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To: H. R. Haldeman. From: Charles Colson. RE: Wallace people. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/25/1972
To: Charles W. Colson. From: Charles S. Snider. RE: Wallace, MacGovern and Nixon campaign. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Letter], 9/22/1972
To: H. R. Haldeman. From: W. Richard Howard. RE: Surrogate scheduling program. 10 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 4/17/1972
To: H. R. Haldeman. From: Charles Colson. RE: Issue mgmt. 9 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/17/1972
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WHSF: Contested, 47-14
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This file contains:
To: H. R. Haldeman. From: Charles Colson. RE: Wallace people. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/25/1972
To: Charles W. Colson. From: Charles S. Snider. RE: Wallace, MacGovern and Nixon campaign. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Letter], 9/22/1972
To: H. R. Haldeman. From: W. Richard Howard. RE: Surrogate scheduling program. 10 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 4/17/1972
To: H. R. Haldeman. From: Charles Colson. RE: Issue mgmt. 9 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/17/1972
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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47
14
9/25/1972
Campaign
Memo
To: H.R. Haldeman. From: Charles Colson.
RE: Wallace people. 1pg.
47
14
9/22/1972
Campaign
Letter
To: Charles W. Colson. From: Charles S.
Snider. RE: Wallace, MacGovern and Nixon
campaign. 4pgs.
47
14
4/17/1972
Campaign
Memo
To: H.R. Haldeman. From: W. Richard
Howard. RE: Surrogate scheduling program.
10pgs.
47
14
5/17/1972
Campaign
Memo
To: H.R. Haldeman. From: Charles Colson.
RE: Issue mgmt. 9pgs.
Tuesday, March 20, 2012
Page 1 of 1
Same-
September 25, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT:
Wallace People
I have been very impressed with Charlie Snyder, Wallace's
top man, who sent me the attached letter which Ithought you
might like to read. While it is rambling, he makes two very
interesting points.
The first is the overture now being made to Wallace by McGovern.
This is for real. I don't think there is a chance of their succeeding
but the McGovera people are presenting some very persuasive
arguments.
The second point deals with the campaign theme, and while he
hasn't stated it very well, I think the trust issue is a very
powerful one. Right now we own it. Sayder suggests that we
exploit it, a point with which I concur on the positive side.
THE
WR4
CAMPAIGN
N-6
wi
September 22, 1972
9/26/72
The Honorable Charles W. Colson
Special Council to President
White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
Dear Chuck:
Paul Johnson, the McGovern coordinator for more than half of
Florida, was in my office Thursday.
Here is what he said:
"I have been over North Florida and Central Florida where
I am the campaign manager for McGovern and I find that the
people are not for McGovern and .they are not for Nixon. They
are still for George Wallace. They are waiting for George
Wallace to drop even a feather of a hint as to where they
should go. And that is where they will go."
He came here with a long brief on similarities between
McGovern and Wallace. It was a part of the increasing court-
ship of the campaign by the McGovern forces. They are using
"party man" and "Democratic candidate in 1976" and such other
hoopla to sell the thought that Wallace must annoint the
McGovern-Shriver ticket. There is an "undecided" group among
Wallace people, but it is decidedly more anti-McGovern because
of his supporters than the man or issues. I keep emphasizing
the word "supporters." So, when you say people are against
McGovern, they mean to a much greater degree, that they are
against welfare cheats, queers, amnesty seekers, militants,
hippies, etc. But somehow this supporter image has been
pushed aside. Paul Johnson said "We are having our young
people cut their hair, shave their mustaches, and clean up
to get away from bad supporter image." In line with this,
STAND
UPFOR
AMERICA
P.O. BOX 1972
TELEPHONE (205) 265-7081
MONTGOMERY. ALABAMA 36103
The Honorable Charles W. Colson
Page 2
the McGovern national organization has attempted to employ as
a speechwriter and consultant one of our campaign people who
has been responsible for the Governor's statements since 1958.
He turned them down because he is loyal to me although the
offer was most attractive.
Now cometh Ted Kennedy. And in line with this, Morris Dees
has been on the phone almost daily to the man they tried to
employ as a speechwriter. He says the turning point of the
McGovern campaign would be the Wallace endorsement.
None of which is going to happen. Right now, we have a state
that is 99 and 44/100 percent pure Nixon and Alabama straws in
the wind will be a key to what Wallace does or does not do. I
have been keeping him informed of this feeling and it is
cemented at this stage.
Now, I would like to hitchhike mentally with you. In other
words, I want to present some viewpoints that in our intell-
ectual redneckism (as opposed to pointy-headed intellectuals)
might give you and the Nixon organization an insight that I
feel is missing.
We are in touch with all three parties and their supporters.
I believe I have found a key to this campaign that is not
present anywhere else in your organization.
The key word is trust. President Nixon said in his book "Six
Crises" that "in politics, victory is never total."
There is no total victory today. There is too much executi-
vists. Too much over-confidence. Too little impact to the
average citizen.
If I can drop back and punt for a second, McGovern came out
of the Democratic convention scarred to hell and back as a
hippie-loving, abortion-pushing, amnesty-favoring, homosexual
supported liberal. Then he capped this with the Eagleton dis-
aster. He was down and dirty and untouchable by average
citizens.
The Honorable Charles W. Colson
Page 3
Now, I want to make this point
there are liberals and left-
ists but they are few in number and there are conservatives
like the Birchers, etc. but they are few in number. The
election is decided by average citizens who are not left,
right or middle of the road. They are political wanderers who
favor a little of the left, a little of the right, and a
little of the middle of the road. Mainly they are concerned
about a job, a three-bedroom house, a car, school, church,
children, maybe a boat, and retirement. They don't know
Bangladesh from an Eskimo, and they have absolutely no con-
cept about what is happening in Vietnam, Korea or Japan and
trade deficit is something for the economists.
They are sold politics by the tube. This is a TV political
year, pure and simple, and that's it. Right now, they have
McGovern, a man they can't stand. But the Democrats are working
on this. in reverse. They are trying to destroy Nixon's
popularity by convincing the people that McGovern might be a
man you can't stand but Nixon is a man you can't trust.
So the word is trust. Trust is the key. So Nixon has to sell
trust. Only not trust in Nixon but trust in the people If
you could come up with a theme that Nixon trusts the people.
Nixon trusts America. Nixon trusts freedom. Nixon trusts the
realness of our times. Then you get away from trust in Nixon
and you associate trust with Nixon with trust in America and
trust in the people and everytime that McGovern and his crowd
try to break this trust image, they create an impression that
they don't trust the people, they don't trust America, they
don't trust freedom.
I know how I would have our man present this theme. And I
know how our staff could take this one line and break it off
in the McGovern crowd because they are saying you can't trust
America. In effect, they are still trying to sell the old saw
that "would you buy a used car from Richard Nixon?"
I see this. Others see this. This is what the next 40 days
is all about. The concept must be that trust is the key. The
wheat deal, Watergate, Vietnam, all of this is tied in to breaking
down trust in Nixon but if the Nixon team can turn this around and
make it appear that this radical crowd is trying to destroy trust
in America, then you have a victory SO fantastic that even the polls
you now have would be underestimated.
The Honorable Charles W. Colson
Page 4
This "NOW, more than ever" line is great and I like it. I
know it is good. But where are the lines that go with it that
explains why? Why not because Nixon trusts the people and
Nixon trusts America--and that is why he is needed now more
than ever because our times demand trust.
I see things happening across the country that polls won't
reflect. The Democrats are still taking "issue" polls only--
not image polls. They are cracking on the anti-issues in an
attempt to crack trust.
I know the campaign is geared toward the middle of October
but I also know that NOW is the time for action to get the
Nixon campaign moving toward the Average citizen.
The average citzen wants to hear trust. He wants to be re-
assured. Reassured. Reassured. This what it is all about.
These are thoughts for what they are worth.
With kind personal regards, I am
Sincerely,
Charles S. Snider
Executive Director
css/bjc
5th Draft: April M, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
W. Richard Howard
SUBJECT:
Surrogate Scheduling Program
On April 12, Chuck Colson, Dwight Chapin, Jeb Magruder,
Larry Higby (part of the meeting) and I met to discuss the surrogate
scheduling program. This meeting was held in response to your
April 10 memorandum on this subject and an attempt was made to
come up with an agreed upon proposal to improve the surrogate
scheduling operation.
It was agreed that this operation can be divided into three
major functions:
1. Planning and strategy of the surrogate operation;
2. Execution of surrogate events, including maximizing
the impact of the event;
3. Distribution of issues and lines for surrogates to use
-- that is, effectively using the surrogates to sell
points of importance to us.
We also agreed that there are clearly political and non-political
events to be scheduled. All events should be looked at from the
standpoint of political value, but as to many, it is our interest
to have our surrogates (at least those in the Administration)
2.
speaking in their official capacity rather than overtly as a
surrogate. Hence, the auspices under which they are scheduled
is quite important.
I. Planning and Strategy. This function is defined
as including both creative scheduling and the initial first level
liaison with the key spokesmen. This means that events and visits
are created or located, and specific key spokesmen are locked into
the events. At this point, the execution phase begins.
A. Creative Scheduling. It was agreed by all present that
creative scheduling for the surrogates would be the
responsibility of 1701 and that they would have authority
for decisions relating to who goes where, when and why.
Magruder indicates that the creative scheduling function
is presently being handled by Marik, Teeter and himself.
He also indicated that the planning and analysis functions
are being direcly related to surrogate scheduling thereby
providing the necessary guidelines. It is felt that this
function could be more productive if a surrogate strategy
section were included in each state plan and if 1701 would
begin drawing on those with past experience to obtain additional
input.
--It is recommended that for each key state, the State
Chairman, the 1701 political operative responsible for that
3.
State, and the 1701 scheduling staff, develop a detailed
surrogate strategy. This surrogate strategy plan should
outline the important issues in each state and determine which
surrogates most effectively present these issue. Not only
should it be determined who should and shouldn't be used in
each state, but the desired number of appearances should be
estimated. This would be the substantive section of the
overall surrogate strategy plan and the White House
should be totally in volved in the development of this
section. The plan should also contain a political section
outlining each state's estimated requirements for key
political drawing cards such as the VP, First Family,
celebrities, etc. I believe it is important for this
type of thinking and planning to be done for each key
state and that these plans be periodically revised. Without
them, only a Speakers Bureau operation exists.
It is further recommended that Magruder, Marik, and Teeter
set up an informal advisory brain trust consisting of Chapin,
Whitaker, Cole and myself who have all been involved in past
scheduling operations. This group should periodically meet and
review the Key State plans so that their inputs and thinking
can be included in the overall surrogate guidelines. It would
be useful if the 1701 political operative concerned with each
4.
state atteneded these meetings during the time their state
is under discussion. Obviously O'Donnell and Porter should
also attend.
B. Spokesmen Contact. During the discussion of this subject,
Magruder proposed that all contact with the surrogates (a list
of 30 key spokesmen developed by 1701 which include Cabinet
officers, White House Staff, Senators, Representatives and
Governors) be made by personnel located at 1701 and that
demands on the time of these key spokesmen should be totally
controlled by 1701. The thinking behind his proposal is that
a key spokesman should be contacted by only one person
regarding his surrogate activities, because contact by more
than one would be confusing and may even create demands which
counter each other. It was further proposed by Magruder
that Pat O'Donnell physically move to 1701 in order to better
coordinate this effort, and to increase the political emphasis
of the scheduling function.
Colson's view is that O'Donnell should remain in the
White House working closely with 1701 and functioning as a
resource of the surrogate scheduling operation there. The
logic behind this position is that there will always be the
requirement for a scheduling function within the White House.
This is true because of the many requests for various White
5.
House briefings and special scheduling operations such
as; busing road shows, economic road show, Kissinger
foreign policy briefings, the special youth speakers operation
and, of course, to continue the use O'Donnell makes of the
sub-Cabinet group. Also, of course, we do have some success
scheduling Laird and Rogers which couldn't readily be done
from 1701.
It is also important to take full advantage of the clout
of the White House. With most non-political (but obviously
political important) forums, initial contact by the White House,
as opposed to 1701, will be necessary to the success of placing
our speakers in these forums. This latter point is particularly
sensitive especially when programming committees of large
national forums which are made up of jealous and protective
factions of all political persuasions. Many non-political
groups want Administration spokesmen but will shy away from
spokesmen scheduled by either political party or political
organization like 1701. If contacted by 1701, these
organizations might well feel obligated to invite someone
from the Democratic side. In addition, if the trip is
arranged by the White House, press arrangements can be made
directly by Clawson and Snyder or by the agencies under Barker's
supervision. TV interview shows in particular, governed as they
are by the FCC's expansion of the equal time doctrine
5.
(the Zapple ruling) are reluctant during a political
period to take a "political spokesman" whereas they can
very easily accept a Cabines member if he is appearing
as an "Administration Spokesman".
I am of the strong opinion that the fastest and most
effective, program is to over organize it. It would probably
way-to stifle a surrogate scheduling
be beneficial to have a single contact for each key spokes-
man who would control all requests for him, but let's not
hide from reality. Each Cabinet officers, Senator, etc.
has multiple demands on his time from numberous sources, and
he always will.; he must continuously determine the priorities
of several requests and I believe the President very
effectively indicated the importance of the political surrogate
program. A periodic reminder of this importance may be
necessary.
There was also no agreement on the requirement for the
entire scheduling operation to be together physically.
I
believe it would be sheer folly stupidity to set this up at 1701
evaluanly
and fail to take advantage of our incumbency.
It was agreed that at some time in the future the
surrogate program would heat up and White House scheduling
requirements would decrease in number and importance so that
it might be desirable to merge the White House and 1701
scheduling operations in one location. Magruder proposes
6.
this merger take place in July. Colson believes that
September and October will be the most important and proposes
the change, if desirable, be made in August or September.
Based on the above discussion the following
recommendations are made:
--O'Donnel stay in the White House but be used
by 1701 when White House clout is necessary for
specific scheduling events. Hewould continue
to handle White House briefings, road shows,
specialized briefings, key non-political forums
and, of course, the entire non-surrogate operation,
--It was further recommended that O Donnell and the
scheduling personnel at 1701 meet almost daily to
review scheduling opportunities, priorities,
requirements, and the decisions with respect to the
execution for the particular day. 0 Donnell would
act as the agent for 1701 in obtaining Cabinet members
and Administration spokesmen in accordance with these
decisions.
--- It is further recommended that
Colson, Magruder,
Chapin review the surrogate program again during July
to determine when and if the scheduling operations should
be merged.
7.
II. Execution and Coordination. Discussion of this area
was not extensive because there was relative agreement. It is
recommended that once the key spokesman is locked into a visit,
responsibility for the success of that visit arrangements-wise, is
turned over to John Foust. Foust should have overall responsibility
for the logistics and the political value of the visit. Foust should
coordinate directly with each key spokesman's scheduler and it will
be his duty to ensure that each visit contains those events
that will have the best political effect. Fourst should also coordinate
the advance men, where used.
As the campaign continues, new events and techniques to expand
the political effect of a surrogate visit should be developed, tested
and expanded. Therefore, the guidelines for both scheduling and
execution will constantly change to reflect the political situation.
The responsibility for maximizing the media impact of every
appearance will depend upon the nature of the for um, the capacity in
which the surrogate is speaking (i.e. surrogate or Administration
representative) and of course who the surrogate is. 1701's surrogate
list is about 1/2 political figures (Congressmen, Senators, and Governors)
and 1/2 Administration spokesmen. As to the former, press and TV
arrangements of necessity must by made by 1701. The White House couldn't
do so without becoming overtly political. The Administration spokes-
men's press and TV arrangements should be handled as they are now. under
8
Barker supervision.
The Departmental PIO arrange then or when
necessary they can be arranged directly by Snyder and Clawson.
III. Lines and Issues. One of the most important aspects
of the surrogate operation of course is to ensure that a particular
surrogate hits a line which we want hit. The issues to be emphasized
at present come from either the President, Haldeman, Mitchell, Colson
or a combination. It would be highly desirable in the future if
Mitchell, Haldeman, and Colson can coordinate this on a regular basis.
It was agreed that it would be Colson's responsibilty to be
sure that Noel Koch has the particular line for use by Hill spokes-
men including of course surrogates when they are here in Washington,
that the RNC have it for use by party workers, to ensure that Des
Barker has it for use by Cabinet officers, that Van Shumway have it for
use for press purposes and Committee personnel and workers and, of
course, that Clawson and Snyder have it in connection with their
responsibility in programming Administration and press opportunities.
This relates to substantive issues either domestic or foreign policy.
As to the political lines to be taken, this, of course, is determined
by Mitchell, and Shumway has the responsibility for seeing that all of
our people are instructed as to that particular line at that time.
Substantive fact sheets will contine to be generated from here in
the White House, but also sent to 1701 for their use in speakers kits,
political surrogate brieftings, etc. Political fact sheet would, of
course, be handled by 1701 and passed on to the White H ouse for
9.
information only.
This does not involve a significant change in our present
and
modus aperandi. It does require very close coordination, whit
It
this will
was agreed to take place on an almost daily basis between Magruder's
office and Colson's office.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 17, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT:
Issue Management
The following is intended as an appendix to Malek's memo to you
regarding issue management. I have a number of quarrels with
the Malek paper primarily in that the solution to the problem is
not setting up new organizational structures; it is in having some-
one, somewhere, sometime, someplace make the decision as to
the issues we need to pursue, how we are going. to pursue them
and then let the troops execute.
One major caveat in considering the issues: this is that this has
to be the most volatile year ever in terms of issues. What looks
very dynamic today may fizzle in a week. On the other hand, we
have to start somewhere and begin sometime. The worst of all
results would be to fight the campaign on whatever issue happens
to be hot in October because it may or may not be "ours". I am
also excluding from this analysis, obviously, foreign policy issues
or questions which go to the P.R. aspects of the President's image.
The whole issue of trust, candor and credibility is one that can't
be dealt with as a separate issue; in my mind it is the "bottom line"
of how well we handle the issues and how well we project the President's
personal strengths in handling these issues. It also is a function of
the gap between rhetoric and performance and unless we can close
the gap we are, in my mind, not going to be able to do very much on
the trust and credibility issue. It can't be handled by P.R. in a vacuum;
it is really determined by how the public perceives the President in
handling the tough issues.
The following is my analysis of the gut issues and some thoughts on
the substantive follow-through we need.
2.
A. The New Populism. Without trying to define this, I think it falls
right now into three categories; 1) we are for the big guy, the
Democrats are for the little man; 2) taxes and 3) disenchantment
with government i.e., the bureaucracy. As to these three:
1.
We are stuck with the big business label and it will be hard
to shed. There are a number of blue collar initiatives we
can take, however, many of them outlined in my memo to
you of May 21, 1971 (ironically, almost a year ago). If we
can start coming forward with some of these initiatives and
sharpen up our P.R. in this area (for example with our
pension program which we have totally neglected) then we
might be able to slide away from the big business label
somewhat. Obviously, from a P.R. standpoint, no visible
association with big business or establishment-type events
should be considered for the President.
2.
There is no way politically that we can defend the present
tax structure, nor should we. Either Humphrey or McGovern
will attack it hard, notwithstanding the obvious hypocrisy of
their position. The dissatisfaction of millions of people can
be exploited very effectively by the "outs"; we are the "ins"
and the fact that the Congress has created the present tax
structure simply doesn't sell as a defense (see again, my
memo of May 21, 1972, page 7). There are 66 million home-
owners. Curbing property taxes is a natural issue. It should
be ours; but we have skirted all around it. We made an
unsuccessful attempt to equate revenue sharing with property
tax relief and we hit the issue hard in this year's State of the
Union, but there has been almost no substantive follow-up.
Bryce Harlow notwithstanding, (the business community isn't
going to go with McGovern or Humphrey), we should quite
candidly acknowledge that the present system is deficient,
inequitable, overly complex, that the heaviest burdens are
on middle-class people, that people shouldn't get away scott-
free without paying any taxes and that property taxes are the
most regressive and onerous of all.
3.
We can say that we have tried in a number of ways to change
the tax structure (citing our position in 1969 versus that of the
Congress) and we are going to change it. We should proclaim
it the number one priority of the second Nixon term. Ehrlich-
man got off to a good start with the briefing a week ago, but if
it is not followed up by a continuous flow of substantive steps,
the briefing will have proved to be counter productive or all
John will be interpreted to have said is "let's wait until next
year". That is not good enough. We should insist that the
ACIR come in with a report in June and meet with the President.
The President should adopt the recommendation that property
taxes not be used for school financing purposes. He should
then, by direction to the appropriate departments, order the
preparation of legislative proposals to accomplish specific
objectives and there should be subsequent announcements by
various Cabinet officials of progress in their assigned areas
of responsibility. Shultz can become highly visible as the
architect of the next tax plan. By Executive Order, the
President can direct a simplification of tax forms and proce-
dures. By July 1, we will be able to' announce that one essen-
tail underpinning of the new Nixon tax program will be a
minimum tax on everyone regardless of tax shelters; in short
the rich must pay a fair share of taxes. (We proposed this in
1969 and were defeated -- it will not hurt our "fat cats"; they
aren't the ones getting off scott-free.) By September 1 the
public should have gotten a very good firm understanding of
four or five key elements of the tax package that we will pro-
pose to the Congress in January of 1973. By that time, the
President should have been seen visibly involved in managing
a major Administration effort to come up with a fresh approach.
In fact, I would propose this be June's number one issue insofar
as the President is concerned -- meetings with tax experts,
Treasury officials, etc. etc.
What I am suggesting here is a specific program with a series
of substantive actions that result in a rather well defined set
of principles that will govern whatever we propose next year
(and what we discuss in the campaign). We can cut the ground
out from under the demogogic arguments of McGovern and
Humphrey if we do this. Otherwise we will be reacting
defensively through the months of September and October.
4.
3.
Particularly if McGovern is the nominee, he will campaign
against the establishment and the unresponsiveness of
Government. This is an issue Wallace has used very
effectively. Since we run the bureaucracy, we will be tarred
with that brush. A major effort should be undertaken to put
some day light between the President and the bureaucracy.
We have opportunity for this at least once a week if we will
use it. The housing scandals in FHA give us a perfect plat-
form to call people in, raise hell, let a few heads roll and
issue strong vigorous Presidential directives. We have done
this a few times, I think very effectively in the drug area but
need to do it more. Within 24 hours of the next mine disaster,
the President should turn on the Bureau of Mines, perhaps
fire someone and once again, issue a whole set of new, tough
orders. Moreover Shultz and Weinberger can be very effective
for us during the campaign and in the months leading up to it
in talking about reducing the federal bureaucracy. Nobody
understands reorganization; they do understand cutting back
on bureaucrats. Substantively we have done all the right things
management-wise; now it is time to do a few demogogic things
which will have high visibility and show a tough, forceful
President cracking down on the bureaucracy. This goes to
the heart of the issue of Government being responsive to the
people.
B. Busing. The fundamental problem with our position on busing is
that it is not clearly perceived. People know the President is against
busing but in the South they know they have already instituted busing
plans, which the moratorium won't help, and in the North they see
the courts rushing forward with new busing orders. Nowhere is the
gap between rhetoric and performance any clearer than in this area
and I would submit this one really fuels the credibility issue.
In part our program is not understood because the moratorium is
in fact offensive in the South (they believe it will stop busing in the
North, but do nothing about busing that has already begun in the
South) and it is not clear in the North that it will do anything. If
Congress acts on the moratorium and the courts respect the statute,
then we will have something to run on in those areas affected but
we still have a problem in the South. If Congress does not act, we
5.
have got to run against the Congress, once again, with a major
effort in key areas. If Congress rejects the proposal, the
President should consider calling for a constitutional amendment
making it very clear, especially in the South, that existing busing
plans can be undone.
Our whole objective here is to simply get our position clearly under-
stood nationally. Once it is understood, then we need not campaign
on it as a national issue, but rather exploit hell out of it in key
areas. I would argue that busing, unlike a lot of other issues, is
clearly voter motivational. It is one of those issues in particular
areas that is absolutely decisive in a voter's mind. He will put up
with anything else if he feels that we not only are against busing,
but can and will do something about it (witness Michigan yesterday,
which I hope will lay to rest the last vestiges of doubt around here
as to whether or not busing is a cutting issue).
C. Inflation/Food Prices. Inflation as an issue probably is worthless.
People do not really know what the CPI means, nor is it terribly
important to them that Rumsfeld succeeded in rolling back the price
of Ford Pintos by $30 a car. What counts is the one basic commodity
that people buy every day food. Food prices have been rising so
long that people think they are rising even when they are not. They
are relatively stable right now and perhaps the best that we canhhope
for is to simply neutralize the food price issue. On the other hand,
if they begin to go up again, we know the political impact this can
have. We should be prepared to take very dramatic, bold action,
perhaps another freeze, before the issue gets away from us. I
happen to believe the Sindlinger polls in March which showed a
significant political upheaval building in the country over this one
issue. I would urge that we not only be prepared for very dramatic
action if food prices begin to rise again, but that we also consider
possible ways to insure now that prices do not rise so that we can
crow about having stabilized food prices (for example meat import
quotas).
All of the other components of the economic issue are in my opinion
either cosmetic or regional. Obviously we should talk about doing
things to create more jobs, but at this point in time, they are either
6.
going to be there or they are not. The President should obviously
be postured against unemployment but there isn't a hell of a lot
substantively that we can do. Regionally we can exploit the defense
spending issue very effectively particularly if McGovern is the
opponent.
In short, except for the food price issue I think that there is not
much that we are substantively lacking in this area (at least that
we can doanything about).
D. Welfare. I assume that our game plan is clear -- get no bill from
the Congress and then blast Congress for having failed to act. If
we can pull this off, it will give us the best of both worlds. I would
urge, however, that we be prepared once we are out of danger inso-
far as Congress acting, that we take executive action (even if it is
later upset in the courts) to do something about the welfare problem.
The President might consider an Executive Order cutting off funds
to welfare recipients who fail to meet certain work standards,
(a rigid enforcement of the Talmadge Bill with a strongly worded
Presidential statement will do it). The HEW bureaucracy will
revolt and everyone in this building will argue the legality of it
and it's ineffectiveness. The impact could be absolutely electric
if it were done under the proper circumstances in September.
The President could say he has waited 4 years for the Congress to
do something, the Congress hasn't acted and that he is therefore
taking firm and decisive executive action to eliminate abuses in
the welfare system. We can play around all we want with pilot
programs in New York and California as we have done to curb
excesses in the welfare program. What we need to get through to
the folks, however, is a very bold action by the President which
would highlight his commitment to end welfare abuses and at the
same time the Congress' inability to deal with the problem. (I
watched something very similar to this on the state level turn a
gubernatorial election 180° around in 1970.) There will be 50 reasons
why we shouldn't do this, but someone should figure out exactly how
we can if we want to.
E. Drugs and Crime. I don't know whether there are additional sub-
stantive steps that can be taken, but I would assign two or three of
the very best minds we have to develop additional substantive
initiatives in this area.
7.
P.R. wise we can be helped enormously on the crime issue by
building Pat Gray. He is a great subject to work with and in the
final analysis this may be the best weapon we have. There is
much more we can do as far as Presidential visibility is concerned
a helicopter trip over the Rio Grande, building up Ambrose, visits
to treatment centers and meetings in key cities with strike forces.
F. Environment. If the Harris theory is correct that the election will
be decided by the over $15, 000 a year, upper middle-class, white
suburbanites, we should start planning carefully ways in which to
promote our record in the environmental area. I have no illusions
that this is a cutting issue; it is not. It is, however, a good,
rather appealing little package that could be used especially with
certain constituencies and we should not neglect it simply because
none of us feel it will be decisive in the election. Substantively, we
need do nothing but there should be a complete strategy for
exploitation of the good record we have made.
G. No Fault Automobile Insurance. I believe this is a real sleeper
issue and that we should poll on it as quickly as possible, particu-
larly in those states where it has either come irto effect or has
been debated in the legislature. Auto insurance is a little like
property taxes, everybody feels. they are being cheated. The
Democrats really have not gotten out front on this one. There
is still time for aggressive Presidential leadership and we can
take over the issue right now. It's an excellent antidote to the
big business versus little guy syndrome. At the moment, we
really have no position.
Key Voter Blocs
In the last two meetings with Ehrlichman, Mitchell, you, MacGregor and
Harlow, I have been emphasizing the need for analytically determining
what will be the decisive voting blocs in the '72 election. I suspect we
will never refine this to a scientific analysis and so perhaps we should
come to some subjective consensus.
I can never get out of my mind the '48 election (see again my memo of
May 21, 1972). Truman won it, among other reasons, by cultivating the
8.
self interest of a few key voting blocs. We have precisely the same
opportunity with the white ethnic, blue collar, new middle class,
Catholics. In this area we are blowing it. In my opinion, we have
a wider gap between promise and performance here than in any other
area and with just a little substantive effort, we can do a great deal.
For example:
1.
We can support the Mills bill (which has strong bipartisan
cosponsorship) providing tax credits for parents who have
children in non-public schools. This issue can be exploited
to a fare-thee-well and even if we are only talking about 7
or 8 million Catholics (which is Morey's argument) that is
one hell of a powerful bloc. With the support of the Catholic
hierarchy, we can undertake a very effective organizational
effort in November. Humphrey is all for aid to parochial
schools so at the very least we would neutralize him on this
issue. McGovern is against it and here the opportunities are
immense in the key states. This is like busing; if properly
exploited in key areas, it is a cutting issue.
2.
We can also support a form of guaranteed annual income for
the building trades. All of-the staff work has been done on this
within the Federal Government. Almost everyone recognizes
the need for something substantive in this area. It will happen
in the next 2 to 3 years. All we need to do is seize the issue
now, endorse it and then campaign selectively within the areas
where it too can be a cutting issue.
3.
Finally, we have the whole open-housing issue. Freezing Romney
in place or even selectively rolling him back could pay enormous
political dividends.
The second voter bloc of major concern is the aging. It can be statistically
established that no Republican has been elected (or perhaps can be) without
a solid majority of the over-60 voters. Our program is right now so much
mush; we embraced the Kennedy nutrition program which is of concern
to poverty level elderly only. This is sheer nonsense because that is not
the aging group that will ever vote Republican. Our highest priority in
this area should be to get an agreed upon Social Security increase so that
the Democrats will not base their campaign on higher Social Security
9.
benefits or force us to veto the increase presently contemplated in
the Congress which in turn will become a highly symbolic campaign
issue. Also, with some clever legislative maneuvering, we could
lift the earning ceiling limitation on Social Security recipients out of
H.R. 1 and attach it to another bill so that perhaps we would have this
one good one to talk about with our elderly constituency. The property
tax issue is also hig with the old folks. We are badly treading water
in this area; especially if Humphrey should be our opponent, we will
be in deep trouble. His image is good with the elderly and he can really
hurt us in key areas. We are not well positioned.
In my view, if we can solidify the traditional Republican vote with the
over-60's and make the inroads I think possible with the Catholics
(including marginal gains with the Spanish-speaking we are doing well
in this area ) these two blocs could be decisive.
As a final item, I have recommended to you before that we compile a
list of goody type announcements that can be issued virtually every day
in September and October things like marifime contracts, parks being
returned to the states, special manpower grants in key states, etc.
Some of these will provide excellent forums for Presidential participation,
and will in any event have strong political appeal at the time of maximum
impact. As best I can tell, these are being let out now as they become
ready. I suggest that as many as we think judicious be held back to be
used during the key months and to give us at least the option of involving
the President in them. We may be overly sensitive to what appears
blatantly political but I would have no hesitation in recommending that the
President go to an event like the San Diego Shipyard event in September to
do another major maritime award. Whether the press calls it political
or not, it will get through to the people, at the very time we want to re-
mind them very visibly of what the President is doing for them. I believe
that we should brazenly exploit the advantages of incumbency while all the
other side can do is promise.