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Typewritten notes RE: various campaign participants. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], no date
from Khachigian titled "Political Memorandum, Why McGovern Lost. 13 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], 11/7/1972
Draft from Khachigian RE 'Political Memorandum, Why McGovern Lost.' 22 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], 11/7/1972
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Typewritten notes RE: various campaign participants. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], no date
from Khachigian titled "Political Memorandum, Why McGovern Lost. 13 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], 11/7/1972
Draft from Khachigian RE 'Political Memorandum, Why McGovern Lost.' 22 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], 11/7/1972
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
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Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
47
44
Campaign
Other Document
Typewritten notes RE: various campaign
participants. 3 pgs.
47
44
11/7/1972
Campaign
Report
Report from Khachigian titled "Political
Memorandum, Why McGovern Lost. 13 pgs.
47
44
11/7/1972
Campaign
Report
Draft from Khachigian RE 'Political
Memorandum, Why McGovern Lost.' 22 pgs.
Thursday, April 23, 2015
Page 1 of 1
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
N-1
hotes
"miltor viorst who is... "
r.d.
M
( ( mix )
[Doc 22]
(typed]
N-2
memor
Rhach-vin do Secretary,
11/10/72
[Doc 23]
(nim)
re: Clans and Preferences
for. become term, with attached
[2] draft copies
[attached to covernmens, Khan
chigian to President, 11/10/72]
N-3
memo
Political memorander why
11/7/72
J
(Anix)
Doc 24]
me Govern Lost"
[attached do cover memo, behachisin
TO Buchavan, 11/7/77)
N-4
memo
Draft copy of N-3, attached
11/7/72
(comx)
[Doc 175]
don-3 case file with ideas
formemo on by Mrs Govern
lost, " n.d,
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
FOLDER TITLE
November [1972] Li0/27
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NA FORM 1421 (4-85)
Presidential Materials Review Board
Review on Contested Documents
Collection:
Kenneth L. Khachigian
Box Number:
7
Folder:
November [1972] [1 of 2]
Document
Disposition
22
Return
Private/Political
23
Retain Open
24
Return Private/Political
175
Return Private/Political
Milton VIEXXX Viorst who is distinguished by his interview
with George McGover which produced McGovern's comment
comparing Ho Chi Minh favorably ** to George Washington --
***** Viopst, whose range and thus danger, does not
extend out of Washington to MM more than
newspapers.
Mankiewicz whose journies into the m predictive
mode show about the same presimes prescience as Mank the
politician whose predictions of a triumphal McGovern
worried Republicans enough to ensure that MEXS McGovern
was indeeds K thoroughly defeated. If the REpublicans
axi had not had a Frank Mankiewicz in the McGovern high
command, they would have had to invent one.
Not EVEN any mea culpa
Mr. Kraft could fully spend the rest of his life trying
to explain away his erross -- but the only safe prediction
is that Joe Kraft will make more, yes, errors.
The problem with the crystal ball brigade ****** is that
it wants to write history before it happens.
Would justifimably provoke RN to say: "Who are those
pundits and why are they saying those terrible things about
me?"
page 2
One NH ****** wishes at times that he was really as
abrasive as he is accused of being -- in that case he
could make his partisans happy by hoisting up the E oh-so-
wrong columns, editorials and television commentaries in
a beaming
the same manner that/Harry Truman once held up that premature
Chicago Tribune foont page and say: "I told you so!"
John Kenneth Galbraith, who, it will be recalled,
said durin g the Tet Offensive of 1968 the Saigon Government
would fall within a "fortnight." Webster's will either
have to changes its definition of that word or Galbraith
might have to eat it.
Hobart Rowen, whose self-described *m "Marxist revo-
utionary" son married George McGovern's daughter -- is
always SHEX quick to predict the worst form Mr. Nixon's
kni policies, but thenxwken WHE why wouldn't he; blood
is thicker than water, they say.
Harriet Van Horne, whom one reads in the evening
one
much for the same reason ymm/asks for arsenic in YEMX his
hors-d'eeuvres (sp?), surely has M pad-locked her stax
door by now against the invaders. Harriet, are you still
there, or have you been size done in by the A"Bloody Assizes?"
Mr. Chuang Tse-tung, head of the table tennis delegation
from the PRC during visit in Rose Garden on April 18, 1972
said:
page 3
"This time last year the U.S. table tennis team, headed
by Mr. Steenhoven, made a friendly visit to China, and today,
in the warm spring season, WEEK wak when flowers are in full
bloom, the Chinese table tennis delegation is here on a
reciprocal X visit."
"Warm spring season!" "Flowers in fmmlfull bloom!"
Omigosh -- tricked by diplomacy again.
Ken Khachigian
November 7, 1972
POLITICAL MEMORANDUM
WHY MCGOVERN LOST
A massive effort must be taken after the election to head off the
liberal establishment effort to detract from RN's election victory. That
effort will take many tacks -- such as RN didn't bring in a Congress; people
voted against McGovern not for Nixon, etc. However, the liberal apologists
will push one line extra hard: the defeat was not for the ideas of left-liberal
movement but rather for the bearer of those ideas.
They will argue that liberalism is still viable -- that we still need
busing, and all the other liberal schemes, and that they need only wait until
they get a standard bearer who won't make the same mistakes McGovern did.
The following analysis serves to debunk that viewpoint, and, it seems to me,
should be put out as much as possible to counter all the opinion contra. This
memorandum focuses on why McGovern lost -- any analysis of the high points
of the RN victory should be taken up in a separate memorandum.
THE CENTRAL POINT TO MAKE
To those who argue that McGovern had bad strategy and bad tactics and
that he made too many mistakes to run a good campaign, we have one basic
response: the tactics of the liberal movement are the logical outgrowth of
the liberal ideology. That is, don't blame McGovern per se, blame the
philosophy. Elitism, close-mindedness, moral righteousness, viewing
things as good versus evil and the penchant for overstatement are all
-2-
fundamentals of the liberal-left political ideology. If McGovern ran a
bad campaign -- don't blame his strategy because the strategy is the
ideology. The personal flaws of McGovern were bred of the flaws of his
political philosophy.
Thus, McGovern could change his mind on central issues, and then with
a straight face defend his credibility. This hurt his standing with the voters,
but being trained in the narrow view as he has, he sees his position only in
moralistic terms, or, as PJB put it, as the true believers.
People rejected the McGovern philosophy pure and simple. If the questions
of his credibility and wishy-washyness arose, it was only because of his
approach to public policy -- one in which he could cut aircraft carriers back
from 16 to 6 and still maintain with a straight face that this would not affect
the strength of the sixth fleet. That is the underlying problem with the left
radicals, i. e., that the wild things they propose really won't disjoint things
important to citizens or voter blocs.
But there are other things to look at in terms of what McGovern did
wrong, and I'll take them in sequence.
THE PARTY REFORM
It is not for nothing that the Democratic Party reform was promulgated
under the "McGovern Commission." This is where we underestimated
McGovern. Immediately, he saw the potential of these guidelines -- they
-3-
served his purposes perfectly. The reforms brought precisely those
people into the process who would directly further his candidacy. Moreover,
it was only McGovern at that point who saw that the complexity of the rules
would be baffling to those who did not know them, and he hired the fellow
who knew the rules best to be his delegate counter -- Rick Stearns.
His opponents did not see soon enough the potential of having a tight
solid base which could bring victory in a field of many candidates. Therefore,
McGovern moved quickly to pre-empt the party's left wing, and knowing
that and with tight organization and his left flank protected, he could con-
ceivably get the nomination. To that extent the liberal-left issues were
winners for McGovern in the early stages of the game.
PRIMARIES
McGovern made it through the primaries with skill, luck, and, later,
with a little help from his friends in the media. New Hampshire was a
Muskie disaster, and McGovern was clever in making his loss out to be a
victory. McGovern's first score. McGovern was wiped out in Florida in
what should have been the first test of the McGovern political philosophy --
but it was not reported that way. It was said that McGovern never expected
to win Florida. Nevertheless, his views on gutting the space program,
support for massive busing, and a few other positions surely were important
in the Florida defeat.
-4-
Next came Illinois where McGovern wisely worked more on getting a
foothold while avoiding a direct test with Muskie. This strategy -- a good
one -- brought him to Wisconsin which he targeted from the beginning as
his strongest state with the yough-lust and an excellent organization. There
the tight-knit support for his radicalism and an excellent youth turnout gave
him a victory. Moreover, the Republicans helped by crossing over for
McGovern and Wallace. If only Democrats had voted, HHH would have won.
Yet Wisconsin was the key for McGovern and most importantly it knocked
Lindsay out and gave McG an unexposed left flank.
From Wisconsin on, it was not very difficult for McG. He took Rhode
Island because there was only about a 10% Democrat turnout -- and the tight
organization, getting the liberals and doves out, did it again. Then came
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania with Muskie mercilessly caught in between
HHH and McG. By this time the press was necking in the back seat with
McGovern, and Massachusetts was a cinch while HHH kept Muskie at bay in
Pa. Again, the organization also went to work in Pa. to pick up some
delegates -- what proved to be a good strategy for McG; he nickel-dimed
his opposition. Throughout, McGovern was assisted by low voter turnouts
coupled with his zealots going to the polls in droves. April 25th served to
put Muskie over the side -- a hapless victim on a fast track.
-5-
Through Ohio, Indiana, Tennessee, and North Carolina, in my
judgment, the press effectively protected McGovern. He didn't do real well
in any of these states -- except Ohio -- yet they only said it was because
he didn't try. Yet, by then they should have known that the McGovern
ideology was like death in those states. Moreover, in Ohio he was basking
in the media glow which did not mention his radical positions at all, but
rather how he represented "the alienated and discontented. " That left
McG free to use his excellent TV spots to bilk the voters of their support.
They only saw a nice guy on the tube, not a radical.
Nebraska was the beginning of the end for McGovern. For the first
time, his opposition began to hammer effectively at the McGovern leftism.
Abortion, amnesty, pot, welfare and defense all became problems. It was
too late for HHH to have much of an impact, but the seeds were planted.
The threat that Offutt Air Base in Omaha would be closed by McGovern was
the first big hit.
By this time in Oregon and California, McG had the only effective
organization and a huge public relations advantage. The media was busy
explaining why they were wrong about the early primaries, and in deference to
McG were giving him every break possible. Michigan and Maryland were
in between, but McG avoided media setbacks because the Wallace shooting
knocked everything else off the front page. Yet those two states were another
hint that McGovern represented the wrong side of the political spectrum.
That story was lost in the Wallace tragedy.
-6-
By the time McGovern got out to the West Coast, the regular
Democrats found out that they were in the process of being had by McGovern.
But it was too late. The Dem party had been infiltrated by the McGovern
guerillas, and there was no time for pacification. (Maybe the fact that
McGovern seemed to think more of the Communists in Vietnam than
their opponents colored his political strategy: he was the Viet Cong of
the Democratic party).
Thus, McGovern won the California, South Dakota, New Mexico and
New Jersey primaries all on the same day -- a tribute to irreversible
momentum. (As McGovern said that night: "I can't believe I won the
whole thing" -- neither could his fellow Democrats who probably swore
that night that they would do anything to try to stop him. ) But California
was the true turning point in the 1972 presidential campaign and it turned
on issues, not on McGovern's personality or bad tactics.
McGovern saw a 20 point lead in the polls drop to 4%. In short, he was
devastated by the HHH one-man shredding machine. The issues caught
up with him, and HHH was able to articulate them in his hammering
staccato fashion as no other figure in American politics could do. Those
three national debates -- which could not be filtered by the writing press
or Frank Reynolds and his gang -- were the real Waterloo for McGovern.
Vast attention was given to the welfare plan, the defense plan, the Vietnam
bug-out, the fact that McGovern had voted against Jewish interests. HHH
-7-
was vicious and relentless and he did for us what we could have never done
for ourselves. Moreover, he did to McG what Rockefeller did to Goldwater:
he labelled McGovern.
Luckily for McG the next primary was New York, and he couldn't lose
it because there was no preferential vote -- only delegate selection. Thus,
the small left-wing delegate machine moved on, aided and abetted by only
a little over a 10% voter turnout.
THE MEDIA IN THIS PERIOD
McGovern got more than his share of breaks from the press in the
early days. They covered for his radical positions by writing tons of
essays on populism and anti-politicians and alienated voters. Moreover,
McGovern's staff was being given the kid-glove treatment. Stories followed
on the McG "wunderkinder." Caddell (whose poll information has been so
spectacularly bad, yet universally praised) was made out to be Gallup and
Harris rolled into one. Stearns, Grandmaison and Pokorny (who Sidey
eulogized with the prairie sod in his ears) were "master strategists" --
and oh so young! Mankiewicz was quoted from coast to coast -- the
man with the quick wit and fast repartee (in my opinion Mankiewicz is
an absolute political lightweight who covered up with a quick wit -- he gave
monumentally bad advice).
These "kids" began to believe their press clippings and probably thought
it was a good time to screw the old-liners. I would guess that the boys in
-8-
the clubhouse didn't appreciate either their treatment or the stories they
read about the "kids. " Their duty was to win elections and not worry about
ideology. The McG people believed that winning elections was a part of
the ideology -- that the two were intertwined, and that their radicalism was
the wave of the future. But give the devil his due -- the organization worked
well and played the delegates and the convention states like violins.
THE CONVENTION
The Convention also had to be quite harmful to McGovern. By this time
McGovern was tarred on the issues, but it was too late to stop him -- he really
had it wrapped up after Califor nia. Nevertheless, the leftism was fully
exposed on national television, and the shock for some probably has not
yet worn off. The spectacle of the abortion people, the libbers and the
homosexuals was too much. McGovern was seen, finally, to be the radical
that his positions made him out to be, and this hurt.
Then came the compromises -- putting the abortion, women's lib, and
other minority planks over the side -- along with George Wiley and Gloria
Steinem. It was time to kiss and make up with Daley, though Daley would
resist. But the sum total was a picture of just another politician, one who
would make deals to win and comprose his principles -- or at least certain
principles.
-9-
But McGovern walked out of that convention a radical. For all
intents and purposes he could not escape that label through November.
It was not because of mistakes in his strategy or flaws in his tactics and
it was not George McGovern the man or personality. It was his position
on the political spectrum -- he was on the left, and he believed in his ways.
EAGLETON
I think the death blow was already delivered before the Eagleton
affair. It only confirmed everything which had already been building
up against McGovern. Those who argue that Eagleton was the turning
point don't know what they're talking about. Eagleton was extremely impor-
tant in terms of harming McGovern's credibility and trust. But even before
Eagleton the seeds were planted -- Eagleton merely made it harder for
McGovern. Without the Eagleton affair, McGovern would have still been
weighted by his positions.
Blaming the Eagleton affair will be a liberal cop-out and a McGovern
staff cop-out. Eagleton did not make McGovern lose a 20 point lead in the
California balloting. We have got to stop the myth of the Eagleton thing before
history writes that it was this and only this which cost McG his crack at the
Presidency. It just ain't true. There was a Gallup after the Dem convention
and before Eagleton which saw RN gaining three points. McGovern was
already on the way down.
-10-
RADICALISM -- THE FATAL FLAW
Hubert Humphrey was always thought to be a radical. He had radical
ideas, like McGovern. But the people around HHH were not radical. He had
pols all around him -- cigar-chomping boys who prowled the back rooms.
McGovern was surrounded by radicals -- all those damn hippy kids and free
love adherents, etc. McGovern's politics were caught up in the culture of
the "movement" and only made his radicalism seem worse.
These were not flaws of the man or his tactics -- again, they were basic
defects of the radical liberal movement. McGovern though that the kooky
people around him were logical extensions of his new politics, of the coming
home of America, and of the revolutionary basis of his candidacy. I would
think that McGovern never did see what was wrong in saying that Henry
Wallace was still "right," that the Soviets would treat him as a "friend"
and not test him; or question why the Rubin and Hoffman endorsements were
bad.
His friends -- Galbraith, Schlesinger, Steinem, et al. -- all came from
the closed club of liberal intelligentsia which saw the historical movement
through its own narrow vision. These were not casual campaign mistakes,
they were the most profound of judgmental errors. McGovern misread the
mood of the country and refused to admit it because liberal intellectuals
always think they have a monopoly on wisdom. (I'm quite serious about
this -- I never knew a liberal college professor who was otherwise, and
McG is a former college professor)
-11-
THE CAMPAIGN
The campaign itself was marred by the same fundamental flaws
of ideology. I don't believe at all that it was a tactical error for McGovern
to campaign in the early days on Vietnam and some of the most leftish
positions. I think he believed that his surrender policy in Vietnam (he
was actually to the left of the Viet Cong in his proposals) was the right
position and probably the politically expedient position. The income redis-
tribution plan and some of the other way-out ideas were still in his speeches
in early September, although not explicitly. And throughout, there was
Vietnam, where McGovern grew to higher reaches of sell-out. He dumped
his $1000-per-person plan for a $4000-per-four-persons plan and gave out
detailed explanations of how this would work.
Basically, I don't think that McGovern forsaked his radicalism. He
simply tried to make it sound not all that bad in the campaign. Sure, he made
some stupid mistakes, but the singular mistake was the belief that he could
sell to the steelworker in the fall what he spoonfed to the students in the
winter -- a disrespected political philosophy.
Finally, the McGovern campaign tactics and language were classics
in New Left politics. The pure smear, the overstatement, the disruption,
the Hitler analogy, the fostering of discord and the planting of fears --
all permeate the liberal ideology. When liberals disagree, the first charge
-12-
they make is "fascist" or "Hitler. " It is reflexive. It is the formbook
liberal tactic -- to many liberal politicians, the ideology imbues the
form -- the substance is the form. And in the end you cannot fault
McGovern for his tactics without really faulting his ideological base.
NOTES
It might be said that McGovern lost the election because of the way
he won the nomination. He sold his soul to the left and had little
inclination to seek salvation. That massive political error cannot be
laid alone to ineptitude -- it is no less than a major misreading of
American values and the cultural ethos of our country.
The polls showed over and over again that the public resented McGovern
"running down America. 11 And while Haynes Johnson traveled the country
talking about alienation, he missed the fact that Americans are basically at
peace with themselves, satisfied with their lives, and optimistic about the
future. What he saw was good old American skepticism -- the "show me"
attitude -- and he mistook it for a penetrating anomie and social listlessness,
Not only did the polls show McGovern misreading the country's mood,
they also showed that McGovern misread the public's perception of the
correct position on the issues. Harris found out in the summer that the
President had the preferable position on 15 out of 16 issues. This shows an
unusually high perception of McGovern's radical views -- moreover, this was
-13-
a huge jump over the period in the primaries where McGovern was viewed as
benign. This confirms that McGovern was hurt deeply by HHH's efforts in
California and that that was the most harmful point in the McGovern candidacy.
It was not that McGovern played the wrong strings -- he was playing the
tuba in a string orchestra. He was out of syncopation; out of tune; and blaring
fortissimo while the public wanted pianissimo.
In a nutshell, McGovern was wrong from the start. His radical politics
took a good shellacking from the Ameri can public -- a deserved repudiation
of alien ideas. Let's not blame it on his political amateur standing --
after all, he did some quite intelligent politicking at times -- let's put
the blame where it belongs: on the elitist, leftward movement in America
which was born of Kennedy, raised in the Great Society and cut down by
the grocer's son who saw the excesses and called 'em like he saw 'em.
KEN Khachipin
POLITICAL MEMORANDUM 11/7/72
WHY MCGOVERN LOST
11/6/72
D
MEMORANUM FOR PAT BUCMANAN
FROM: KEN KHACHIGIAN
SUBJECT: WHY MCGOVE RN LOST POLITICAL ANALYSIS
A massive effort must be taken after the election to
head off the
media effort to detract from RN's
election victory. That effort will take many tacks --
such as
RN didn't
bring in a Congress; people voted
against McGovern not for Nixon, etc. However, the libeal
apologists will push one line extre hard: the defeat
ideas of
was not
for the left-liberal movement but rather for
the bearer of those ideas.
They will argue that liberalism is still viable --
that we still need busing, and all the other liberal schemes
and that they need only wait until they get a standard
bearer who won't make the same mistakes McGovern did. The
following analysis serves to debunk that viewpoint, and, it
seems to me, should be put out as much asm possible to
contra.
counter all the oppositie a opinion This memorandum
focuses on why McGovern lost -- any analysis of the
high points of the RN victory should be taken up in
a
separate
separed
memo,
which
draft up
if
THE
CENTRAL POINT TO MAKE
To those who argue
that McGovern had bad stragegy
and bad tactics and that he
made too many
mistakes
to run a good campaign, we have one basic response: the tacitics
page 2
of the libreral movement are the logical outgrowth of
the liberal ideology. That is, don't
blame McGovern
per
blame the philosophys Elitism, close-mindedness,
moral righteousness,
viewing things
as good versus
evil and the penchant for overstatement are
all
fundamentals of the liberal-left political ideology. If
McGovern ran a bad campaign -- don't blame his strategy
because the strategy is the
ideology. The personal flaws
his
of McGovern
were bred of the
flaws of politidal
philosophy.
Thus, McGovern could change his mindo on central issues,
and then with a straight face defend his
credibility.
This hurt his standing with the voters, but
being train
ed
in the narrow view as he has, he sees his position
only
in moralistic terms, or, as PJB put:
it, as the true
believert
People
rejected the McGovern
philosophy pure
and simple. If the
questions of his credibility and
wishy-washyness arose, it was only because of his approach
to
public policy -- one in which he could
cut aircraft
with a
carriers back from 16 to 6 and still
maintain that
this would not
affect the streng of the sixth fleet. -
That is the underlying problem with the left radicals, i.e.,
that the wild things they propose really won't disjoint things
important to
citizens or
voter blocs.
page 3
But there are other things to look at in terms of
what McGovern did
wrong, and I'll take them in sequence.
THE PARTY REFORM
It is not for nothing that the Democratic Party
reform was promulgated under the "McGovern Commission."
This is where we underestimated McGovern. Immediately,
he saw the potential of these guidelines -- they served
his purposes perfectly. The reforms brought pre-
cisely those people into the process who would directly
further/ his candidacy. Moreover, it was only McGovern at
who
that point
saw that the comp Mexity of the rules would
be baffling to those who did not know them, and he hired
the feallow who knew the rules best to be his delegate
counter -- Rick Stearns.
His opponents did not somewhing see the potential of having
a tight solid
base which could bring victory in a field
many
of candidates. Therefore, McGovern moved quickly
and
to
preempt the party's left wing, and knowing that
with tight organization and his left flank
pro-
tected, he could conveivably get the nomination. To that
extent the liberal-left issues were winners
for McGovern
in the early stages of the
game.
page 4
THE PRIMARIES
P.I
McGovern made it
through the prima
ares
with
skill,
luck, and, later, with a litt help from his
freends in the media. New Hampshire was Muskie disaster,
and McGovern was clever in making his loss out
to be
a victory. McGovern's first score. McGovern was wiped
out in Florida in what should have been the first test
of the McGovern political philosophy -- but it was not
reported that
way. It was said that McGovern never
expected to win
Florida. Nevertheless, his views
on gutting the space program, support for massive busing,
and a few other postions surely
were important in
the Florida defeat.
Next came Illinois where McGovern wisely worked more
on getting a foothold
while avoiding a direct
with Muskie. This strategy -- a good one -- brought
him to Wisonnsin which he targeted from the beginning as
his strongest state with the youth-lust and an excellent
organization. There the
tight-knit support
for his
and excellent youth turnout gave him
a
victory. Moreover, the Republicans helped by
crossing over for McGovern
and Wallace. If only Democrats
had voted, HHHL would have won. Yet Wisconsin was the
key for Mcgovern and most importantly it knocked Lindsay out
and gave MCG an un exposed left flank.
page 5
From Wisconsin on, it was not very difficult for McG.
He taok Rhode Island because there
was only about a 10%
Democrat turnout -- and the tight organization, getting
the libeerals and doves out, did it again. Then
came Massachusetts
and Penasylvania with Muskie mercilessly caught in between
HHH and McG. By this time the press was
necking
in the back seat with McGovern and Massachusetts was a cinch
while HHH kept Muskie
at bay in Pa. Again, the organization
also went to work in Pa. to pick up some delegates -- what
proved to be a good strategy for MCG; he
nickel-(sp)
dimed his opposition.
Throughout, McGovern was assisted
by low Lvoter turnouts coupled with his zealots going to the
polls in droves. April 25 served to put Muskie over the
a
side
hapless victim a fast track.
Thfough Ohio, Indiana,
Tennessee, and North Carolina,
in my judgment, the press effectively protected McGovern.
He didn't do real well in any of these states -- except
Ohio -- yet they only said it was because he didn't try.
Yet, by then they should
have known that the McGovern
ideology was like death in those states. Moreover, in Ohio
he was basking in the media glow which did not mention
his radical positions at all, but rather how he represented
"the alienated and disconteneed." That left MCG free to use
his excellent
TV spots to bilk the voters of their support.
They only saw a nice guy on the tube, not
a radical.
page 6
Nebraska was the beginning of the end for McGovern.
For the first time, his opposition began to hammer effectively
at the McGovern leftism. ABortion, amnesy, pot, welfare
and
defense all became problems. It was too late
for HHH to have much of an impact, but the seeds were planted.
The threat that
Offutt Air Base in Omaha would be
closed by McGovern was the first big hit.
By this time in Oregon and Californa, MCG had the
only effective organization
and a huge public { relations
advangage. The media was busy, explaning why they were
wrong about the early primaries and in deference to MCG
were giving him every break possible. Michigan and Maryland
were in between, but MCG avoided media setbacks because
the Walaace shooting knocked everything else off the front
another hint
that
page. Yet these two states were
McGosern represented the wrong dide of the political spectrum.
That story was lost in the Wallace trapedy.
By the time McGovern got out to the WEST Coast, the
regular Democrats found
out that they were in the process
of
being had by McGovern. But it was too late. The
Dem party had been infiltrated by the McGovern guerillas,
and there was no time for pacification fact
that McGovern seemed to think more of the Communists in
Vietnam
than their opposants colored his political
strategy: he was the Viet Comp of the Dansentic
party).
page 7
Thus, McGuvern won the California, South Dakota,
New Mexico and New Jersey primaries all on the semne
day
irreversible momentum. (As McGovern
said that night: "I can't believe I won the whole thing"--
neither could his fellow Democrats who probably swore that
night that they would do anything to try to stop him#.)
But California was the true turning point in the 1972
presidential campaign and it
turned on issues, not
on McGovem's personality or
bad tactics.
McGovern
saw a
20
point lead inf the
polls drop to 4% In short, he was devastated by
the HHH one-man shredding machine. The issues caught
up with him, and HHH was able to articlulate
them in
his
hammering
staccato fashion as no other
figure in American politics could do. Those three national
debates -- which could not be filtered by the writing
press or Frank Reynolds and his gang
were the real
Waterloo for McGovern. Vast attention was given to the
welfare plan, the
defense plan, the Vietnam bug-out,
the fact that Mc G overn had voted against Jewish interests.
HHH was vicious and relentless and he did for us what we
could have never done for ourselfes. Moreover, he did
to MCG what Rockefeller
did to
Goldwater:
he labelled m (Govern.
page 8
Luckily for McG the next primary was New York, and
he couldn't lose it
because there was not preferential
vote -- only deledgate selection. Thus, the small left-wing
(onlya
delegate machine moved on, aided and abetted by
a
10% voter turnout.
THE MEDIA IN THIS PERIOD
McGovem got more than his share of breaks from
the press in the early days. They covered for his
radical positions by writing tons of essays on populism
and anti-politic and alientated voter Mordever,
McGovern's staff was being given the kid-glove treatment.
Stories
followed on the McG " wunderkinger " Caddell
(whose poll information has been so spectacularly bad,
yet
universally praised) was made out to be Gallup and Harris
rol
into one. Stearns, Grandmaison and Pokorny (who Sidey
eulogized with the prairie sod in his ears) were "master
"
strategists and oh so young! Mankiewicz was quoted from
coast to coast -- the man with the quick wit and fast
repartee (in my opinion Mankiewicz is an absolute
poliitcal lightweight who covered up with a quick wit --
he gave monumentall bad advice)
These "kinds" began to believe their press clippings
and probably thought it was a good time to screw the
old-liners
I would
guess that the
boys in
the
clubhouse didn't appresiate either their treatment or
pag e 9
the
storeis they read about the "kids."
Their duty was to win elections and not worry about
ideology. The McG people believed that winning elections
a part of the ideology -- that the two were intertwined,
and that
their radicalism was the wave of the future.
But give the devil his due -- the organization worked well
and played the delegates and the convention states like
violins.
THE CONVENTION
The Conventinn also had to be quite harmful to McGovern.
By this time McGovern was tarred on the issues, but it was
too late to stop
him -- he really had it wrapped up
after California. Neverthe ess, the leftism was fully
exposed on
national
television, and the shock for
some probably has not yet worn off. The spectacle of
the abortion people, the libbers and the homosexuals
was too much. McGovern was seen, finally, to be the radical
that his positions made him out
to be, and this hurt.
Then came
the compromises -- putting the abortinn,
womens lib, and other minority planks over the side -- along
was
with George Wiley and Gloria
Steinem. It
time
to kiss and make up with
Daley, though Daley would
resist. But the sum total was a picture of just another
politican, one who would make deals to win and compromise
his principles -- or at least ertain principles.
page 10
But Mc a overn walked out of that convention KME a
radical. For all intests and purposes
he could not
scape that label through November. It was not because
of mistakes in his strategy or flaws in his tacitcs and it
was not George McGovern the man or personality. It was his
position on the polifical spectrum -- he was on the left,
and he believed in his ways.
EAGLETON
I think the death blow was already
delivered
e
before the Eaglton affair. It only confirmed everything
which had already been building up against McGovern. Those
who argue that Eagleton was the turning point don't know
e
what
they're talking about. Eagliton was extremely impor-
tant in terms harming McGovern's credibility and trust.
But even before Eagleon the seeds were planted -- Eagleton
merely made ith harder for McGovern. Without the Eagleton
affair, McGovern
would have still been weighted by
his positions.
Blaming the
Eagleton affair will be a
liberal
cop-out and a McGovem staff cop-out. Eaglton did
not
make McGovern
lose a 20 point lead in the Calf iornia
ballioting. We have got to stop the myth of the Eagleton
thing before history writes that it was this and only
this which cost MCG his crack at the Presidency. It just ain't
page 11
true. There was a
Gallup after the Dem convention and
VRN
gamms
before Eagleton which saw
three points,
McGovern was already on the way down.
RADICALISM
THE FATAL FLAW
Hubert Humphrey was alwas
thought to be a radical.
He had radical ideas , like McGovern. But the people aroudn
HHH were not radical. He
had pols all around him --
cigar-chomping
boys who prowled the back rooms.
McGovern
was surrounded by radicals -- all those damn
hippy kids and free love adherents, etc. McGovern's politids
"Movement"
were caught up in the
culture of the
and
only made his radicalism seem worse.
These were not flaws of the man or his tactics -- again,
defects
radical
they
were basic
of
the
liberal movement. McGovern
thought that the kooky
people around him were logical
exensions of his new politics, of the coming home of America,
and of the revolutionary basis of his candidacy. I would
think that McGovern never did see what was wrong in saying
that Henry Wallace was still "right," that the Soveets
would treat hims as a"freend"and not test him;
or
question why the Rubin and Hoffman endorsements were bad.
His friends -- Galbraith, Schlesinger,
Steinem,
et
al. all came from the closed club
of liberal intell
page 12
saw the
historice
movement through
own narrow vision. These were not casual campaign mistakes,
they were the most profound of judgmental errors. McGovern
misread the mood of the country and refused to admit it
because
liberal intellectuals alwasy
think they
have a
monopoly on wisdom. (I'm quite
serious about
this -- I never knew a liberal college professor who was
otherwise, and McG a former college professor)
THE CAMPAIGN
The
campaign itself was marred by the same funda-
mental flaws of ideology. I don't believe at all that
in the early days
it was a tactical error for McGovern to campaign/on
Vietnam and some of the most leftish pestions. I think
he believed that his surrender policy in Vientam (he was
actaally to the left of the Viet Cong in his proposals)
was the right positions and probably the politically
expedient
position. The income redistribtuion
plan and some of the other way-out
ideas were still
in his speeches in early September, althoggh not explicity
And throughout, there
was Vietnam, where McGovern
grew to higher reaches of sell-out.
He dumped
his
$1000-per-person plan for a $4000-per-four-persons plan
and gave out detailed explanations of how thise would
work.
page 13
I
don't think that McGovern forsaked
his radicalism. He simply tried to make it sound not all
that bad in the
campaign. Sure he made some stupid
mistakes, but the
singular mistkae was the belief that
to the steelworker
he could sell in the fall what he spoonfed to the students
in the winter
a
disrespected political philosophy.
Finally, the McGovern campaign tactics and language
were classics in New Left politics. The pure smear,
the overstatement, the disruption, the Hitler
analogy,
the fostering of discord and the planting of fears -- all
permeat the libemal ideology. When liberals disagree, the
first
charge they make is
"fascist" or "Hitl
=
It is reflexive. It
the formbook liberal tactic --
imbues
to many liberal politicians, the ideobogy
the
form -- the substance is the fom And in the end you
cannot fault Mogovern for his tacties without faulting his
ideological base.
NOTES
It might be said that McGovern lost the
election
because of the
way he won the nomination. He sold
his
soul to the left and had little inclination to
seek salvation. That massive political error cannot be
laid
alone to ineptitude -- it is no less than a
major misreading of American values and the culturmal
ethos of our country.
p. 14
The polls showed over and over again that the public
resented McCovern "running down America." And while
Haynes Johnson traveled the country talking
about
alienation, he missed the fact that Americans are
bascially at peace with themselves, satisfied with
their
lives, and optimistic about the future. What
he saw
was good old American skepticism -- the "show
ook
me" attitude -- and he
mist
it for a penetrating
anomie and social listlessness.
Not only did the polls show Mc overn misreading the
country's mood, they also showed that McGovern misread
the public
perception of the correct position on
the issues. Harris found out in the summer that the
President
had the prefermable position on 15 out of
16 issues. This shows an unusually high perception of
McGovern's radical views -- moreover, this was a huge
jump over the period in the
primaries where
McGovern
was view d as benign. This confirms that McGovern was
hurt deeply by HHH's efforts in California and that that
was the most harmful
point
in the McGovern candidacy.
It was not that McGovern played the wrong strings --
he was playing the tuba in a string orchestra.
He
was out of syncopation; out of tune; and
blaring
fortissimo while the public wanted pianissimo.
1 age 15
In a nutshe
,
McGovern was wrong from the start#.
His readical politics took a good shellacking (sp?) from
the American public -- a deserved repudiation of alien
ideas. Let's not blame it on his political amateur standing --
after all, he did some quite
intelligent politicking
at times -- let's put the blame where it belongs: on
the elitist, leftward movement in America which was
born of Kennedy, raised in the Great Soceity and
cut
down by the
grocer's son who saw the excesses and
called
'em like he saw 'em.
ideas for memo on Why McGovern lost
MCG (ost because of the way he won /
-- said that it is McGovern's tactics -- the way he
runs the campaign, not the libemal ideology. This is
their way of X blaming MCG without blaming leftism --
But his tacigcs are a logical outgrowth of iddology -- the
elitism, * close-mindedness, excessive moralism, etc. In
the case of the *EM extreme left procedures are part
of the ideology -- here is step by step of how McG
wons nomination, how he lost election.
-- Begin with XHMX party reform -- here is where
McG smart politician -- ** few others saw the potential
of having a tight, solid base to win a victory in a
widespread field of candidatesx :_ won primaries by
dumb luck -- New HMH Hampshire (Muskie error and must media help --
after all, Muskie EXE won) -- Florida, Wallace, zip for MaG
though great interest in race R -- Illinois, a handful (if
we realized we should have known by then he would nickee dime
his oppostion to death) -- Wisconsin, won because of Repub.
Lindsay out: "deft"
XXX crossovers to MCG and Wallace, otherwise HHH
Rhode
Island - won with something like 10% vote turnout Ax --
Chemic
Maas. and Pa. -- MCG won one and HHH the other -- Muskie
sandwiched unmercifully -- Mass was obvioas, tw low turnout
but heavy student and left-wing vote; Pa -vote for delegates,
and thus McG's tight organization victoriius. -- --
fund vitually Indiana out. HHH
page 2
Ohio -- by that time, media BY love affair was on, McG
gettings nothaxing but good press -- new face, clever ads --
no one knew where he stood and again good org. -- HHH old
face. Ohio hurt. -- Tennessee -- zip for McG --
North 7 Carolina, zip for McG -- Nebraska, McGa won , but for
first time and indicator of HHH attacks, big McG lead was
cut in the last days -- first time HHH started on military,
abortions and related issues -- AMERE Avoided W E st Va, except
for delegate votes (no loss could be had thus) -- Maryland
and Michigan same day -- wash because of Wallace, but started
to show how in two Democrat states, MCG was not wave of future --
evaded busing issue in MIE Mich, but would catch up later --
Oregon, MM foregone conclusion for MCG, overwhelming buildup --
Only now do any Democrates realize what happening to them --
they were infiltrated and found the guerillas too late (maybe
the premier lesson fre for McG from Vietnam war) -- Finally
Calif., N.J., New Mexico, and South Dakota (I can't belive
I won the whole thing -- and unfortunately for MCG, neither
could other Dems who decided they couldn't swallow him and
would start against him although too late -- but Calif.
was turning point in terms of MCG V. RN on the whole campaign. --
MCG saw a 21% poll lead drop to 4% on election day -- for the
first time in campaign, issues caught up -- and HHH was
ablxe to articulate hhem in his hammering stacatto fashion in
page 3
three national debates -- That was the real Waterloo for
McG just as California was for Goldwater --New York -- MEXH
obvious, the leftists were in control and only about a 10%
turnout again -- sure thing for METX McG.
*******
McG won because he was organizied and Rick Stearns
who NIN helped write the rules also ran the organization.
Meanwhile the press started writing about populism and
MCG being the "anti-politieian" -- covering the leftism
in their purple prose -- Moreover, all those syrupy stories
about the McG WE wunderkinder Caddell (whose poll information
has been so spectacularly WXEX wrong but universally praised) --
Stearns, Pokornay (with the prairie sod in his ears); Grandmaison,
Mankciewiez (who is the dumbest pol I believe we have ever
faced -- good wit but lousy strategist) -- They started
to believe they were superior to all the oldimers who
proabably resented this because they worked hard but
KM only *** laughed at. -- Yet the org was still there, and
played the rules like violin -- as good as Barry did in 1964 --
but Barry actually represented his party more than McG did
his. --
Convention -- the leftism was fully exposed on national
television, EXCHK but the sheer momentum would not deprive
McG he was dead before the balloting -- the spectacle
in the media -- queers, abortionishs, women's lib,
page 4
Then the km political acts -- putting the libbers, the welfare
people and othess over the side -- screwing everybody on
the miniority planks -- this was was printed in a rash of
articaes after convnetion and it took hold -- finally,
McG was seen to be a politicaian just like the rest -- the
desire to hs kiss and make up with Daley etc. MBX
Eagleton affair MHMX merely confirmed what was building
FO up -- the XX it awf served the purpose of dramatizing
evarything that was wrong with MCG and proably caught
the press at a time when they were fed up with the
way MCG hand had been given the sweetheart treatment --
the warts were there and it was time to show them, with
a vengeance.
But ***** through it all, the left-readadalism showed
through -- the welfare and defense plans, the taxing,
theabortion, abnesty and pot positions -- he could not
escape them (and he would have been better off x if he
didn't try to keep compromising and swithcing 2x this was
the worst thing he жиха could have done) -- but ***** this
was a minor flaw in tacfics; it was the basic radecalism of
the positions which went to the core FX of gut Democrats.
HHH alwass talked like a radical but all those pols around
him showed MIR he was ok, but McGa not only talked like
a radical , but had radicals around him --
page 5
-- youth vote -- took it for granted; arrogance and elitism
of left was the reason MCG acted this way -- his downfall
with youth; he left them somewhat -- but it is what left-
wing has always attempted to do, MXK win over hard-core in
private and in primaires and then ignore them in Fall to
get the big EN I shx one.
Then the campaign -- he chose to campaign for weeks
on the issues of the left -- Vietnam (wheee he was truly
crushed; this probably hurt him equally with other issues) ;
tax loopholes; redistribution -- and he sometimes bacbked
off, butxsmmakki tried X to still believe in it -- e.g.,
substitute $L,000 per person with $x999 $4,000 per family (big
deal).
Finally, the laguage and tactids -- in the end, pure
New Left -- indduendo, smear, overstatement, disruption,
fostering discond, planting fears -- it was a calssic
in the way New Left ideology permeates form -- the libral
XXX substance is the liberal form -- you cannot attack
McGs tactics wihhout attacking his ideology.
Also notes: Polls showed that people thought MCG
was running down America; didn't buy his defense paans,
his tax plans; his foreign policy and isolationsm; and
basically found themselves to ** his W right -- also
they viewed McG as tof a far left -- polls showed time
after time that Mr ideology was a major weakness.
page 6
Americans did not think they were= sick or racist or warmongering
or heartless towards poor -- Magoo was pulling at wrong strings --
there might be *** things wrong with U.S. but George wouldn 2t
ever admit it was a good countey anrd would never admit
for exampel that North Vietnam was a bad country H& -- the
fatal left-wing flaw -- lack of consistency and moral
fervor "only I am wright and everyone else is wrong".