press report from
Cairo announcing Mr. Sisco's trip to Israel. It was agreed that the only
comment would be that the talks had been useful. Just as the meeting
was breaking up Mr. Sisco received a message suggesting a final modification
in the language of the proposal. The principal one was the suggestion that
the words "under the auspices of the UN" be added to paragraph 2. Also
it was suggested at the end of paragraph 5 that the words "at the bank of
the Canal" should be added. There was no disagreement about this, but
the Prime Minister urged that the idea of UN auspices be dropped. She
felt that throwing the issue into the UN would create a "terrible mess. "]
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
17
[At this point, Dayan intervened to explain that the Egyptians
were probably simply trying to describe the same procedures that
govern the present talks among the Generals. They describe these
talks as under the auspices of the UN even though the UN fellow is
far away. ]
Sisco: I will communicate this to Cairo as your understanding of the
meaning of "UN auspices. 11 If I hear differently I will let you know.
[At this point, the meeting ended with warm handshakes all
around. ]
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
C. RELATED MEMCONS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FARD
SECRET
Classification
UNITED STATES or AMERICA
Department of State
CN: 9034
TELEGRAM
8 NOV 73
INDICATE:
LLECT
From:
Amembassy TEL AVIV
3:30 AM
ARGE TO
Tel Aviv
E.0.11652
XGDS
TAGS
PFOR, IS, EG
Subject:
Middle East Situation
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION:
USINT CAIRO FLASH
INFO:
SecState WASHDC FLASH
VIP5
SLCRET TEL AVIV
9034
NODIS/CHEROKEE
AMB
NODIS
CHRN
FOR SECRETARY FROM SISCO
(D)
1. Meeting with PM Meir took place at Guest House where
you visited on your stop in Israel. Allon, Dayan and Yariv
OUTGOING
also present on Israeli side. Keating and Saunders joined
me on US side. Meêting took place in two parts, divided
by break I asked for while we waited for arrival of your
three flash messages. Actual meeting time was about three
hours.
2. I had just completed my point by point discussion of
Tel Aviv
provisions in proposed agreement when word of your messages
arrived. During that part of discussion, two main issues
immediately aroused Israeli concern:
(a) First, PM was concerned that turning inspection
over to UN on road amounted to turning road entirely over
to UN. I simply agreed to come back and clarify this
point at completion of general run-through of proposal.
DRAFTED BY:
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT
APPROVED BY:
HSaunders/JSisco/csl
OUTGOING
CLEARANCES:
Classification
FORM FS-413(H)
39-F
Tel Aviv
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
Tel Aviv
DECL ASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECREY
Page 2
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9034
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MRN
(b) Point that really concerned PM was question
After explaining Egyptian willingness to ease blockade
of oral understanding on blockade. /
Tel Aviv
meant letting ships go through, I added that Egyptian hope was
that because Israel will use moderation ships 12 transiting.
as to number
She acôt asked: What does "in moderation" mean?
Can Sadat determine that Israel has exceeded some
undefined limit on the number of ships and renege on
understanding? If he does, there will be no record at
UN or elsewhere; Israel can complain to US but US may
not be in position to help. How can Govt reply when
OUTGOING
Knesset members ask what we did about blockade? What
if news of oral understanding with US on easing blockade
becomes public, will Israel be accused of violating a
confidence and will that be used as excuse for reimposing
blockade? Later Allon added that prisoners are number
one issue emotionally but blockade is number one issue
politically and strategically. PM said it raised same
Tel Aviv
issues as Sharm-el-Sheikh in 1967, only worse.
3. KE Leaving question of road until later, I responded on
blockade as follows: I suggested PM could say that questions
of Oct 22 lines and formal lifting of blockade would be
taken up at later stage between the two parties--i.e. in
context of discussion on disengagement. I also stressed
that realities on the ground on West Bank would give Israel
leverage if easing of blockade not effective since proposed
agreement did not force Israel back to Oct 22 lines. Egypt
SECRET
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FORM
4-68
FS-413(H)=
CONTINUATION SHEET)
Tel Aviv
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
Tel Aviv
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
Page
3
of
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7039
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MRN
keenly aware of these realities and Israel's continuing
capacity under this agreement to turn a tap on or off
Tel Aviv
with respect to supplies for Third Army. Finally, I said
we attached importance to Sadat's assurance to us and I
hoped Israel would give similar weight to this assurance.
4. Following receipt your messages, mood of conversation
changed. I had previously made point but stressed again
to
pursuant to your message Isreeli
that only /military movement required
under agreement is away from the checkpoints. Then your
OUTGOING
message that Israel could make unilateral statement that
end of
ceasefire included/all military actions and therefore
includes blockade was very well received. This capped off
by helpful X Fahmi message that orders for blockade's
relaxation already issued and thatsince blockade never formally
declared, it cannot be formally lifted. Also informed her
of proposed letter to SYG as means of explaining procedures
Tel Aviv
anticipated. PM and colleagues relaxed considerably and
turned attention to sharpening their understanding of
exactly what agreement would mean for them.
5. First issue was road. PM finally summed up as follows:
important point is that when Egyptian trucks reach Israeli
administered area, first checkpoint should be UN checkpoint
with Israelis observing but not participating in inspection.
Second checkpoint would be at the point of unloading and
there Israel would participate in the inspection.
SECRET
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RM
4-68
FS-413(H)a
(CONTINUATION SHEET)
Tel Aviv
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
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DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
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6. Dayan pointed out on several occasions that question
complicated by a number of technical details which would
Tel Aviv
have to be worked out on the ground. For instance, he
noted that one small segment of Third Army isolated at
head of Little Bitter Lake who so far excluded from
resupply. He also felt their need to map present positions
of parties. He said he not introducing these as subject
of negotiation with us but simply to illustrate that
Generals would have serious issues to discuss and to be
OUTGOING
sure US understands these complications. I agreed these
issues would have to be discussed on the ground and
cautioned strongly against getting too precise about mapping
present positions since that would reopen issue of Oct 22
lines. Dayan understood and PM agreed very strongly with
my statement re dangers inherent in trying to delineate lines.
7. PM turned to declaration on blockade. Dayan said it
Tel Aviv
logical to take position suggested that ceasefire naturally
PM readily agreed. He
covers all military actions including blockade. /in
also added
/it would be inconsistent to say that ceasefire in force and
yet maintain blockade. I called attention to fact that
Fahmi said order to relax blockade already issued and stated
my view that Egyptians serious about easing blockade by
letting ships through. PM indicated satisfaction with idea
of unilateral statement. Allon cautioned that if Egyptians
OUTGOING
turn back a ship, that would amount to breach of ceasefire
and war.
SECRET
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FORM
4-68
FS-413(H)a
(CONTINUATION SHEET)
Tel Aviv
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
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mrn
8. Dayan then хнікий raised major point on negotiating strategy,
He suggested that issue of disengagement be dealt with in
Tel Aviv
talks between the Egyptian and Israeli generals and not be
deferred until peace conference. Le felt it easier to deal
with this as Israeli/Egyptian issue than to get Syrians
and others involved. I stressed our hope to make discussion
of October 22 lines academic and our desire to give Israel
an opportunity to have some time before facing this issue.
I emphasized importance of fact that both sides prepared
OUTGOING
to discuss disengagement. PM and Allon both supported
idea of letting Yariv discuss disengagement with Egyptian
general. Allon added argument that if disengagement
became first phase of peace talks, presence of Soviets and
Syrians on this issue could kill negotiations at outset.
Also pointed out that some members of Cabinet would object
to Soviet involvement in this issue. I simply noted their
Tel Aviv
view, agreeing we did not have to settle it tonight.
I leave it to you as to whether Egyptians should be made
aware that Israeli military representative apt to raise
disengagement matter at some early meeting.
9. On subject of peace talks, Allon felt it would be
wiser for Israel to negotiate with each Arab country
separately. Trying to negotiate with all at once would
just compound difficulties. I outlined our notion of
plenary opening session of peace conference to be
SECRET
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(133HS LNOC)
Aviv
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
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Tel Aviv
SECRET
Page 6 of
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MRN
followed by real negotiations that likely to break down
quickly into smaller groups and issues. We do not, for
Tel Aviv
instance, want Soviets involved in any serious way in
Jordanian negotiations. I said I thought such formula
would provide flexibility Allon asking. PM Meir again
strongly agreed.
10. Allon stated and PM seconded view that peace conference
in early December too early in view of Israeli electims
on December 31. PM said she could understand opposition
OUTGOING
argument in that government should not negotiate until its
mandate confirmed. I said we had stretched timing as far
as we could with Israeli problem in mind but did not want
to propose January. . Felt early December was best we could
do. PM accepted this point but said she would merely like
understanding with U.S. about Israeli predicament. On
other hand, she did not want to make too much of this
Tel Aviv
argument for fear of raising question in Egyptian minds about
durability of present argument on stabilizing cease-fire.
I said I would report this to you and felt myself that Sadat is
a keen enough politician to understand problem. I concluded
saying we would try to be helpful in the few weeks before
the Israeli election, bearing their concerns in mind
11. PM then turned to prisoners in Syria. I urged that
neither we nor Israel appear over-eager on this issue and
OUTGOING
suggested that we wait for announcement of present
SECRET
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FOR
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Tel Aviv
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DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
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agreement to have its effect on Syria. PM Meir suggested
we follow up with Soviets, and I agreed we would in a few
Tel Aviv
days if we have not heard from the Syrians by then. Dayan
noted that Syrians have 15,000 peasants whom they want to
return to occupied villages, saying that could be a counter-
pressure on prisoner issue. I said I felt Israeli offer
to Syrians on civilians and POW's was constructive.
12. PM originally had in mind calling Cabinet at 10:00 a.n..
I asked if she could make it earlier, stressing importance
OUTGOING
of maintaining momentum and concluding agreement before we
meet with Saudis. She agreed. PM will call in opposition
leaders at 8:00 a.m. tomorrow and the full Cabinet at
9:00 a.m. Said she would try to give me final answer by
10:30-11:00.
13. PM said she wanted us to know that Israel will have
to add to its list of prisoners ten more. Mine of them
Tel Aviv
from the War of Attrition. Tenth is Barukh Mizrachi, who
arrested for intelligence activities in Yemen and trans-
ferred to Egypt. In this general connection, Dayan noted
that, while arranging checkpoints on the Cairo-Sumz road
would take only a few minutes, the exchange of prisoners
could take some time and he asked us to suggest to
Egyptians that they begin preparing lists And machinery
so that exchange can get started at earliest possible
OUTGOING
SECRET
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FORM
4-68
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CONTINUATION SHEET)
Tel Aviv
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
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DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
Page 8 of
Classification
MRN
time, especially for wounded. Suggest you make this point
in your final meeting with Egyptians.
Tel Aviv
14. In response to question on how I envisioned UN
ratification of this agreemènt, I said I would recommend
to you a procedure which àid not involve formal debate and
voting. The SYG would consult members of Security Council
informally and report consensus.
15. At several points in conversation, PM showed consider-
able interest in Sadat personality. Said on at least two
OUTGOING
occasions she would like to meet him. I stressed ХИКМЯ
Sadat's desire to work through us rather than through USSR.
Pia seemed genuinely pleased over announcement of resumption
of relations in principle.
16. I described the format regarding the UN conference,
i.e. Geneva, US-USSR auspices, Syrian, Egyptian, Jordanian
and Israeli composition with Lebanon to decide for itself
Tel Aviv
whether to participate. PM voiced no difficulty
with any of the above, just nodded approvingly.
17. As meeting about to conclude, I asked what I should
report to you. PM asked me to tell you that the Cabinet
would be meeting in the morning. She hoped there would
be no difficulties but if there were, she would overcome
them. She asked me to give you her best and to tell you
KMaxK that this is a "fantåstic achievement."
OUTGOING
SECRET
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4-68
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(CONTINUA TION SHEET)
Tel Aviv
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
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DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified,
SECRET
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Classification
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18. Just as meeting breaking, final suggestions on changes
brought in. When PM heard suggestion of adding "under
Tel Aviv
auspices of UN" at end of paragraph 2, she felt Israel
should not accept that. She began to lambast UN involve-
ment in familiar fashion. At this critical point, Dayan
intervened, explaining that Egyptians describe present
auspices for talks between Egyptians and Israeli generals
as being under UN auspices even though UN representative
not present. Dayan felt Egyptians simply seeking way to
OUTGOING
indicate that similar procedures would continue to be
followed. We agreed that this change would be İkke
incorporated, the Israeli understanding of this change
being it refers to auspices similar to those under which
present talks between generals taking place. I said
I would let them know in the morning if I got any
information that would be contrary to this information.
Tel Aviv
19. M eeting ended at midnight with very warm feelings
all around.
A
KEATING
OUTGOING
SECRET
Classification
FORM
4-68
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(CONTINUATION SHEET)
Tel Aviv
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
Tel Aviv
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
X Or OTHER
Department of State
AE TEL AVIV
TELEGRAM
STATES OF I
ACT AMB
INFO CHR (DUMMY()
SECRET!/ NODIS
CN 11422
Z 071415Z NOV 73
Classification
7 Nov 73
FM USINT CAIRO
5:57 pm
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 3404
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY ANMAN FLASH 2745
RUEHO/SECSTATE WASHDC 4243
BT
3 E : C R E I CAIRO 3395
NODIS/CHEROKEE
NODIS
SECTO 29
FOR AMBASSADOR KEATING FROM SISCO
EO 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PBOR, IS, JO
CHRON
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS
1. I AM FLYING IN TO ISRAEL IN ABOUT THREE HOURS.
1 EGYPTIAN PLANE IS TAKING ME TO CYPRUS AND AN ISRAELI PLANE "IS
CKING ME UP IN CYPRUS TO TAKE ME TO ISRAEL.
2. I WILL BE DISCUSSING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER A PROPOSAL
WHICH HAS BEEN AGREED TO BETWEEN PRESIDXNT SADAT AND SECRETARY
KISSINGER. I WOULD LIKE YOU TO MEET ME AT THE AIRPORT SO THAT
I CAN FILL YOU IN BEFORE YOU AND I AND HAL SAUNDERS MEET WITH
THE PRIME MINISTER.
3. PLEASE TELL THE PRIME MINISTER THAT I WOULD LIKE TO
MEET WITH HER AS SOON AS I ARRIVE AND WOULD LIKE TO COME TO
HER OFFICE FROM THE AIRPORT.
4. FOR YOUR INFORMATION MY ARRIVAL WILL BE PRECEDED BY A
PRESIDENTIAL LETTER IN SUPPORT OF THE PROPOSAL.
5. I WILL BE SEEKING 41, ANSWER TO THE PROPOSAL FROM THE
ISRAELI GOVERNMENT THIS EVENING.
6. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, MY TENTATIVE PLANS ARE TO STAY
OVERNIGHT AND HAVE THE ISRAELIS DRIVE ME TO THE ALLENBY
BRIDGE WIERE ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE TO HAVE THE JORDANIAN
GOVERNMENT DRIVE ME TO AMMAN TO REJOIN THE SECRETARY'S PARTNOM
7. FOR AMMAN: THIS IS STRICTLY FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION
AND YOU SHOULD DO ABSOLUTELY NOTHUNG AT THIS TIME: ALL OF THE
OVE MUST BE STRICTLY HELD.
MISSINGER
of
#3395
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FORM
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
AMOUNTMENT or STATE
Department of State
AVIV
AMERICA assin
TELEGRAM
ACT: POL-3
STATES OF
INFO: AMB DCM VIP5 ECO DAO CHRN USIS
CONFIDENTIAL
CN: 11430
Classification
Z 071829Z NOV 73 ZFF4
7 NOV 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 8286
6:32 PM ++
BT
C ONFIDENTIALSTATE 219569
E.O. GDS
TAGS: OVIP (SISCO, J.)
FOR SISCO FROM PICKERING
TWO FLASH MESSAGES, ONE FROM SECRETARY, OTHER CONTAINING
SLIGHT WORDING MODIFICATIONS, BEING SENT TO YOU. DO NOT
MAKE ANY APPROACH UNTIL YOU RECEIVE MESSAGES. KISSINGER
BT
#9569
++ advance on receipt to duty officer.
CONFIDENTIAL
Classification
FORM
FS-412(H)
4-68
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
E.0.11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, EG
SUBJ: Middle East Situation
ACTION: USDEL RIAD
FLASH
hich Ismelis would observe
INFO:
SECSTATE WASHIC
FLASH
would be worked out on
for and
SECRET TEL AVIV
enformal understay,
NODIS/CHEROKEE
but not a changes
FOR SECRETARY FROM SISCO
basis document.
ground
1. Day began when Yariv arrived at Embassy with text of
"memorandum of understanding between Israeli Govt and
USG on the agreement between the Govts of Egypt and Israel
concerning the ceasefire." This was presented to us by
(d) point from checkpoint
Yariv as Israeli interpretation of each of the articles in
generally
del
the basic proposal. however All were ^ acceptable to us although the
that would
require some work to arrive at discribe statement
not create problems when me nero go together's
principles that would govern UN manning at inspection points
between on military reps that while Instin might by outs
the road.
I also made clear that in
Point which two ment time related to anmin at
soggestime 2. Toursdation points fine ~ soul. arrived This portan of enformal meno
"Inspection of the non-military supply to the East Bank up!
will be according to the following procedure:
a. The Western checkpoint on the Cairo-Suez road
will be manned by UN personnel. The vehicles carrying non-
military supplies and driven by UN drivers will be inspected
by UN officers with Israeli officers observing.
other and interputation ance we did not , could not get
some of then pints, that this was not
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
into detail at Salat level. create differention
such spenfu ml John Invelis not
which que that could an name alp question of good intention.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 2 -
b. At the Bank of the Canal the unloaded supplies
will be inspected by Israeli officers with UN officers observing."
3. During this discussion, Yariv in touch with PM who asked
that we come to her office to go over final understanding
and to discuss how exactly proposal would be implemented.
4. Meeting with PM began with Allon, Yariv, Dayan, one of
Dayan's aides and Mordechai Gazit of PM's office present.
Ambassador Keating and Saunders accompanied me.
5. Meeting with PM began with above formulation reviewed
and agreed In this discussion, I made three points which
I ashed be recorded as vew.
(a) Exact location of inspection checkpoints would be
left to be worked out on the ground Sudul had mentral
102° a 1090.
(b) Question of whether a third checkpoint apart
from ones at Western end of road and at unloading point
necessary would be left to parties;
(c) We could not object if Israelis insisted on trying
to negotiate presence of Israeli liaison officer with refruement, each
convoy along road, but if Egyptians resisted this
we
comed
marstand on.
6. PM then went over what she would sday say on blockade.
Her final formulation developed along following lines:
Israel had agreed to scrupulous observance of ceasefire,
which of course includes all actions in the air, on the ground
appreciate how they would
but Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential 1 we Library. was not
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
portune of support for Inveli view.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 3 -
and on the sea. She noted that she could not guarantee that
newsmen would not get wind of private understanding on this
subject. Also, newsmen would begin to see boats arriving in
Eilat. I urged her to tell us when first boats would be coming
through so that we could pass word to Eghptians and hopefully
minimize incidents or misunderstandings.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
7. PM asked exactly what Israelis needed to do and what U.S. would
do regarding announcement of agreement. She would like to go on
the air at 8:30 p.m. Friday Israeli time. I told her I would cable
procise of action after I talked to in Riyadh.
you and that a menage would be sent to her re thing
8. At this M meeting seemed about to end with total agreement
then
a
and PM said that agreement would create a new mood foxx if prisoners
were promptly exchanged and if X boats began coming through Straits.
apparately
9. At this point, however, she realized that the paper that would be
published tomorrow would be basic document presented to her last
night and not informal US-Israeli memo of understanding discussed this
morning. She professed to believe that basic agreement would be
changed to reflect wording of memo of understanding. She said that
the Cabinet had approved memo of understanding basic recement.
Then me same another pout.
basin dount lain document
Main sticking point as word "replaced" in statement that UN would
She felt this was bad domestrially for her smile he
replace Israeli checkpoints on road For almost 30 minutes, she
opponents
maintained that she would have to dall another Cabinet meeting and
would
make
urged us to go back to Sadat changing wording of that point to say that
while the change has important substantly
much
checkpoint would be manned by UN personnel. I stated firmly that we
underment now without messurg 1
of
could not accept changes without delay and Msk of upsetting whole
"yo
at deart a 4 hom delay reopening entire pet.
I argued strongly that she not reopen the negotiations.
toking over of
10. Break in impasse came with suggestion that she employ tactic
from the
similar to one you suggested on blockage, and she finally agreed that
Instin
in speech to Knesset she would state as a fact her understanding of what
was objectmentle, she mind
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-5-
be necessary agrand
owner steps would be taken en the ground to effect change on the
I amhed not
road. All on was useful at this point, saying that she could tell Knesset
a
that question of special corridor not at issue and that there would be
no change in fact of control over the road since Invilis not at
11. PM acquiesed with understanding that she could state her inter- protone.
required A move k n
pretation of principle elements of agreement as contained in US-Israeli
memo of understanding but without referring to that memo. Points
$12 would 12 In be Famel die made castion as BUT hers of what of alone. should informal be said memo to pres of on understanding our meeting; Leing
sent
regosted that Hill state simply that we had had useful talks and that I
my way to Riyadh to report to the Secr clary. PM asked
reptel.
whether T could say that 14 was optimistic. At her request I agreed
to do this. Brief three-xxixxote sentence statement to reporters along
these lines made as NO left PM's office.
13 Thus we have final Israeli agreement to basic proposal which you
sent with / Isunel
to le too spenfic, party out that
of regulation talk, diffult
they want a get some of then public number
specificy at mentary will only make at more
for the other side,
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.