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By HILALY
APRIL 1971
Message from Premier (hou an Lai
Premier Choce en Lai thanked President Yahya
for conveying the message of President Nixon on
5 Jan 71. Premier Chou eu Lai is very grateful to
President Yahya and he will be grateful if President
Yahya conveys the following Verbatein message to
President Nixon
"Owing to the setuation at the time, it
has not been possible to raply earlier to the
message from the President of the USA to the Premier
of People's Republic of Chesia
At present contacts between the
peoples of China and the limited states are
being renewed. However, if the relatin
between Chuia and the USA are to be restored
freendamentally , the US must withdraw all its
Armed forces from Chrias Taiwan and
Tanion Straits area. A solution to this
crucial question Call be found only
through direct discussions between high
level responsible persons of the two countries.
Therefore, the Chinese Goot reaffiems its
willingness to receive publically in Peking
a special envoy of the President of the
US (for instance, Mr Kiessinger) or the
US Secy of state or even the Prosident of
the US himself for a direct mesting and
Reproduced
at
the
Richard
Nixon
discussions. of Course if the us President
Considers that the time is not yet ripe, the
matter may be deferred to a later date. As
for the modulities, procedure and other details
of the high level meeting and discussions in
Peking, as they are of no substantive significance,
it is behived that it is entirely possible for proper
arrangements to be made through the good
offices of President Yahya Khan ."
April 21, 1971
Renroduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential I ibrary and Museum
The Honourable
Dr Henry A. Kissinger
The White House Office
Washington D.C.
embassy OF pakistan
2315 massachusetts avenue, N.W.
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20008
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DELIVERED BY HUALY
TAB 19
6:15 27 APRIL 71
RECORD OF A DISCUSSION WITH MR HENRY KISSINGER
ON THE WHITE HOUSE ON 16TH DECEMBER 1970.
I was summoned to the White House by Mr Kissinger
this morning at 11 a. m. He told me that in reply to the message
sent by Premier Chou en-Lai through our President which I
conveyed to him on the 9th December, President Nixon would like
to send a fresh message to President Yahya for passing it on to
the Chinese Prime Minister (he presumed this would be through
the Chinese Ambassador in Pakistan). He then gave me an unsigned
note in an envelope. When I asked him what it contained he said
that in response to Chou en Lai's suggestion that a special
representative of President Nixon would be welcome in Peking
to discuss the question of Taiwan, President Nixon wished to
inform Premier Chou en Lai that the U.S. Government was prepared
to attend a preliminary meeting at an early date in a location
convenient to both sides to discuss what
arrangements could
or should be made for sending a U.S. delegation to Peking for
high level discussions. In reply to questions from me, Mr
Kissinger said that the preliminary meeting could take place in
Rawalpindi if General Yahya's government would not be embarrassed
in any way by it. From the U.S. side the representatives could
be, Ambassador Murphy or Mr Dewey or Ambassador David Bruce.
Or it could also be himself. (He could arrange to pay a visit to
Vietnam and under that cover, arrange a halt in Pakistan for
the purpose of meeting the Chinese epresentative. It would
depend on what kind of official the Chinese would send to Pakistan
for this purpose).
Mr Kissinger added that if a U.S. delegation ultimately
went to Peking, the discussions would not be confined to the
question/
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
.
- 2 -
question of Taiwan but all matters connected with improving
relations with the Chinese and reducing tensions would
be discussed. Also that it would not be difficult to comply
with the Chinese request for withdrawing American forces
from Taiwan. There were no American military forces there
except advisory and training missions
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Handed by Mr. Kissing
to am Hilaly 1200, 5/10/71.
33
President Nixon has carefully studied the message of April 21,
1971, from Premier Chou En-Lai conveyed through the courtesy of
President Yahya Khan. President Nixon agrees that direct high-level
negotiations are necessary to resolve the issues dividing the United
States of America and the People's Republic of China. Because of the
importance he attaches to normalizing relations between our two countries,
President Nixon is prepared to accept the suggestion of Premier
Chou En-Lai that he visit Peking for direct conversations with the
leaders of the People's Republic of China. At such a meeting each side
would be free to raise the issue of principal concern to it.
In order to prepare the visit by President Nixon and to establish
reliable contact with the leaders of the Chinese People's Republic, President
Nixon proposes a preliminary secret meeting between his Assistant for
National Security Affairs, Dr. Kissinger and Premier Chou En-Lai
or another appropriate high-level Chinese official. Dr. Kissinger would be
prepared to attend such a meeting on Chinese soil preferably at some
location within convenient flying distance from Pakistan to be suggested
by the People's Republic of China. Dr. Kissinger would be authorized to
discuss the circumstances which would make a visit by President Nixon
most useful, the agenda of such a meeting, the time of such a visit and to
begin a preliminary exchange of views on all subjects. of mutual interest.
If it should be thought desirable that a special emissary come to Peking
publically between the secret visit to the People's Republic of China of
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 2 -
Dr. Kissinger and the arrival of President Nixon, Dr. Kissinger will
be authorized to arrange it. It is anticipated that the visit of President
Nixon to Peking could be announced within a short time of the secret
meeting between Dr. Kissinger and Premier Chou En-Lai. Dr. Kissinger
will be prepared to come from June 15 onward.
It is proposed that the precise details of Dr. Kissinger's trip
including location, duration of stay, communication and similar matters
be discussed through the good offices of President Yahya Khan. For
secrecy, it is essential that no other channel be used. It is also under-
stood that this first meeting between Dr. Kissinger and high officials of
the People's Republic of China be strictly secret.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TAB38
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
May 15, 1971
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER K
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Ambassador Farland,
May 7, 1971
On Friday, May 7, I met for three hours with Ambassador Farland
in Palm Springs. At that time, I outlined the exchange of messages
between the U.S. and China that has taken place through the Pakistanis;
I read portions of the most recent message delivered by Ambassador
Hilaly on April 21 and told Ambassador Farland that you intended to
respond by proposing that I meet with Chou en-Lai, or a suitable
Chinese representative, either in Pakistan or at a location in southern
China easily accessible from Pakistan. We considered a number of
details associated with the trip and reached some tentative decisions.
-- After reviewing several alternative communication channels,
we agreed to place a special Navy communicator in Karachi to provide
a communications channel similar to the one I have set up with Bahr
and Rush. This should be operational this week.
-- I discussed with Ambassador Farland my proposed trip
itinerary which would provide for an arrival in Islamabad on a Friday,
at which point he or Yahya could arrange to host me for the weekend.
This would provide the cover for my meeting with the Chinese, and on
Monday I would continue on to Tehran. I indicated that I would probably
require about 24 hours with the Chinese and would plan on meeting in
three separate sessions.
-- Ambassador Farland felt that it would be better to be taped
by the Chinese than the Pakistanis, and for this reason the meeting should
be conducted in southern China rather than Pakistan.
-- We discussed the relative merits of my traveling to China by
Pakistani, Chinese or U.S. aircraft and tentatively decided that the
optimum arrangement would be to pre-position a smaller White House
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
- 2 -
aircraft in Pakistan equipped with a Pakistani navigator. This would
permit the larger aircraft in which I arrive to remain parked at
Rawalpindi over the weekend in public view.
-- I instructed Ambassador Farland to discuss our meeting
and my proposed trip with Yahya and made him responsible for all the
technical details of the trip. He will submit for my review several
possible scenarios for the China meeting as soon as the special communi-
cations channel is activated.
Ambassador Farland made several more general points:
-- He was sharply critical of Ambassador Keating who, in his
view, is attempting to make a partisan issue of the Pakistani situation
and discredit the Administration in the process. Ambassador Keating
apparently called in a New York Times correspondent and divulged the
contents of the Blood cables, and Ambassador Farland feels that
Ambassador Keating will use his trip back to Washington to lobby
against your Pakistan policies.
-- Ambassador Farland stressed his conviction that it will take
a substantial (i.e., $250 million) loan to sustain Pakistan for another
six months and he requested support in obtaining a commitment from
the World Bank or IMF. As a related matter, Ambassador Farland
asked that Hannah be told in a forceful way that you want him to adopt
a positive attitude toward Pakistan for at least the next six months.
-- Ambassador Farland also felt that Germany, Great Britain
and possibly also Japan should be apprised of our determination to save
Pakistan and asked to adjust their policies to support our position.
A full record of the meeting is attached at Tab A.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TAB52
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
May 25, 1971
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
M. and Mme. John Paul Sainteny
Brig. General Alexander M. Haig
W. Richard Smyser, NSC Staff
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
PLACE:
Dr. Kissinger's Office
TIME:
Luncheon, May 25, 1971
Substantive portions of the luncheon conversation centered on Vietnam
and China. Following are the highlights of M. Sainteny's observations.
Vietnam
M. Sainteny said that:
-- Hanoi does not fully believe that the Americans will leave
Vietnam. If they were assured of that and of a certain number
of seats for the NLF in the Assembly, they would come to terms
on POWs, ceasefire, and the separation of the two Vietnams for
a number of years. (M. Sainteny actually was somewhat ambiguous
about North Vietnamese political demands but appeared to suggest
that Assembly representation might satisfy them for the time being
anyway.)
-- The NLF is really quite independent of North Vietnam and there
could be significant differences between them. However, M. Sainteny
thought Hanoi would be willing to deal with us without the NLF.
-- The North Vietnamese are still determined to pursue their struggle
although he sensed a certain degree of uncertainty. Le Duan is
in charge, but he clearly does not have the authority of Ho Chi Minh.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
2
The extensive corruption in South Vietnam gives the
non-corrupt North Vietnamese an advantage with the
South Vietnamese people. The GVN is so tarnished that
it would be better from our standpoint to see it replaced.
There are good people in South Vietnam and Paris; for
example, Big Minh, who, while not brilliant, is popular.
Madame Binh is tough; Xuan Thuy is enigmatic; Mai Van Bo's
replacement is not up to his standard.
-- In response to Dr. Kissinger's query whether Hanoi might
fear its traditional enemies, China and Japan, Mme. Sainteny
did not believe this was an important factor. She did not think
that the North Vietnamese feared China, and with Japan their
concern was only in the economic realm. On the other hand,
they believe that the Americans have reasons to stay in Vietnam,
including their anticommunism and their position as world leader.
China
Mr. Sainteny said the following:
The US moves concerning China were good, and we were now
on a good path.
With the Chinese, if you knock on one door they will open another
one. Thus, while the Chinese Ambassador in Paris had merely
transmitted Dr. Kissinger's note without comment, M. Sainteny
believed the approach through him had been very efficacious with
respect to recent events.
-- Chou En-lai has been clearly in charge since the Cultural
Revolution, with Mao now being old.
The Chinese will blow hot and cold in their dealings with us.
We should multiply our gestures toward them to show our good will;
he cited as an example that his company wished to sell helicopters
to the Chinese, but were prevented by COCOM restrictions because
an American license was needed for certain parts.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
3
Dr. Kissinger said that M. Sainteny could tell the Chinese that
the US will look positively at these trade questions. We will be
freeing some trade items, although we cannot guarantee to free them
all and will not release any with military significance.
After Lunch
After lunch, M. Sainteny remained for further private conversation
with Dr. Kissinger. During that conversation he asked Dr. Kissinger
whether he could tell Ambassador Bruce and Xuan Thuy that he had
occasional contact with Dr. Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger said that he
could tell those people.
Dr. Kissinger asked M. Sainteny whether we could use him to get
a message to the Chinese very fast if we needed to. M. Sainteny said
he thought he could get to the Chinese quickly enough to deliver any
urgent message, and that he would be pleased to do it.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Message from Premier Chou En Lai to President Nixon
May 29, 1971
"Premier Chou En Lai sincerely thanks His Excellency President
Yahya Khan for most rapidly transmitting the three messages from President
Nixon.
"Premier Chou En Lai has seriously studied President Nixon's
messages of April 29, May 17th and May 22nd, 1971, and has reported with
much pleasure to Chairman Mao Tse Tung that President Nixon is prepared
to accept his suggestion to visit Peking for direct conversations with the
leaders of the Peoples Republic of China. Chairman Mao Tse Tung has
indicated that he welcomes President Nixon's visit and looks forward to
that occasion when the may have direct conversations with His Excellency
the President, in which each side would be free to raise the principal issue
of concern to it. It goes without saying that the first question to be settled
is the crucial issue between China and the United States which is the question
of the concrete way of the withdrawal of all the U. S. Armed Forces from
Taiwan and Taiwan Straits area.
"Premier Chou En Lai welcomes Dr. Kissinger to China as the
U. S. representative who will come in advance for a preliminary secret
meeting with high level Chinese officials to prepare and make necessary
arrangements for President Nixon's visit to Peking.
"Premier Chou En Lai suggests that it would be preferable for
Dr. Kissinger to set a date between June 15 and 20th for his arrival in China,
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-2-
that Peking may be the location and that he may fly direct from Islamabad
to a Peking airport not open to the public. As for the flight, he may take a
Pakistan Boeing aircraft or a Chinese special plane can be sent to fly him
to and from China, if needed. The talks plus the flights on both ways will
probably take three or four days. If there is the desire to use his own
telecommunication equipment on a temporary basis during his stay in Peking
he may do so.
"As it is difficult to keep Dr. Kissinger's trip strictly secret, he
may well consider coming for the meeting in an open capacity. If secrecy
is still desired the Government of the Peoples Republic of China will on its
part guarantee the strict maintenance of secrecy. When the talks have
yielded results, the two sides may agree to a public announcement to be
made after the meeting, if it is so desired.
"As for other details, they may be discussed and arranged through
President Yahya Khan directly with the Chinese Ambassador.
"Premier Chou En Lai warmly looks forward to the meeting with
Dr. Kissinger in Peking in the near future. 11
I notice from the above message that the Premier has given an
alternative for an open meeting between himself and Dr. Kissinger. Knowing
Dr. Kissinger's desire to maintain strict secrecy which fact I have been
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-3-
impressing upon Premier Chou En Lai, the above message is indicative
of the Premier's acceptance of the secret meeting for which he has given
guarantee. The rest will depend upon U.S. and Pakistan maintaining secrecy.
As regards arrangements on our part, I have discussed with the
Chinese Ambassador and propose as follows:
(a) Dr. Kissinger arrives on a D Day
(b) After a 24 hour stop in Islamabad and a meal with
me, he will ostensibly make a trip to a place not open
to public in the Northern region. In actual fact, a
Pakistan Boeing will carry him along the Northern
route direct to Peking up from Islamabad. The time
of flight will be approximately seven hours. On
completion of the mission, Dr. Kissinger will return
to Islamabad to resume his onward journey.
If Dr. Kissinger would find it helpful, I am considering sending a
high level Pakistani with him to Peking.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Messa from Premier (hou eu Lou to Resident Nixon
May 29, 1971
Premier (hou En Lai suicerely thanks His Excellency
President Yahya Khan for most rapidly transmitting the three messages
from President Nixon.
Premier (hou Eu Lai has seriously studied President Nixon's
messages of April 29, May IT the are dizznd May 1971, and has reported
with much pleasure to (hairmone Mao Tse Tung that President Nixon is
prepared to accept his suggestion to visit Peking for direct conversations
with the Leaders of the Peoples Repuslic of China. (hairman Mao Tse Tung
has indicated that he Welcomes President Nixon's visit and looks
forward to that occasion when he may have direct conversations
with His Excellency the President, in which each side would be
free to raise the principal issue of concern to it. It goes without
saying that the first question to be settled is the crucial issue
between (heria and the linited States which is the question of the
concrete way of the withdraw-al of all the US Armed forces from
Taiwan and Taiwan Straits Area
Premier (hou En Lai welcomes Dr Kissinger to (hina
as the US representative who will come in advance for a
preliminary secret meeting with high level (hinese officials to
prepare and make necessary assongements for President Nixon's
visit to Paking.
would
Premier (hou En Lai suggests that it will be preferrable
for Da Kissinger to set a date between June 15 and 20 the for his
arrival in (hina, that Peking may be clinese the location and that he may
they direct from Islamabad to a Peking Airport not open anicraft, to the
Puslie. As for the flight, he may take a Pakistan Boeing a
Chinese special plane can be sent to fly him to and from
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
2
(herie, if needed. The talks plus the flights on botte ways will
probably take three or four days. If there is the desire to use his
own telecommunication equipment on a temporary basis during his
stay in Peking he may do so,
As it is difficult to keep Dr Kissinger's trip strictly
secret, he may well consider coming for the meeting in an open
capacity. If secrecy is still desired the Gout of the Peoples Repullic
of Cheria will on its part * guarantee the strict maintenance of
secrecy. when the talks have yielded results, the two Sides may
agree to a public amouncement to be made after the meeting,
if it is so desired.
As for other details, theymay be discussed and arranged
through President Yahya Khan directly with the Chinese
Ambassador.
Premier (hou En Lai warmly looks forward to the
11 meeting with Dr Kissinger in Peking in the near future is
x
Message Ends.
1 notice from the above message that the Premier has given
an alternative for an open meeting between himself and Dr Kissinger
Knowing Dr Kissinger's desire to maintain strict secrecy which fact 1 have
been impressing upon Premier (hou Eu Lai, the above message is indicative
of the Premiers acceptance of the secret meeting for which he has given
guarantee. The rest will depend upon US and Pakistan maintaining secrecy
As regards arrangements on our part, 1 have discussed with
the (hinese Ambassador and propose as follows:
a. De Kissinger arrives on a DDay
b. After a 24 hours stop in Islamabod and a meal with
me, he will ostensisly make a trip to a place not
open to public the Northern region. In actual fact,
a Pakistanit Boeing will carry him along the Northern
route direct to Peking from Islamabad. The time of
flight will be approximately seven hours. On completer
of the missine, Dr Kissenger will return to Islamabad to
resume his onward Journey.
of Dr Kissinger would find it helpful, I are considering sending
1,
Ee high level Pakistani with him to Peking
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
Pranier (hou eu Laus' Message to President Nixon
June 11, 1971
President Tahya Khan ore June 9; 1971 has been
President Nixon's message transmitted by
received Premier Chou eu Lai agrees to change the time
of Dr Kissingers visit to Peking to July 9 the to 11 the
1971.)4 The Sout of Peoples Repuslic of Chena will make all
the necessary assongements accordungly ,
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
embassy OF pakistan
WASHINGTON, D. C.
19" June 71.
My dear Henry.
9 Rm.
Enclosed is the ship of
paper Dent to me by President Yahya
Khan. She rest of the ship had
the following message from him tome
" the above message for
Peking seems to chinch the issue
finally. Please assure our
friend that absolute fool proof
arrangement will be made by
us and he need have no
anxiety on this Count. I will
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
be expecting him in Islamabad
on July 8- mid-day. Please
deliver the above message to
him t send me his confirmation
t reaction if any. 11
with my best regards.
2Pms Sincerely
Agha.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
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"ocrText": "By HILALY\nAPRIL 1971\nMessage from Premier (hou an Lai\nPremier Choce en Lai thanked President Yahya\nfor conveying the message of President Nixon on\n5 Jan 71. Premier Chou eu Lai is very grateful to\nPresident Yahya and he will be grateful if President\nYahya conveys the following Verbatein message to\nPresident Nixon\n\"Owing to the setuation at the time, it\nhas not been possible to raply earlier to the\nmessage from the President of the USA to the Premier\nof People's Republic of Chesia\nAt present contacts between the\npeoples of China and the limited states are\nbeing renewed. However, if the relatin\nbetween Chuia and the USA are to be restored\nfreendamentally , the US must withdraw all its\nArmed forces from Chrias Taiwan and\nTanion Straits area. A solution to this\ncrucial question Call be found only\nthrough direct discussions between high\nlevel responsible persons of the two countries.\nTherefore, the Chinese Goot reaffiems its\nwillingness to receive publically in Peking\na special envoy of the President of the\nUS (for instance, Mr Kiessinger) or the\nUS Secy of state or even the Prosident of\nthe US himself for a direct mesting and\nReproduced\nat\nthe\nRichard\nNixon\ndiscussions. of Course if the us President\nConsiders that the time is not yet ripe, the\nmatter may be deferred to a later date. As\nfor the modulities, procedure and other details\nof the high level meeting and discussions in\nPeking, as they are of no substantive significance,\nit is behived that it is entirely possible for proper\narrangements to be made through the good\noffices of President Yahya Khan .\"\nApril 21, 1971\nRenroduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential I ibrary and Museum\nThe Honourable\nDr Henry A. Kissinger\nThe White House Office\nWashington D.C.\nembassy OF pakistan\n2315 massachusetts avenue, N.W.\nWASHINGTON. D. C. 20008\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDELIVERED BY HUALY\nTAB 19\n6:15 27 APRIL 71\nRECORD OF A DISCUSSION WITH MR HENRY KISSINGER\nON THE WHITE HOUSE ON 16TH DECEMBER 1970.\nI was summoned to the White House by Mr Kissinger\nthis morning at 11 a. m. He told me that in reply to the message\nsent by Premier Chou en-Lai through our President which I\nconveyed to him on the 9th December, President Nixon would like\nto send a fresh message to President Yahya for passing it on to\nthe Chinese Prime Minister (he presumed this would be through\nthe Chinese Ambassador in Pakistan). He then gave me an unsigned\nnote in an envelope. When I asked him what it contained he said\nthat in response to Chou en Lai's suggestion that a special\nrepresentative of President Nixon would be welcome in Peking\nto discuss the question of Taiwan, President Nixon wished to\ninform Premier Chou en Lai that the U.S. Government was prepared\nto attend a preliminary meeting at an early date in a location\nconvenient to both sides to discuss what\narrangements could\nor should be made for sending a U.S. delegation to Peking for\nhigh level discussions. In reply to questions from me, Mr\nKissinger said that the preliminary meeting could take place in\nRawalpindi if General Yahya's government would not be embarrassed\nin any way by it. From the U.S. side the representatives could\nbe, Ambassador Murphy or Mr Dewey or Ambassador David Bruce.\nOr it could also be himself. (He could arrange to pay a visit to\nVietnam and under that cover, arrange a halt in Pakistan for\nthe purpose of meeting the Chinese epresentative. It would\ndepend on what kind of official the Chinese would send to Pakistan\nfor this purpose).\nMr Kissinger added that if a U.S. delegation ultimately\nwent to Peking, the discussions would not be confined to the\nquestion/\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n.\n- 2 -\nquestion of Taiwan but all matters connected with improving\nrelations with the Chinese and reducing tensions would\nbe discussed. Also that it would not be difficult to comply\nwith the Chinese request for withdrawing American forces\nfrom Taiwan. There were no American military forces there\nexcept advisory and training missions\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nHanded by Mr. Kissing\nto am Hilaly 1200, 5/10/71.\n33\nPresident Nixon has carefully studied the message of April 21,\n1971, from Premier Chou En-Lai conveyed through the courtesy of\nPresident Yahya Khan. President Nixon agrees that direct high-level\nnegotiations are necessary to resolve the issues dividing the United\nStates of America and the People's Republic of China. Because of the\nimportance he attaches to normalizing relations between our two countries,\nPresident Nixon is prepared to accept the suggestion of Premier\nChou En-Lai that he visit Peking for direct conversations with the\nleaders of the People's Republic of China. At such a meeting each side\nwould be free to raise the issue of principal concern to it.\nIn order to prepare the visit by President Nixon and to establish\nreliable contact with the leaders of the Chinese People's Republic, President\nNixon proposes a preliminary secret meeting between his Assistant for\nNational Security Affairs, Dr. Kissinger and Premier Chou En-Lai\nor another appropriate high-level Chinese official. Dr. Kissinger would be\nprepared to attend such a meeting on Chinese soil preferably at some\nlocation within convenient flying distance from Pakistan to be suggested\nby the People's Republic of China. Dr. Kissinger would be authorized to\ndiscuss the circumstances which would make a visit by President Nixon\nmost useful, the agenda of such a meeting, the time of such a visit and to\nbegin a preliminary exchange of views on all subjects. of mutual interest.\nIf it should be thought desirable that a special emissary come to Peking\npublically between the secret visit to the People's Republic of China of\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 2 -\nDr. Kissinger and the arrival of President Nixon, Dr. Kissinger will\nbe authorized to arrange it. It is anticipated that the visit of President\nNixon to Peking could be announced within a short time of the secret\nmeeting between Dr. Kissinger and Premier Chou En-Lai. Dr. Kissinger\nwill be prepared to come from June 15 onward.\nIt is proposed that the precise details of Dr. Kissinger's trip\nincluding location, duration of stay, communication and similar matters\nbe discussed through the good offices of President Yahya Khan. For\nsecrecy, it is essential that no other channel be used. It is also under-\nstood that this first meeting between Dr. Kissinger and high officials of\nthe People's Republic of China be strictly secret.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTAB38\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\nMay 15, 1971\nTHE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nTHE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nHENRY A. KISSINGER K\nSUBJECT:\nMeeting with Ambassador Farland,\nMay 7, 1971\nOn Friday, May 7, I met for three hours with Ambassador Farland\nin Palm Springs. At that time, I outlined the exchange of messages\nbetween the U.S. and China that has taken place through the Pakistanis;\nI read portions of the most recent message delivered by Ambassador\nHilaly on April 21 and told Ambassador Farland that you intended to\nrespond by proposing that I meet with Chou en-Lai, or a suitable\nChinese representative, either in Pakistan or at a location in southern\nChina easily accessible from Pakistan. We considered a number of\ndetails associated with the trip and reached some tentative decisions.\n-- After reviewing several alternative communication channels,\nwe agreed to place a special Navy communicator in Karachi to provide\na communications channel similar to the one I have set up with Bahr\nand Rush. This should be operational this week.\n-- I discussed with Ambassador Farland my proposed trip\nitinerary which would provide for an arrival in Islamabad on a Friday,\nat which point he or Yahya could arrange to host me for the weekend.\nThis would provide the cover for my meeting with the Chinese, and on\nMonday I would continue on to Tehran. I indicated that I would probably\nrequire about 24 hours with the Chinese and would plan on meeting in\nthree separate sessions.\n-- Ambassador Farland felt that it would be better to be taped\nby the Chinese than the Pakistanis, and for this reason the meeting should\nbe conducted in southern China rather than Pakistan.\n-- We discussed the relative merits of my traveling to China by\nPakistani, Chinese or U.S. aircraft and tentatively decided that the\noptimum arrangement would be to pre-position a smaller White House\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\n- 2 -\naircraft in Pakistan equipped with a Pakistani navigator. This would\npermit the larger aircraft in which I arrive to remain parked at\nRawalpindi over the weekend in public view.\n-- I instructed Ambassador Farland to discuss our meeting\nand my proposed trip with Yahya and made him responsible for all the\ntechnical details of the trip. He will submit for my review several\npossible scenarios for the China meeting as soon as the special communi-\ncations channel is activated.\nAmbassador Farland made several more general points:\n-- He was sharply critical of Ambassador Keating who, in his\nview, is attempting to make a partisan issue of the Pakistani situation\nand discredit the Administration in the process. Ambassador Keating\napparently called in a New York Times correspondent and divulged the\ncontents of the Blood cables, and Ambassador Farland feels that\nAmbassador Keating will use his trip back to Washington to lobby\nagainst your Pakistan policies.\n-- Ambassador Farland stressed his conviction that it will take\na substantial (i.e., $250 million) loan to sustain Pakistan for another\nsix months and he requested support in obtaining a commitment from\nthe World Bank or IMF. As a related matter, Ambassador Farland\nasked that Hannah be told in a forceful way that you want him to adopt\na positive attitude toward Pakistan for at least the next six months.\n-- Ambassador Farland also felt that Germany, Great Britain\nand possibly also Japan should be apprised of our determination to save\nPakistan and asked to adjust their policies to support our position.\nA full record of the meeting is attached at Tab A.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTAB52\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\nMay 25, 1971\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nPARTICIPANTS:\nDr. Henry A. Kissinger\nM. and Mme. John Paul Sainteny\nBrig. General Alexander M. Haig\nW. Richard Smyser, NSC Staff\nWinston Lord, NSC Staff\nPLACE:\nDr. Kissinger's Office\nTIME:\nLuncheon, May 25, 1971\nSubstantive portions of the luncheon conversation centered on Vietnam\nand China. Following are the highlights of M. Sainteny's observations.\nVietnam\nM. Sainteny said that:\n-- Hanoi does not fully believe that the Americans will leave\nVietnam. If they were assured of that and of a certain number\nof seats for the NLF in the Assembly, they would come to terms\non POWs, ceasefire, and the separation of the two Vietnams for\na number of years. (M. Sainteny actually was somewhat ambiguous\nabout North Vietnamese political demands but appeared to suggest\nthat Assembly representation might satisfy them for the time being\nanyway.)\n-- The NLF is really quite independent of North Vietnam and there\ncould be significant differences between them. However, M. Sainteny\nthought Hanoi would be willing to deal with us without the NLF.\n-- The North Vietnamese are still determined to pursue their struggle\nalthough he sensed a certain degree of uncertainty. Le Duan is\nin charge, but he clearly does not have the authority of Ho Chi Minh.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\n2\nThe extensive corruption in South Vietnam gives the\nnon-corrupt North Vietnamese an advantage with the\nSouth Vietnamese people. The GVN is so tarnished that\nit would be better from our standpoint to see it replaced.\nThere are good people in South Vietnam and Paris; for\nexample, Big Minh, who, while not brilliant, is popular.\nMadame Binh is tough; Xuan Thuy is enigmatic; Mai Van Bo's\nreplacement is not up to his standard.\n-- In response to Dr. Kissinger's query whether Hanoi might\nfear its traditional enemies, China and Japan, Mme. Sainteny\ndid not believe this was an important factor. She did not think\nthat the North Vietnamese feared China, and with Japan their\nconcern was only in the economic realm. On the other hand,\nthey believe that the Americans have reasons to stay in Vietnam,\nincluding their anticommunism and their position as world leader.\nChina\nMr. Sainteny said the following:\nThe US moves concerning China were good, and we were now\non a good path.\nWith the Chinese, if you knock on one door they will open another\none. Thus, while the Chinese Ambassador in Paris had merely\ntransmitted Dr. Kissinger's note without comment, M. Sainteny\nbelieved the approach through him had been very efficacious with\nrespect to recent events.\n-- Chou En-lai has been clearly in charge since the Cultural\nRevolution, with Mao now being old.\nThe Chinese will blow hot and cold in their dealings with us.\nWe should multiply our gestures toward them to show our good will;\nhe cited as an example that his company wished to sell helicopters\nto the Chinese, but were prevented by COCOM restrictions because\nan American license was needed for certain parts.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\n3\nDr. Kissinger said that M. Sainteny could tell the Chinese that\nthe US will look positively at these trade questions. We will be\nfreeing some trade items, although we cannot guarantee to free them\nall and will not release any with military significance.\nAfter Lunch\nAfter lunch, M. Sainteny remained for further private conversation\nwith Dr. Kissinger. During that conversation he asked Dr. Kissinger\nwhether he could tell Ambassador Bruce and Xuan Thuy that he had\noccasional contact with Dr. Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger said that he\ncould tell those people.\nDr. Kissinger asked M. Sainteny whether we could use him to get\na message to the Chinese very fast if we needed to. M. Sainteny said\nhe thought he could get to the Chinese quickly enough to deliver any\nurgent message, and that he would be pleased to do it.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMessage from Premier Chou En Lai to President Nixon\nMay 29, 1971\n\"Premier Chou En Lai sincerely thanks His Excellency President\nYahya Khan for most rapidly transmitting the three messages from President\nNixon.\n\"Premier Chou En Lai has seriously studied President Nixon's\nmessages of April 29, May 17th and May 22nd, 1971, and has reported with\nmuch pleasure to Chairman Mao Tse Tung that President Nixon is prepared\nto accept his suggestion to visit Peking for direct conversations with the\nleaders of the Peoples Republic of China. Chairman Mao Tse Tung has\nindicated that he welcomes President Nixon's visit and looks forward to\nthat occasion when the may have direct conversations with His Excellency\nthe President, in which each side would be free to raise the principal issue\nof concern to it. It goes without saying that the first question to be settled\nis the crucial issue between China and the United States which is the question\nof the concrete way of the withdrawal of all the U. S. Armed Forces from\nTaiwan and Taiwan Straits area.\n\"Premier Chou En Lai welcomes Dr. Kissinger to China as the\nU. S. representative who will come in advance for a preliminary secret\nmeeting with high level Chinese officials to prepare and make necessary\narrangements for President Nixon's visit to Peking.\n\"Premier Chou En Lai suggests that it would be preferable for\nDr. Kissinger to set a date between June 15 and 20th for his arrival in China,\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nthat Peking may be the location and that he may fly direct from Islamabad\nto a Peking airport not open to the public. As for the flight, he may take a\nPakistan Boeing aircraft or a Chinese special plane can be sent to fly him\nto and from China, if needed. The talks plus the flights on both ways will\nprobably take three or four days. If there is the desire to use his own\ntelecommunication equipment on a temporary basis during his stay in Peking\nhe may do so.\n\"As it is difficult to keep Dr. Kissinger's trip strictly secret, he\nmay well consider coming for the meeting in an open capacity. If secrecy\nis still desired the Government of the Peoples Republic of China will on its\npart guarantee the strict maintenance of secrecy. When the talks have\nyielded results, the two sides may agree to a public announcement to be\nmade after the meeting, if it is so desired.\n\"As for other details, they may be discussed and arranged through\nPresident Yahya Khan directly with the Chinese Ambassador.\n\"Premier Chou En Lai warmly looks forward to the meeting with\nDr. Kissinger in Peking in the near future. 11\nI notice from the above message that the Premier has given an\nalternative for an open meeting between himself and Dr. Kissinger. Knowing\nDr. Kissinger's desire to maintain strict secrecy which fact I have been\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-3-\nimpressing upon Premier Chou En Lai, the above message is indicative\nof the Premier's acceptance of the secret meeting for which he has given\nguarantee. The rest will depend upon U.S. and Pakistan maintaining secrecy.\nAs regards arrangements on our part, I have discussed with the\nChinese Ambassador and propose as follows:\n(a) Dr. Kissinger arrives on a D Day\n(b) After a 24 hour stop in Islamabad and a meal with\nme, he will ostensibly make a trip to a place not open\nto public in the Northern region. In actual fact, a\nPakistan Boeing will carry him along the Northern\nroute direct to Peking up from Islamabad. The time\nof flight will be approximately seven hours. On\ncompletion of the mission, Dr. Kissinger will return\nto Islamabad to resume his onward journey.\nIf Dr. Kissinger would find it helpful, I am considering sending a\nhigh level Pakistani with him to Peking.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMessa from Premier (hou eu Lou to Resident Nixon\nMay 29, 1971\nPremier (hou En Lai suicerely thanks His Excellency\nPresident Yahya Khan for most rapidly transmitting the three messages\nfrom President Nixon.\nPremier (hou Eu Lai has seriously studied President Nixon's\nmessages of April 29, May IT the are dizznd May 1971, and has reported\nwith much pleasure to (hairmone Mao Tse Tung that President Nixon is\nprepared to accept his suggestion to visit Peking for direct conversations\nwith the Leaders of the Peoples Repuslic of China. (hairman Mao Tse Tung\nhas indicated that he Welcomes President Nixon's visit and looks\nforward to that occasion when he may have direct conversations\nwith His Excellency the President, in which each side would be\nfree to raise the principal issue of concern to it. It goes without\nsaying that the first question to be settled is the crucial issue\nbetween (heria and the linited States which is the question of the\nconcrete way of the withdraw-al of all the US Armed forces from\nTaiwan and Taiwan Straits Area\nPremier (hou En Lai welcomes Dr Kissinger to (hina\nas the US representative who will come in advance for a\npreliminary secret meeting with high level (hinese officials to\nprepare and make necessary assongements for President Nixon's\nvisit to Paking.\nwould\nPremier (hou En Lai suggests that it will be preferrable\nfor Da Kissinger to set a date between June 15 and 20 the for his\narrival in (hina, that Peking may be clinese the location and that he may\nthey direct from Islamabad to a Peking Airport not open anicraft, to the\nPuslie. As for the flight, he may take a Pakistan Boeing a\nChinese special plane can be sent to fly him to and from\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum\n2\n(herie, if needed. The talks plus the flights on botte ways will\nprobably take three or four days. If there is the desire to use his\nown telecommunication equipment on a temporary basis during his\nstay in Peking he may do so,\nAs it is difficult to keep Dr Kissinger's trip strictly\nsecret, he may well consider coming for the meeting in an open\ncapacity. If secrecy is still desired the Gout of the Peoples Repullic\nof Cheria will on its part * guarantee the strict maintenance of\nsecrecy. when the talks have yielded results, the two Sides may\nagree to a public amouncement to be made after the meeting,\nif it is so desired.\nAs for other details, theymay be discussed and arranged\nthrough President Yahya Khan directly with the Chinese\nAmbassador.\nPremier (hou En Lai warmly looks forward to the\n11 meeting with Dr Kissinger in Peking in the near future is\nx\nMessage Ends.\n1 notice from the above message that the Premier has given\nan alternative for an open meeting between himself and Dr Kissinger\nKnowing Dr Kissinger's desire to maintain strict secrecy which fact 1 have\nbeen impressing upon Premier (hou Eu Lai, the above message is indicative\nof the Premiers acceptance of the secret meeting for which he has given\nguarantee. The rest will depend upon US and Pakistan maintaining secrecy\nAs regards arrangements on our part, 1 have discussed with\nthe (hinese Ambassador and propose as follows:\na. De Kissinger arrives on a DDay\nb. After a 24 hours stop in Islamabod and a meal with\nme, he will ostensisly make a trip to a place not\nopen to public the Northern region. In actual fact,\na Pakistanit Boeing will carry him along the Northern\nroute direct to Peking from Islamabad. The time of\nflight will be approximately seven hours. On completer\nof the missine, Dr Kissenger will return to Islamabad to\nresume his onward Journey.\nof Dr Kissinger would find it helpful, I are considering sending\n1,\nEe high level Pakistani with him to Peking\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum\nPranier (hou eu Laus' Message to President Nixon\nJune 11, 1971\nPresident Tahya Khan ore June 9; 1971 has been\nPresident Nixon's message transmitted by\nreceived Premier Chou eu Lai agrees to change the time\nof Dr Kissingers visit to Peking to July 9 the to 11 the\n1971.)4 The Sout of Peoples Repuslic of Chena will make all\nthe necessary assongements accordungly ,\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nembassy OF pakistan\nWASHINGTON, D. C.\n19\" June 71.\nMy dear Henry.\n9 Rm.\nEnclosed is the ship of\npaper Dent to me by President Yahya\nKhan. She rest of the ship had\nthe following message from him tome\n\" the above message for\nPeking seems to chinch the issue\nfinally. Please assure our\nfriend that absolute fool proof\narrangement will be made by\nus and he need have no\nanxiety on this Count. I will\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nbe expecting him in Islamabad\non July 8- mid-day. Please\ndeliver the above message to\nhim t send me his confirmation\nt reaction if any. 11\nwith my best regards.\n2Pms Sincerely\nAgha.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
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