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Black Strategy [November 1984 – February 1985] (1)
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Black Strategy [November 1984 – February 1985] (1)
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Records of the Office of the Chief of Staff (Reagan Administration)
James Cicconi's Subject Files
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 12, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD REGAN
MICHAEL K. DEAVER
FROM:
JAMES CICCONI
Jave
SUBJECT:
Follow-Up on Black Strategy
In a previous memo, I outlined a possible strategy for reaching
out to black Americans. Assuming agreement on the need for such
an effort, it is perhaps useful at this point to provide a more
detailed discussion of certain elements.
Basics of a New Approach
1. Any new approach to blacks must be rooted in substance, not
just atmospherics: the latter should showcase the former.
This is admittedly different from our past efforts, but it is
a difference born of necessity. Efforts based largely on
scheduling and symbolism have worked with groups where our
policy disagreements are minimal. Blacks, however, perceive
themselves to be at odds with most policy priorities of this
Administration. The resulting gap can only be closed by
affirmatively seeking common ground with a significant
segment of black Americans.
2. We must be prepared to sustain any new effort over the long
term. Gains from an issue-oriented approach will be
incremental, and perhaps barely noticeable in the short run.
3. We must walk before we can run. Any initial gains will be
among upwardly-mobile blacks who are part of, or
entering, the middle class; broader targeting would be
premature. Upwardly-mobile blacks should be inclined toward
this Administration's policies, but for a number of reasons
have not been supportive. In effect, we must package our
policy message for them and, at the same time, minimize
other obstacles to their support.
4. We must prevent major goofs. The biggest single obstacle to
increasing our black support in the first term was our own
inability to foresee the perceptual consequences of certain
decisions, some of which were considered to be minor at the
time. While most of the Administration has grown more
sensitive in the wake of Bob Jones, such misjudgments still
represent a danger which, unless avoided, can undo any
political gains from our new strategy.
Page 2
5. For the immediate future, we must avoid the "established"
black leadership. As stated previously, such leaders are
unremittingly hostile to this President and cannot be
expected to take a constructive approach. The current black
leadership seems, quite frankly, more interested in personal
publicity and enhancing their influence within the Democratic
Party than they are in new approaches to black problems. In
fact, they are personally and rhetorically linked to a
philosophy which cannot be reconciled with our own. Thus,
meetings would not only be unproductive, but would serve to
strengthen the position of such hostile leaders within their
own organizations, and among blacks generally. Instead of
allowing ourselves to be pressured into such old, no-win
patterns, we should seek out other blacks with whom there is
a chance of reaching common ground.
6. We should make clear that favoritism on grants and contracts
is out-of-bounds, and will not be considered as an aspect of
our strategy. Too often, political support by certain voter
group members is viewed as a license to demand favoritism on
grants or contracts. Our resistance to this pattern has led
to criticism from some of our black supporters; however, it
is absolutely essential that we not fall into this "spoils
system" trap in the same way that previous Administrations
have. As part of our Hispanic strategy, we made clear that
no one in the White House, including the Hispanic liaison,
would discuss grants or contracts, and we must be similarly
adamant with our black supporters. The political base we
build among blacks must rest on common policy ground, and not
on hope of personal financial benefit.
Shaping our Alternative
1. We should work to develop a policy package that addresses the
very real problems of black Americans from a conservative
standpoint. This can include new ideas, as well as
established Administration policies (e.g., enterprise zones,
youth opportunity wage) that would be re-packaged to
highlight their appeal to black Americans.
2. Such a package need not be confined to economic issues, but
could also include criminal justice and social policy issues.
Blacks, for example, are victimized disproportionately by
crime, yet black politicians are the most ardent foes of
tougher criminal laws. Similarly, the break-up of the black
family has been an increasing and alarming trend for over
twenty years, and has arguably been exacerbated by federal
policies. Such issues, often ignored by the Democrats, have
good potential for attracting blacks to the Republican Party
if our solutions make sense.
Page 3
3. Our main emphasis should be on the overall philosophical
difference between our policies and those of the liberal
Democrats. In effect, we would stress the concept of
providing incentives for self-reliance, versus the failed
course of increased dependence on government. Current policy
dynamics favor our approach for several reasons. First, our
policies are largely untried, and therefore hold some
prospect for success, while the liberal methods have been
tried on a massive scale and, for the most part, have failed.
Second, decreasing government resources make the liberal
approach impossible to sustain financially, and dictate that
alternatives be tried. Third, there is no longer a national
consensus in support of the liberal approach; in fact, the
opposite is now true. Fourth, there is a significant
intellectual trend, manifested in a continuing series of
books and articles, toward questioning the social policies of
the past twenty years. Given such developments, we stand a
decent chance of attracting more adherents to our philosophy
among black Americans.
Fostering Public Debate
1. We should attempt to foster, and fuel, a public debate on
policies aimed at addressing the problems of black Americans.
This is in our interest because, as noted above, the policy
dynamics favor our argument. Our insurgent ideas will be
pitted against a liberal philosophy that has not yet been
questioned on a national scale, and which will be difficult
to defend. In short, we should foster a public debate
because we can have every expectation of winning it.
2. We should encourage Republican elected officials to
participate in the debate, even if their policy prescriptions
differ somewhat from ours. For example, it is to our
advantage that some GOP Congressmen are publicly pushing a
black legislative package, because such actions add to the
debate without an appearance of White House orchestration.
3. Relatively minor items on the President's schedule can also
add to the public debate. These could include, for example,
wire photos with the author of a new book, a publicized phone
conversation with someone like Thomas Sowell, or a
Presidential message to a conference that might otherwise go
unnoticed.
4. Administration and Republican Party officials can begin
publicly referring to the fact that "a national debate is now
occurring" on the social policy of the past twenty years,
with hints that a change is needed. The President can also
acknowledge the debate in passing public references.
Page 4
5. We must be prepared to give access, and, thereby,
credibility, to black groups that show interest in publicly
espousing new approaches to black problems, even if we differ
on particulars. One example is the new Council for a Black
Economic Agenda, which met with the President last month in a
session that drew a surprising amount of press attention
(along with criticism from black leaders that was based
transparently on egotism). We should not, however, tie
ourselves to only one group: our interest in fostering
debate is better served by a variety of groups, all of which
are competing for public (and White House) attention.
6. Once the ground has been prepared through ample public
discussion, the President should raise it to a higher level
of prominence by publicly laying out our policy package, and
then engaging fully in the philosophical discussion. (The
President's personal involvement will increase the level of
public attention to such an extent that our policy
alternative must be ready, and capable of withstanding
scrutiny.)
The Civil Rights Problem
1. Any new approach to blacks cannot ignore the perceptual
problem we face on civil rights. Many black Americans feel,
quite simply, that this Administration has worked to reverse
the legal gains of the Sixties, and some even accept the
notion that this President is anti-civil rights. If we are
to move forward, we must "clear the decks" in this area.
2. Our difficulties on civil rights are rooted mainly in
inaccurate perceptions that have been propagated by
Washington's civil rights lobby. This group subsists on fear
that the days of state-sanctioned discrimination will return,
and it creates that fear through alarmist predictions,
misrepresentation of motives, exaggeration of current
problems, and by downplaying the progress that has been made.
3. With the objectives of the Sixties largely achieved through
legal and even attitudinal changes, we have seen the civil
rights movement of that era displaced by the civil rights
lobby of today. No longer seeking the moral goals of
equality, they are, like any other lobby, seeking to create,
defend, and extend special programs and status for the group
they represent. In this context, their vested interest in
creating misperceptions about our civil rights record is
understandable; indeed, it is to be expected in the same way
that the environmental lobby can be expected to distort our
actions in that area. We should, therefore, deal with them
accordingly.
Page 5
4. We should also recognize that we have unintentionally aided
such programmed misperceptions in two ways. First, we have
sometimes taken actions without considering the appearance
that would be created among blacks (e.g. Bob Jones, and our
delays regarding the Voting Rights Act). Second, we have
unnecessarily picked fights on issues that are tangential to
our Administration's civil rights policy goals (e.g. the Dade
County set-aside case). The first point has been taken care
of, to the extent it can be, by experience derived from our
past mistakes. The second point, however, is still a
concern. We dissipate our effectiveness and blur our message
if we allow ourselves to be drawn into legislative and legal
battles on even minor civil rights issues. Our energies and
political capital should instead be expended on those issues
that bear directly on our philosophy and on which we can set
forth a well-reasoned public argument (quotas and busing are
two such examples). Also, since such determinations involve
policy, there must be a high degree of coordination by the
White House. We must not allow our civil rights policy to be
made on an ad hoc basis by mid-level agency officials, as
often occurred in the past.
5. We can also address the "fear factor" by beginning to lay out
what we are for, as well as what we oppose, in the area of
civil rights. By outlining what we favor and support, we
draw implicit limits on our future actions, and negate
unspoken black concern about how far we are prepared to go.
This can be accomplished through a civil rights policy
statement, a Presidential speech, or both.
Pacing our Effort
1. Our effort to offer policy alternatives to black Americans
must be properly paced. We should not attempt to do
everything at once, nor should we move before the groundwork
has been properly laid.
2. For the next several months, we should concentrate on the
effort to foster a debate regarding U.S. social policy. As
noted previously, this should be done in a low-key manner,
building toward an eventual speech by the President.
However, such a speech (to lay out our philosophy and policy
alternatives) should not be given until the budget battles
are well on their way to resolution. To do otherwise would
risk both a conflict in our priorities, and accusations that
we were trying to distract attention from painful domestic
budget cuts.
3. A statement or speech on civil rights should also be held in
abeyance until spring, but should be delivered several weeks
in advance of the philosophy/policy alternatives speech.
Page 6
4. The specific policy points for each statement or speech
should be quietly developed by the White House, beginning
immediately, in order to be ready for a late spring target
date.
5. A senior White House official should be designated to
coordinate implementation of this strategy over an
extended period of time.
6. A suggested timetable would be as follows:
February to mid-May
--
measures to foster public debate
-- staff development of civil
rights policy statement
-- staff development of social and
economic policy package
-- designation of White House
coordinator
Mid-May to June
-- civil rights policy statement
and/or Presidential speech on civil
rights
Late May or
-- Presidential speech on
early June
economic/social policy package and
philosophy
The effort will, of course, need to extend well past June, but it
is preferable to delay further decisions until reaction to the
above steps has been assessed.
CC: John A. Svahn
Frank Donatelli
December 21, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR
JIM CICCONI
FROM:
KEVIN R. HOPKINS
KRA
SUBJECT:
BLACK STRATEGY
At your suggestion, I reviewed your December 12, 1984,
memorandum to Mike Deaver concerning the Administration's
"Black Strategy". I think the steps you outline are
on-target -- indeed, essential -- to building support
among blacks for the President's policies.
As you correctly point out, the first thing the President
must do is neutralize institutionalized black hostility
toward the President. You accurately observe that current
black "leadership" is unremittingly antagonistic toward the
President, and correctly imply that these so-called black
leaders do not necessarily speak for the majority of black
Americans. Still, far too many blacks who otherwise might
support us confront such a wall of personal emotional
resistance to the President and his policies that their
easiest emotional course is simply to avoid listening to us.
Nor are we blameless. Policy missteps aside, we have made
no significant effort in our four years to reach out to
black Americans other than through public liaison efforts,
a few speeches, and a select few "pro-black" policy initiatives,
such as aid to the HCBUs.
We must do more than this in our second term. Strategically,
three steps are required.
1. We must undertake a continuous and sincere campaign to
make black Americans feel comfortable with Reaganism -- to
let them know we want their support. Most important, this
requires that the President make more than a speech or two
focused on "black concerns". Rather, the President should
begin to regularly address the plight of blacks and the
poor in his speeches. Such references should not come
across as mere pandering (which, unfortunately, can be the
impression if "black issues" are relegated to a set speech
or two or to a single week each year. Rather, they should
be seen to stem from the President's deep concern for
extending the benefits of a healthy economy to all Americans.
In other words, we must ask -- repeatedly -- for black
support if we really want to secure it.
-2-
2. We must, as you suggest, solidify our support for civil
rights. Specifying the action this requires goes beyond the
scope of this memorandum (and you have addressed the matter
elsewhere in a memorandum I have not had the opportunity to
review). But whatever steps we take, we must make it clear
to the public that we take the protection of civil rights as
a given -- that we intend to enforce the law vigorously and
continuously. Only if blacks perceive they have nothing to
fear from us on the race issue will they begin to listen to
us on non-race issues.
3.
Finally, we must broaden our policy agenda to encompass
blacks. This requires not a change in policy, but a significant
change in the communication of that policy. We must "package"
our existing policies SO that blacks who are willing to listen
to us see that they can, indeed, benefit from Reaganism.
Key here is that we move beyond the so-called "black issues".
To the average black, HBCUs and SBA minority loans are
tangential matters. Yet it appears to me that in the first
term we used just such policies as the primary justification
for blacks' supporting us. In point of fact, we sought to
use such "pro-black policies" in connection with the second
objective above -- solidifying our image on civil rights --
rather than to advance our overall policy objectives. In
other words, we confused the "substance" of point 2 with
the "objectives" of point 3, and thus rarely came to the
stage of asking blacks to support our overall policy goals.
It was if (and I exaggerate here for emphasis) we were telling
the world we had two sets of policies: tax cuts and low
inflation for non-blacks, and HBCUs, minority loans, and
black appointments for blacks.
In the second term we must correct this problem. Specifically,
our second-term policy objective must be to move beyond civil
rights into the area of opportunity. We then should proudly
and confidently place our "opportunity agenda" up against
the opposition's -- and this is an argument (unlike competition
on civil rights grounds) that we can win.
Elsewhere, I have advocated an overall policy communication
structure based on a similar concept (see my attached two
memoranda). Moreover, I believe the White House should
establish a specific office (under Baker, Deaver, Darman,
whoever), the sole purpose of which is to devise substantive
means for broadening the appeal of the entire range of the
President's agenda. I would be happy to discuss this concept
with you further at your convenience.
#
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 19, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR
BEN ELLIOTT
FROM:
KEVIN R. HOPKINS
KRH
SUBJECT:
PRESIDENT'S SECOND INAUGURAL ADDRESS
The President's second inaugural address should be heavily
thematic, and should lay out the broad principles that will
govern the President's term. He should stress that after
four years of America's learning again what she can do for
herself, it is time for all people in the country to move
forward together. In particular, he should call for an end
to the "sniping partisanship" whose only purpose over the
past four years has been to obstruct for obstruction's
sake. In this regard, he should cite the deficit issue,
and point out that those who have been wailing loudest about
the deficit problem are the same ones who have been first
to bail out every spending program on the books. In other
words, he should challenge those who have been his opponents
these past four years to work with him to do what needs to
be done, or to shut up and let those who know what needs to
be done, do it.
Particular themes he should emphasize include:
Taxes. He should reiterate, in the strongest possible terms,
that he will not support a tax increase, for three reasons.
First, it would only feed higher spending. Second, it would
hurt the economy. Third, people already pay too high taxes.
The President should begin his second term determined to
end the notion that tax increases are an option for reducing
the deficit; they are not an option because they do not reduce
the deficit. The focus must shift back to where it belongs,
namely
Spending. The President should stress that the number one
budget goal in his second term must be to bring down spending
without impairing our national security. In this regard, he
should emphasize two aspects of his proposed spending reduction
plan. First, it eliminates programs where the government has
no business spending money (e.g., business subsidies). Second,
in legitimate programs, it removes beneficiaries who don't
deserve taxpayer assistance (e.g., middle class in student loans).
He should acknowledge that all aid helps somebody, but that the
aid isn't free, and that his standard is whether a worker
earning $10,000 or $12,000 per year should be taxed to pay for
the program. In other words, the focus should be not just on
reducing spending for spending's sake (though that is part of
-2-
it), but on eliminating spending that would be illegitimate
regardless of economic or budgetary conditions.
Tax Simplification. He should make similar arguments here,
stressing the populist arguments and those pertaining to the
family (see my Washington Post article). As with spending,
he should challenge directly those special interests who
benefit at the expense of average people because of special
provisions in the tax code.
Economic Opportunity. He should re-emphasize that the only
way all Americans are going to prosper is through economic
growth and economic opportunity. This requires, first of
all, that government take no action that will impede overall
economic growth or individual economic opportunity, which
should be stated as a major guiding principle for evaluating
all current and future laws and regulations (such as higher
taxes). Second, it requires the enactment of specific steps
that promote growth and opportunity (e.g., enterprise zones).
Family. The President should similarly stress the need for
policies that help preserve or prevent the break-up of
families. He should note the central role families play in
individual financial security and transmitting socially
acceptable norms of behavior, and emphasize that no society
will be strong and prosperous unless its families first are.
(See the extensive work by Bruce Chapman in this area.) The
President should also cite the problem of illegitimacy,
particularly among blacks, and assert that it must be a major
concern of policymakers for the rest of the decade.
He should use these five factors to redefine (and rename) the
fairness issue so that he, and not his opponents, will
control the debate on this issue in the second term.
*****
On foreign policy and defense, the President must similarly
move to recapture the debate in three areas: national security
(defense spending), arms control, and support for democracies
overseas. In the first area, he must emphasize how little has
really been done to rebuild our defenses (thanks to Democratic
obstructionism) and reposit the case for strong defense forces,
especially conventional forces that can prevent the advance to
nuclear conflict. In the second area, the President absolutely
must shift the debate from space weaponry (essentially irrelevant
in the current nuclear equation) to the thousands of nuclear
warheads aimed at the U.S. that could kill millions of people.
And he should stress that he will sign no arms agreement unless
it fulfills his objectives, namely, equitably reducing arms on
both sides, enhancing stability, and being verifiable. On the
third issue, he must strongly draw the distinction between
democracies and totalitarian states, and emphasize that America
must first be a friend to democracy (and transition thereto)
- 3-
before she can ever be a friend to freedom.
The recent problems in Ethiopia allow the President to
powerfully add a fourth item to this list: Third World
economic growth. He should emphasize that his foreign
policies in his second term will be aimed at giving Third
World nations the option between the mire of socialist policies
(that have produced, among other things, the famine in Ethiopia)
and the hope of capitalism and economic growth. He should
make it plain that the era of an America subsidizing suffering
has come to an end.
*****
Boldly setting out themes such as this will, I believe, permit
the President to move quickly to control the policy agenda,
and hence the creation of policy, for the next four years.
#
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 20, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR EDWIN MEESE III
FROM:
KEVIN R. HOPKINS
SUBJECT:
Strategic Elements of the 1985 Agenda
Following are the key strategic considerations involved in
successfully implementing the President's 1985 agenda.
Policy and Political Objecives in 1985
A. Policy Objectives
Without question, the Administration's four top policy objectives
in 1985 are: (1) budget reductions; (2) revenue-neutral tax
simplification; (3) maintenance of the defense build-up; (4)
achievement of equitable, verifiable arms reductions. A major
second-tier objective may be the enactment of enterprise zones
legislation.
B. Political Objectives
In order to build the political base for post-Reagan Republicanism,
the Administration must hold its traditional conservative base
(primarily by firmly upholding the President's traditional
objectives of budget and tax restraint and a strong defense)
while, at the same time, reaching out to "populist" liberals and
moderates and the poor and blacks. As well, the Administration
must continue to build support among emergent Republican
groups, such as the youth.
The First-term Experience
The Administration achieved three significant policy victories
in 1981: (1) major restraint in spending; (2) significant tax
rate reductions; and (3) the beginnings of a rebuilding of the
nation's defenses. However, by 1982 the Administration found
itself on the defensive in all three areas. In the first, it
was asserted that the President's budget cuts had devastated
the poor (the fairness issue). In the second, it was aasserted
that the tax cuts had helped only the rich (fairness) while
creating a $200 billion deficit (the deficit issue). In the
third, it was contended that "huge and unnecessary" defense
spending increases had widened the deficit (the deficit issue)
while making the world less safe (the arms control/peace issue).
2
As a result, the Administration spent the last three years of
the President's first term: (1) achieving no major new restraints
on the growth of spending, and in many cases sanctioning higher
than desired spending levels; (2) acquiescing to four major tax
increases; and (3) constantly defending, with only mixed success,
the defense rebuilding effort.
The Political Landscape in 1985
Given the President's landslide victory last November, one
might assume a favorable political landscape. But such is not
the case. While the electorate proclaimed strong support for the
President and his policies, their role, in business-as-usual
Washington, is now over for the present. From this point on,
the major players are the Administration, the Congress, and
the special interests. The latter are as powerful and determined
as ever to hold on to their special spending programs and tax
breaks, while the former (even some Republican members) are
decidedly more hostile than in 1981. Therefore, if the
Administration is to achieve its principal policy goals in
1985, it must create an enormous countervailing force --
grassroots public outcry -- to offset the greater strength
of the institutional forces opposing it -- and the Administration
must do so to a far greater extent than it did even in 1981.
Three major steps are required.
Create a Political Paradigm
The first step must be to create publicly appealing model of
the Administration's objectives. The nature of the President's
proposed budget reductions and the Treasury tax reform proposal,
along with the President's repeated emphasis on opportunity,
suggest a natural paradigm: now that the economy and our national
security have been returned to the road to health, it is time to
replace the government of privilege with an economy of
opportunity. Of note, this paradigm should appeal to the
targeted political groups (populist liberals and moderates,
poor, blacks, and youth), while retaining most of the President's
traditional conservative base.
The elements of this paradigm include:
Keep workers' taxes down by ending the special spending
programs that line the pockets of corporations, bureaucrats,
and upper-and middle-income people who can make do on their
own. The standard by which a program should be judged is
whether it is worth raising taxes on a $10,000 or $12,000
per year worker. The President should stand firm against a
tax increase because it would only permit more spending and
make people worse off.
3
Simplify taxes to reduce average workers' tax rates
while ending special tax breaks for business and the
wealthy.
Increase economic opportunity by maintaining economic
growth (and doing nothing to slow it down) and enacting
pro-opportunity legislation such as enterprise zones.
Maintain a strong defense so that we can achieve real
arms reductions on both sides.
Shift and Hold the Debate to the Administration's Own Terms
In order for this strategy to succeed, it is imperative that the
Administration keep the debate on its own terms. Just as surely
as our loss of control of the terms of debate paralyzed our efforts
in 1982-1984, it will doom our efforts in 1985 and beyond.
In particular, we must keep the budget debate on spending, and
not deficit, grounds. The moment we allow that our efforts are
directed toward reducing the deficit (rather than reducing
spending), we open the door to a TEFRA-like "grand compromise"
in which taxes shoot back up and spending remains virtually
untouched. In fact, we must work explicitly to remove tax
hikes as a deficit-reduction option; because they slow down the
economy and only fuel higher spending, tax increases are not
merely an undesirable option for controlling the deficit --
they are no option at all.
Similarly, while we must advocate spending control for its own
sake, we must also advocate spending reductions in particular
programs because the indicated spending would be unjustified
regardless of the state of the economy or the size of the budget.
Finally, we must shift the debate back to our side on defense
and arms control. Clearly, the anti-defense mood prevalent on
Capitol Hill makes it difficult to maintain our defense build-up.
Moreover, both Mondale, during the campaign, and the Soviets,
now, have made the principal focus of arms control space weaponry.
In the nuclear equation, such weapons are almost irrelevant;
the real and continuing danger are the thousands of Soviet
warheads aimed at targets in the U.S. and Europe. Unless we
make it publicly clear that no arms agreement will be worthwhile
unless it significantly reduces this most dangerous of weapons,
then our failure to achieve an arms accord (should that occur)
would place the burden for the failure on us (because we refused
to give up on SDI), and therefore further undercut support for
our defense program.
Wage a Grassroots Campaign for the President's Program
The elements of this step are outlined in detail in the white
notebook.
"Notebook prepared for Ed Meese by Bruce Chapman.
I do not have a copy.
December 21, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR
JIM CICCONI
FROM:
KEVIN HOPKINS
KRH
SUBJECT:
THINK TANK IDEA
In your memorandum of December 12, 1984, to Mike Deaver,
you mentioned the possibility of encouraging formation
of a "private, conservative black 'think tank Should
you desire to pursue this idea, I think an excellent
candidate to head up such a think tank would be Wendell
Gunn, who previously served as Special Assistant to the
President and Assistant Director of the Office of Policy
Development for Commerce and Trade during 1982-1984.
Wendell is now a privately employed financial and economic
consultant, working out of his home in Stamford, Ct. (Phone:
203/329-0807) In the past, he has expressed to me an
interest in creating just such a think tank as you describe.
It might be constructive for you to talk with Wendell about
this idea. I would be happy to assist you in this endeavor
in any way you might need.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
STATE / CRIWN
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
January 8, 1985
MEMORANDUM TO: Boyden Gray
Roger Porter
Jim Cicconi
Ken Cribb
FROM:
Mike Horowitz
MY
SUBJECT:
Task Force on Barriers to Economic Achievement
In light of the day's events, the question of who establishes the
task force proposed in the attached memo, and under whose
auspices it operates, may be somewhat problematic. (My personal
preference would be for the Vice President to organize and chair
it.)
As the attached editorial from today's Washington Times makes
clear, however, events will not await the completion of the
"transition" -- hence the attached draft. Moving ahead with the
task force would, in my judgment:
o Promote adoption of a clean version of the Grove City
legislation favored by the President.
o Enable the Administration to initiate, rather than react to,
events.
o Shift the current terms of the civil rights debate.
I will try to get us together during the current "interregnum" so
that the proposal/process can be fleshed out. This is a good
initiative, in my opinion, and I hope we can get a quick decision
out of the system re setting the Task Force up.
Attachments
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
THE SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URDAN DEVELOPMENT
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Task Force on Barriers to Economic Achievement
In 1984, we marked the twentieth anniversary of the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. That legislation signaled
America's determination to eliminate race, national origin, and
sex as a basis for decisionmaking by our government, economy, and
our society as a whole. Clearly, the country has made
substantial progress toward achieving the Act's objectives during
the intervening decades and, as we enter 1985, Federal
enforcement of the Act (and the civil rights legislation which
succeeded it) remains a central Federal priority.
It is becoming increasingly obvious, however, that while it
continues to be right and necessary to employ the instruments of
government to eliminate discrimination, including discrimination
fostered by government regulations, such action alone is
insufficient. A true agenda for opportunity must include
addressing and eliminating the barriers to economic achievement
by minorities and women, particularly those statutory and
administrative barriers imposed by Government itself. To cite
only the most obvious examples, such barriers:
Create unreasonably difficult or costly licensing
requirements for entry into trades and professions, or
the establishment of businesses.
Discourage employers from locating (and creating new
jobs) in minority communities.
Restrict the ability of women and others to pursue paid
employment within their own homes.
Inhibit effective maintenance of discipline and academic
standards in our nation's public schools, effectively
denying equal educational opportunities to too many of
our minority children.
-2-
Frustrate the employment of minority youth and restrict
the ability of their elders to successfully compete for
employment opportunities through minimum wage and similar
mandates.
Encourage dependence rather than independence in the
administration of public assistance.
Preclude improved housing for public housing tenants by
restricting the privatization of housing units.
The President is concerned that America get on with implementing
the full agenda for opportunity for those who need it most. As a
first step, [I] [
] will be chairing a Task Force on
Barriers to Economic Achievement to identify, and recommend
strategies to eliminate, the significant government-created
barriers to economic achievement by minorities and women. i am
asking that each of you provide me, by
, with the name
of the senior agency official you have designated to serve on
this task force.
the endeavor will be a challenging one. with few exceptions, the
statutory and administrative mandates which now serve as barriers
to economic achievement by minorities and women were enacted with
the best of intentions. Many of these barriers have also
acquired powerful constituencies with vested interests in their
preservation -- who may yet argue that minorities and women
benefit from their maintenance, or for still more Federal
programs to deal with their effects. They should understand,
however, and the Task Force will need to do the critical work to
make clear, that the Administration is determined to proceed with
the more effective alternative: removal of the barriers
themselves.
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
January 8, 1985
The Equal Opportunity Act of 1985
The economic liberation of black
economic expertise. Within a few weeks they
Americans is about to be undertaken, for the
are to introduce the most important piece of
first time in decades, by political leaders who
civil rights legislation in almost 20 years -
know what they are about economically.
an omnibus bill intended to strike down at one
Black leaders long have understood that
blow all the most important barriers to full
blacks would never be integrated fully into
black participation in the American econ-
American society until they aquired both
omy.
economic and-political power. But the drive
Few of the proposals are especially
for black political rights came first and nat-
original. Many have been kicking around for
urally enough was dominated by liberal lead-
years: education vouchers to let low-income
ers and liberal ideas. The libs are the
parents send their children to decent
specialists in that kind of thing, and so ran
schools; repeal of the Davis-Bacon Act,
the show while conservatives dragged their
which effectively discriminates against inex-
heels.
perienced or non-union minority workers on
As an unfortunate side effect, by the time
government-funded construction projects;
the essential elements of black political lib-
urban homesteading to sell public housing
eration had been put into place, the political
projects to their occupants; a special sub-
and economic welfare of American blacks
minimum wage to help minority teenagers
had been entrusted to liberal leaders, even
get summer job experience; enterprise
though in economic affairs they were out of
zones to attract business to the inner city;
their depth.
repeal of home-work regulations that essen-
Liberal programs for black economic lib-
tially outlaw cottage industries; perhaps
eration - affirmative action, for example -
even welfare reform to reduce welfare
were only marginally effective because they
dependency.
were based on political concepts such as
What is new is the idea of packaging all
enfranchisement or bureaucratic notions
these proposals together so as to draw atten-
such as credentials. Political concepts have
tion to their single theme-making the econ-
little use in the economic sphere, where (as
omy work for disadvantaged minorities. Also
long as the government refrains from coun-
new is the effort to put these proposals on the
tenancing discrimination against minorities)
front burner. In the past they usually were
productivity is more important than legal
reserved for wishful speeches about what
entitlement.
conservatives could do for blacks, if people
Now, however, a group of young House
would step aside and give them the chance.
Republicans, for the most part members of
These young leaders want to make their own
the so-called Conservative Opportunity Soci-
chance, and after tax reform the administra-
ety, are about to make a major effort to bene-
tion ought to have no higher domestic prior-
fit minorities through conservative
ity than helping them.
Racial politics, black and white.
A NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA
BY GLENN C. LOURY
F
ORTY YEARS AGO the Swedish economist Gunnar
ly on white racism, and which force us to confront funda-
Myrdal argued in An American Dilemma that the prob-
mental failures in black society. The social disorganization
lem of race in the United States cut to the very core of
among poor blacks, the lagging academic performance of
our definition as a people. Myrdal described America as
black students, the disturbingly high rate of black-on-
a nation which, although founded on the ideals of individ-
black crime, and the alarming increase in early unwed
ual liberty and personal dignity, could not bring itself-
pregnancies among blacks now loom as the primary obsta-
through either law or social practice-to treat the descen-
cles to progress. To admit these failures is likely to be
dants of slaves as the equals of whites. The dilemma for
personally costly for black leaders, and may also play into
white leaders in particular was that these racial prac-
the hands of lingering racist sentiments. Not to admit
tices were so deeply ingrained that even if they wanted
them, however, is to forestall their resolution and to allow
to get rid of them, it seemed politically impossible to do
the racial polarization of the country to worsen. If the new
so. In 1944 Myrdal hardly could have foreseen the ex-
American dilemma is not dealt with soon, we may face the
tent to which the United States would confront and
possibility of a permanent split in our political system
begin to resolve this great dilemma. As recently as
along racial lines.
twenty years ago many conservatives denied as a matter
It is deeply ironic that this dilemma has arisen in the
of principle that the government should interfere in
wake of the enormous success of the civil rights move-
private decisions in order to assure equal opportunity
ment. In little more than a generation, the United States
for black people. (Ronald Reagan, for example, opposed
has changed from a country callously indifferent to the
the 1964 Civil Rights Act.) Two decades later that posi-
plight of its black citizens into one for which that plight is a
tion has been completely discredited, both legally and
central feature of our political life. A new middle class of
morally.
well-educated and well-placed blacks has emerged, whose
The old racism is not gone, but the disparity between
members can be found in technical, managerial, and pro-
American ideals and racial practice has narrowed dramati-
fessional positions throughout the leading institutions of
cally. Today the civil rights debate is dominated by
the nation. Differences in earnings between young, well-
the issue of affirmative action, in which the question
educated black and white workers have diminished dra-
is whether the history of racism warrants special-not
matically; and something approximating parity in eco-
simply equal-treatment for blacks. Whereas blacks were
nomic status has been achieved for young, intact black
once excluded from politics by subterfuge and the threat
families.
of violence, they now constitute a potent political bloc
Yet, in general, even this class of blacks does not
with often decisive influence on local and national elec-
view itself as being in the American mainstream. There is
tions. Martin Luther King Jr., whose passionate, relent-
a keen appreciation among blacks of all social classes
less, and compelling articulation of black aspirations
that at least one-third of their fellow blacks belong to
made him the nemesis of Presidents, governors, and
the underclass. There is no way to downplay the social
F.B.I. officials alike, is now honored as a national hero.
pathologies that afflict this part of the black community.
The moral victory of the civil rights movement is virtually
In the big-city ghettos, the youth unemployment rate
complete.
often exceeds 40 percent. It is not uncommon for young
And yet racial divisions remain. Today we are faced
men to leave school at age 16 and reach their mid-20s
with a new American dilemma, one that is especially diffi-
without ever having held a steady job. In these communi-
cult for black leaders and members of the black middle
ties, more than half of all black babies are born out of
class. The bottom stratum of the black community has
wedlock. (In Central Harlem the most recently reported
compelling problems which can no longer be blamed sole-
figure is 79.9 percent.) Black girls between the ages of 15
and 19 constitute the most fertile population of that age
Glenn C. Loury is Professor of Public Policy at Harvard's
group in the industrialized world; and their birth rate is
Kennedy School of Government. He is currently at work
twice as high as any other group of women in the West.
on a book about racial advocacy in the post-civil rights era
(See "Children As Parents," by Ann Hulbert, TNR, Sep-
entitled Free At Last?
tember 10.)
December 31, 1984
14 THE NEW REPUBLIC
The undeniable progress of the black middle class has
erected since 1964 to assure racial fairness, and to the
been accompanied by the undeniable spread of these
private efforts undertaken by a great number of individu-
problems. Today nearly three of every five black children
als and institutions to increase black participation in their
do not live with both their parents. The level of dependen-
activities.
cy on public assistance for basic economic survival in the
A recent Gallup poll conducted for the Joint Center for
black population has essentially doubled since 1964.
Political Studies, a black think tank in Washington, re-
About one-half of all black children are supported in part
vealed the dimensions of the gulf between black and white
by transfers from the state and federal governments. Over
perceptions. More than two out of three whites said they
half of black children in public primary and secondary
believe that "all in all, compared with five years ago,
schools are concentrated in the nation's twelve largest
the situation of black people in this country has im-
central city school districts, where the quality of education
proved," compared to only about one in three blacks.
is notoriously poor, and where whites constitute only
Nearly one-half of the whites polled were "satisfied with
about a quarter of total enrollment. Only about one black
the way things are going at this time," but only one-
student in seven scores above the 50th percentile on the
seventh of blacks were. One-half of blacks felt that "blacks
standardized college admissions tests. Blacks, though lit-
should receive preference in getting jobs," compared to
tle more than one-tenth of the population, constitute ap-
one in eleven whites. Some 72 percent of blacks but only
proximately one-half of the imprisoned felons in the
31 percent of whites thought of Ronald Reagan as
nation.
"prejudiced."
Among those great many blacks who have entered the
The 1984 Presidential election made distressingly clear
middle class in the past twenty years there is, under-
why this gap is not likely to be bridged. Two-thirds of all
standably, a deeply felt sense of outrage at the injustice
whites voted for Reagan, while nine-tenths of all blacks
of conditions endured by the black poor. Somewhat less
voted against him. And black leaders went beyond merely
understandable is their reluctance to consider their
opposing the President. Roger Wilkins lambasted the Ad-
own success as evidence of the profound change that has
ministration for engaging in a "concerted effort to con-
taken place in American attitudes, institutions, and prac-
strict the democratic rights" of blacks, an effort which
tices. The position of poor blacks is perceived as being
Coretta King said was aimed at "turning back the clock"
inherently linked to the racist past of the nation, as prov-
on black progress. Benjamin Hooks declared that the Ad-
ing that the historic injustice of which Myrdal spoke still
ministration had to be "eliminated from the face of the
flourishes.
earth."
Moreover, middle-class blacks do not generally look to
It strains credulity to attribute Reagan's broadly based
their own lives as examples of what has become possible
landslide to a resurgent racism among whites. Much
for those blacks still left behind. Talented black profession-
broader forces are evidently at work-just as there are
als, who in decades past would have had scant opportuni-
forces broader than racism sustaining and encouraging
ty for advancement, now, in the interest of fairness and
the social pathology of the ghetto. But black leaders, like
racial balance, are avidly sought in corporate board rooms
their constituents, cannot seem to bring themselves to
or on elite university faculties. Nonetheless they find it
admit this. They prefer to portray the problems of the
possible, indeed necessary, to think of themselves as
ghetto as stemming from white racism, and to foster racial
members of an oppressed caste.
politics as the primary means of fighting it. Within the
Democratic Party, racial splits such as the one created by
T
HE GREAT MAJORITY of Americans do not see the
Jesse Jackson's Presidential candidacy or the civil war be-
situation of blacks in this way. Whereas black politi-
tween Chicago Mayor Harold Washington and his white
cians and intellectuals consider the ghetto and all that
opponents may well be a sign of things to come. The
occurs there to be simple proof that the struggle for civil
already tense sparring between New York Mayor Ed Koch
rights has yet to achieve its goals, others are repelled by
and his black foes could grow into bitter confrontation in
the nature of social life in poor black communities. Though
next year's mayoral campaign. By casting their political
most are too polite to say so, they see the poverty of these
battles in starkly racial terms, black leaders help to pro-
communities as substantially due to the behavior of the
mote a racial schism in American political life, without
people living there. They are unconvinced by the tortured
necessarily addressing the most fundamental problems of
rationalizations offered by black and (some) liberal white
their constituents.
spokesmen. They do not think of themselves or their
country as responsible for these dreadful conditions. Most
nonblack Americans know something of hardship. Most
U
NFORTUNATELY, neither Democratic leaders nor
Republican leaders nor black leaders have much in-
were not born wealthy; many have parents or grandpar-
centive to prevent this political fracas from exacerbat-
ents who came here with next to nothing, and who
ing the general racial division of American society.
worked hard so that their children might have a better life.
The Democrats, having just finished a campaign in which
Most aren't hostile or even indifferent to the aspirations of
a quarter of the votes for Walter Mondale were cast by
blacks. In fact they point with pride to the advancement
blacks, appear to have a big stake in the perpetuation
that blacks have made, to the elaborate legal apparatus
of racial schism. Far from viewing the "color gap"
DECEMBER 31, 1984
15
with alarm, Democratic strategists have come to depend
support-Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley, for example-
on it. Yet under electoral pressure the Democrats have
are discernibly closer to the center of the Democratic
had to keep their distance from the black leadership.
Party.
The Democrats' chief problem is how to maintain the en-
The results can be bizarre. Jesse Jackson actually cam-
thusiasm of black supporters without alienating white
paigned in the Deep South urging local politicians to
supporters. Witness one of the central dilemmas of the
join his Rainbow Coalition so that, working together,
Mondale candidacy: how to keep Jesse Jackson close
they might enact the Equal Rights Amendment, eliminate
enough to win blacks but far enough away to placate
state right-to-work laws, and secure a nuclear freeze.
whites.
Most candidates running in the South on such a platform
The Republicans and President Reagan cannot, in the
have short political careers. Lasting alliances between
short run, expect to win much support from blacks, no
poor southern blacks and whites, if they are to emerge
matter what they do. Moreover, any such overt appeal to
at all, will not emerge with this as the substance of
blacks by Reagan would risk alienating the right wing of
the black politician's appeal. Yet southern whites who
his constituency. Some right-wing Republican candidates
are repulsed by such "progressive" candidates are writ-
are not above exploiting the vestiges of racism. (Jesse
ten off as racists. And the incentive for the emergence
Helms, for example, managed to mention Jesse Jackson's
of a centrist black leadership which might someday
name twenty-four times in a fund-raising solicitation dur-
achieve significant white support is diminished even
ing his recent reelection campaign.) Thus, from Reagan's
further.
point of view, the benefits of rapprochement will seem
slight, and the costs as potentially great. Representative
Nozick once gave a lecture at
Jack Kemp's speech at the Urban League convention last
Do Intellectuals Hate Capital-
summer-in which he made an overt appeal for black
ism?" and found one intellectual's answer scribbled on a
support, pledging to include the black poor in his "new
poster announcing the talk: "Because we're smart!" One
opportunity society"-was a hopeful exception to the Re-
way black leaders might answer the question, "Why are
publicans' indifference.
you so undifferentiated in expressed philosophic perspec-
tive?" is: "Because we're smart"-smart enough to under-
B
UT OF ALL the actors in this drama, black lead-
stand black interests and to uniformly recognize them to
ers play the most important role, and the most
be well served by a left-liberal politics.
problematic. The prevailing ideological cast of many
This argument, while not implausible, is not necessarily
prominent black leaders and intellectuals is considerably
correct. An alternative explanation for the ideological pos-
to the left of the national mainstream, and often of
ture of black leaders is this: the outcome of the internal
the black community itself. Because of the long history
struggles among black elites for leadership is sharply af-
of racist exclusion, many blacks place group solidarity
fected by the general perception of the black community
above mere philosophical differences when deciding
on the quality of race relations. When most blacks think
whom to support. A black ideologue of the left (or, for that
that things are going poorly for the group (as they do
matter, of the right-Louis Farrakhan, for example) is al-
now), relatively radical forces in the leadership will be
most immune from challenge by another black, since it is
strengthened. When the American political establish-
precisely in ideological terms that whites most often op-
ment, liberal or conservative, reacts negatively to these
pose him. By posing the challenge, the black critic seems
radical leaders, it becomes all the more difficult for moder-
to ride with whites against his own race. The black chal-
ate blacks to challenge them.
lenger may thus forfeit black political support if he ex-
This is what happened in 1984. Last summer Jesse
pands his appeal to white voters by criticizing incumbent
Jackson's candidacy came under severe criticism from
black leadership. The opposition of whites to the black
Democrats and Republicans alike. There was talk of
incumbent is taken by other blacks as proof that he is
not permitting him to speak at the Democratic Conven-
"sticking it to the man," and thus deserves support. The
tion unless he repudiated Farrakhan. Conservative com-
black challenger winds up appearing, in the eyes of his
mentators were extremely critical of his post-primary
own people, to be an agent of forces inimical to their
junket to Central America and Cuba. At the convention,
interests.
many blacks were disappointed by the limited conces-
As a result, many black leaders act in ways which
sions Mondale offered Jackson supporters. Their discom-
exacerbate their isolation from the American political
fort was enhanced by the adoption in Dallas of the most
mainstream without fear of reproach by more centrist
conservative major party platform in the last fifty years.
blacks. The way in which the Voting Rights Act has come
As a result, the black leadership was fiercely critical
to be enforced compounds the problem. To avoid redis-
of both Mondale and Reagan (for different reasons, of
tricting battles in courts, legislatures routinely create
course), but virtually silent about some of Jackson's
overwhelmingly black, electorally "safe" districts for
more extreme views. It would have required great cour-
black incumbents. As a result, most nationally prominent
age for any black leader of prominence to publicly criti-
black politicians do not require white support to re-
cize, say, Jackson's foreign policy positions, or to publicly
tain their prominence. Those blacks who do require white
acknowledge the serious problem of black anti-Semitism
16 THE NEW REPUBLIC
during the campaign-and virtually none did.
Again, they do not seem to be doing so, which only
This alternative explanation accounts for two central
widens the schism between blacks and the American
features of black politics today that the "Because we're
mainstream. It is unhealthy that NBC correspondent Mar-
smart" retort cannot. First, it suggests why black political
vin Kalb could feel obliged to ask Jesse Jackson, before a
debate, though by no means non-existent, is so truncated.
television audience of millions, whether his loyalties were
Consider that between 1965 and 1979 the number of low-
first to America or first to black people-especially when
income blacks who were victims of robbery rose by 1,266
the answer was the latter. When Jackson ended his speech
per 100,000; among middle-income whites the increase
at the University of Havana with "Long live Cuba! Long
was 359. But the residents of inner-city Detroit, who face
live the United States! Long Live President Castro! Long
one of the highest criminal victimization rates anywhere,
live Martin Luther King! Long live Martin Luther King!
regularly return to Congress John Conyers, who uses his
Long live Che Guevara! Long Live Patrice Lamumba!" the
position as chairman of the House Subcommittee on Crim-
clear suggestion was that Martin Luther King's movement
inal Justice to crusade against police brutality and white-
and Che Guevera's movement are on the same moral and
collar crime, but spends little time publicly addressing the
political plane. Such cavalier use of King's moral legacy
plight of the victims of street crime. No serious challenge
will only squander it. And yet while the rest of the elector-
to Conyers has ever been waged by a black attacking him
ate gasps, blacks seem to slumber.
for failing to represent the community's interest in reduc-
To be sure, ordinary black people feel a genuine ambiva-
ing crime. Here is a case where, arguably, blacks' interests
lence about their American nationalism. Blacks find them-
are not served by Conyers's traditional left-liberal perspec-
selves in America only because their ancestors were kid-
tive. What blacks in Detroit need is less, not more, unifor-
napped and brought here as slaves. In the century
mity of opinion.
following emancipation, black artists and intellectuals—
What conceivable justification can black leaders offer for
whose legacy continues to exert a powerful influence on
such limited debate among the victims of crime about
educated young blacks-found they could only gain free-
Conyers's views on crime? To argue that ordinary black
dom of action and the recognition for their accomplish-
people identify with and excuse the criminals who brutal-
ments by exiling themselves. The complicity of the federal
ize them would be to plumb the depths of fatuity and
and state governments in sustaining Jim Crow laws and
condescension. And yet consider how the N.A.A.C.P.,
the de facto system of racial caste, and the ubiquity of
the largest and oldest civil rights organization in the coun-
racist assumptions and practices throughout American life
try, characterizes the inner-city crime problem in the April
have left deep scars. There can be no forgetting that Mar-
1983 issue of its magazine, The Crisis:
tin Luther King Jr. was hounded as a suspected enemy of
Blacks make up
12 percent of the nation's total population
the state by the F.B.I., even as he was helping to effect the
an incredible 50 percent of the total prison population
nation's great moral awakening. Today, when the Reagan
[but] only 4 percent of the nation's law enforcement person-
Administration seems to flinch from condemning the ugly
nel.
Why are so many blacks in prison and
so few
racism of South African apartheid, it makes many blacks
blacks in law enforcement? One inescapable answer applies to
even more reluctant to embrace fully their American
both questions: racism. Superficially, it would appear that
nationalism.
blacks commit more crimes than anyone else
[but the]
only explanation for this
discrepancy is conscious choices
of key decision makers to focus on crimes committed more
T
HUS WHITE LEADERS too, if they do not seek to
understand the nature and sources of black political
frequently by blacks.
alienation and respond sensitively to it, are in danger of
If the common ideology of the black leadership is this
making our racial dilemma worse. White Democrats and
reticent to express principled opposition to the damaging
white Republicans who are elected to office without black
criminal behavior of a relatively few young black men, it
support will be tempted, as all politicians are, to reward
simply does not serve the welfare of blacks.
their friends (i.e., whites), and punish their enemies (i.e.,
Second, the "Because we're smart" argument cannot
blacks). If they succumb to this temptation, they will make
explain the ubiquitous coolness that nationally prominent
it infinitely harder for black leaders to adopt positions that
black politicians exhibit toward the defense of American
make mutual compromise and accommodation possible.
interests abroad. The most vulnerable segment of the
This is the great problem confronting President Reagan,
American population to any major setback abroad are the
as great in its own way as the deficit problem. Even in
black inner-city poor. If vital raw materials become scarce,
the absence of any short-term political gain, he must
who will suffer first and most? If markets abroad disap-
seek to reach out to the blacks and include them in his
pear, if trading partners can no longer afford to buy our
new majority. The President need not pretend to be a
goods, who will be unemployed? Of course, factors be-
liberal Democrat. In a manner consistent with his social
yond the narrow interests of constituents should deter-
philosophy, he should act on the statement he made in
mine one's foreign policy positions. Still, the answers to
1982 to the National Black Republican Council: "No other
these questions are sufficiently uncertain that those advo-
experience in American history runs quite parallel to the
cating the interests of the inner-city poor would do well to
black experience. It has been one of great hardships, but
consider them carefully.
also of great heroism; of great adversity but also great
DECEMBER 31, 1984
17
achievement. What our Administration and our party
support for the development of a strong black entrepre-
seek is the day when the tragic side of the black legacy in
neurial class. He has to show he is willing to take
America can be laid to rest once and for all, and the long,
some risks, and make some compromises to see that these
perilous voyage toward freedom, dignity, and opportuni-
and other initiatives are enacted. In his first term
ty can be completed, a day when every child born in
the President seemed reluctant to appear before black
America will live free not only of political injustice, but
audiences-perhaps because he feared an ugly reception.
of fear, ignorance, prejudice, and dependency."
Yet, by taking blacks seriously enough to directly seek
The President must recognize the damage that is done
their support, he can take the lead in healing the country's
to the country by poor judgment in policy decisions of
racial wounds.
powerful symbolic importance. Two examples of this
Should Reagan be prepared to take these steps, a histor-
problem from Reagan's first term come to mind. The Ad-
ic opportunity will present itself to the black leadership.
ministration appeared to support segregationist Bob Jones
The black underclass cannot afford another four years of
University in its efforts to gain a tax exemption; and it
wishful thinking from its leaders about the drift of political
failed to give early support to a compromise version of the
ideas in contemporary America. Those leaders must find
bill to extend the Voting Rights Act, and thus permitted
the courage and wisdom to heed the growing signs of
itself to be portrayed as opposing the measure. Such mis-
racial political isolation, and to seek accommodation and
takes served only to insult and further alienate a tenth of
compromise. They need not become conservative Repub-
the population.
licans. What is required is that black leaders, from a ma-
Reagan must also push with greater vigor and urgency
ture and varied set of ideological positions, adopt strate-
those initiatives he already supports: enterprise zones, a
gies consonant with the shifting political realities. Until
sub-minimum wage for the hard-to-employ, ownership
they do so, the new American dilemma will be perpetuat-
possibilities for responsible public housing tenants, and
ed by blacks and whites alike.
RESIDENT
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
THE
UNITED
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
SERVE
STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
December 21, 1984
MEMORANDUM TO: Jim Cicconi
FROM:
Mike Horowitz
M4
SUBJECT:
Black Strategy
These are some hasty reactions to your memo, which I believe to
be absolutely on target in many of its points.
This Administration, under normal circumstances, would be
expected to draw considerable support from any group:
O In which the church is the principle community
institution -- and in which there is accordingly greater
than average agreement with Administration positions on
"social issues" such as moral values, school discipline,
pornography, etc.
o Which is by far the most victimized by violent crime, and
hence has the most to gain from this Admiistration's efforts
to restore balance to the criminal justice process.
O Whose children bore the brunt of the deterioration in
educational standards which occurred during the 1970's, and
which this Administration has done SO much to reverse.
O Which was (and to the extent that reforms remain to be
effected, still is) disproportionately represented among
those workers taxed, under Great Society policies, to
provide transfer payments to support others with a lifestyle
which exceeds their own.
O Large numbers of whom live in areas which would be
designated as "Enterprise Zones", and whose young people
disproportionately bear the burden of such interest group
"successes" as high minimum wages.
O Contains a large and growing middle class, with a vested
interest in preserving and expanding individual economic
opportunity.
O Which, polls consistently indicate, overwhelmingly favors
a policy of equal opportunity, and which shares this
Administration's opposition to busing, quotas, and similar
"race conscious" policies.
That we do not, as you correctly emphasize, is not so much a
function of poor salesmanship (to which, we are frequently
exhorted, the solution is more and better salesmanship) as it is
the absence of a coherent and identifiable product to sell -- a
core of ideas and beliefs (a policy) based on which this
Administration can be consistently seen to act.
A policy can be evaluated (and sold) in terms of its overall
effects. A series of ad hoc (and frequently, contradictory)
episodes in the various departments and agencies cannot --
particularly when they are undertaken with the apparent, vain,
hope that they will not be noticed. As the predictable result
has been a civil rights record about which we have been, by
turns, defensive, apologetic, or (occasionally) defiant --- but
all-too-infrequently assertive or affirmatively proud.
While I agree that we should take every opportunity to give
additional prominence to the emerging cadre of conservative
intellectuals and leaders in the black community (and that we
should avoid actions which further empower media-created
"leaders") I would put somewhat less emphasis on developing
leaders or agendas for blacks. As the ovewhelming repudiation of
the Mondale campaign (which had an "agenda" and "leaders" for
every discernable group), Americans prefer national leadership
and a national agenda (even where they do not agree with every
particular).
As Glenn Loury powerfully emphasizes, blacks are no exception in
this regard (although he might tellingly have added that we have
too often acted as though they were). As Loury convincingly
argues, once the Administration develops a truly national civil
rights agenda, real debate within the black community can begin.
A debate from which new agendas and additional leaders can emerge
- from the black community itself.
An obvious first step would be to offer substantive
Administration jobs to leaders such as Loury and Sowell who have
taken it upon themselves to challenge the assumption blacks
benefit from the liberal agenda. To date, we have ignored the
Loury's and Sowell's (when we have not rejected them outright)
in favor of "bridge figures" (whose message to blacks, in the
end, is that they should support the Administration "in spite of
it all"). As I indicated yesterday, I believe that the
appointment of Tom Sowell to a Cabinet-level position could, in
and of itself, truly affect history -- and not in the area of
civil rights alone. I know it will take some tough persuading,
and personal appeals by the President, but success on this score
will, in my opinion, give a basis to a large proportion of the
black community (and more media figures than might be imagined)
to identify with the President's overall program.
These are initial thoughts offered in haste as you leave for your
R & R, and I look forward to further talks when you return.
House GOP priorities (domestic):
(1) Budget;
(2) Tax reform;
(3) Civil rights;
Why civil rights should be a priority:
(1) Opportunity to reach out to black voters;
(2) Opportunity to push the conservative agenda under the
banner of "social justice";
(3) Opportunity to go on the offensive -- to act because we're
interested in the social good instead of reacting because we
don't agree with the left's approach;
(4) Opportunity to seize the left's moral high ground by
challenging their protection of it.
The situation in the 99th Congress:
(1) The Leadership Conference will introduce another Grove City
bill. It may be more sophisticated but it will have the same
effect. [Covering small grocers' because customers buy food
with Food Stamps; or farmers because they benefit from price
supports.
(2) If we don't have a positive alternative they will be able to
paint anyone who questions the measure, or tries to amend it,
a racist -- especially since a handful of conservative GOP
Senators defeated the bill last year.
(3) Analysis of statistics and trends gives every indication that
the policies now in place aren't working.
(4) The GOP does have economic proposals that would attack
directly some of the economic problems of blacks.
A Proposal:
(1) Make civil rights a GOP priority.
(2) Embrace documents, such as the bishops draft letter on
poverty, that point out the problems that do exist.
(3) Make the case for the failure of the policies now in place.
(4) Use the inevitable Grove City bill as a wedge to enter the
civil rights debate and begin talking about how we can really
ensure civil rights.
(5) Have an alternative omnibus bill or amendment that can be
offered as a substitute to Grove City. That bill or
amendment should include:
Grove City language conservatives can support;
Language reversing the trend toward policies that have the
effect of racial quotas;
*
Enterprise zones;
Youth opportunity wage;
Privatization of housing;
[It could also include repeal of Davis-Bacon, education
vouchers, repeal of homework regulations, and a review of
operational licensing standards and procedures.]
Strategy:
(1) Adopt an alternative that dovetails with other priorities
(like the one suggested above).
(2) Use every possible forum to talk about it.
(3) Cultivate media interest -- don't focus on the Washington
media, try Reader's Digest, the WSJ, USA Today, and radio.
(4) Make our high ground a driving interest in results, not
process and rhetoric.
Tactics:
In order for this approach to work civil rights has to become a
priority -- use every possible forum to bring it up:
Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families could
hold hearings on black teenage unemployment -- especially
since the Democrats want to hold hearings on poverty as
the cause of existing problems.
When Revenue Sharing comes up offer an amendment that
conditions funds on review of state licensing procedures
and how they impact on black employment.
Get national religious leaders to sponsor a gala event --
talk about the problems and our solutions; solicit ideas
from the people we're trying to help -- whites can't solve
blacks' problems, they can only get out of the way.
Sell the idea to conservative celebrities -- particularly
those who work with inner-city kids and the disadvantaged
-- and get them to begin lobbying for the approach, in
Washington and around the country.
Get GOP youth organizations to take the issue on as their
cause.
Immediate goal: Damage control on Grove City
Long Term goal: Change the focus of debate on civil rights
Best case scenario:
(1) Defeat the Leadership Conference's Grove City bill;
(2) Change the focus of debate;
(3) Pass our economic proposals.
Worst case scenario:
(1) Pass the Leadership Conference's Grove City bill
overwhelmingly;
(?) Continue to be at a loss for an alternative to the left's
civil rights agenda;
(3) Continue to vote for civil rights legislation we're opposed
to.
Most likely scenario:
(1) Begin to change the focus of debate;
(2) Pass bad Grove City language, or moderately bad language,
with enterprise zones attached.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 12, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEAVER
FROM:
JAMES W. CICCONI
SUBJECT:
Black Strategy
At this point, it is perhaps more reflective of current thinking
to outline a possible black strategy, and secure your reactions.
In that vein, I would offer the following points:
1. Our approach must address, and not ignore, the reasons for
the President's current unpopularity with blacks. Much of our
problem is rooted in black perceptions that the President is
anti-civil rights, and that his economic program is unfair to
blacks. While this seems obvious as a matter of analysis, it
also points out the need to correct current misperceptions
at the same time we are looking forward.
We can begin to address the civil rights aspect by clearly
defining what we are for, as well as what we are against. (I
have already written a memo on the civil rights policy
problem, which includes some specific recommendations, and
will be happy to send you a copy.) The bottom line here,
though, is that much of our problem is based on a fear,
abetted by our policy missteps, about how far we might go
in rolling back the civil rights gains of the past 20 years.
We can allay that fear only by clearly defining our policy
(thereby setting some limits), and restoring control of civil
rights policy-making to the White House (thus making certain
that the President's views, and not ad hoc agency decisions,
determine our policy).
2. We must begin to lay out a "new agenda for black America".
This requires a good deal of thought, and the participation not
only of our political supporters, but also of conservative black
thinkers from around the country. Faith Whittlesey has begun
some contacts with such a group. So far, the meetings have
been less than productive, because they are not goal-oriented
and have not been integrated with an overall strategy. We
have taken steps to correct that, with a view toward encouraging
formation of a private, conservative black "think tank."
3. We must begin to form our own black leadership composed of
people with whom we can deal. This should not be totally
Republican, and need not be in tune with us on every issue--
- 2 -
the key is simply that they not be hostile to the President,
or to our ideas in general. We can bestow credibility on the
people we choose by consulting with them, speaking to their
groups, and providing them access within the Administration.
This is, of course, precisely what we did with Hispanics.
Black leadership is, to a great extent, in the eye of the
beholder. We can affect such perceptions by the publicity
White House recognition provides. Change will only come
slowly, but the espousal of our message by recognizable
blacks is important to its overall credibility.
4. We cannot hope to gain ground by dealing with the estab-
lished black leadership (Jesse Jackson, Ben Hooks, Vernon
Jordan, et al). They are unremittingly hostile to this Presi-
dent, their agenda is diametrically opposed to ours, and their
status as leaders is dependent on their continued public
criticism of our program. If we are seen to be dealing with
them, we will only strengthen their credibility among blacks,
thereby damaging ourselves. We must shut them out of the White
House to the maximum extent possible without adverse publicity.
We must also put them in the position of responding to our
"new agenda," since they will be hard put to oppose many of the
issues we could put forward.
5. We must move with deliberation, and not with undue haste.
A time when severe budget cuts are the primary news is not the
best time for a major black outreach effort. Instead, we should
begin to put the "infrastructure" of such an effort in place.
This would include preparation of a "new agenda" of policy ideas;
the ordering of our own house on civil rights policy, culminat-
ing in a formal policy statement and a major Presidential speech
on civil rights; encouragement for the formation of a private
"think tank" of black conservatives; and identification and
promotion of an alternative black leadership.
6. We must work closely in the meantime with other groups, like
ethnics and Hispanics, that were far more supportive of the Presi-
dent in 1980. Such groups will react with hostility if they feel
we are focusing on blacks while ignoring them.
7. We must recognize up front that progress will be very slow,
and difficult to measure since we are starting from such a
small base (e.g., a five point increment represents a 50% gain).
Moreover, we must be prepared to sustain the effort over a
period of years if we hope to show any significant progress.
The political arguments for doing so are strong, though, and
the increasing racial polarization of U.S. politics adds a
moral argument, as well.
CC: James A. Baker, III
Long Term goal: Change the focus of debate on civil rights
Best case scenario:
(1) Defeat the Leadership Conference's Grove City bill;
(2) Change the focus of debate;
(3) Pass our economic proposals.
Worst case scenario:
(1) Pass the Leadership Conference's Grove City bill
overwhelmingly;
(?) Continue to be at a loss for an alternative to the left's
civil rights agenda;
(3) Continue to vote for civil rights legislation we're opposed
to.
Most likely scenario:
(1) Begin to change the focus of debate;
(2) Pass bad Grove City language, or moderately bad language,
with enterprise zones attached.
House GOP priorities (domestic):
(1) Budget;
(2) Tax reform;
(3) Civil rights;
Why civil rights should be a priority:
(1) Opportunity to reach out to black voters;
(2) Opportunity to push the conservative agenda under the
banner of "social justice";
(3) Opportunity to go on the offensive -- to act because we're
interested in the social good instead of reacting because we
don't agree with the left's approach;
(4) Opportunity to seize the left's moral high ground by
challenging their protection of it.
The situation in the 99th Congress:
(1) The Leadership Conference will introduce another Grove City
bill. It may be more sophisticated but it will have the same
effect. [Covering small grocers' because customers buy food
with Food Stamps; or farmers because they benefit from price
supports.
(2) If we don't have a positive alternative they will be able to
paint anyone who questions the measure, or tries to amend it,
a racist -- especially since a handful of conservative GOP
Senators defeated the bill last year.
(3) Analysis of statistics and trends gives every indication that
the policies now in place aren't working.
(4) The GOP does have economic proposals that would attack
directly some of the economic problems of blacks.
A Proposal:
(1) Make civil rights a GOP priority.
(2) Embrace documents, such as the bishops draft letter on
poverty, that point out the problems that do exist.
(3) Make the case for the failure of the policies now in place.
(4) Use the inevitable Grove City bill as a wedge to enter the
civil rights debate and begin talking about how we can really
ensure civil rights.
(5) Have an alternative omnibus bill or amendment that can be
offered as a substitute to Grove City. That bill or
amendment should include:
Grove City language conservatives can support;
Language reversing the trend toward policies that have the
effect of racial quotas;
Enterprise zones;
*
Youth opportunity wage;
Privatization of housing;
[It could also include repeal of Davis-Bacon, education
vouchers, repeal of homework regulations, and a review of
operational licensing standards and procedures.]
Strategy:
(1) Adopt an alternative that dovetails with other priorities
(like the one suggested above).
(2) Use every possible forum to talk about it.
(3) Cultivate media interest -- don't focus on the Washington
media, try Reader's Digest, the WSJ, USA Today, and radio.
(4) Make our high ground a driving interest in results, not
process and rhetoric.
Tactics:
In order for this approach to work civil rights has to become a
priority -- use every possible forum to bring it up:
*
Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families could
hold hearings on black teenage unemployment -- especially
since the Democrats want to hold hearings on poverty as
the cause of existing problems.
When Revenue Sharing comes up offer an amendment that
conditions funds on review of state licensing procedures
and how they impact on black employment.
*
Get national religious leaders to sponsor a gala event --
talk about the problems and our solutions; solicit ideas
from the people we're trying to help -- whites can't solve
blacks' problems, they can only get out of the way.
*
Sell the idea to conservative celebrities -- particularly
those who work with inner-city kids and the disadvantaged
-- and get them to begin lobbying for the approach, in
Washington and around the country.
*
Get GOP youth organizations to take the issue on as their
cause.
Immediate goal: Damage control on Grove City
1.
Coordinative
:
JC, Rhodes, Donatelli
Deaves
- coordination of overall strategy
2.
Event Strategy
: Donatelli, Rhodes, JC, Bradley
- propose a Progression of meetings and events for next 90 days; lay grandate for blitz
3.
New
Agenda : Chapman, Rhodes, JC, (ontside groups), Holladay Bradley-
- devise set of initiatives and proposals to attract black support; assemble as pkg.
4.
Civil Rights Policy JAB, EM, Svahn (Jc)
- restructure policy-making process; draft civ its policy statement; Pres'l speech
is
New Leadership : Bradley, Rhodes, Holladay
- identify, begin cultivating alt black ldrs via meeting, photos, etc; low-key
6.
Appointments : Armstrong
- identify, promote GOP blacks w/ ediship potential; install one or two high-lend applate
but
- Verstanding seeting
- thank
you Sun theon
- Tobacco investigation>
- 2 days on this; documents
UNESCO
- hearing is Jan 3 (report due by end
observes
SP
of month)
aware of sit.
FERC
Georgiam
Sheldon
on
now assessing
Ed Cox in Dallas wants to help
= w/in 30 days but
= what is timetable on this?
not before Jan 2
7510 Salgado -
= assessing =
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
Bue descuss
WASHINGTON
pls with JCF to
December 14, 1984
get lave
are with
MEMORANDUM TO: Michael Deaver
FROM:
Steal
Cureten aremo)
J. Steven Rhodes
SUBJECT:
Black Strategy as prepared by Jim Cicconi.
I would like to respond to Jim Ciconni's memorandum to
you by addressing each of the subjects he raised.
Point 1: Jim talked about the reasons for the President's
ht.
I agree wholeheartedly that the President should clearly
denunciate this Administration's position on civil rights
and clearly state what we are for, as well as against.
Additionally, civil rights matters must be cleared through
the White House because of their impact on numerous con-
stituencies as women, minorities, handicapped, etc.
Point 2: Jim suggests that the White House should try out
new agendas for black America. I disagree with this para
graph because I feel that the White House should respond
to the needs and concerns for black Americans and address
these issues. The black community should not be patro-
nized by an assuming White House that knows "what is best
for black America." There are a number of black think
tanks that are ideologically consistent with this Admini-
stration. Bob Woodson, President of the National Center
for Neighborhood Enterprise, is by far the most credible
of all these.
Point 3: 1 agree with Jim. I also agree that we must
cultivate black leadership which is consistent with the
Administration. The White House can reinforce the credi-
bility of these leaders in America but this leadership
should be substantive and articulate.
Page Two: Memorandum to Michael Deaver.
Point 4: Jim discusses the approach we should take with
existing black leadership. I agree we should spend more
time with those people who can articulate their support of
the President as opposed to those who are diametrically
opposed to the President and the Administration.
Point 5: This is the same as Point 2 and 3, however, we
need not create new organizations but rather work with
existing organizations that support us, are credible and
have constituencies - of which there are many. We should
focus our time on those issues affecting all Americans but
that have more direct impact on the black community. We
would thereby bring black America into the mainstream so
minorities are not treated as second class citizens.
Point 6: I agree with Jim wholeheartedly.
Point 7: I do agree with the direction Jim is taking, how-
ever I feel that if we segment the black community by
targeting our message to particular individuals and organi-
zations concerned with economic development, there is a far
greater probability that the President's message will be
understood. Economic development is color blind.
In summation, I generally agree with what Jim is saying
However I do not feel that the White House needs to create
new black leadership. There are already leaders existing
in the Administration as well as out.
AEI and the Heritage Foundation were not created by the
White House. Similarly, the Lincoln Institute and National
Center for Neighborhoos Enterprise are established organiza-
tions with a strong constituency supportive of the President.
Although Jim does not suggest this, I would be remiss if I
did not advise that we quickly need to acknowledge black
Republicans who labored in the 1984 campaign to re-elect the
President. It would be unprofessional to begin the job of
Outreach in the black community without thanking the indivi-
duals who helped to get us here in the first place.
The Republican Party has been notorious for not saying thank
you to its supporters. This is critical in handling Outreach
in the minority communities. Symbolism is important in all
constituencies as industry, labor, religious, handicapped, etc.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 13, 1984
TO: MIKE DEAVER
Attached, per your request, is a
memo which reflects my current
thinking on a possible black
strategy. I have shown a draft
to Frank Donatelli, and he is in
basic agreement.
I have tried to be concise, and
not mince words, in order to save
your time and draw your honest
reaction to each point. Obviously,
the different points could be
fleshed out with much more detail;
also, there is much here that is
implicit.
I have also attached a copy of a
memo on civil rights policy-making
which is a bit more lengthy. So
far, only Baker and Svahn have seen
it, and I'd be interested in your
reactions.
Thanks-- I'll be happy to have a
meeting to discuss these papers at
any time you wish.
Jim Cicconi
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 12, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEAVER
FROM:
JAMES W. CICCONI
SUBJECT:
Black Strategy
At this point, it is perhaps more reflective of current thinking
to outline a possible black strategy, and secure your reactions.
In that vein, I would offer the following points:
1. Our approach must address, and not ignore, the reasons for
the President's current unpopularity with blacks. Much of our
problem is rooted in black perceptions that the President is
anti-civil rights, and that his economic program is unfair to
blacks. While this seems obvious as a matter of analysis, it
also points out the need to correct current misperceptions
at the same time we are looking forward.
We can begin to address the civil rights aspect by clearly
defining what we are for, as well as what we are against. (I
have already written a memo on the civil rights policy
problem, which includes some specific recommendations, and
will be happy to send you a copy.) The bottom line here,
though, is that much of our problem is based on a fear,
abetted by our policy missteps, about how far we might go
in rolling back the civil rights gains of the past 20 years.
We can allay that fear only by clearly defining our policy
(thereby setting some limits), and restoring control of civil
rights policy-making to the White House (thus making certain
that the President's views, and not ad hoc agency decisions,
determine our policy).
2. We must begin to lay out a "new agenda for black America".
This requires a good deal of thought, and the participation not
only of our political supporters, but also of conservative black
thinkers from around the country. Faith Whittlesey has begun
some contacts with such a group. So far, the meetings have
been less than productive, because they are not goal-oriented
and have not been integrated with an overall strategy. We
have taken steps to correct that, with a view toward encouraging
formation of a private, conservative black "think tank."
3. We must begin to form our own black leadership composed of
people with whom we can deal. This should not be totally
Republican, and need not be in tune with us on every issue--
- 2 -
the key is simply that they not be hostile to the President,
or to our ideas in general. We can bestow credibility on the
people we choose by consulting with them, speaking to their
groups, and providing them access within the Administration.
This is, of course, precisely what we did with Hispanics.
Black leadership is, to a great extent, in the eye of the
beholder. We can affect such perceptions by the publicity
White House recognition provides. Change will only come
slowly, but the espousal of our message by recognizable
blacks is important to its overall credibility.
4. We cannot hope to gain ground by dealing with the estab-
lished black leadership (Jesse Jackson, Ben Hooks, Vernon
Jordan, et al). They are unremittingly hostile to this Presi-
dent, their agenda is diametrically opposed to ours, and their
status as leaders is dependent on their continued public
criticism of our program. If we are seen to be dealing with
them, we will only strengthen their credibility among blacks,
thereby damaging ourselves. We must shut them out of the White
House to the maximum extent possible without adverse publicity.
We must also put them in the position of responding to our
"new agenda," since they will be hard put to oppose many of the
issues we could put forward.
5. We must move with deliberation, and not with undue haste.
A time when severe budget cuts are the primary news is not the
best time for a major black outreach effort. Instead, we should
begin to put the "infrastructure" of such an effort in place.
This would include preparation of a "new agenda" of policy ideas;
the ordering of our own house on civil rights policy, culminat-
ing in a formal policy statement and a major Presidential speech
on civil rights; encouragement for the formation of a private
"think tank" of black conservatives; and identification and
promotion of an alternative black leadership.
6. We must work closely in the meantime with other groups, like
ethnics and Hispanics, that were far more supportive of the Presi-
dent in 1980. Such groups will react with hostility if they feel
we are focusing on blacks while ignoring them.
7. We must recognize up front that progress will be very slow,
and difficult to measure since we are starting from such a
small base (e.g., a five point increment represents a 50% gain).
Moreover, we must be prepared to sustain the effort over a
period of years if we hope to show any significant progress.
The political arguments for doing so are strong, though, and
the increasing racial polarization of U.S. politics adds a
moral argument, as well.
CC: James A. Baker, III
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 12, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEAVER
FROM:
JAMES W. CICCONI
SUBJECT:
Black Strategy
At this point, it is perhaps more reflective of current thinking
to outline a possible black strategy, and secure your reactions.
In that vein, I would offer the following points:
1. Our approach must address, and not ignore, the reasons for
the President's current unpopularity with blacks. Much of our
problem is rooted in black perceptions that the President is
anti-civil rights, and that his economic program is unfair to
blacks. While this seems obvious as a matter of analysis, it
also points out the need to correct current misperceptions
at the same time we are looking forward.
We can begin to address the civil rights aspect by clearly
defining what we are for, as well as what we are against. (I
have already written a memo on the civil rights policy
problem, which includes some specific recommendations, and
will be happy to send you a copy.) The bottom line here,
though, is that much of our problem is based on a fear,
abetted by our policy missteps, about how far we might go
in rolling back the civil rights gains of the past 20 years.
We can allay that fear only by clearly defining our policy
(thereby setting some limits), and restoring control of civil
rights policy-making to the White House (thus making certain
that the President's views, and not ad hoc agency decisions,
determine our policy).
2. We must begin to lay out a "new agenda for black America".
This requires a good deal of thought, and the participation not
only of our political supporters, but also of conservative black
thinkers from around the country. Faith Whittlesey has begun
some contacts with such a group. So far, the meetings have
been less than productive, because they are not goal-oriented
and have not been integrated with an overall strategy. We
have taken steps to correct that, with a view toward encouraging
formation of a private, conservative black "think tank.
3. We must begin to form our own black leadership composed of
people with whom we can deal. This should not be totally
Republican, and need not be in tune with us on every issue--
- 2 -
the key is simply that they not be hostile to the President,
or to our ideas in general. We can bestow credibility on the
people we choose by consulting with them, speaking to their
groups, and providing them access within the Administration.
This is, of course, precisely what we did with Hispanics.
Black leadership is, to a great extent, in the eye of the
beholder. We can affect such perceptions by the publicity
White House recognition provides. Change will only come
slowly, but the espousal of our message by recognizable
blacks is important to its overall credibility.
4. We cannot hope to gain ground by dealing with the estab-
lished black leadership (Jesse Jackson, Ben Hooks, Vernon
Jordan, et al). They are unremittingly hostile to this Presi-
dent, their agenda is diametrically opposed to ours, and their
status as leaders is dependent on their continued public
criticism of our program. If we are seen to be dealing with
them, we will only strengthen their credibility among blacks,
thereby damaging ourselves. We must shut them out of the White
House to the maximum extent possible without adverse publicity.
We must also put them in the position of responding to our
"new agenda," since they will be hard put to oppose many of the
issues we could put forward.
5. We must move with deliberation, and not with undue haste.
A time when severe budget cuts are the primary news is not the
best time for a major black outreach effort. Instead, we should
begin to put the "infrastructure" of such an effort in place.
This would include preparation of a "new agenda" of policy ideas;
the ordering of our own house on civil rights policy, culminat-
ing in a formal policy statement and a major Presidential speech
on civil rights; encouragement for the formation of a private
"think tank" of black conservatives; and identification and
promotion of an alternative black leadership.
6. We must work closely in the meantime with other groups, like
ethnics and Hispanics, that were far more supportive of the Presi-
dent in 1980. Such groups will react with hostility if they feel
we are focusing on blacks while ignoring them.
7. We must recognize up front that progress will be very slow,
and difficult to measure since we are starting from such a
small base (e.g., a five point increment represents a 50% gain).
Moreover, we must be prepared to sustain the effort over a
period of years if we hope to show any significant progress.
The political arguments for doing so are strong, though, and
the increasing racial polarization of U.S. politics adds a
moral argument, as well.
CC: James A. Baker, III
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
December 12, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER, III
FROM:
JAMES W. CICCONI
SUBJECT:
Civil Rights Policy
During the President's first term, a pattern emerged in the
area of civil rights which has been disturbing, and which has
continually led to problems. In short, it boils down to this:
our Administration has not formulated a specific civil rights
policy framework. Instead, our policy has been determined on
a case-by-case basis by the Civil Rights Division, with little
or no White House involvement.
Civil Rights Policy-Making
Over the past four years, with only occasional exceptions,
major civil rights policy decisions have not been brought
before the President prior to some executive branch action
which either constrained his options, or rendered any dis-
cussion purely informational. The Cabinet Council on Legal
Policy was created in the wake of controversy over Adminis-
tration civil rights policies, and was designed as a forum for
identifying such issues and bringing them before the President
for policy decision. This was expected to involve the normal
debate of opposing viewpoints and consideration of options
that the Cabinet Council system has produced in most other
policy areas. The President, hearing the different positions
and options, would then decide. Unfortunately, the CCLP has
failed utterly in fulfilling this function.
In the absence of a White House system for setting Adminis-
tration policy in the multitude of areas encompassing the term
"civil rights," a vacuum has developed. This has under-
standably been filled by the Civil Rights Division, which has
been quite clearly making such decisions in place of the White
House. Policy decisions are reflected in speeches, amicus
briefs, interventions, and positions in various lawsuits which
not only reverse longstanding Justice Department policy, but,
in many cases, defy legal precedent.
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To be sure, the Civil Rights Division cannot be faulted for
these developments. There has indeed been a vacuum in the
civil rights policy area which the White House has not moved
to fill. Failing White House insistence that policy be
decided here, the decisions in any policy area will, predict-
ably, be made at the departmental level. The "vacuum" is more
than a problem of systems, though: it extends to the
particulars of our policy itself. We have not fleshed out the
President's philosophy in this area, and, after four years,
are still left with only certain statements, expanded somewhat
by last year's ABA speech (e.g. favoring affirmative action,
against rigid quotas and busing). The Civil Rights Division
has thus been free to interpret their preferred courses of
action as being consistent with the President's philosophy
largely due to the absence of contrary Presidential
pronouncements. This has given the division a degree of
policy leeway enjoyed by few, if any, comparable offices. In
contrast, White House involvement has invariably been limited,
ad hoc, and often after-the-fact. The White House usually
receives information in one of the following ways:
a. consultation limited to a few individuals in the
White House or OMB who tend to be sympathetic with
the Civil Rights Division's position;
b. limited information provided to either the Counsel's
Office or Cabinet Affairs, often at the last minute;
or
C.
particular White House staffers will hear of an
issue "through the grapevine," and will request more
detailed information from Justice.
Since the necessary information reaches the White House senior
staff either right before, or right after a particular action
is taken by DOJ, options are constrained accordingly. Meet-
ings are set up to brief appropriate White House officials and
to answer questions. However, our options are usually
limited:
a.
Justice is given tacit approval to proceed, usually
when a position has already been filed (the Dade
County example);
b.
the Justice position is modified in some way to
satisfy significant White House concerns, while
remaining consistent with the overall DOJ thesis
(the Grove City example); or
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C. the Justice position remains intact, but a differ-
ent, and more politically palatable rationale for
the stance is presented (the Bob Jones example).
The point here is not whether we ended up in a proper or
ill-advised position on a particular issue. It is that the
civil rights policy process (if it can be called that) is
operating beyond White House control or Presidential involve-
ment, and without any considered, coherent strategy except,
perhaps, on the part of the Civil Rights Division.
Policy Consequences
Beyond the issues of busing and quotas, there is a good deal
of confusion about what this Administration stands for. As an
example, the President has often spoken in a supportive way
about affirmation action, yet DOJ actions can, in many cases,
by interpreted as opposing affirmative action. Similarly, the
President has supported minority set-aside programs on the
federal level (even going so far as to reject agency goals,
and impose higher ones), at the same time his Justice Depart-
ment is fighting them on the state and local level. The
President seems to distinguish between "goals" and "quotas,"
while DOJ files briefs equating the two.
These are symptoms of ad hoc policy-making. It is confused
because we are confused. It is often contradictory because we
often contradict ourselves (Bob Jones is one example; our
position on the Voting Rights Act is another).
Instead of identifying and focusing on specific policy objec-
tives, we have repeatedly found ourselves skirmishing over
issues that were not of our choosing, as in Grove City and Bob
Jones. Ill-considered positions in court have led to unneces-
sary controversy which, even when we prevailed legally,
required us to confront legislation worse than the situation
we sought to correct.
In Congress, too, we sometimes "missed the boat" because of
unrealistic assessments of what could be achieved. For
example, in early 1981, instead of supporting a straight
extension of the Voting Rights Act, which would have been
applauded, we sought significant changes which were unjustly
portrayed as an attempt to gut the law. The resulting contro-
versy allowed the civil rights lobby to "up to the ante."
Though we ultimately decided to support a straight extension,
it was too late: the bill that reached the President contained
provisions far worse than the original Act.
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Thus, in a number of civil rights areas, we have found our-
selves in battles, by virtue of DOJ decisions, which continue
to have repercussions in Congress, in the courts, and in the
political arena. Yet, the most striking aspect of the situa-
tion is that, for all the political damage sustained by the
President, we have achieved very little of substance in such
battles. In fact, our main achievements have been in those
areas where the President's policy is clearest and least
controversial: busing and "true" quota cases.
Unfortunately, it is not our civil rights achievements, but,
instead, our often unsuccessful "rollback" actions which have
been more likely to stick in the public mind. This is partic-
ularly true with blacks, the media, and those who view them-
selves as sensitive to civil rights. From a policy standpoint,
this has made even our initiatives (e.g. fair housing enforce-
ment) suspect, and vulnerable to being "trumped" by the civil
rights lobby. From a political standpoint, the damage is more
severe, and perhaps not reversible for many years. in effect,
we have incurred the enmity of 90% of America's blacks, and
cemented them to the Democratic Party. To be sure, voting
trends among blacks have not been promising for the GOP.
However, we have squandered our opportunities by a perceived
assault on the civil rights laws--an "assault" that was not
planned, but was instead stumbled into through a lack of White
House attention, and a failure to assert our coordinative
prerogatives.
Future Republican candidates may not be capable of carrying
the South, as President Reagan did, while losing 90% of black
voters. It is politically imperative that we cut into this
bloc vote in the coming years, even if our efforts yield only
several percentage points difference. Thad Cochran and Strom
Thurmond have both proven that such efforts, rooted in more
sensitivity to civil rights concerns, can turn a close
election into a safe one.
More important, though, is that Republicans begin to identify
what we are for in the area of civil rights, in addition to
what we are against. Otherwise, we risk being viewed as
reactionaries seeking to undermine civil rights, mostly in a
sub-rosa fashion. By and large, Americans are proud of the
civil rights progress we have made in the thirty years since
Brown. Republicans have every right to share in that pride--
Kennedy may have sent federal marshals to Birmingham, but Ike
sent the National Guard to Little Rock. By appearing negative
today, we belie our own Party's contribution to the decline of
state-sanctioned racism in the U.S. In fact, the subliminal
message is that we could envision rolling back the clock, if
only because our actions, combined with a failure to articu-
late limits, raise questions about how far we would go.
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Civil Rights Policy in the Second Term
There are a number of steps that I would recommend be con-
sidered in a second term:
1. We should revitalize the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy
so that it indeed serves as a forum for developing policy
options in the area of civil rights. For such discussions,
both the chairman of the Civil Rights Commission and the
chairman of the EEOC should sit as members.
2. It should be clearly directed that policy questions (as
distinct from enforcement actions or case filings where there
is ample precedent) must be brought to CCLP for discussion.
The Administration has tended to allow Justice more discretion
than necessary in deciding civil rights policy because of our
unwillingness to interfere with their decisions about what, or
whether, to file in particular cases. Unless our policy is
already clear (and in most cases, it has not been), the
Cabinet Council and the President should decide what the
policy is; Justice would then file in accord with that policy.
Simply because DOJ has broad discretion in its judicial
filings does not mean the White House must also abdicate
policy decisions to them.
3. A policy statement on civil rights should be drafted and
then debated not only within the White House, but among Party
leaders. Frankly, some black academic thinkers like Thomas
Sowell have done a far better job of articulating a conserva-
tive civil rights policy framework than this Administration
has. We simply must define what we are for, as well as what
we are against, and why. This would counter the irrational
fears conjured by our opponents, and may be the only way we
can give blacks a reason for rallying to our Party. It would
also provide the Justice Department with the type of central
policy guidance that has been lacking in the civil rights
area.
4. The President should be engaged directly. He should be at
the center of discussions on what our policy is, and what we
stand for in the area of civil rights. The President should
also be exposed periodically, in small sessions, to the views
of the black community. Too often in the past, the President
has been surprised by outcry among blacks about his Adminis-
tration's policies. Exposure to black viewpoints on such
issues (including Republicans such as Bill Coleman and Ed
Brooke) will give the President a direct understanding of how
certain civil rights issues are viewed by the black community.
- 6 -
5. Legislative strategy on civil rights issues must be
controlled by the White House. On a number of occasions, we
have been insufficiently attentive to such issues in Congress,
leaving them in DOJ's hands until they have passed beyond our
power to control (e.g. the Voting Rights Act). In the past
year, we have done better on several potentially volatile
issues (insurance equity, comparable worth, Title IX/Grove
City legislation) because we have asserted White House control
at an early stage.
I will be happy to discuss these points further if you desire.