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TELCON Hal Sonnenfeldt Secretary Kissinger 3/5/74 9:06 a. m. S: question of what we do about it is really the difference between being relaxed and letting it fall of its own weight or actively working against it. I never doubt it after what Home said that the British weren't going to stop it and then they were too weak to stop it anyway, I don't know what Sheel said to you in Bonn but I think to keep the French happy and to just show a movement, it was pretty inevitable I'm that they should do it and getting together some people right now to do a paper for you, but I don't really-- K: I am determined not to accept it; it is not a question of whether the decision in itself can harm us, it is when the Secretary of State is in Brussels to brief NATO to be summoned to the EC and then to be informed of a decision that they have already taken and that it is already in the newspapers S: Yeh, of course, I couldn't tell what Scheel might ha ve said to you in Bonn on the thing K: He lied--you know, he obviously said we would do a few minor things but we will never go to the Foreign Minister's meeting S: There is some talk this was a surprising development, but I can't believe it--that these things happen out of no where. K: And to take the decision with Britain absent and Italy having no government is inexcusable S: I think obviously that puts you in a very awkward position and it is a stupid thing to do in this fashion and undoubtedly it was done as a means of repairing a relationship with the French. I don't think everybody has a hell of a lot of confidence that it amounts to a great deal and it does come down in the end to how much capital you want to spend to work against something like this. K: I don't want to work against it, I want to use it as an excuse to show that this procedure will never be accepted again. S: I think that on the most immediately related issue--the energy conference, the Europeans still seem to be under some general impression that they did us a favor in the way they conducted themselves in the conference, and I think that is where our tactics are going to have to be adjusted to more passive position

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    "ocrText": "TELCON\nHal Sonnenfeldt\nSecretary Kissinger\n3/5/74\n9:06 a. m.\nS:\nquestion of what we do about it is really the difference between\nbeing relaxed and letting it fall of its own weight or actively working\nagainst it. I never doubt it after what Home said that the British\nweren't going to stop it and then they were too weak to stop it anyway,\nI don't know what Sheel said to you in Bonn but I think to keep the\nFrench happy and to just show a movement, it was pretty inevitable\nI'm\nthat they should do it and getting together some people right now to\ndo a paper for you, but I don't really--\nK:\nI am determined not to accept it; it is not a question of whether the\ndecision in itself can harm us, it is when the Secretary of State is\nin Brussels to brief NATO to be summoned to the EC and then to be\ninformed of a decision that they have already taken and that it is\nalready in the newspapers\nS:\nYeh, of course, I couldn't tell what Scheel might ha ve said to you in\nBonn on the thing\nK:\nHe lied--you know, he obviously said we would do a few minor things\nbut we will never go to the Foreign Minister's meeting\nS:\nThere is some talk this was a surprising development, but I can't\nbelieve it--that these things happen out of no where.\nK:\nAnd to take the decision with Britain absent and Italy having no government\nis inexcusable\nS:\nI think obviously that puts you in a very awkward position and it is a stupid\nthing to do in this fashion and undoubtedly it was done as a means of\nrepairing a relationship with the French. I don't think everybody has\na hell of a lot of confidence that it amounts to a great deal and it does\ncome down in the end to how much capital you want to spend to work against\nsomething like this.\nK:\nI don't want to work against it, I want to use it as an excuse to show that\nthis procedure will never be accepted again.\nS:\nI think that on the most immediately related issue--the energy conference,\nthe Europeans still seem to be under some general impression that they\ndid us a favor in the way they conducted themselves in the conference, and\nI think that is where our tactics are going to have to be adjusted to more\npassive position"
}