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Matlock Chron November 1985 (6)
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Matlock Chron November 1985 (6)
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Chronological Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron November 1985 (6)
Box: 13
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 4/13/2005
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON NOVEMBER 1985 (6/10)
FOIA
F06-114/3
Box Number
13
YARHI-MILO
1304
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
8008 MEMO
MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE
1
ND
B1
SOVIET DESIRE FOR JOINT DOCUMENTS:
HARTMAN'S MEETING WITH
SHEVARDNADZE ON NOVEMBER 14
R
3/8/2011
F2006-114/3
8009 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SOVIET
1 11/15/1985 B1
DESIRE FOR JOINT STATEMENT: HARTMAN-
SHEVARDNADZE MEETING NOVEMBER 14
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3/8/2011
F2006-114/3
8010 MEMO
SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE 11/14
1 11/15/1985 B1
HARTMAN-SHEVARDNADZE MEETING
R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3
8011 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE DRAFT
1 11/13/1985
X
B3
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PAR 4/13/2011
F2006-114/3
8012 MEMO
GATES TO MCFARLANE RE "DOMESTIC
1 11/6/1985 B3
STRESSES ON THE SOVIET SYSTEM"
PAR 4/13/2011 F2006-114/3
8013 PAPER
"DOMESTIC STRESSES ON THE SOVIET
55 11/5/1985 B1 B3
SYSTEM
D
4/13/2011
F2006-114/3
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
matterh
SYSTEM I
9225
clinin
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
read
FROM:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT:
Soviet Desire for Joint Documents: Hartman's
Meeting with Shevardnadze on November 14
George Shultz has sent you a memorandum describing Art Hartman's
conversation with Shevardnadze yesterday, when the latter
expressed "astonishment" that we are unwilling to proceed to
draft a communique to be issued following your meeting with
Gorbachev. It is clear that the Soviets very much want some type
of joint document to carry home.
While a traditional type of communique is not in our interest,
and we should continue to resist Soviet desires on this point, we
may find that it will be useful to us to issue some sort of joint
statement, provided the Soviets agree on a sufficient number of
concrete matters that a commitment from them serves our interest.
We should decide this only at the meeting, and use the Soviet
desire for a document as leverage: that is, imply to them that if
they want a document so much, then it is up to them to come up
with sufficient content to make it worthwhile.
This way, you can make the call on the spot. In any event we
would have separate statements describing the talks as a whole,
plus perhaps signing of the exchanges agreement. Then, if the
Soviets come across with some things in our interest, there could
be a joint statement listing them.
Recommendation
OK
No
That you read the Memorandum at Tab A from
Secretary Shultz
Attachment:
Tab A
Memorandum to the President from Secretary Shultz
Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FOG- 114/3#8008
BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11
2
SYSTEM I
9225
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
November 15, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCRARLANE
JACK MATLOCK Aam
un
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Soviet Desire for Joint Statement: Hartman-
Shevardnadze Meeting November 14
Secretary Shultz has sent the President a Memorandum which
reports on the meeting Art Hartman had with Shevardnadze
yesterday. Not surprisingly, Shevardnadze made quite an issue
out of our position that there will be no joint communique.
Art considers this clear evidence that the Soviets badly want
some sort of joint document to emerge from the meeting.
Assuming that if we get agreement on a sufficient number of
concrete items, we are not adverse to formulating it into some
form of a joint document (not, of course, a communique in the
traditional sense), I believe we can use the Soviet eagerness for
a document as some modest leverage. It is also my understanding
that this is not counter to the President's wishes, since there
would still be separate statements dealing with the meeting as a
whole, and any joint statement would be confined to those
specific actions on which both sides have agreed.
I have drafted a cover memorandum to the President on these
assumptions. You should, of course, amend it if it does not
reflect your thinking.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you forward the Memorandum at Tab I to the President.
Approve
Disapprove m
Attachments:
Handway
Tab I - Memorandum to the President
Tab A - Secretary Shultz's Memorandum to the President of
November 15.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/3#8009
BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11
3
ES SENSITIVE 8533868
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
9225
WASHINGTON
SECRET SENSITIVE
November 15, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
George P. Shultz
SUBJECT:
11/14 Hartman-Shevardnadze Meeting
Art Hartman spent two hours this morning with Shevardnadze
reviewing where we stand on the eve of your meeting with
Gorbachev. The main thing Art came away with was that the
Soviets badly want a final document of some sort in Geneva.
The document issue came up when Art presented our proposed
language on the new exchanges initiatives. When he would not
be pinned down on whether we expected the language to be
included in a communique, Shevardnadze expressed "amazement"
that there could be any question on this issue. He claimed to
have a report from Dobrynin that a joint document had already
been agreed except for a few details. (Shevardnadze was
presumably referring to our having accepted on Monday for
consideration some new Soviet ideas on specific issues in a
joint document.) Shevardnadze complained that it would be a
"waste of time" for you and Gorbachev simply to go to Geneva
and say you had agreed to meet again. In the end, Shevardnadze
acknowledged our right to refuse to accept a joint document,
but made clear that he and Gorbachev personally felt that one
was desirable.
Art reminded Shevardnadze of my repeated warnings that we
remained to be convinced of the necessity or desirability of a
final document. Art speculated that you and Gorbachev might
make a final decision on how the meeting should be recorded
only in Geneva. Shevardnadze was clearly not comfortable with
this prospect.
It is clear from Shevardnadze's discomfiture how much
importance the Soviets attach to a final document in Geneva.
Dobrynin, probably pandering to the mood in Moscow, has
apparently fueled expectations in the Kremlin by overstating
our willingness to consider a document. I will use my Friday
session with Dobrynin to be sure he knows our position on a
final document and to underscore our continued seriousness as
Geneva draws nigh.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR
NLRR Fob-114/3 #8010
BY Civ NARA DATE 10/30/07
4
System II
91166
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET
ACTION
November 15, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK 4
SUBJECT:
Draft National Intelligence Estimate
The CIA has provided an advance draft of a National Intelligence
Estimate concerning domestic stresses on the Soviet system (Tab
I). Essentially it covers in greater detail the points
made in the meeting of CIA analysts with the President
Wednesday. You may wish to glance through it for further
FOIA(b) (3)
details.
JL
John Lenczowski concurs.
RECOMMENDATION
That you review the attached draft NIE if time allows.
Approve of
Disapprove
Attachment:
Tab I
Draft NIE
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
NLRR 606-114/3#8011
BY RW NARA DATE 4/13/11
SECRET
SYSTEM II
5
The Director of Central Intelligence
91166
Washington. D.C. 20505
FOIA(b) (3)
National Intelligence Council
NIC #05472-85/1
6 NOV
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
FROM:
Robert M. Gates
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT:
National Intelligence Estimate 11-18-85, "Domestic Stresses
Rond-
on the Soviet System"
1. The DCI has instructed that I make available to you the uncoordinated
draft of the forthcoming National Intelligence Estimate 11-18-85, "Domestic
Stresses on the Soviet System," so that its themes can be of use in
preparations for the meeting between the President and Gorbachev.
2. Please be reminded that this draft does not represent coordinated
national intelligence. So far it is only the product of the National
Intelligence Officer/USSR and select analysts of CIA/SOVA. Since we have not
previously tackled this range of internal Soviet problems, it is more than
usually difficult to anticipate final agency positions. I anticipate that
some will take the position that this draft exaggerates the depth of Soviet
internal difficulties and their constraining impact on Soviet foreign and
military behavior. Others may feel that these Soviet problems make it more
likely than this draft judges that the Gorbachev regime will compromise on
security issues to achieve a relaxed and predictable course for East-West
relations. Nevertheless, while dissents may be vigorous, I doubt they will be
radically at variance with this draft.
3. We plan to submit a coordinated draft for approval by the National
Foreign Intelligence Board on 14 November and to publish the NIE shortly
thereafter.
Robert M. Gates
Attachment
CC: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06-114/3#8012
BY RW NARA DATE 4/13/11
SECRET