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Yitled "Election 1970: Anatomy of a Disappointment." Compares the 1970 election to the one which it beared the greatest resemblance - 1954. 8pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Report], no date
To: The President From: Patrick J. Buchanan RE: "The 1970 Campaign." 14pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/6/1970
To: The President From: Charles W. Colson RE: "1970 Congressional Campaign." 6pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/6/1970
To: H.R. Haldeman From: Murray Chotiner RE: "Campaign Managers." 4pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/12/1970
To: The President From: Murray Chotiner RE: "Pennsylvania." 1pg [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/12/1970
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This file contains:
Yitled "Election 1970: Anatomy of a Disappointment." Compares the 1970 election to the one which it beared the greatest resemblance - 1954. 8pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Report], no date
To: The President From: Patrick J. Buchanan RE: "The 1970 Campaign." 14pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/6/1970
To: The President From: Charles W. Colson RE: "1970 Congressional Campaign." 6pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/6/1970
To: H.R. Haldeman From: Murray Chotiner RE: "Campaign Managers." 4pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/12/1970
To: The President From: Murray Chotiner RE: "Pennsylvania." 1pg [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/12/1970
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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45
31
Campaign
Report
Report titled "Election 1970: Anatomy of a
Disappointment." Compares the 1970
election to the one which it beared the
greatest resemblance - 1954. 8pgs
45
31
11/6/1970
Campaign
Memo
To: The President From: Patrick J. Buchanan
RE: "The 1970 Campaign." 14pgs
45
31
11/6/1970
Campaign
Memo
To: The President From: Charles W. Colson
RE: "1970 Congressional Campaign." 6pgs
45
31
11/12/1970
Campaign
Memo
To: H.R. Haldeman From: Murray Chotiner
RE: "Campaign Managers." 4pgs
45
31
11/12/1970
Campaign
Memo
To: The President From: Murray Chotiner
RE: "Pennsylvania." 1pg
Thursday, March 15, 2012
Page 1 of 1
ELECTION 1970: ANATOMY OF A DISAPPOINTMENT
Amid all the post-election jockeying and posturing, the amazing
thing is that no one thought to compare the 1970 election to the one
to which it bears the greatest resemblance: 1954.
The similarities are striking. A Republican President was half-
way through his first term, having defeated a non-incumbent Democrat
two years earlier in the midst of a limited war in Asia. By means of
a successful peace initiative, the Republicans had turned the war into
a non-controversial issue. But the economy was in a mild recession,
and Republicans understandably tried to deflect the focus to other matters.
The Vice President, campaigning in the West, charged that incumbent
Democratic Senators were "almost without exception members of the
Democratic party's left-wing clique which
has tolerated the Communist
conspiracy in the United States. 11
Republican opportunities for Senate gains were striking. Running
six years earlier, Harry Truman had pulled in nine new Democratic
Senators; of the seats contested in 1954, 21 were Democratic, only 11
Republican. Many of the Democrats were liberal. Some analysts con-
tended that the Republicans could be expected to lose substantially, both
because of the recession and the long-standing tradition that the party in
power loses many seats in off-year elections. Other analysts pointed to
the large numbers of Democratic Senators seeking re-election, and to the
fact that the Republican President had not had substantial coattails two
years earlier. Republicans had gained 22 House seats and only one
Senator in 1952, unusually small gains for a year of Presidential victory.
Hoping for uncharacteristic off-year gains, the President and Vice
President put their prestige squarely on the line. While the Vice President
concentrated on hard-hitting partisan attacks, the President, according
to Congressional Quarterly, "appealed to the voters to return a Republican
Congress and he campaigned harder and longer than any other President
had ever done in a midterm election. 11
When the returns were in, there was disappointment for both sides.
The Republican loss in the House -- 18 seats -- was well below the
midterm average. But the seemingly golden opportunity for Senate gains
had been frustrated. The GOP did pick up three previously Democratic
seats. But four previously Republican seats went Democratic, giving the
Democrats a net gain of one. The heavily Democratic "Class of 1948"
was still heavily Democratic, now by a margin of 22 to 10.
2
The Administration claimed a moral victory, pointing to their
less-than-average midterm losses. But Democrats pointed to the
intensive Presidential efforts to affect the result, and claimed that
those efforts had failed. Liberal Republicans began a campaign to
dump the Vice President which was to last until the next Republican
convention. Political analysts across the spectrum said the new
Democratic governorships would serve as a vital Presidential base.
And the press was virtually unanimous in its major finding: Dwight
Eisenhower would be vulnerable in 1956.
Although this analogy makes a mockery of much of the currently
fashionable analysis, Republicans should not come away wholly com-
fortable about the 1970 returns. To be sure, it is premature to talk of
Richard Nixon as a lame-duck President. Unfortunately, it is equally
premature to talk of the Republican Party as the nation's natural majority
coalition.
The fact that Dwight Eisenhower was easily re-elected following his
party's mild setback of 1954 is an important point, and may be applicable
to President Nixon's situation now; but the overriding fact of the
Eisenhower years was the failure of the President and Vice President to
build an enduring GOP majority in the nation. It seems to us that this
failure is in grave danger of repeating itself.
Particularly illustrative in this respect is the pattern of the Senate
races. In the eleven states of the industrial Northeast, Republicans won
two previously Democratic seats, and a conservative Republican captured
a third that had been held by a liberal Republican. But in the thirty-nine
states outside the Northeast 33 of which had been carried by either
Nixon or Wallace in 1968 the election was a standoff. Republicans
captured Democratic seats in Tennessee and Ohio, but Democrats turned
the tables in California and Illinois.
The heart of the Republican disappointment was the small, rural,
conservative states of the Plains and Mountains. These thirteen states
all voted overwhelmingly for Richard Nixon in 1968, by margins ranging
from 8 per cent (Nevada) to 28 per cent (Nebraska). At the beginning
of this year, Republicans targeted five Democratic Senators who seemed
eminently eligible for retirement. They were McGee (Wyoming), Moss
(Utah), Cannon (Nevada), Montoya (New Mexico), and Burdick (North Dakota).
Bright, attractive candidates won Republican nominations in the five states;
four had been personally recruited by President Nixon, three were incumbent
Representatives, and all were conservatives. All but one (William Raggio
of Nevada) seemed like possible victors as late as two weeks before the
election. All lost. The one who came closest (New Mexico's Anderson
Carter, with 47 per cent of the vote) was the one who had not been
3
recruited by Mr. Nixon, and the only one who had been through a
divisive primary. The worst showing was made by Rep. Thomas Kleppe
(38 per cent in North Dakota), whom an impartial poll had shown two
points behind before the President's October visit to the state. In Nebraska,
conservative veteran Roman Hruska barely survived a lightly regarded
challenge by a perennial Democratic office-seeker. In the entire Plains
and Mountain region, the most conservative and Republican area of the
entire nation, only Sen. Paul Fannin of Arizona emerged with a solid
Republican win.
The pattern is inescapable: the area that was most pro-Nixon in 1968
was the least pro-Nixon in 1970; the area least pro-Nixon in 1968 (the
industrial Northeast) gave the party its most striking successes of 1970.
The big Eastern wins in New York, Connecticut, and Maryland all took
place in states carried by Hubert Humphrey in 1968. Not exactly a
harbinger of partisan realignment.
Except in this sense: traditional Democrats deserted their party in
substantial numbers in states where the primary was won by candidates
who seemed radically out of step with the rank and file. The fact that
"New Politics" Democrats like Joseph Duffey in Connecticut, Richard
Ottinger in New York, and Howard Metzenbaum in Ohio scored most of
their primary wins in the eastern half of the nation (George Brown, for
example, was defeated in the California primary) may go a long way toward
explaining the drift of Eastern Democrats particularly urban Catholics
toward the GOP. In states where bread-and-butter liberals like John
Tunney, Hubert Humphrey, and Harrison Williams controlled the Democratic
primaries, the Republican-vs. -radical alignment proved impossible for the
party to make credible.
But the other half of the coin the failure of conservative Republicans
to beat liberal Democrats in overwhelmingly conservative states contains
the major finding of the 1970 Senate elections. This is the failure of the
Nixon Administration to satisfy its own constituency.
It is tempting to attribute this Administration failure to the economy.
But a careful look at the returns does not justify such a sweeping assumption.
After a post-election survey of 129 House districts and 13 states with Senate
elections where unemployment was at or above the national average,
Congressional Quarterly concluded: "Unemployment. was less than a
decisive issue in the over-all outcome of the Congressional election
Only in the Midwest and Plains states, where declining farm income and
4
related problems were a factor in substantial Democratic gains, does
there appear to have been a trend based on economic issues. 11 Indeed,
the entire nine-seat Democratic gain in House races would have been
wiped out had traditionally Republican Farm Belt districts voted as they
had in 1968. And House returns, not Senate or gubernatorial returns,
are the traditional barometer of economic unrest. If unemployment had
been the decisive factor many pundits have claimed it to be, Democrats
would have scored net House gains in other areas than farm-related ones.
One must look elsewhere than economics for the Democratic trend in
the most anti-liberal sections of the nation. The simplest answer seems
applicable: the pro-Nixon voters of 1968 are not getting what they thought
they were going to get.
In 1968, candidate Nixon campaigned against excessive Johnson
domestic expenditures; President Nixon has retained every one of the
Great Society programs (including the Job Corps, which he pledged to
abolish) and has increased the outlays for many of them: Candidate
Nixon categorically pledged not to support a guaranteed annual income;
President Nixon has proposed the Family Assistance Plan, seen as
exactly that by all who have examined it, and regarded at least as a
massive increase in the Federal welfare load by everybody else.
Candidate Nixon called for decentralization; President Nixon has
installed the most rigidly centralized White House bureaucracy in
history. Candidate Nixon attacked the Democratic-fostered "security
gap"; President Nixon has cut defense spending to the bone, causing a
massive aerospace slump in such key 1970 battlegrounds as Texas, New
Mexico, and Southern California.
The one area where the 1968 Nixon constituency seems at least
partially satisfied is the South. The Administration policy of appointing
strict constructionists to the Supreme Court and of working with, rather
than against, Southern leaders in implementing court-ordered desegre-
gation, must be judged at least a partial success. With the primary
defeat of Ralph Yarborough and the November defeat of Albert Gore, the
era of "national liberalism" in the South has come to an end. Of the 22
Senators who will represent the Old Confederacy in the 92nd Congress,
only one William Fulbright of Arkansas is left of center on the
national spectrum. A similar pattern has emerged among Southern
members of the House in recent years.
5
This move to the Right in the South has not yet resulted in a heavy
realignment toward the Republicans, and certainly did not in 1970. Of
the 106 Southern House seats, only one changed partisan hands this year
(the Virginia seat of a retiring Democrat went Republican). But Republicans
held all four of the seats vacated by incumbents who went for higher office,
and the GOP will be in position to benefit from the mandatory changes of
Southern district lines with the 1970 Census. The loss of two Governor-
ships (while gaining one) was disappointing to local Republicans, but less
so to the Nixon Administration. The two GOP lame-ducks, Winthrop
Rockefeller and Claude Kirk, were the only two prominent Southern
Republicans who voted for Nelson Rockefeller at the 1968 convention. Pretty
much exploded is the Ripon Society thesis that the way to Republican gains
in the South is a "moderate" coalition involving Negroes and silk-stocking
liberals. Another Ripon favorite, liberal gubernatorial nominee Paul
Eggers in Texas, went down to his second straight crashing loss to color-
less conservative Democrat Preston Smith. Liberal Republicans will win
every now and then in the South (though only one, Governor Linwood Holton
of Virginia, now holds major office of any kind), but this will occur only
on a temporary basis, as a direct result of Democratic factionalism. When
the Democrats get around to mending their own coalition, as they did this
year in Arkansas, such gerry-built political structures will inevitably
come crashing down. Like it or not, for the foreseeable future Southern
Democrats will have a rarely breakable lock on Negro loyalty.
The failure to perceive this was a major reason for one of the
biggest Republican disappointments of 1970: the defeat of George Bush
in Texas. Since the election, Bush has said privately that the central
mistake of his campaign against conservative Democrat Lloyd Bentsen
was his open wooing of Negro and Mexican-American voters. Bush,
no liberal himself, credits this tactic with bringing out a far bigger than
expected rural conservative vote for Bentsen. At the same time, Bush
was unable to push his Negro and Mexican vote totals much above his 1964
levels, when his opponent was liberal Ralph Yarborough. Bush is reported
to have said: "If I couldn't get them in this situation, there's no sense in
any Republican trying for them ever again.
Ray Garland, the Ripon backed "moderate" Senate candidate in
Virginia, may have come to similar conclusions. Running as the center
man between liberal Democrat George Rawlings and conservative independent
Sen. Harry Byrd, and bidding openly for a Negro-Republican coalition,
Garland found himself squeezed from both ends. Rawlings swept the
Negro vote in all areas -- and Byrd carried most of the Republican ones.
Garland was left with 15 per cent of the vote the worst Republican showing
in a generation. Though Byrd was tacitly backed by the Administration,
6
his remarkable 53 percent victory has not been widely cited as a
triumph of the Southern strategy, either by the press or the Ripon
Society One wonders what would have been their reaction if Byrd
had come close to losing to either Rawlings or Garland. At any rate,
Ripon-acclaimed Governor Holton, who backed Garland, is reportedly
having second thoughts about the strongly liberal image he has pro-
jected in his first year of office.
But the most encouraging outcome in the South over and above
the statewide sweep in Tennessee, the Byrd win, and despite the losses
of Bush and Rep. William Cramer in Florida -- is the suddenly modest
standing of George Wallace. The victories of moderate, locally based
Democrats like Governers-elect Dale Bumpers of Arkansas, Jimmy
Carter of Georgia, and Reubin Askew of Florida, have caused an over-
night erosion of Wallce's organizational base outside the hard-core states
of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Shortly after the election,
loyalist Southern Democrats like Sen. Ernest Hollings of South Carolina,
himself slightly right of center, started making distinctly anti-Wallace
sounds, and Wallace's own profile has been noticeably low of late If
President Nixon carries through his pledge to appoint a Southern con-
servative to the next Supreme Court vacancy, and continues his relatively
smooth handling of desegregation, Wallace may not run. In a two-man
race with a liberal Democrat, Nixon would be favored to win all 128
of the Southern electorial votes. The Southern strategy has positioned
itself for possibly massive success in 1972.
But ACU has always maintained, the Southern strategy is not enough.
The Supreme Court and school desegregation, both of which the Adminis-
tration has handled reasonably well, bulk much larger as issues in the
South than anywhere else. The failure of Republican candidates in
strongly Republican states is sympotmatic of the Administration's failure
to satisfy the non-Southern voters it won in 1968. And the 1970 Catholic
gains will quickly evaporate if the Democrats nominate, as expected, a
Catholic for President in 1972 unless strong steps are taken between
now and then to mold a new, creatively conservative Administration
program to appeal to a new majority of voters.
The Administration should take the following negative steps:
1. Removal of Secretary George Romney of the Housing and Urban
Development Department. If Romney is permitted to continue with his
7
radical, divisive plan to relocate slum dwellers in suburbia -- a plan
even liberals like Robert Kennedy repudiated -- he will become as
much of a liability to the Administration as he was to his wife Lenore
in her Michigan Senate race. Aside from the social arguments against
the Romney plan, suburbia is the political focal point of any majority
coalition for the Republican Party To permit Romney to proceed along
his present path is political lunacy.
2. Removal of Secretary of Agriculture Clifford Hardin. When
Hardin's department (which is studded with holdover Democrats)
announced a cutback in dairy price supports right before a special 1969
House election in the heaviest dairy district in the nation, that was a
minor disaster. But when the Department released figures two days
before this year's election showing the lowest farm prices since 1934,
Hardin became the single man most responsible for the Republicans'
Farm Belt disaster, and thus for the net nine-seat House loss. He
should be replaced by a working Republican politician who will clean
the department's liberal bureaucrats right out -- for good.
3. Scrapping of the Family Assistance Plan. ACU is amply on
record concerning the merits of this bill, so we will confine ourselves
to a simple political statement: if FAP is ever implemented, it will
become the single biggest long-term Republican liability since the Great
Deparssion The majority of Americans clearly believe that welfarism
has gone much too far not that it needs to be radically expanded, as
FAP would in practice do. The GOP as the party of expanded welfare
is a losing proposition.
4. A serious effort to cut domestic expenditures -- starting with
the unpopular Great Society programs but definitely not excluding
public housing and older bankrupt urban renewal items. A successful
effort to cut back domestic spending could lead the way to a politically
potent tax cut by 1972.
The Administration should take the following positive steps:
1. Announcement of support for the voucher plan, which would give
parents a free choice between private and public education for their
children Such an initiative would intersect with two powerful political
currents: the concern of Catholic voters over the decline of the under-
financed parochial school system, and increasing dissatisfaction on the
part of a much broader group with the public school system in general.
8
A recent Gallup Poll found that the largest single problem cited by
dissatisified parents was discipline, and that 53 percent believe that
public school discipline is "not strict enough. 11 An earlier poll found
that a majority of parents would send their children to private schools,
were they financially able.
2. Reprivatization of necessary, but badly performed, government
functions. One example would be a bill repealing the monopoly of the
new Postal Corporation on first-class mail.
3. Increased defense expenditures, particularly for nuclear weapons
and other hardware. Aside from the strategic necessity of this step in
the face of the massive Soviet nuclear and naval buildup, the sectors of
the economy aided will be those most available to Republicanism.
4. Tough new legislation to street crime and political violence.
Because of the Democrats' near-unanimous cave-in to Vice President
Agnew on the crime issue, a new legislation is unlikely to meet with
much Congressional opposition. In 1972, Republicans will no longer be
able to label Democrats as the party of permissiveness; they will have
to be able to "point with pride" to their own record. The only way to
reverse the rise in street crime and pornography, and curb radical
violence, is through much stronger legislation than has heretofore been
passed. Otherwise, the crime issue will work for the Democrats in 1972.
The Administration's rhetoric in 1970 was more than adequate; the
speeches of Vice President Agnew, in particular, brought concervative
ideas to an audience bigger than ever before. But 1970 also proved that
rhetoric is not enough. If the Administration is to hold its supporters of
1968, much less take advantage of the promising opportunities to expand
its base, it must carve out a moderately conservative position that has
its root in deeds as well as words. We are convinced that a majority of
Americans wants to go this way; if the Admini stration agrees, the
Republican Party can become the embodiment of that majority, in 1972
and beyond.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
THE 1970 CAMPAIGN
Memorandum to the President
From Patrick J. Buchanan
November 6, 1970
STRATEGY
Looking back, in my view, the Social Issue was clearly the right
one upon which to focus in the campaign. We took the lead on it with
the Vice President's speeches; forced one Democrat after another to
defend himself, to get on the right side of it -- and thus precluded
their taking the offensive on the only good issue they had -- the
economic one. Secondly, the issue clearly worked. Tunney spent
half the campaign getting out of police cars; Stevenson was talking
about his Marine Corps record by the campaign's end and wearing a
flag pin in his lapel; Humphrey ran on law and order -- and Kennedy
was calling campus militants "campus commandos. " (The President
might have noted on election night that the Senior Senator from
Massachusetts now has a haircut.) What happened this campaign --
in a number of instances -- was that Democrats like Tunney and
2
Stevenson got themselves back on the right side of this issue,
through speeches and spots, as Scammon and Wattenburg had
urged them to do and once they got right on this issue; it became
a contest on personalities and on the economic issue, I would guess,
and they won hands down.
On the other hand, if Ottinger had gotten well on this issue he
would very probably be the new Senator from New York.
Those Democrats who did go hardline on law and order apparently
gave up nothing on their left -- just as S-W contended (the kids have
nowhere else to go) and won the suburbs. Moreover they were able
to endorse the President's peace initiative and Mideast policy, thus
losing nothing there.
Those candidates, who came off in the election as out and out
liberals, Gore and Goodell and Duffy and did not get well on our
issues -- were defeated.
The legitimate question to ask the Mortons and others is what
issues they would have had us run on, take the offensive on. Had we
devoted our campaign to the economic issue -- those final statistics
about a seven billion deficit for the first quarter, the 5 retail price
increase, the GM loss, the massive increase in industrial price
index would have been crippling blows. Had we devoted all our effort
to the economic issues, Gore would have won -- and Buckley very
probably lost.
3
As for our domestic programs -- from my travels around the
country with the Vice President -- everybody thought revenue
sharing was nice while most of our guys were running away from
the Welfare Plan -- and we constantly had to stress work incentives.
All through the South and Southwest this was hurting, not helping us.
My main reservation about the Social Issue campaign was that
we started too hard, too early. We threw the Democrats completely
on the defensive in the first two weeks -- but they still had six weeks
to get well on the issue, to alter their campaign spots to deal with
the issue; and like Tunney and Stevenson and Kennedy, they clearly
succeeded in doing this. Smith specifically started his hard-line too
soon, considering media's impact.
One thing we underestimated by a long shot is our ability to
command the media and get our points across -- we do not need to
hit something day in and day out for eight weeks now -- we can do it
in a matter of two-hours and be successful. In retrospect we might
have been better off to start out -- not full-bore -- but low-keyed,
light and positive, and then gone over on the all-out offensive around
the second week of October -- which would not have given the opposition
enough time to re-orient their campaigns.
There is another point that should not go unanswered. The
"social issue" was not a "missile gap" issue -- i. e., a complete
4
creation of our campaign -- it was an issue created by the people
of this country who declared it to be their prime concern in state
after state after state. It would have been utter folly not to recog-
nize public concerns on this issue; recognize we were positioned
correctly and go after our opponents.
When one considers the other issues; the economy -- where we
had problems; foreign policy, where the Mideast could go up, where
the U.S. Soviet relations were cooling; and RN had proposed a cease-
fire which the doves could say they had called for long ago -- we had
nothing to draw a sharp line of division with them; nothing which we
could take to the country and say clearly -- here we stand; here they
stand -- throw them out for this reason and put us in. We have to
remember that we were trying to throw them out of office -- not keep
ourselves in -- and in that kind of effort you have to go on the offensive
for the people are not going to understand why there is a need for a
change.
THE ECONOMY
Clearly, this must have hurt I see nothing else to explain why
Reagan did not get the margin everyone predicted -- after the dismal
campaign of Mr. Unruh. Also, it seems to me the only explanation
why our Western Senators went down so badly when we had felt they
might all run a close race.
5
(Incidentally, whoever was giving us the optimistic poll information
ought to be called upon for some ample explanation why they were so
far off.)
Looking at the races by State -- which we have to do -- I think
we can see what won or lost it. There were it seems no national
trends -- as this was not a national election.
Connecticut, the President certainly helped -- so also did the
Vice President in convincing conservatives and GOPers that Weicker
was acceptable and even desirable. This helped with the Dodd voters.
In New York, the White House and Vice President can legitimately
claim to have won this by the attack on Goodell, bringing liberals into
his camp, and by letting New York know that Buckley was both
acceptable and desirable. The Social Issue here finished the Demo-
cratic candidate -- what else explains why a young, good-looking
Democrat can't get 40 per cent of the vote in New York. Also, Rocky
hit hard on the Social issue.
In New Jersey, our friend, Gross injured himself with his
campaign tactics -- wherein he took left-wing anti-Nixon positions
and then shifted himself back. I don't know the ultimate reasons for
his defeat - but a social issue campaign by Cahill against a drawing
board liberal won by half a million in that state.
6
In Pennsylvania, God knows why Scott won so narrowly against
an unknown -- we ought to find out. Perhaps economy.
In Maryland, the President helped certainly -- but this was an
"anti-Tydings vote" because in my view Tydings ran a hell of a good
strong campaign. The Mahoney people just couldn't hack him.
In Virginia we had a nice liberal Republican running and he got
15 per cent of the vote.
In Tennessee, we were running against a hell of a campaigner,
in Albert Gore; he had the best media and press of any campaigner
in the country; he ran as a fighting underdog, the "Grey Fox, 11 and
the only reason we beat this fellow was the issues -- not on candidates
or personalities.
In Texas, I don't know why George Bush lost -- but he lost to a
fellow who was as tough or tougher than he was on the social issues.
So, this surely did not lose Texas. Economy, desire for 1 Dem and
1 GOP Senator (originally won for Tower) and perhaps even rumor
about Bush for Agnew hurt.
Florida, we got beat because we beat ourselves with the Carswell
gambit, with the Kirk-Guerney-Cramer feud, which turned off the
voters of both parties -- and because the Democrats came up with two
populist conservatives who had no scars and a lot of attractiveness.
7
If I were a Florida Republican, I would have been fed up with the GOP
nonsense and Kirk myself and the fellows elected seemed conservative
enough.
As for the nonsense that this proves the failure of the Southern
Strategy - - we ought to ignore it. Bentsen and Chiles are not liberals.
The only two Southern liberals in this election -- Gore and Yarborough
were defeated. Any Southern Strategy is part of a presidential strategy --
it does not apply to Democratic conservatives running at the State level --
indeed, RN and Vice President Agnew are as popular as ever south of
the Mason-Dixon line -- and would sweep that area still in a national
election.
In Indiana, we had a candidate who was not the most attractive
fellow in the world; some of his tactics brought out into the open were
questionable; if he wins it will be because of the issues, and because
of our visits. Certainly, it won't be on his personality.
In Michigan, the GOP had a disasterous primary and came out
with the worst possible candidate -- and Hart is attractive, without
enemies, and the Warren incident made it hard to handle the social
issue - and Mrs. Romney's basic positions are unsuitable to that kind
of campaign.
In Illinois, Stevenson scrambled for his life after the first two
weeks of the campaign - and succeeded in getting well on the issue
by his flag pin, emphasizing his Marine career, hiring Foran as his
8
Deputy Campaign Manager and climbing between the sheets with
none other than old Law and Order himself, Richard J. Daley.
In Missouri -- money, and a young and attractive candidate
almost knocked off Symington, who has lost touch with the people of
the State of Missouri.
In the West, we went down like Ninepins in the Senate races --
the only thing I can see as the reason here is that perhaps the Social
Issue does not have the bite of the economic issues in the great plaines.
But the economic issue does -- as the President knows from hearing
the howls of GOP Senators at even the least mention of a cutback in
public works. Perhaps the farm vote let loose here. Shuman's gripes
and drops in farm prices had been ominous portents.
In California, it must have been the economy -- since everyone
agreed that Reagan ran a tremendous campaign, was popular, and
Unruh was a joke. Also, again, Tunney spent the campaign getting
out of police cars -- and if that issue was neutralized, then Murphy
was through, due to Technicolor, age, condition and economy.
THE HOUSE
Most analyses indicate that one percent in unemployment can be
translated into an additional loss of five House seats above and beyond
9
usual off-year losses -- well, we had two points of unemployment
higher than full employment -- and that might well explain our 10
defeats in the House. Also, a number of popular House incumbents
were put up for Senate races -- which contributes to that figure.
(US News showed that 51 seats were average off-year loss in those
years when unemployment was on the increase.)
THE GOVERNORS
Here is the big loss; here is the major problem -- along with
the State Legislatures. Again, we can go down them one by one.
Pennsylvania - - They had us on the State issues after the Shafer-
Broderick Administration.
Ohio -- The scandal plus a commonplace candidate against
Gilligan lost this even before it was started. (Note -- however,
Gilligan was outraged and went to court on that quote we were using
against him.)
Wisconsin- A real disaster here, a real problem for 1972 - -
partially explained by the incredible showing of Proxmire, who gets
the entire Democratic vote; who does well on a national television;
and who has the image in Wisconsin of a fellow who saves the taxpayers
dollars. Erickson was regarded all along as a weak sister and his poor
showing pulled Olson down as well.
10
Maine and Rhode Island - - the near losses here for Democrats
indicate the vulnerability of Governors in times of rising prices
and rising taxes; vulnerabilities which have little to do with whether
they are pro-Nixon or Democratic. (Muskie's coattails showed little
attraction here.)
Arkansas -- A populist Democrat got the Wallace vote, and
Mr. Rockefeller did not run on the Social Issue; indeed he would have
been especially hard put to hit permissiveness. He lost this one
himself -- and Bumpers is an example of the new breed of hard-
headed Democrat populists that did well all over the South.
Florida - - Kirk lost it for well-known reasons.
The Western Governors - I don't know why some of these failed
to win; it would be worth a close investigation -- but ab initio I would
attach it to State issues, to the vulnerability of executive incumbents - -
who are blamed when things go wrong more readily than might a
Congressman or Senator be blamed.
FINAL POINTS
SOME TURKEYS
One reason we did not do better was that in many states, we did
not field our strongest possible candidate. George would have done
11
better than Lenore; Lugar better than Roudebush; Finch better than
Murphy; Laxalt better than Raggio; Andrews better than Kleppe; most
anyone better than Smith. We had a few turkeys out there -- and it
is not an easy thing to unseat an incumbent Senator; the odds are long
against it. (Something like 8-1.) Indeed, two of ours who lost were
appointed -- not elected to the job -- Goodell and Smith.
CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING
Much of this has become counterproductive because of the massive
nature of it; because of the negative publicity it gets from press and
networks. Also, some of the harsher attacks from our side are
certain to gather the irate attention of the liberal media -- just as
those gutting ads in the final weeks outraged all networks -- and they
said SO. The adverse reaction to campaign ads may not have helped
our last night's stump speech appearance. But clearly the technical
problems with that show outranked any gain or loss based on substance
of speech.
On the law and order issue -- clearly it can be overdone as we
believe Smith overdid it in the suburbs -- where he ran as poorly as
any Republican ever ran. There is a point of diminishing returns on
the Social Issue as George Wallace found out. But our problem
was that we began too early too hard in my view -- enabling the
Democrats to reposition themselves and effectively defend it.
12
SOCIAL ISSUE
It was the right issue for us in 1970 -- but we should remember
that in 1972 -- they will be using it against us to some effect, if
it is not visible that there has been a national change in either
climate or statistics.
THE PRESIDENT
We are getting a bum rap on the President's campaign -- being
accused of appealing to fears, of a divisive polarizing campaign --
that is simply not true -- but it is a result of our natural enemies in
the Media. The President however, did go out and fight for his
candidates, in the GOP and the presentation of RN as a partisan
necessarily involves some attrition in his national image as President
of all the people, above the battle. We ought to review here whether
the gains from this campaigning is worth the risk of depreciation of
our most vital political asset -- the Presidency.
THE CAMPAIGN
Victory has a thousand fathers; defeat is an orphan. Some of the
bitching and moaning are now coming from individuals who had no hand
in the selection of the strategy -- and much of what they say might
reflect certain sour grapes. This should be taken into consideration
just as the consideration that those who favored this strategy (i. e., me)
also have an investment in its vindication.
13
VICE PRESIDENT
He carried out his assignment to the letter. We kept the
national media off our backs -- gnawing at us -- until the final two
weeks by virtue of an unprecedented amount of fresh, useable copy.
We ran a rough hard-hitting campaign, which has been distorted by
the media -- but which raised both money and enthusiasm and good
publicity very nearly everywhere we went.
The President will recall that in 1958, with more serious economic
dislocation, and a popular Republican President, and a hard campaign
- we lost 57 seats in the House. We did one hell of a lot better this
year - and among the reasons is the aggressiveness of our campaign
against the Democrats, the media we received by virtue of the Vice
President's controversial positions and his out-spokenness -- and the
strategy we used which was devised and approved by the President.
But, just as the President suffered nationally, by his reputation
as a fighting partisan in the fifties -- so also, has this Vice President.
Strong recommendation is that he be given responsibility for some
domestic area where he can come off as a fighting progressive - also,
that he be authorized to deliver some speeches on new Nixon Adminis-
tration initiatives, in domestic policy. And perhaps a major speech
14
or two outlining Administration foreign policy. All these things
he can garner great publicity for -- at the same time he broadens
his own national image -- and thus becomes a more effective
campaigner on the stump.
Because of the nature of the request -- I will withhold for the
time being thoughts both substantive and political -- looking toward
1972.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 6, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
1970 Congressional Campaign
Neither the failures nor the successes of this campaign
can be attributed to any one factor. Indeed, there
were significant regional and local factors which
weighed heavily in the final outcome. As an illustra-
tion, one half of our total national House losses
occurred in four contiguous Congressional districts
located in North Dakota, South Dakota and Minnesota.
Obviously, the farm issue was critical and nothing
else in the national campaign could overcome it.
We must also remember the inherent difficulty of trans-
lating Presidential popularity into support for
individual candidates. We lost many states that you
would have carried handily had this been a Presidential
election. We just couldn't succeed in making your
supporters feel that they had to vote for your candi-
dates. Nor historically, has this ever been easy to do.
Your campaigning was vital in terms of arousing our
own troops and eliminating the apathy, which contrary
to the normal historical pattern would have this year
worked against us. Finally, by campaigning you demon-
strated your loyalty to the candidates and to the party.
The results, had you not campaigned, would have been
far worse and you would have taken the full blame which
would have hurt in 1972.
Beyond these general observations, I think some specific
points can be made:
1.
Law and order is a national issue but it affects
voting patterns differently in different areas.
The issue helped us in the liberal urban, suburban
Northeast but, ironically did very little for us.
in the conservative, rural Midwest and Far West.
-2-
The reason, I think, is that the issue is meaning-
less where there is no crime and violence problem.
If the people in North Dakota are not really con-
cerned about crime or the safety of their homes,
they can't get very worked up about their own
Senator just because of his poor record on that
issue. In the urban areas of the East, where fear
of crime and violence is wide spread, our stand on
law and order (and that of our candidates) was the
key issue (except where the economic issue surpassed
it).
2.
Except in the urban Northeast, we did not succeed
in making the public believe that Democrat, Liberal
permissiveness was the cause of violence and crime.
There are a combination of reasons for this. As
noted above, people in the more conservative states,
while they are all for law and order, don't blame
their own liberal Senator for a problem that they
don't personally confront. Secondly, the Democrats
in many cases recaptured safe ground on the issue:
Stevenson is a classic example. Thirdly, our
campaign pitch didn't really come across in a way
to lay the responsibility onto the Democrats. In
this sense we were, perhaps, too negative. Everyone
knew that we were against permissiveness and violence
but we didn't sell the point that violence and dis-
order in our society are caused directly by the
rhetoric, softness, and catering to the dissidents
which the Democrats have engaged in. We just didn't
make the connection in the mind of the average voter.
3.
The war issue became neutralized in the campaign.
People are generally very satisfied with your handling
of the war. Because they are and because it, there-
fore, has become something of a non-issue, they
weren't motivated to vote against those who have
opposed you on the war. In short, the issue would
have been an enormous plus had you been the candidate
but it didn't significantly benefit our supporters or
hurt our opponents. Evidence of this was in Massachu-
setts which has been the most "dovish" state in the
-3-
union. There was a war referendum on the ballot --
440,000 supported immediate withdrawal, 190,000
supported an all-out military victory and 711,000
supported the President's peace plan. At the same
time doves won big margins. Your success with the
peace issue probably helped us generally, but it
didn't hurt our opponents.
4.
The economic issue hurt badly. The pocketbook
issue is always the gut issue in any campaign. It
was this year a question of fear more than fact;
concern over whether the country is heading into
another recession or, perhaps even depression
coupled with continued inflation, was a potent
factor in a number of areas. As Scammon has
pointed out in his book, the social issue is domi-
nant only if there is no pocketbook issue. This
one obviously hurt us in California. (Also, how-
ever, was the problem of Murphy's image, age and
the Technicolor retainer.) It hurt in a number of
Congressional races particularly in the Midwest
and in certain areas of particularly heavy
unemployment (the vote in Seattle is an example).
The economic issue was compounded by the GM strike
which unquestionably cost us the Indiana race --
if we have lost it -- and made the Taft race closer
than it should have been. The general economic
issue was further compounded by the farm problem.
Republicans did badly in those states in which high
parity price support has always been the issue
(Nebraska, the Dakotas, Kansas, for example); witness
the four contiguous House seats in which the farm
issue beat us and a number of districts that we should
have won, but for the farm issue. We had been warned
of discontent in the Farm Belt but it was too late to
counter it.
5.
In general, we probably peaked too early. The Vice
President peaked in late September, his line became
very predictable and with many voters "old hat.'
Once committed to it, there was, of course, no way
to turn around; perhaps, the tempo and approach could
have been varied. Clearly, the Vice President had a
very healthy impact in arousing our troops, raising
money and generating campaign activity. (His Goodell
-4-
strategy was a key to New York.) Once he had peaked,
however, his line became increasingly ineffective
in winning either Democrats or Independents.
In this general regard the Democrats scored against
us, by engendering sympathy. They charged us with
dirty campaigning and excess spending, which tended
to make us appear to be "overkilling." They were
clever in making this more of an issue than it should
have been. The press continually reported that we
were outspending the Democrats 5 to 1 but failed to
report that approximately $3 million was being spent
on Democratic campaigns by the Council for a Livable
World, the McGovern Fund ($1 million alone), COPE
and the National Committee for an Effective Congress.
I am told this issue killed Burton even though Moss
outspent Burton 2 to 1. Winthrop Rockefeller was a
case in point, as was the sympathy for Lawton Chiles
"poor boy" campaign.
People became tired of the campaign ten days to 2
weeks before it was over. We took the blame for
excessive spending in campaigning. This hurt us as
people became sick of politics and the usual charges
and counter charges which they then tended to dismiss.
6.
We made significant inroads with the blue collar, white
ethnic vote, George Gallup's comments to the contrary
notwithstanding. This vote elected Beall, defeated
Duffey, elected Buckley and put Prouty over big. We
are scoring in this area because of law and order and
patriotism. (We are conducting an analysis of
selected blue collar districts to test this conclusion.)
Prouty, who was a colorless, ineffective campaigner,
carried Democratic blue collar wards in Burlington
because of their antipathy toward his excessively
liberal opponent. The same happened in Baltimore.
Dodd took the blue collars away from Duffy. Buckley
swept the white ethnic, blue collar vote. Significantly
we did well in areas where unions we have begun to win
over are strong (construction workers) ; badly, where we
haven't made progress ( (the UAW, steelworkers).
-5-
7.
As in every campaign, there were mistakes made
in individual states which hurt us.
Texas: For weeks prior to the election, George
Bush was convinced that he had the election won
provided no one rocked the boat. He refused to
allow us to use some very derogatory information
about Bentsen. He resisted any ads -- positive
or negative -- and refused to attack Bentsen. We
probably should have forced him to do more. Dick
Scammon thinks that Bush lost it for this reason
and because he ignored the social issue and tried
to be more liberal than Bentsen.
Maryland: In the case of Beall, he similarly
refused to attack. We ended up doing it for
him in a variety of ways and the political situa-
tion in Maryland reversed itself dramatically in
the last week of the campaign.
Florida: Clearly the split in the party cost us the
state.
Illinois: There was no way ever to elect Smith but
his campaign grew excessively negative and, I am
told, turned the liberal moderates in the Chicago
suburbs sour. Also Ogilvie has serious splits in
the party (there are some serious warnings here for
1972).
Ohio: The state ticket scandal cost us the Governor-
ship.
Maine: With just a little help from the national
level we might have elected a Governor (Irwin was
hurt by the feeling the state was written off).
Pennsylvania: Shafer was so disliked, no Republican
could succeed him. Scott won, which indicates the
Governorship was purely a state issue.
New Jersey: Our candidate made classic mistakes,
shifting positions and creating distrust.
-6-
Michigan: There was no hope without a candidate.
8.
Negativism. Rightly or wrongly, the Democrats and
the press made us (the Vice President in particular)
appear to be too negative. As indicated in my memo
on the Broder articles, we need to stress more and
more the positive theme of accomplishment; that we
are not only against unlawfulness and disorder but
that we are doing things to control it and that we
are reforming Government. We need to promote our
record of accomplishment as we have done so well in
foreign policy.
Conclusion: We made maximum use of national media. Our
analysis shows that your campaign resulted in giving us
twice the coverage the Democrats got. Without this, I
am convinced the result would have been much worse because,
especially in the closing days, the effect of your
campaign was to take the economic issue out of the news.
As indicated above, in hindsight, I think we could have
won a few more, particularly in the Senate, and with
stronger party machinery could have done better with our
Governorships.
On balance, we did better than the press and the pundits
credit us with doing. If you accept the premise that it
is inherently difficult for Presidential popularity to
rub off on local candidates, then we did very well,
particularly in the House.
Finally, I do not think the elections reflect any loss of
support for you. To the contrary, I am convinced that had
this been our election, we would have won big.
Charles W. Colson
STRICTLY
THE WHITE HOUSE
CONFIDENTIAL
WASHINCTON
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O, 12065, Section 6-102
By contriss NARS, Date 6-5-80
November 12, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
MURRAY CHOTINER
RE:
CAMPAIGN MANAGERS
CALIFORNIA
Murphy for Senate/Bill Roberts
Roberts knows his business but too many times I would
call the Murphy headquarters and was informed that he
was at his own office, which means, like so many other
professional campaign managers, he had other "fish to
fry" which required his attention.
Like too many professional campaign managers who have
their own agencies -- he was inclined to concentrate on
media which is commissionable - - as a result precinct
organization, direct mail and the volunteer side of a
campaign is relegated to second place.
ILLINOIS
Smith for Senate/Jim Mack
Nice guy but never seemed to be able to give an answer,
which meant he had to check with other people. He may
have been the manager in name but not in fact. I also felt
I was merely relaying messages to "someone" through him.
STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL
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2
INDIANA
Roudebush for Senate/Gordon Durnil
Durnil is a fine person but obviously without authority.
Everything went through Keith Bulen. Bulen had so many
things going at the same time that sometimes it was hard to
know which project received his undivided attention.
MICHIGAN
Romney for Senate/Al Boyer
He is very personable, has good ideas, but I always felt he
lacked political judgment.
MISSOURI
Danforth for Senate/Wayne Millsap
Millsap is a lawyer and was one of the hardest working
managers of all those with whom I came into contact. He is
knowledgeable.
NEW MEXICO
Carter for Senate/Dennis Howe
He was a hard worker, was knowledgeable, but I always
felt he didn't have enough confidence in himself.
Domenici for Governor/Jim Morris
He seemed to lack the necessary experience to wage a state-
wide campaign.
NORTH DAKOTA
Kleppe for Senate/Jim Groot
He was imported from out of state through Jim Allison. He
seemed particularly well-qualified and knew what he was doing.
CONFIDENTIAL
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3
OHIO
Taft for Senate/John Kelley
This is another case where he didn't seem to have either
authority to act or confidence to do SO.
UTAH
Burton for Senate/Brad Hays
Exceptionally well-qualified. The only objection to Brad
is that he was spread between Utah and Wyoming, with
excursions to Virginia and elsewhere. He was part of the
Roy Pfautch organization.
Other possible objections to Brad's operation were that
the local people resented to the very end the importation
of an out of state manager and the fact that he always
wasn't available on the scene.
WYOMING
Wold for Senate/Roy Pfautch
Roy is very knowledgeable but, here again, was another
case of a professional organization taking on too much work.
The result was -- he was not available and Brad Hays had
to come over from Utah to assist.
General observations are:
1.
My contacts in most instances were with the candidates.
Therefore, other than those listed above, I cannot give you im-
pressions of managers in other States.
2.
Professional managers, strictly speaking, are not the
answer. We need Party people who are campaign oriented with
the ability to conduct campaigns.
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
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4
3.
They should not be spread too thin. A statewide
campaign is all a good campaign manager should endeavor
to handle.
In short, we need more good campaign managers.
tramary
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 12, 1970
MESSAGE FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
MURRAY CHOTINER
SUBJECT: PENNSYLVANIA
With the exception of Senator Hugh Scott, the election in
Pennsylvania was something of a debacle.
Steps to regroup and rebuild should start early if we hope
to have any chance of carrying the State in 1972, as well as
recapturing the Governorship in 1974.
With that thought in mind, I met with Bob Kunzig this
morning. I will be meeting with State Chairman Cliff Jones
this afternoon and will talk with Senator Scott when he
returns from Mexico on Sunday. I will also meet with Jack
Jordan, former State Chairman, and now at HUD.
You will be importuned to appoint Ray Broderick and/or
Ray Shafer to an important post.
May I respectfully suggest that doing so will not contribute
anything significant towards rebuilding the GOP in Pen-
nsylvania, according to well-informed sources.
At the moment, the only two names that appear to be on
the horizon for future public office in Pennsylvania are Bob
Kunzig and Dave Maxwell, formerly Insurance Commissioner
for Pennsylvania, and presently General Counsel at HUD.
Jummy