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    "ocrText": "TELCON\n- 2 -\nJerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger\n5:50 p.m., September 29, 1972\nK:\nYeah, but I don't want to jeopardize anything. And therefore to say, \"it\nwould be wrong to conclude that it's all wrapped up, 11 indicates that it's\n90% wrapped up.\nS:\nNo, it doesn't. Not to me it doesn't. It means that\nK:\nBut can you say, \"But it's wrong to say that a settlement is in sight. 11\nS:\nSure.\nK:\nOkay. Alright. What's your next problem?\nS:\nI don't have any other real problems. \"It would be wrong to say that a\nsettlement is in sight, 11 fine. That's swell.\nK:\nGood. See how easy I am to get along with.\nS:\n(laughter) Yeah. The rest of it just for your information we\ngot\nstuff out of Saigon, which I knocked down, but they are saying of late\nU.S. Embassy officials in Saigon have suggested that since the South\nVietnamese control 90% of the population, they should also control the\nin\nland. That is, any ceasefire agreement Communists forces would be\nhard to pull back to friendly populated regrouping areas along the Laos\nand Cambodian border. There is a notion as the case in existence before\nrepresents no more than an optimum hope and a forewarn one. Hanoi\ninsists that any ceasefire must recognize the quote \"actual realities\"\nwith each side having political control in areas which troops control\nand Washington would not likely jeopardize chances for a ceasefire on such\na dubious point. And then we talk about\nK:\nWell, all of this is your own speculation.\nS:\nRight, right, right. But a lot of this is from Saigon. not a big story\nreally. It's kind of keeping the momentum going.\nK:\nRight. Okay.\nS:\nOkay. Thanks, Henry. Bye.\nwgh"
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