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LSE recommendation- -
no letter. vor
December 23, 1968
KISSINGER/ALLEN
DEC2 6 1968
Mr. W. A. Kelley
Lany 1 make
5415 Duvall Drive
me this is unsiden
Washington, D. C. 20016
Dear Spike:
by em man Japan Okinana
Merci for the thoughtful study on the
Okinawan problem. It is in the right
hands -- those of Dr. Kissinger, to be
exact -- and I'm sure it will receive
the close attention it deserves.
I have also your December 10 note with
the copy of your letter to Mr. Knudsen,
still there is nothing definite to re-
port, but then in the chaos of transition,
progress is slow!
The best to you and yours in these holiday
times.
Warmly,
Bryce N. Harlow
Assistant to the
President-Elect
BNH:ph
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
5415 Duvall Drive
Washington, D. C. 20016
December 2, 1968
Mr. Bryce N. Harlow
Assistant to the President-Elect
Pierre Hotel
61 Street and Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10022
Dear Bryce:
Many thanks for your letter of November 19 that unaccount-
ably was received after my letter to you of November 25.
I realize thatthe top jobs must be decided upon before any
thought is given to the lower positions. Meanwhile, in an
effort to be helpful, I have prepared staff studies of
several sensitive areas that you can hand on to whoever is
assigned responsibility for the areas.
The first of these on "Okinawa" is attached. It is one of
the most important bases we have in the world. However,
unless some decisive action is taken shortly, we not only
will lose Okinawa, but our bases in Japan.
1 am leaving here Tuesday for Washington and will be staying
with J. D. Burrus, Jr., 5415 Duvall Drive, Washington, D. C.
20016 Telephone 202 Oliver 4 - 6030. You may remember
Jeff as one of the best tennis players in Washington. He
is in the Legislative Division of the Bureau of the Budget.
With kindest regards and best wishes,
Sincerely yours,
Spike W. A. Kelley
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
OKINAWA
A Staff Study by W. A. Kelley, Former
Assistant Civil Administrator of Okinawa
The Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa, the largest island, is
administered by the United States under provisions of Section III
of the U. S. - Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952. As the most heavily
fortified base in the world, it is the key to the U. S. position
in the Far East and it is the only base on foreign soil where a
status of forces agreement is not necessary, permitting us complete
freedom of action.
However, we are on the point of being forced out of Okinawa. The
Okinawa legislature has sent petitions to the Japanese Diet, to
the United Nations, and to the U. S. Congress. Last week the
Ryukyuan people elected Chobyo Yara as Chief Executive. He ran on
a platform of immediate reversion to Japan. His defeated opponent
ran on a platform of gradual reversion. This is more galling when
it is realized that the Ryukyuan people were never happy under the
Japanese rule. There was a highly developed Okinawan culture long
before there was a Japanese Empire. Over four hundred years ago
under the Okinawa kings a flourishing trade was carried on all over
the Pacific and Indian Oceans and particularly with the great
Chinese empire.
Japanese war lords coveted this trade and moved in gangster style
to control it. Finally, the Japanese Government in 1879 took
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
2
captive the King of Okinawa at the point of the sword and placed
him under house arrest in Tokyo. At the same time they filled
all of the administrative jobs in Okinawa with Japanese and the
Okinawa people were forced to accept second class status. The
Ryukyu Islands became a Prefecture of Japan.
The Okinawa people attempted to stay out of World War II and
begged the Japanese not to fortify Okinawa. When the Japanese
did fortify the island, no provision was made for civil defense
for the inhabitants. On the contrary, they were exposed to the
heavy gunfire in the war's bloodiest battle, SO that there were
147,000 casualties among the civilians.
Consequently with the end of hostilities there was rejoicing
among the Ryukyuan people that the United States was victorious.
The feeling of friendship was increased by the Americans providing
food and shelter and medical assistance to attempt to alleviate
the desperate condition of the people. Every building in Naha,
the capital, had been razed by bombing and gunfire.
Although the Okinawans were not consulted when the U. S. - Japan
peace treaty was negotiated, they happily accepted the transfer
of the Administration of the islands to the United States. They
expected to regain their old freedom, to re-establish the old
kingdom, and resume the prosperous trade of pre-Japanese years.
In this happy, hopeful period we could have negotiated an agree-
ment mutually helpful to both the U. S. and the Ryukyuan people,
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
3
by which we would have guaranteed the security, freedom, and
political stability of the islands and given economic assistance
in return for the right to maintain our bases free of any status
of forces limitations or any interference whatever. This relation-
ship could have existed indefinitely and grown stronger with the
passage of time. Instead, we are on the verge of losing the base
entirely, in spite of the herculean efforts of the last two U. S.
High Commissioners.
Before attempting to propose any remedial action, it is necessary
to review the causes of the loss of such a priceless opportunity.
Instead of being treated as free, friendly equals, the Ryukyuan
people have been treated as conquered subjects. In fact, one
recent High Commissioner openly treated them as such and made
them grovel for everything they needed. In a speech to their
young leaders of the Golden Gate Club, he told them they had
neither the intelligence nor the integrity to govern themselves.
Instead of being given the opportunity to set up their own in-
dependent government, the Military Government established after
the battle of Okinawa has been continued. The name was changed
to U. S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR);
the military doffed their uniforms for mufti; but nothing else
was changed. The military High Commissioner continued to issue
ordinancesand retained the authority to review and approve all
acts of the puppet legislature. Not until this November were
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
4
the people allowed to elect their Chief Executive. The local
budget had to be approved by the Hicom.
Those United States civilians who staffed the USCAR departments
under the military heads used their official authority to their
own advantage and looked upon their positions as personal fiefs.
Many of them were incompetent and incapable of carrying out their
responsibilities.
The control of United States funds appropriated for the local
economy was inadequate; this looseness generated misunderstanding.
Congress also contributed to the erosion of the United States
position by deciding that funds for the development and operation
of the Ryukyus came under Foreign Aid and were subject to the
limitations and regulations of that program. Actually such funds
were no more Foreign Aid than any expense incurred in the operations
of any other base under the United States flag - Fort Myer, Fort
Lewis, Fort Benning or the Presidio. Okinawa is one vast United
States base completely under the command of a Lieutenant General
acting as High Commissioner. Appropriations for Okinawa should
be reviewed by the Armed Services Committees and not by the Foreign
Aid Committees.
Over the past twenty-six years under constant pressure from both
the Ryukyuan people and the Japanese Government, various concessions
have been made by the United States; but each one was granted un-
willingly and ungraciously. Consequently the United States became
identified as the oppressor and Japan as their savior.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
5
We also have made the mistake of believing that money andjobs in
the military installations can buy Ryukyuan cooperation and friend-
ship. More important to them is a loss of face by being forced to
be a nation lacking in identity in world affairs and not even
allowed to fly their own flag.
Recommendations
A military base in the Ryukyu Islands is essential for the United
States position in the Far East and as an early warning station
for any attack on the United States mainland or on the Free World.
Therefore the following actions are recommended:
I. While the United States still retains "the right to exercise
all and any powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdic-
tion over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including
their territorial waters" (U. S. - Japanese Peace Treaty), and
while we still have the support of the ruling Japan Liberal
Democratic Party (JLDP), we should negotiate with the Govern-
ment of the Ryukyu Islands the agreement that we should have
offered twenty-six years ago. This should be done with the
help and support of the JLDP.
This agreement should include:
A. The abolishment of USCAR
B. The appointment of a Civilian Advisory Staff consisting
of competent, qualified, capable specialists on leave from
appropriate departments in Washington and headed by a civilian
Director.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
6
C. A Ryukyu Islands Corporation should be established under
a Deputy Director to be responsible for and to administer all
United States funds used for or by the local people. The Ryukyu
Development Loan Corporation, the Ryukyu Water Development
Corporation, the Ryukyu Electric Power Corporation, the Ryukyu
Tourist Development Board and the Bank of the Ryukyus would be
transferred to and become part of the Corporation.
D. The people of the Ryukyu Islands could proceed to establish
their own form of government not antagonistic to the security
of Japan or the United States.
E. The United States could continue indefinitely to maintain
and operate military bases in the Islands with the same degree
of freedom that exists today.
F. The civilian Director would be a member of the Area Committee
consisting of the Commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force.
The Commanding General of the Army IX Corps would continue to
act as the Representative of the Commander in Chief Pacific
(CINCPAC) and as such would act as Chairman of the Committee.
G. Funds appropriated for civil purposes in the Islands
should be distributed where possible on a loan basis with
reasonable interest except for ememgency purposes, such as
typhoon damage repair. This should permit a revolving fund
to be built up.
H. Overall plans for economic, political, educational,
judicial, and foreign trade development as well as for internal
security should be worked out by the local government assisted
by the Civilian Advisory Group.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
7
I. The United States would reserve the right to take any
necessary action to protect the security of the Islands.
II. As insurance against the possibility of being driven out of
Okinawa, the United States should purchase outright from Okinawa
the island of Iriomote, solely as a base. It is located 250
miles southwest of Okinawa almost within sight of Taiwan.
In 1962 a study made by the Civil Administration revealed the
following facts about Iriomote:
AREA. About 110 square miles.
TOPOGRAPHY. Mountains about 1600 feet high sloping off to the east.
WATER. Ample water throughout the year with two rivers.
CLIMATE. Semi-tropical, much like that of Taiwan.
HARBOR. The finest natural harbor in the Far East, 210 foot
depth surrounded by mountains. Large enough to hold the entire
Japanese fleet in World War II. The fleet used it when threatened
by a typhoon.
POPULATION. Practically unpopulated. Malaria had driven the
population away. The U. S. Army cleared the island of mosquitoes
and malaria has been eradicated. The former inhabitants, however,
never returned.
TRANSPORTATION. Accessible by boat. There is a small grass
landing area for small planes at the eastern end. There is enough
flat area plus the filling in of shoal water to make runways for
large planes. At present there are almost no roads.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
8
INDUSTRY. Fishing and agriculture are the main occupations.
A Japanese company does some lumbering under a license granted
by the United States.
MILITARY USE. A few troops are trained in jungle warfare on
the heavily wooded mountainsides.
RECREATIONAL FACILITIES. Iriomote has some of the finest beaches
in the Ryukyus. There is space available for a sporty golf
course, tennis, and archery. Taiwan is almost in sight on a
clear day, and Ishigaki is only a few minutes away by plane or
boat.
The report of the study concluded with a recommendation that the
island be purchased and plans initiated for the location of
various military installations. The report pointed out that
Iriomote could be defended more easily than could Okinawa.
CONCLUSION. There is no middle ground. We either accept one or
both of the above recommendations or something similar, or the
United States will lose its base in the Ryukyus. If we continue
to pursue our present course of making piecemeal concessions without
attempting to find an overall, permanent solution, the Japanese
Liberal Democratic Party will within three years fall on the issue
of Okinawa; then not only will we be forced out of Okinawa, but
the U. S. - Japan Mutual Security Pact will not be renewed.
It must be kept in mind that some of our Allies during World War II
never concurred in our continued occupation of Okinawa. Our policies
and procedures in the Ryukyus during the past twenty-six years
have strengthened their doubts.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
OPTIONAL FORM NO 10
5010-108
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
Read
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
SECRET/EXDIS
Memorandum
TO
:
EA - Mr. Bundy
DATE: December 24, 1968
EA - Ambassador Brown
FROM : EA/J - Richard L. Sneider
W
SUBJECT: Trip Report: Okinawan Reversion on the Front Burner
The overwhelming impression I have after ten days in
Japan and Okinawa is that we have reached the point of
no return on the reversion issue. The pressures have
built up in both Japan and Okinawa to the point where
I can see virtually no hope of stalling off beyond the
end of next year a decision on the timing of reversion,
although the actual return would take place later.
Particularly worrisome is the turn of events in Okinawa
since Yara's election. There, our problems could indeed
mount up very rapidly. At the same time, there is little
indication that we are as yet any closer to a mutually
satisfactory solution covering our post-reversion base
rights than we were a year ago.
Japan and the Sato Pledge
Once again, Sato has easily overcome the threats to his
power from his rivals within the Party and has put into
office a cabinet, which is by far the ablest and most
understanding of the vitals of U.S. -Japanese relations.
But, the strength of Sato's position can prove to be
transitory: he is an acknowledged lame duck and the
consequential intra-party maneuvering to succeed him has
only now begun. Furthermore, by publicly committing his
regime to solution of the Okinawa problem, he has given
his rivals within the party and his foes outside the party
a major test of success.
With the onset of 1969, there is no doubt that Okinawa is
the number one national issue in Japan. It may be argued
SECRET/EXDIS
SECRET/EX
L.
that Sato placed hi
£ in his
e
predi
ent of
needing an agreemen
th the U
n
aw
uring
1969 by stressing t
ssue over
P
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ears.
However, for bette
wor
he
dor
so
I think
his political ju
it was
bab
at any
effort to pla
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lave
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is
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event, not
onser a ves 1:
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ake
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"fort
solve t
nawa
to continue
proceed
s1
g
plans on Oki
Neither
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tl
Foreig
Of
as
reached any
usion on
'lic'
to
rds
st
rsion
base rights
though
OV
g
IW
that
an offer of C
inued n
toral
CO
b
olitical
suicide. The
reign o
to wi
some
concept
convention
free us
S
thoug : thre gh the
details, part
ilarly hc
ell
to t Japane e public.
In fact, the
appears
CO
ious fort to avoid
deciding the
DJ posit
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n
U.S.
Admin
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is thoroughl
tested.
sado
Jol
keeps re
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the GOJ, on
other h
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first t'
through
its policies terms of
al
ic
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of
t
security nee
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he
un
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whose securi is vital
In the meant
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11 other U
apan
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package of
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is
in As
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ckage fr
IS.
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might give C
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to how i
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E policy
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Their
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nding
oughout
2
spring
to be followed by al summit meeti in Washi
the
fall. Threy have accepted the wisdom of not pushing the
SEC
T/EXDIS
SECRET/EXDIS
3.
new Administration for'an immediate decision on the
Ryukyus, but are worried lest it be put off tdb far
and bring them into 1970 without an agreement.
Okinawa, a Potential Trigger
The new factor in the Okinawa reversion equation is the
pressures developing within Okinawa on reversion. In
the past, it has been the implicit assumption of both
ourselves and the Japanese that the big boys (the U.S.
and Japan) will settle the problem and the Okinawans will
docilely accept our joint decision. This assumption can
no longer be counted upon. The Okinawan intrusion into
the reversion negotiations can come in two ways, through
agitation leading to open incidents with U.S. forces, and
through the evangelistic pressures for action on the part
of the new Chief Executive, Yara.
The potential for an incident involving an open clash
between demonstrators and American military forces
protecting our bases is much higher today than ever
before. Given the limited capabilities of the Ryukyuan
police, such an incident has always been possible. The
odds have been considerably shortened in recent weeks by
three factors:
(1) The increased militancy and radicalism of the
students who are beginning to mimic the tactics of their
Japanese brethren;
(2) the ambiguous position of Yara who at the same
time is the accepted leader and spokesman of the anti-
base movement and is now responsible for controlling it
-- nobody knows how he will react when the crunch comes;
and,
(3) the development of an issue that binds almost
all Okinawans and strikes a sympathetic, emotional chord
-- the B-52 operations at Kadena and the danger of another
incident.
SECRET/EXDIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
SECRET/EXDIS
4.
In this climate, our insistance upon exercising our
unrestricted rights for B-52 operations, SSN visits,
etc. becomes not only a focal point for potentially
dangerous demonstrations, but further an incentive to
seek as soon as possible reversion of Okinawa at the
"homeland level" where the Japanese Government will
"protect" the Okinawans against the U.S. General
Unger is making every effort to reach a modus vivendi
with Yara without making serious concessions on base
rights. But it is a precarious task given the pressures
Yara is under from his left-wing coalition and the
inherent desire of the conservative opposition to see
him fail.
Yara, moreover, has cast himself as the confirmed and
authentic spokesman of Okinawan reversion sentiments.
In his grand tour of Japan, he constantly pushed the
theme of early reversion. But, of even more concern
to us is his effort at the same time to inject himself
into the debate on the conditions for reversion. Yara
has publicly urged not only "homeland level" but a thinning
out of U.S. bases. He has made it clear that he, as
Okinawa's elected leader, is going to resist efforts to
ignore the Okinawan view on post-reversion U.S. base rights.
Thus, it is not impossible that the pace of events in
Okinawa could press the Japanese Government to accelerate
its current timetable. Certainly, an incident involving
a clash between demonstrators and U.S. military guards
around bases will put the Japanese Government on a very
difficult spot. The spectre of such a development constantly
plagues the Foreign Office and other Japanese officials.
The General State of Health of U.S. Japan Relations
Outside the Okinawan issue, there are some encouraging
notes of progress in resolving current U.S. -Japan problems,
particularly with respect to trade restrictions against
U.S. imports, and the reasonably quiet visit of the nuclear
sub. In very large part these actions taken by the
SECRET/EXDIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
SECRET/EXDIS
5.
Japanese are in their own self-interest and cued to
clearing the decks for a favorable decision on reversion.
But, they also reflect the dedication of the current
leadership to maintaining a close relationship with us.
Symptomatically, after lengthy consideration, the
Japanese Government has accepted our offer for space
cooperation rather than going it alone.
However, below the surface there are bubblings of
serious discontent from within the ranks of the next
generation of leaders about the character of the U.S. -
Japan alliance and Japan's great dependence on the U.S.
These younger men are not necessarily dissatisfied with
a partnership with the U.S. but are concerned that the
present relationship gives too little freedom to the
new Japanese nationalism -- a vague and still far from
well-defined concept. They are not now seeking or even
necessarily desirous of a break with the U.S. and embarking
on a deGaullist path. They do look for a new relationship
with the U.S. by 1980 which meets their principal criterion
of "equality" with us. In the context of this new nationalism,
Okinawa has become a serious test of U.S. willingness to
treat Japan on more equal terms.
is
EA/J:RLSneider/pmh
SECRET/EXDIS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
IN REPLY REFER TO:
SECRET
January 11, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kissinger
FROM
: Richard L. Sneider
SUBJECT
: Policy Issues for NSC Consideration
Short-term (within the next two months)
1. U.S. policy on Okinawan reversion in the context
of a full review of U.S.-Japanese relations.
2. Review of Indonesian policy. (Our current policy
is basically sound but needs review and confirmation.)
3. U.S. policy towards the Philippines. This should
cover both U.S.-Philippine relations and the potential
for major internal upheaval in the Philippines.
Mid-term (four to five months)
1. China policy.
2. U.S. policy towards Cambodia and Laos in the context
of a Viet-Nam settlement.
3. U.S. policy towards Thailand.
4. U.S. policy towards Korea. (SIG has a major study
of Korean policy under consideration but no decisions
have been made.)
Long-term (The problems below are essential starting points
for any reframing of our Asian policy but have less
operational urgency than the problems set forth above.)
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
SECRET
2.
1. U.S. interests, commitments and role in Asia.
2. The future structure of regional associations in
Asia and the U.S. role therein.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
IN REPLY REFER TO:
SECRET
January 11, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kissinger
FROM
: Richard L. Sneider
SUBJECT
: Major Issues Anticipated During the
Next Six Weeks in East Asia -- Addendum
You have my previous memorandum of January 7 listing the
major anticipated issues. Set forth below is a further
elaboration on the options available, the status of
current policy consideration and my recommendations.
1. Issue: Korea - Pueblo
Problem: With the return of the Pueblo crew there
remains the requirement to register a formal protest
on the treatment of the crew for the record at
Panmunjom and the UN and to come to a decision on
what we do about the ship. Our protest on the treatment
of the crew presents no problems. However, the Navy
is disposed to take punitive action (e.g. seizure of a
North Korean ship) if the Pueblo is not returned.
The State Department feels we should protest at
Panmunjom and the UN but go no further.
Status: The Korean Task Force is developing plans
for next steps on both problems.
Recommendation: Punitive action would be very risky
and is not likely to get the Pueblo back. The State
Department line makes more sense, particularly since
they would combine this with an occasional show of
Naval force outside North Korean territorial waters.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
SECRET
2.
2. Issue: North Korean provocation
Problem: There is a possibility that the North
Koreans may intensify guerrilla warfare or otherwise
take provocative actions in the next months.
Status: There are contingency plans available and
North Korean actions are under close watch.
Recommendation: I suggest these contingency plans
be checked out at an early date.
3. Issue: Warsaw talks
Problem: The Chinese Communists have opened the
door slightly for the February 20 Warsaw talks,
indicating they would like to talk about peaceful
co-existence and Taiwan. They may be prepared to
give us further signals and/or test out the new
Administration.
Status: EA has under consideration several options
ranging from a willingness to hear out any Chicom
proposals along with a restatement of our Taiwan
policy to a more positive offer of sounding out the
Chinese on normalization of relations.
Recommendation: At this stage I would be inclined
to move very cautiously with the Chinese and put the
monkey on their backs to come up with any specific
proposals for peaceful co-existence but leaving the
door open for reconsideration of our policies with
the exception of our commitment to Taiwan.
4. Issue: Japanese trade talks
Problem: The U.S. has been pushing the Japanese to
ease their restriction on American imports. Favorable
Japanese action will be quite useful in dealing with
Congressional pressures for protectionist legislation.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
SECRET
3.
Status: Further negotiations are underway with
some hope of getting a satisfactory Japanese offer.
Recommendation: An early statement from the new
Administration spokesman stressing its concern
about this problem will be necessary.
5. Issue: B-52s on Okinawa
Problem: Since an accident in late November, there
has been continued and widespread agitation in
Okinawa against the stationing of B-52s for Viet-Nam
operations. So far, the agitation has been limited
to peaceful demonstrations and protests but a general
strike is planned in early February. If these
demonstrations lead to any bloodshed and the involve-
ment of U.S. troops, our reversion timetable and
negotiating position could be upset.
Status: EA is planning to raise this issue with the
Secretary-designate after January 20.
Recommendation: My inclination is to move the B-52s
in a carefully prepared scenario to Thailand where
additional facilities will be available in early
February.
6. Issue: Laos
Problem: The North Vietnamese offensive in Laos
has already begun in earnest, but the level of
military activity is not yet above previous years.
Status: The situation is under close watch and
options are under consideration for escalating U.S.
countermoves in case the NVN raises the ante.
Recommendation: No additional U.S. measures would
seem to be required at the present level of North
Vietnamese activity.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
SECRET
4.
7. Issue: Cambodia
Problem: Recent signals from Sihanouk indicate
greater interest in resuming relations with us.
At the same time, Cambodia remains a major
infiltration route and supply area for the NVN
-- a matter of erratic concern to Sihanouk.
Status: The State Department has under consideration
a possible U.S. border declaration, a necessary first
step to resumption of relations. The JCS is likely
to seek authorization for more extended military
action against the NVN in Cambodia.
Recommendation: I would be inclined to let
Sihanouk set the pace of any move to resume
relations but leave the door ajar for him. Any
move in this direction should not involve restraints
upon our present level of military action against
VC use of Cambodia and hopefully additional restraints
on the VC. I would not go along with additional
U.S. military measures against the VC inside
Cambodia.
8. Issue: Philippines
Problem: In recent weeks, particularly since
Romulo took over as Foreign Minister, the Filipinos
have been on a rampage. They have focused on the
base rights issues. They will inevitably make an
early effort - outside normal diplomatic channels
probably -- to test their credentials and leverage
with the new Administration. They may also raise
the Laurel-Langley problem.
Status: The Department is watching this closely but
proposes no immediate ameliorating action.
Recommendation: I would play it cool and somewhat
distant with the Filipinos until an urgent review
of the Philippines package is completed.
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
SECRET
5.
9. Issue: Outer Mongolian recognition
Problem: The question of recognizing the
Mongolian Peoples' Republic has been pending
for some time but held up largely due to
anticipated GRC strenuous objections.
Status: A recommendation for recognition has
been prepared but held over for the new Administration.
Recommendation: There is no compelling reason
to move on this one quickly. But, it makes
generally good sense although any action should
be checked for its bearing on broader China policy.
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
department OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
SECRET
January 7, 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kissinger
FROM
: Richard L Sneider
SUBJECT
: Major Issues Anticipated During
the Next Six Weeks in East Asia
1. Viet-Nam Negotiations: Obviously the key issue
requiring immediate decision is the U. S. posture in
the Viet-Nam negotiations. I assume you are already
seized with the details of this one.
2. Other Potential Crisis Possibilities: EA has
prepared the attached memorandum for Secretary-
designate Rogers covering the major crisis possibilities.
I would only add two footnotes: (1) the latest reports
from Laos indicate that the North Vietnamese dry season
offensive has already begun in earnest with activity in
three out of the four military regions; (2) the current
pressure point in Okinawa is general agitation over the
stationing of B-52s for Viet-Nam operations, resulting
from one B-52 accident and one near miss.
3. Other Policy Issues:
a. Korea: A series of actions will be required
to finish up on the Pueblo incident.
b. China: (1) Warsaw talks with Chinese Communists
are scheduled for February 20, providing the
first clear opportunity for the new Administration
to sound out Peking and signal its own policy.
(2) Italian recognition of Peking: Foreign
Minister Nenni has indicated his Government's
intention to move toward recognition of Communist
China with the timing and other details still
left vague.
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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2.
C. Japan: (1) Trade talks: We are in mid-
stream in discussions with the Japanese
on trade liberalization. The first round
was only partially satisfactory and more
discussions are scheduled. An early signal
from the new Administration on this issue
will be looked for by the Japanese and
required. (2) Meeting schedule: The
Japanese have been sounding us out on a
schedule for top level meetings, both
unofficial and official and including a
joint cabinet session during the summer and
a Prime Minister visit in the fall. Much of
this relates to the Japanese desire for
reaching an Okinawan settlement by the end
of the year, but there are other key problems
to be faced. An early decision on the cabinet
level meeting will be desirable. We shall also
have to begin hacking away at the fundamental
policy issues invo 1ved in an Okinawan agreement.
d. Cambodia: The question of a possible U.S. border
declaration leading to a resumption of relations
with Cambodia could come up in the early weeks.
e. Outer Mongolia: The question of recognizing
the Mongolian People's Republic has been pending
for some time and could be given an early look.
f. Philippines: The Filipinos will inevitably be
nosing around very early in the new Administration
to test their credentials and leverage. They may
raise their desire to negotiate a new bilateral
trade agreement with us, which they have been
pressing for.
g. Burma: U.S. military assistance to Burma, which
has been at modest levels, ran out in 1968.
There are hints the Burmese want to continue this
program but a decision has been left to the new
Administration.
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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3.
4. Future of AID: The bulk of our aid resources are
expended in Asia. The future of U.S. assistance programs
and AID is very shaky. There is a vital need for very
early resuscitation and restructuring if we are to avoid
serious damage to our interests in Asia.
Attachment:
Memorandum on Crisis Possibilities
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
SECRET-EXDIS
Crisis Possibilities in First Two Weeks of the New Administration
EAST ASIA
1. Possible crises arising from deliberate, provocative acts
designed to embarrass the new administration:
a. South Viet-Nam - Major VC/NLF attacks on the cities.
b. Laos - Communist drive against key souther towns
of FAR strongpoints in the north; NLHX campaign to
try captured U.S. pilots for "war crimes".
C. North Korea - Intensified guerrilla warfare against
South Korea; terrorist attacks in major cities,
violations of DMZ, inserting guerrilla parties
by sea. These might be so provocative as to trig-
ger South Korean retaliation.
6. Communist China - We expect no deliberate provo-
cations, particularly in view of the CPR's decision
to meet with us in Warsaw on February 20.
2. "Coincidental crises" not aimed at the U.S. but potentially
embarrassing to the new administration:
a. Sabah - Outbreak of terrorist activities, air or
naval "incidents" between the Philippines and
Malaysia.
b. Okinawa . Anti-Mase demonstrations which get out
of control and require the use of U.S. forces to
contain them.
C. South Viet-Nam - Domestic political crisis arising
from factionalism and rivalries in the GVN.
d. Cambodia - A serious border incident possibly
involving capture of U.S. personnel.
EA: RWDuenling
January 6, 1969
SECRET-EXDIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library