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Nuclear Accident: Chernobyl 04/29/1986 (3)
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Nuclear Accident: Chernobyl 04/29/1986 (3)
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Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Nuclear Accident: Chernobyl
04/29/1986 (3)
Box: 29
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
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Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 5/13/2005
File Folder
USSR: NUCLEAR ACCIDENT: CHERNOBYL APRIL 29,
FOIA
1986 3/9
F06-114/8
Box Number
29
YARHI-MILO
2909
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
10407 FAX COVER
AMBRAMOWITZ TO MATLOCK RE
1 5/1/1986 B2 B3
SHEET
CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR DISASTER
PAR
3/16/2011
F2006-114/8
10408 PAPER
CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR DISASTER: INITIAL
20
5/1/1986
B1
B3
ANALYSIS
PAR
3/16/2011
F2006-114/8
10409 FAX COVER
FORTIER AND MCDANIEL RE
1 5/1/1986 B3
SHEET
RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH CONSEQUENCES
TO TRAVELLERS IN THE USSR
PAR
3/16/2011
F2006-114/8
10410 MEMO
RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH CONSEQUENCES
2 5/1/1986 B1 B3
TO TRAVELLERS IN THE USSR
PAR
3/16/2011
F2006-114/8
10411 MEMO
SOVIET NUCLEAR DISASTER
3 5/1/1986 B1
10412 CABLE
011257Z MAY 86
3 5/1/1986 B1
R
9/30/2008
F06-114/8
10413 CABLE
011737Z MAY 86
2 5/1/1986 B1
R
9/30/2008
F06-114/8
10414 CABLE
011732Z MAY 86
1 5/1/1986 B1
R
9/30/2008
F06-114/8
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
5/13/2005
File Folder
USSR: NUCLEAR ACCIDENT: CHERNOBYL APRIL 29,
FOIA
1986 3/9
F06-114/8
Box Number
29
YARHI-MILO
2909
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
10415 CABLE
011352Z MAY 86
1 5/1/1986 B1
R
9/30/2008
F06-114/8
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Filehernolgh
URCHNI
B
86 47
S/S #
SITUATION ROUSEM
MESSAGE NO. 307491
UNCLASSIFIED
CLASSIFICATION
No. Pages 4
FROM: MBOVE
5/8
73126
7224
(Officer name)
10ffies symbol)
(Extension)
(Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION
Soviet Statements re Chernobyl
TO: (Agency)
DELIVER TO:
Extension
Room No.
NSC
Rod McDeniel
456-2257
RALPH
MATROCIC
ST. MART, N
FOR:
CLEARANCE
INFORMATION
PER REQUEST
XX
COMMENT
REMARKS:
PLEASE DELIVER URGENTLY TO ADDRESSEE.
S/S Officer:
MBCg Jander
FORM
06-1760
...
Unofficial Translation
As a result of the measures taken within the last 24 hours,
the discharge of radioactive substances has decreased and the
level of radiation in the area of the incident has lowered.
Measurements taken demonstrate that fission chain reaction
of the atomic generator is not occuring. The reactor is in an
inactive ("saglushennom") state.
Active work for cleaning the contaminated unit is in
progress.
The Soviet Union possesses sufficient material, scientific
and technical possibilities for the works to liquidiate the
consequences of the socident and at the present moment the need
does not arise for sesistant from other states. We are
appreciative for the propeeals of aid to us.
Foreign citizens located in the Soviet Union (in particular
specialists or tourists) have not approached competent Soviet
organisations in connection with the accident at the Chernobyl
A.E.S. (stomic energy station).
3
Unofficial Translation
In Moscow there is appreciation for President Reagan's
expression of sympathy in connection with the accident at the
Chernobyl A.E.S. (atomic energy station), and also for the
expressed readiness to render assistance in liquidating its
consequences. We are undertaking all necessary efforts to
localize the accident and keep its consequences to a minimum.
At the present moment there is no need for assistance from
other states.
As far as the facts of the situation, the President of 1:
USA has been informed of them.
4
B результате принятых Mep 3a встекшие сутки выделение радио-
активных веществ уменьнилось, уровни радиации B районе происшест-
вия онизились.
Проводимые измерения свидетельствуют o TOM, что цепной реакции
деления яхерного тожлива me прожеходит. PeaKTop находитоя B заглу-
шенном состоянии.
Развернуты padoru по очистке загрязненных участков.
Советский Come располагает достаточными матернальными, науч-
ными X техническими воеможностии для работ по ликвидации послед-
ствий аварии M Ha даниом этапе потребности B содействии CO cTopo-
HH других государств Ho возинкает. Мы признательны sa предложение
вами помощи.
B компетентные осветские организации He поступало обращений
CO стороиы находящихся B CoBeTcKoM Союзе иностранных граддан (B
частности опециалнотов XXX TypMoToB) B овязи c аварией Ha Черно-
быльской АЭС.
5
B Mookse признательны sa вырахенное Президентом Рейганом
сочувотвие B связи o аварней Ha Чернобильской AЭС. a TaKKe 3a
проявленную готовность оказать содействие B устранении послед-
отвий случивиегося. Неми предпринимаются Bce необходимне you
xra по локанизации аварян E оведению K минимуму ee последствий.
Ha данном этапе потребности B содействия B этой связи CO cTopo-
MM других государств He возникает.
Что касается фантического положения дел, TO o HeM
Презкдент Chila ISSACK промыђормирован.
121,
WASHFAX RECEIPT
IIC
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
& MR -1 1
B
80 MAY 9: 48
NM
S/S #
WHITE IROUSE
SITUATION KOOM
MESSAGE NO.
007505
SECRET/NO FORN/WNINTEL
18
CLASSIFICATION
No. Pages
FROM: Amb. Abramowitz
INR/OD
2220
6527
(Officer name)
(Office symbol/
(Extension)
(Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster
TO: (Agency)
DELIVER TO:
Extension
Room No.
CIA/DDI
RKerr
(3)
FOIA(b) (2)
OSD
EIkle
McDannel
NSC
Jiatlock
DIA
NSA
FOR
CLEARANCE
INFORMATION
PER REQUEST
COMMENT
REMARKS:
S/S Officer: mmD
SLMA
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
FORM
06-1760
"
NLRR FD4-114/8#10407
BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11
SECRET/NOFORM/WNINTEL
1
Cheracbyl Nuclear Disaster:
Initial Analysis
(ICOD: 2000 GMT, 1 May 1986)
T/NOTORN/MMINTEL
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR FD6-114/8#10408
BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11
SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL
8
Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster
Table of Contents
1. Current Status
A. Chernobyl Reactor
B. Evidence of a Neltdown
C. Nature of the Accident
D. Casualties
II. Economic Effects
A. The Chernobyl Plant in Boonomic Perspective
B. Coping with Reduced Cenerating Capacity
c. Short-term Energy Resources
D. Nuclear Reaction Sales
E. Effect on World Commodity Prices
III. Ecological Effects
A. Population Affected
B. Medical Consequences
C. Effect on Agriculture (Food and Water Resources)
IV. Soviet Domestic Consequences
V. Foreign Reaction
A. East Bloc
B. Western Europe
VI. Other Soviet Reactor Problems
A. Civil
B. Military
Chernobyl Reactor Disaster
9
1. Current Status
A. Chernobyl Reactor
May 1 morning imagery shoved what appeared to be
smoke/vapor continuing to be emitted from the severely damaged
reactor, Unit 14, at Cheractyl, indicating that the fire
continued to burn, despite Soviet statements to the contrary.
Fire engines and emergency vehicles continued to be parked in
the same locations around the reactor site where they were
originally observed two days ago. This area has been very
heavily contaminated.
Other imagery showed continuing efforts at fire suppression
by helicopter. The fire suppressent units may contain earth or
sand in an attempt to smother the fire. Imagery of Kiev showed
the city to be functioning normally (see Map 1).
Although there have been press reports that Reactor 3 is
also melting, the Intelligence Community has no technical data
to support this. The infrared signature on Landsat photos of
Chernobyl does not allow us to distinguish between the large
amount of heat emanating from Reactor 4 and any possible loss
from Reactor 3. On April 29, after the accident, it appeared
that cooling water was being pumped into Reactor 3. Even
though this reactor has been shut down, it is still necessary
to continue cooling.
There are also reports that four reactors that are
identical to the severely damaged Chernobyl unit--Kurek 3 & 4
and possibly Smolensk 1 & 2-have been shutdown by the Soviets.
The emergency commend and control site that was about
1 km southeast of the reacter has been moved, and may now be
located at a possible field hospital and decontamination site
approximately 4.8 km to the southeast.
B. Current Evidence of a Meltdown
The withdrawal of the emergency command and control center
to a greater distance probably reflects the continued spewing
of the heavier redicective firsion particulates from the
burning reactor core. Preliminary analysis of data from
Scandanavia suggests that all of the volatile [gaseous] fission
products [radioactive krypton, zenon, iodine] vented from the
reactor. [At Three Mile Island a tiny fraction of 1 percent of
the volatile fission products vented.] More than 50 percent of
the total fission products [including particles of radioactive
cesium, strontium, barium, tellurium, lanthanum, ruthenium, (in
addition to the gases noted above) has already been scattered.
T/NOFORN/WMINTEL
Map 1
10
Kreeneye
Posudovo
CHE
REACTOR
BRAGINK
Gden
Parishchev
CHERNOBYL
Zalamye
Opeshitsy
Kamenka
Rairead
Hard surfered
Terekhi
multilians red
if,
Dityotki
Gubin
Butt up orne
- or march
Strakholes'ye
Gernestrypel
Area subject
10 inundation
To Kisy
VODOKHRANILISHCHE
10
Pribank
]
.
0512 ⑉ STATE(GE)
-1-
Radioactive particles deposited in Sweden and Finland now
include some of the heavier, less reactive, radioactive
elements. The appearance of these elements in samples so far
from the site of the accident is a strong indicator that at
least a partial core meltdown has occurred, and that a major
fraction of the coze's radioactivity has been and is continuing
to be dispersed. Speculation that fracturing and subsequent
burning, rather than nolting, of the damaged fuel in the core
occurred, does not change this assessment. The difference in
expected radiological consequences between the two cases is
essentially meaningless.
C. Mature of the Accident
Continuing analysis of available imagery suggests the
following sequence of events:
--For an as yet undetersined reason, at least part of the
reactor coolant was lost. West German sources have reported
that an initial power loss was the immediate cause, which
interrupted the pumping of coolant water into the reactor. The
operatore may have tried to use auxiliary power, which either
failed or case on too late to prevent an initial overheating.
--At that point the operators probably tried to shut down the
reactor. However, even when a reactor is shut down, its
temperature will continue to rise for an uncertain period of
time.
--Given the initial loss of coolant, the remaining coolant
channels overheated, feeding superheated steam into the steam
separator, which takes heat from the reactor to feed to the
turbine. [Alternatively, the overheating of the reactor core,
coupled with a rupture of the feed water tubes running through
the reactor may have generated an gas--either hygdrogen or
methane--which then expleded, shattering the steam lines in the
adjacent steam separator.]
--At this point, the steam separator apparently exploded. This
destroyed the upper portion of the reactor hall, with two
inmediate effects: first, this added air to the overheated
graphite core, fueling the fire; second, the uranium core was
now melting, if it had not already begun to do so after the
reactor was shut down. The destruction of the reactor hall
allowed radioactivity to spread. By this time, everyone in the
immediate area, estimated at between 50 and 100 workers, were
dead or dying. [The Soviets have now admitted to two dead and
197 hospitalised, of whom 18 are said to be in serious
condition.]
--The - continuing fire now spread a cloud of radioactive gas.
This sequence of events took place on Friday 25 April and
early Saturday 26 April. We do not know when the Soviets began
evacuation of the surrounding towns, established the security
perimeter and noved in helicopters to fight the fire. We
became aware of the incident on Monday 28 April, following
Scandinavian reports of radiation drifting from the USSR. Our
satellite imagery of the 29th showed the accident, evidence of
evacuation, and connand posts being established. While the
helicopter fire-fighting activity has increased since then,
little else has changed. River traffic continues, as does
normal life in Kiev 80 miles to the south.
D. Casualties
The entire Intelligence Community believes a fatality
figure of two is preposterous. A normal day shift at an
individual Soviet RBMK-1000 power reactor is reported to be
around 100 people: a night shift would be 25-35 people. This
would mean that, because Unit 3 and 4 are adjacent, as many as
200 people in the daytime or 50-70 people at night could have
been working in the vicinity of Reactor Unit 4 when the
accident began. While we would expect that an immediate
evacuation was ordered when the seriousness of the accident
became apparent, still a fairly large crew (compared to US
reactor operations) would be expected to remain to carry out
emergency procedures in an attempt to shut down the reactor and
to solve whatever problem may have caused the accident. This
crew would be a "forlorn hope," kept at the site in order to
rectify the problem, but with the knowledge that they would be
lost should the problem wetson dramatically. The only
alternative to this would be to abandon the site immediately at
the sign of major problems, which would virtually insure the
sort of disaster that ultimately occurred.
If the accident situation lasted for any amount of time we
would expect the emergency crew to be augmented as the
seriousness of the situation became known. Shift supervisors
and foremen from the other units would be called in to make
sure that appropriate actions were being taken to head off any
potential catastrophe. Imagery showing fire engines and
energency vehicles near the reactors supports the supposition
that additional personnel were responding to the accident.
They could only have been brought in before any explosion.
Based on numbers of vehicles in the area and postulating an
augmented emergency crew, as such as 100 people could have been
in the immediate vicinity of the reactor when a major steam/gas
explosion occurred, ripping open the reactor building and
causing major structural damage.
Because of the extent of the damage observed on imagery of
the site, we feel that all the people in the immediate vicinity
of the Unit 4 explosion were either killed or suffered lethal
radiation doses at the time of the explosion. The failure of
the Soviets to evacuate the fire engines from the lethal
radiation sone around the destroyed reactor building is another
indication of fatalities.
CRET/NOFORN/MMINTEL
13
II. Economic Effects
A. The Chernobyl Plant in Economic Perspective
The 4,000 negewatt (m) Chernobyl nuclear power plant
represents nearly one-teath of the electric generating capacity
of the Ukraine (and one percent of total Soviet capacity). The
Ukraine and Moldavia essentially comprises the South
Consolidated Electric Power System (South OES) in the USSR (see
Map 2, which shows the regional electric transmission lines).
In turn, the South OFS is one of nine OESes comprising the
Unified Power System of the USSR. (Two other OESes--the
Central Asia OZS and the For Bast OES--are isolated from the
unified system and operate independently.) The unified system
also is linked to the East Buropean CEMA countries, Finland,
Norway, and Turkey. This integration increases the flexibility
of Soviet electric power supply in that power can be
transferred between the linked systems, albeit usually only in
small amounts (e.g., in 500 MM loade).
It is likely that Chernobyl Reactors 1, 2, and 3 will not
be operational for at least three years, if not longer. Two
larger renk reactors under construction within 2 km of the
explosion cannot be worked on either because of the radiation.
This represents a not loss of 7,000 negawatts of electricity
[4,000 current and 3,000 potential].
The Chernobyl accident also sets back plans in the latest
Soviet Five Year Plan to increase the share of electricity
generated by nuclear pewer from 11 percent to 20 percent of the
total.
B. Coping with Reduced Generating Capacity
The Soviets could transfer judicious amounts of power from
adjacent OESes to the South OES, but would have to be careful
of robbing Peter to pay Paul. Other short-term options for
adjusting to the shutdown of the Chernobyl' plant include:
-- increase power output at fossil-fuel plants and
selectively ration electricity;
-- cut back electricity exports via the South OES: and
-- increase imports via the South OES from Poland.
Map 2
14
Nuclear Power Plants & Electrical Transmission Lines
I I 1 I I I 1
1 . 1 I I I I
- - - - - - 1
I 1 .
4
2
1
4
KIEV
MOSCOW
3
3
VOLGOGRAD
2
Huclear Power Plant
(member of reselars)
Nuclear Power Plant
Under Construction
2
Transmission Line
o
400
800
Klemeters
. Transmation - - - - 239 av
6310 0-00 State (NR/SD)
1 I I I
-5-
15
Over the longer term, the Soviets might consider delaying any
planned retirement of older generating capacity, especially in
the South OES and adjacent regions.
FOIA(b) (i), (3)
Selective retioning of electric power probably will be
KOECOM'S first response II only because It could take days or
even weeks to implement some of its other short-term options.
This would provide imediate relief: otherwise, key industries
in the Ukraine and Beleruasia--which is at the end of & major
trunk line fed by the Cheraobyl plant--could suffer serious
power shortages.
Cutting back on electricity exports would have negligible
hard-currency consequinces For the USSR and would relieve
considerable pressure on an otherwise capacity-short system.
In 1984, the last year for which detailed information is
available, the USER exported 24.7 billion kwh of electricity,
an amount comparable to the estimated annual output of the
Chernobyl plant. More than 19 billion kwh went to its CEMA
partners; the balance appears to have gone to Western
countries, primarily to Fialand but also to Turkey, Norway, and
Greece. The only hard-ourrency generated by these sales was
some $15 million from 552 million kWh sold to Greece and from
about one million 10th sold to Norway. (Sales to Finland and
Turkey are on barter terms.) with the exception of sales to
Finland and Norway, most of the electric power appears to have
been shipped via the affected South OES (and possibly the
Transcaucasus OES for exports to Turkey).
Increased irrects from Peland are a distinct possibility.
According to Folish telatics, Poland is a net importer of
electric power from the UTER, but only marginally so. Overall,
Poland is a significent net exporter of electric power, with
major customers including other East European countries and
Austria. Slack demand last year apparently denied Poland the
chance to reclain lost coel markets in the West. Poland thus
may be capable of increasing coal exports to the USSR to help
ensure steady, higher levels of operation in coal-fired power
plants, and might be able to increase its exports of electric
power to the South OES. Conceivably, Poland might also boost
exports to other East Europeans to compensate for the likely
decline in Soviet exports.
C. Short-Term Energy Resources
The shutdown of the Cheracbyl' plant puts additional strain
on the USSR's already trechied energy sector. While gains were
posted for all Bajor fuels during the first quarter of 1986
compared with the came period last year, the oil industry is
still falling short. Output recovered to nearly 12.1 mb/d, the
SCRNT/NOFORN/MMINTEL
16
highest level since 1984 but less than earlier achieved and
below the 12.3 mb/d rate planned for 1986. More than 100 teams
from different producing regions were sent to the important
Samotlor field in West siberia in an effort to boost output.
The output of natural gas continues to increase faster than
planned, and coal output continues to increase--perhaps finally
raising the coal industry up from its nearly seven-year
doldrume. This improved performance by coal could not have
come at & more opportune time given the setback to the USSR's
nuclear program and the increased reliance on fossil fuel
plants.
D. Nuclear Reactor Sales
Soviet nuclear reactor exports have not included the type
that exploded at Chernobyl. Nevertheless, Moscow will be very
hard-pressed to play down the unfavorable publicity generated
by the Chernobyl incident in their continuing efforts to market
their nuclear reactore. At present there are Soviet reactors
in Finland and in all European East Bloc countries except
Poland: two are under construction in Cuba. The Soviets have
offered assistance to Egypt, Morocco and Indonesia. They have
bid on plants for Yugoslavia and, recently, North Korea.
E. Effect on World Commodity Prices
Chernobyl should have no real effect on world commodity
prices. The quick upowing in wheat futures prices was a
typical spurt of speculative activity in the face of
uncertainty. The global stock of wheat is currently in excess
of 300 million metric tome, Soviet wheat production for 1986 is
projected to be about 190 million metric tons, with an
additional 17 million being imported. Even a disaster of the
scope of Chernobyl would be unlikely to dent global stock.
(Effects on Soviet grain production are discussed below.)
III. Ecological Effects
A. Population Affected
The Southwest Region, which includes Chernobyl, is densely
populated, even in rural areas. Large villages are located in
the major river valleys. The Chernobyl plant employed some
10,000 workers. Based on an average family size of 2.5, the
workers' settlement of Pripyst, located just northwest of the
plant, has a population of at least 25,000. Chernobyl, 17 km
south of the reactor, had a 1970-estimated population of
10,100. Both of these towns have been evacuated, although we
do not know if the evacuation took place before or after the
explosion.
Based on rural population densities (171 person/square
mile) and major towna and cities, the population in the
17
surrounding area is (see Hap 3),
within 30 km
50,000 people
within 40 km
250,000 people
within 160 ks
7 milion people
within 208 ke
9 million people
Kiev is the largest city in the region, approximately 100
km downstream from the Cheraobyl reactor. The 1984 population
estimate for Kiev is 2.4 million, with another 1.9 million
outside the city but within the Kiev Oblast.
Both Pripyet and Chernobyl appear to have been evacuated.
We do not know if the evacuation took place when the initial
problem occured, or after the explosion. No evacuation from
Kiev is evident. We do not have enough information about the
evacuation to draw any conclusions about the effectiveness of
Soviet civil defense plaaning.
B. Medical Consequences
of the various types of radioactivity released by the
reactor, the most immediate concern is iodine, which is easily
absorbed by humans and can lead to thyroid cancer. To preclude
the absorption of redioactive iodine, iodine tablets or liquid
can be taken. Radioactive iodine 131 has a half-life of about
eight days.
The longer term threat is provided primarily by cesium-137
and strontium-90, which have half-lives of 30 years and 29
years respectively. Cesium concentrates in electrolytes
(bodily fluids). Strentium concentrates in the bones. It is
readily absorbed via dairy prejucts. Thus, the milk supplies
and milk producing areas areund the accident site will be
contaminated, posing a difficult problem for Soviet officials
who may be reluctant to admit the importance of the accident by
dumping tainted milk. Both types of radiation can cause such
cancers as leukemia, lung, and bone.
C. Effect on Agriculture (Food and Water Resources)
The type of radiation being emitted is easily absorbed by
plants, especially during the rainy spring season. However, it
is impossible for us adequately to address the radiological
impact of the accident on Soviet agriculture at this time,
other than to say that things could have been worse. The area
closest to the plant and, presumably, receiving the highest
levels of radioactive contamination, is . low lying, relatively
awampy area where truck crops are the major agricultural
activity. It lies about 100 km north of the Ukraine
NUT/NOFORN/MMINTEL
8
Map 3
ESTIMATED POPULATION IN THE AREA OF THE CHERNOBYL REACTOR
160 km
7,000,000
30 km
50,000
40 km
250,000
He zhen
Determ
Redread
Read
19
Map 3
ESTIMATED POPULATION IN THE AREA OF THE CHERNOBYL REACTOR
160 km
7,000,000
Charage
30 km
50,000
40 km
260,000
Hoshir
Driver
Redread
Read
-8-
20
breadbasket, and the winds blew away from the Ukraine at the
time when the heaviest contamination vented from the damaged
reactor. For this reason the immediate radiological threat is
less than had the wind direction been reversed.
However, the Pripynt March is a major water basin (see
Map 4), and its contact iration could have an effect lasting for
generations. Bow BOOR the contamination will begin to affect
cities and towns downstrees is impossible to determine at this
time. The migration of the redioactive products through soil
and water table is dependent on the exact type of soil, water
flow rate, turbulence and chemical composition. However, based
on US accident cases, the water contamination problem is a
longer rather than a shorter term problem.
The 30 mile long Kiev reservoir is certainly contaminated,
but the extent and the type of contamination cannot be well
estimated without access to measurements. The Kiev authorities
may be able to mitigate the contamination through extra
filtration.
IV. Soviet Consequences
International. Gorbachev's year-long effort to project a
new image of Soviet leadership as more open, responsive, and
concerned about popular issues such as the environment has been
seriously damaged, especially in Europe, by the regime's
handling of the Chernobyl incident. Faced with the emergency,
the bureaucracy automatically reacted along familiar lines:
highly restricted and centralised news control; denial of the
importance of the issue to other countries; an automatic replay
of past American problems in auclear energy: and a reflexive
linking of the issue to the need to accept Gorbachev's arms
control initiatives. The initial Soviet admission, several
days after the accident apparently took place, was probably
prompted by two factors: (1) the inability to continue
covering it up, owing to the detection of radiation in
Scandinavia: and (2) an assessment at that time that the
situation was out of control and required foreign assistance.
Indeed, the Soviet government did initially request aid from
Sweden and West Gerzany, on May 1, the Soviets asked Italy for
aid, according to the proos.
However, in the following days the Soviets have reverted to
their more familiar behavior in such crises. They have claimed
to have put out the fire and gotten the situation under
control: most Western analysts believe the fire has continued
to burn. On April 30 the Seviets put on television pictures of
Reactors 3 and 4 before and after the accident. This confirmed
the seriousness of the damage, although the pictures were shown
to promote the view that as there was no smoke the fire must be
out. We believe that the smoke was edited out of the image.
The testimony of a Soviet embassy officer before a
congressional subcommittee on May 1 was an interesting
CRNT/NOFORN/MNINTEL
21
exception to their continued reticence. The Soviet official
insisted that the accident occured on Monday, although we
continue to believe that Friday or Saturday is more likely.
The regime has banked upon an ephemeral European
unhappiness over Nosesw's reirstance to inform its neighbore
about Cheracbyl and the prof:bility that traditional interests
will soon reasert their priority. Nevertheless, Gorbachev
probably will try to and feaces with his neighbors, probably
in bilateral communications, in the future.
Dorestic. Party and governmental officials probably
approve of the regiss's handling of the Chernobyl incident as
being in line with Soviet law and custom, and in accord with
deeply ingrained Russian reluctance to reveal problems to
foreigners.
The popular reaction will, as always, vary according to.
social class. Critical intellectuals rely on foreign
broadcasts and personal ocatacts for such of their information
and will be much better informed than the man in the street,
and thus critical of the regise's restriction on news.
Bureaucrate also rely on foreign broadcasts as an important
supplement to official information, and are likely to be
asbivalent toward the regime's handling of the crisis. The
ordinary workers will for the most part be passive, expecting
the government to handle the crisis properly. But, at the same
time, the ordinary people are the most avid rumor mongers,
disregarding logic and autual incompatibility of conflicting
rumors. The response of this social class is the one that the
regime fears most, and this concern is one of the primary
shapers of the regime's clamp on news. The only area in the
USSR likely to have any public demonstrations is Estonia and
Latvia where there is a long standing resentment of the regime
as well as Bore consciousness on environment issues.
Leadership Aloofness. It is a Soviet tradition that
Politburo leaders remain uninvolved publicly with hot issues
such as the KAL shootdown and the current crisis. Gorbachev
has not said a word in public about the Chernobyl accident, and
the traditional May Day parados took place in Moscow and the
republic capitals without reference it. As usual, the state,
not the party is the responsible organization for handling the
problem, and the customery responsible body has been created, a
government inquiry ocraission headed by the deputy premier for
fuels and energy, Boris Shchertina. While such commissions
often whitewash events, in this case it is likely that a review
of the atomic energy industry will lead to changes in operating
procedures and design changes in reactors. Furthermore, some
officials will be singled out as responsible and punished. A
scandal over the building of the Atomash factory in Volgadonsk
(which produces nuclear reactors) eventually led to the
retirement of deputy premier 1. T. Novikov, then in charge of
construction, in July 1983.
22
Political forgementing? Inevitably, there will be politics
involved even in determining responsibility for the Chernobyl
disaster and its conseruences. In addition to eacking
technical officials, there say be an effort to use the event
for attacking, or even removing, high-level political
officials. Corbacher night find this . convenient occasion to
undercut Ukrainian leader Cheherbitskiy, whose state apparatus
charged with ecological controls and clean-up is poorly
organized and ill-equipped to handle the Chernobyl pollution.
Should such a power nove develop, it would materialize only
slowly, and would probably be signalled ahead of time by
traditional political indicators in the press.
V. Foreign Reactions
A. East Bloc
Issediate Health Crocerps. Poland announced early on that
radiation levels In the northeastern portion of the country
posed potential health hasards. The government set up a
high-level commission in direct contact with the Soviets to
consult on the problem. Precautionary health and safety
standards were instituted is those areas affected by the
fall-out. Polish children 16 years old and younger were being
given iodine to prevent their absorbing radioactive iodine from
the atmosphere. Government spokesmen said--somewhat
paradoxically--that there was "no indication of a health
hazard."
Hungery and Yugoslavia announced they are monitoring
radiation levels, but that the redioactivity measured thus far
posed no public health problers. Romania made a similar
announcement. Romanien television announced that Ceausescu
chaired a party leadership meeting to review the situation. A
task force headed by his wife was formed to oversee the quality
of the environment. It was also noted that there had been
"some increase in radioactivity" in the northeastern part of
the country. Bulgaria, Csechoslovakia, and East Germany made
no announcements about monitoring, or about any safety
precautions. Mor sover, the Bast Germans in general have
downplayed the affair, following the Soviet line that the
severity of the accident has been greatly exaggerated by the
Western press.
Political. The Polish government hinted at a general
annesty if Solidarity backs down from its plane to hold May 1
and May 3 (old Polish National Day) demonstrations. All
indications are that the demonstrations were likely to be small
and containable. The Chernobyl accident could give the
protesters an additional anti-regime (anti-Soviet) issue around
which to rally.
Csechoelovakia is a najor supplier of reactor components
13
both within the bloc and as part of Soviet nuclear reactor
exports, and expects nuclear power to supply roughly 20% of the
planned increase in its electricity output in the next
five-year plan. Thus, the Caechs are particularly concerned
about public reaction, both domestically and abroad.
Romania, already herd pressed to meet its energy demands,
receives some of its electrical power from the Chernobyl plant
and may soon face sporadic shortages. Romanian-Soviet
discussion of bilateral economic agreements are expected in the
near future and a Cosusesou visit to Moscow is again being
rumored; this development could complicate that bargaining.
Hungary is heavily committed to nuclear energy. Anti-
nuclear protests--small onee--may develop here, if only as
another outlet for exhibiting dissatisfaction with the
government. The country does have an active environmentalist
group which can be expected to seize on the episode for new
campaigns.
There may be similar protests in Yugoslavia, where
Western-style demonstrations are popular. Moreover, there is a
serious debate over nuelear power in Yugoslavia--an industry in
its early stages--and this secident is sure to enliven that
debate.
No protests are likely in Bulgaria, however, where there is
a large nuclear power industry struggling to grow larger.
Behind the scenes concern about its effect on the country's
agricultural exports is likely to grow
Three bloc countriss--Bulgaria, Csechoslovakia, and the
GDR--produce an appreciable share of their electricity from
Soviet-designed nucleer power plants. Heretofore nuclear
programs within the bloc have been bilateral, between the
Soviets and the participating country. The long-term Science
and Technology program announced at the CEMA session in
December 1985, earmarked nuclear energy as one of the five
priority areas in which the bloc members will increase efforts
at joint production. CENA head Vyacheslav Sychev said that
total capacity of the nuclear power plants in the bloc will
double in the next five years. Most bloc countries have been
reluctant to commitment themselves fully to the ambitious
integration scheses backed by the Soviets via CEMA. The
Chernobyl accident will likely increase the foot-dragging.
B. Western Europe
Immediate Health Conserne. Scandinavia as well as some
parts of West Germany, and Switzerland have reported
significant increases in radicectivity--three to ten times
normal levels in many areas, and over a hundred times in
western Sweden where rain fell. Nevertheless, health
authorities in all except Austria have not called for
24
precautionary measures. Officials in eastern Austria warned
mothers to keep babies inside.
Political. The four day delay in notifying affected
countries has provoked a round of official criticism of the
Soviets. Sweden ledred & digiematic protest and desanded an
international investigation of Soviet nuclear power stations.
The other nordic nations, except Finland, demanded an official
Boviet report. Although the French press sharply criticized
the USSR, the French government has remained muted--perhaps due
to France's distance from the disaster and their commitment to
nuclear energy. The West Germans have asked the USSR to shut
down similar plants and seconded US urgings that an
international team inspect the Chernobyl plant. Other
countries have also blasted the Soviets' dinosaurian
response--denting Gorbachev's oarefully cultivated image as a
forthooming new Soviet leader.
Peace and ecological groups are likely to mount limited
protests against the soviets, while seeking primarily to
exploit public anxieties to foster generalized opposition
against things nuclear--energy and weapons. Swedish activists
are lobbying to preserve a 1930 vote to dismantle Sweden's four
nuclear plants by 2010. Greens in the FRG, who recently staged
several rowdy anti-nuclear power demonstrations, will step up
their efforts, as will the British Greens and Campaign for
Nuclear Disarmament (CND) who have protested low-level leaks at
a reactor on the Irish Sea. Heightened public anxieties may
also strengthen the hand of the FRG Social Democrate' left-wing
which--in cooperation with the Bast German communist party--is
drafting a proposal for . central European nuclear weapons free
zone.
VI. Other soviet Reactor Problems
A. Civil. Since the late 1940s, Moscow has had its share
of nuclear-related accidents, although only the distintegration
of a nuclear-powered satellite over Canada affected other
countries. Emigre reports and occasional Soviet press items
document at least five domestic incidents:
--In 1948, workers at Soviet atomic energy installations
were said to have developed cataracts and other illnesses
because of radiation leaks.
--In 1958, an explosion at the Kyshtya facility near
Chelyabinsk contaminated more than 125,000 square
kilometers of Siberian countryside.
--In 1963, apparent lazity in the handling of radioactive
materials led to a wave of leukemia cases in Moscow.
--In 1965, Soviet scientists reported unusual levels of
strontium in the Caspian sea, suggesting it had been used
as a nuclear waste dump.
SOFORN/MMINTEL
25
-13-
--In 1968, the Soviet press took the unusual step of
denying rumors that nuclear power plants caused disease.
Trud, for example, published the complaint of someone
living near such a plant that "the high level of radio-
activity" night explain "why I an frequently sick." The
paper's decision to publish such a letter, even while
rejecting the premise, suggests a nuclear episode at the
time.
Two enigre accounts, Shores A. Medvedev's Nuclear Disaster
in the Urals (1979) and Boris Komarov's The Destruction of
Nature In the Soviet Union (1980), provide details on these
specific incidents. 15.1 reported that reactors were deliber-
ately built outside populated arous to limit the number of
people who would be affected by or be aware of problems.
Furthermore, the authorities always denied any report of a
problem.
That procedure has become less effective, however, as more
plants have been built, the ecology movement has expanded, more
people have come in contact with such plants, and more ques-
B. Military. Numerous humint reports indicate that
radiation sickness is a common fear in the Soviet Navy: that
there are special clinics for affected submariners: and even
that spinal tape are routinely administered to check for
radiation sickness. Inadequate quality control of reactor
system production and pose practices by operating personnel
have led to a large number of naval reactor problems, with
chronic reactor leaks being the most commonly noted. Some
classes are more affected than others: the first-generation
Soviet nuclear submarines (the H-class SSBNs, E-class SSGNs,
and M-class SSMs) have motoriously bad propulsion plants. The
second-generation V-I-class SEYE and C-class SSGNs also have
been trouble-ridden. On several occasions, submarines' nuclear
power plants failed completely, requiring the units to be towed
home. Nuclear propulsion problems have required individual
submarines to be out of service for years at a time, and have
even necessitated scrapping a few of them.
SECRET/NOFORM/MHINTEL
26
Belo-Russian S.S.R.
Comel
Mazyr
R.S.F.S.R.
Charnigev
Approximate
POLAND
Drainage Basin
Chernobyl
of Pripyet River
REACTOR
SITE
Klev
Cherkaney
CZECH.
Ukrainian
a s r.
TWY
s.a.r.
ROMANIA
BLACK SEA
I
.
i
200
XX
Unclassified
8513 5-00 STATE (MAGE)
- - - 1
- - -
DATE/TIME TRANSMITTED
WASHFAX MESSAGE NUMBER
DATE/TIME RECEIVED 27
27
File Electrolegy
C I A
OPERATIONS CENTER
SITE h
WASHFAX MESSAGE RECEIPT
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
?
80 :2d 98
P
FROM Richard J. Kerr
Deputy Director for Intelligence
FOIA(b) (3)
SUBJECT
Radiological Health Consequences to Travellers in the USSR
CLASSIFICATION
PAGES 2
SENT TO:
DELIVER TO:
EXTENSION
ROOM
Deputy Assistant to the President
-hite House
Donald R. Fortier
for National Security Affairs
456-2257
WHSR
lite House
Rodney B. McDaniel, Executive Secretary, NSC
395-3684
304
OEOB
JHSK
C
Ron St. Martin, Sentor Director, Crisis Management
Center
395-7310
REMARKS:
THOUGHT YOU MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN THE ATTACHED.
DICK KERR
DDI
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06-114/8#10409
BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11
SECRET
/
28
FOIA(b)
1 Kay 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
Radiological Health Consequences to Travellers
in the USSR
1. Summary. We continue to see no short term radiological health
hazzards to persons outside the vicinity of Chernobyl (distances beyond
40-50 km). There can be long term consequences to people, particularly at
great distances, if radioactive iodine-contaminated foodstuffs are
ingested.
2. Discussion. Although the total radiation released from the damaged
reactor at Chernobyl was immense, possibly hundreds of millions of Curies,
most is either confined to the immediate vicinity of Chernobyl or has been
dispersed widely, thus diluting its potency.
3. The radiation released can be divided into two classes--particulate
and gaseous. The particulates, which contain many long-lived, highly
radioactive elements, settle out from the atmosphere within tens of
kilometers of the source. These particulates will represent the Soviets'
long term clean-up problem.
4. The radiation detected
is predominately from the
gaseous releases. By far, the majority of these gases were released at the
instant of the reactor explosion. Thus, radiation readings far from the
site should peak as this bow wave passes, then decline rapidly. This is
true even though the damaged reactor
5. The primary gaseous releases
are
radioactive noble gases (zenon, krypton, etc.). These are dangerous gases
when concentrated because of the high energy (2 million electron volts) of
the gamma rays given off when they decay. But being noble elements, they
cannot react chemically to form particulates, and are no danger to
foodstuffs. As the bow wave of these gases is dissipated, the danger
subsides.
6. At about the same time as the noble gases were released, major
amounts of gaseous iodine were released as well. The radioactive iodine
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06-114/8#10410
0625136
OADR
BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11
SECRET
COL 1-82
29
SECRET
does not represent a near term radiological health problem, however,
because the garrs rays enitted are only about a tenth as energetic as for
the noble gases.
7. Iodine is a great long term concern because it does chemically
react with the environment and does contaminate foodstuffs. The major
health hazzard stems from dairy cattle that ingest contaminated feed, and
concentrate the iodine in their milk. This, in turn, is concentrated in
thyroid glands in people, particularly infants, who drink the milk. Direct
inhalation is also a hazzard, though less radioactivity is concentrated in
the thyrold by this means. The carcinogenistic effect of this radioactive
iodine is well documented. Cancer of the thyroid is fatal about 25 percent
of the time. Radioactive iodine has a half life of about eight days. This
means that, for practical purposes, only food or milk produced within the
next few months will be a danger.
8.
The
only concern might be If the reactor blows again as the Soviets pour water
on it to cool it off, and the winds were blowing to Kiev. Even then the
total dosage in Kiev should be within safe levels. Radioactive iodine
levels will need to be monitored.
9.
Gordon C. Oehler
Director
Scientific and Weapons Research
Central Intelligence Agency
2
SECRET
30
Editorial 0-1848 (2UR67)
May 1, 1986
NUCLEAR DISASTER AT CHERNOBYL
Anncr:
Lally
Next, a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.
Voice:
Worldwide attention is focused on Chernobyl, a complex of nuclear power plants
Revise
sixty miles north of Kiev in the Soviet Ukraine, where a meltdown of the central
the methow
core of a nuclear reactor has taken place causing an explosion that released
did not
filind a
of
of
cause
dangerous quantities of radiation. It is believed that the graphite housing of the
the
core may still be burning at Chernobyl, spewing particles of radioactive debris into
explosion
the atmosphere.
There seems little doubt that this is the most serious nuclear accident in history. No 1958(?)
Official Soviet press statements have termed it a "disaster," and because the Soviets
rarely publicize news about any domestic catastrophes -- even earthquakes or floods
-- their use of the word "disaster "is especially significant.
Nuclear radiation in the atmosphere doesn't respect national borders. It
disperses into the air of the planet and is therefore an international concern. The
reluctance of the Soviet Union to supply all of the details about the Chernobyl event
than
is especially disturbing. Within hours of the accident, radiation readings in
more day- a day
Scandinavia were one hundred times higher than normal, but the Soviets didn't
alert the world to the event for more than a day, and then only after they received
an inquiry from the Swedish government. They didn't inform the International
Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna until Monday, April 28 -- two days after the
explosion occurred.
Officially, the Soviets claim that the situation at Chernobyl has stabilized, that
radiation levels are under control. Nevertheless, they have asked Sweden and West.
Ficials
Germany for help, and there are unconfirmed reports of mass evacuations from the
Chernobyl area. The United States has expressed regret to the Soviet government
about this tragedy, our concern about civilian casualties, and our readiness to
provide humanitarian and technical assistance as soon as possible. But as yet, the
Soviets have not asked for our help.
American specialists want to share their knowledge and experience with Soviet
experts, for they know that sealing the damaged reactor, cleaning up the
surrounding environment, and treating the thousands of people potentially
affected by radiation is a difficult and extensive process. In 1979, there was a partial
meltdown at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania. Most of
the escaping radiation was contained, and there were no deaths or associated
illnesses among the nearby population. Nevertheless, the knowledge Americans
gained from their study of the Three Mile Island incident and the recommendations
for immediate safety measures could be especially important to the Soviets at this
tragic time.
The extent of the Chernobyl catastrophe is not yet known, mainly because the
Soviet government has released so little information. Rumors and speculation
abound, and will continue to increase as long as the Soviets refuse to set the record
straight. American and Japanese tourists returning from the Kiev area, for example,
say they were warned about possible contamination of the drinking water, but
there have been no official cautions from the Kremlin. U.S. intelligence sources
NO
believe there is reason to fear that a second reactor at Chernobyl may be in danger They
of meltdown; yet, again, there is no word from Moscow to confirm or deny this
not
report.
think NO,
When it comes to nuclear safety, no one can stand on ceremony. The potential
dangers of human radiation poisoning and irreversible damage to the environment
are of worldwide concern, regardless of the reticent Soviet government's desire to
32
avoid embarrassment. We want to help in whatever way we can -- to minimize
casualties, prevent further contamination, and to work with Soviet authorities to
make nuclear energy safe for the future.
Anncr: That was a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.
-0-
To: JFM
From: PWR 33
May 1, 1986
POLITICAL TALKING POINTS/THEMES
Whatever the cause of the accident, the Soviets' handling of the
accident reminds us of some things about the Soviet system.
E.G.:
--
The Soviet attitude toward international obligations:
IAEA Experts' Guidelines (1983-84), which Soviet
experts participated in drafting, laid down standards
of conduct for such cases, including timely sharing of
information to affected states.
Other countries' ability to assess environmental
impact, hazards to health, and future extent of both,
is seriously hampered by withholding of facts about
cause and circumstances of the accident.
Demonstrates requirement for effective verification and
greater transparency in agreements reached with
U.S.S.R.
--
Aspects of the Soviet system:
Callousness toward their own people.
Misleading, even deceptive public statements. E.g.,
TASS's claim that this was first Soviet nuclear
accident, when we know of at least five (including a
major explosion in Siberia in 1958 that contaminated
more than 125,000 sq. km. of countryside).
Casts doubt on Gorbachev's pledges of "openness" and
his image as a "modern, enlightened" type of leader.
I
SB/ pls heys
a copy-
form
34
summary pables
then May,
incident relaty to nuclear
thile
CONF BENTIAL
38
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 01
WARSAW 4476
DTG: 011257Z MAY 86 PSN: 015524
E0B150
AN002900
TOR: 121/1439Z
CSN:HCE508
TELEPHONE INQUIRES FROM VIEWERS. PANELISTS WERE:
MINISTER OF HEALTH MIROSLAW CYBULKO; DOMESTIC
DISTRIBUTION: MAN-01 DOBR-01 KRAM-01 SOMM-01 LENC-01 MAT-01
TRADE MINISTER JERZY JOZWIAK; DIRECTOR OF THE
/006 A2
INSTITUTE OF MOTHER AND CHILD PROF. KRYSTYNA BOZEK;
PROF. ZBIGNIEW JAWOROWSKI OF THE CENTRAL LABORATORY
FOR RADIOLOGICAL PROBLEMS; DIRECTOR OF THE
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
NATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AND RESEARCH AGENCY MIECZYSLAW
SIT: VP SIT
SOWINSKI; AND PROF. JANUSZ NAUMAN OF THE POSTGRADUATE
EOB:
MEDICAL CENTER. THE PANELISTS BRIMMED
EXPERTISE AND EXUDED TRANQUILITY, OF COURSE
INTENDED TO ALLAY THE ANXIETIES OF THE POLISH PEOPLE.
OP IMMED /PRIORITY
4. PROF. JAWOROWSKI, WHO HAS BEEN PRINICPAL INVESTIGATOR
STU0164
ON A MARIE SKLODOWSKA-CURIE FUND GRANT AND IS AN
DE RUDKRW #4476/01 1211300
INTERNATIONALLY-RESPECTED RADIOLOGICAL MEASUREMENTS
OP 011257Z MAY 86
SPECIALIST, PROVIDED WHAT IS THE "HARDEST" GOP DATA
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO DATE ON THE LEVELS OF ABSORBED RADIATION DOSE BY THE
POLISH POPULATION. HE SAID: A) THAT THE AVERAGE ABSORBED
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0757
DOSE THROUGH APRIL 30 WAS ABOUT 0.1 REM; B) THAT THE
HIGHEST LEVEL OF RADIATION EXPOSURE WAS SUCH THAT IF IT
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS PRIORITY
WERE SUSTAINED FOR TEN DAYS IT WOULD RESULT IN AN ABSORBED
AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 3037
DOSE OF ABOUT 0.58 REM; C) THAT THE LOWEST ABOVE BACKGROUND
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 1836
LEVEL REPORTED IN POLAND WAS ABOUT 50 TIMES LOWER, I.E.
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 0742
0.012 REM. HE ASSURED HIS VIEWERS THAT THESE DOSES WERE
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 0528
NOTHING TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT SINCE THE "RECOMMENDED
AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0387
ABSORBED DOSE LIMIT FOR INCIDENTS OF THIS SORT WAS 10 REMS."
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 0034
(COMMENT: THIS LEVEL OF ABSORBED DOSE IS ALIMIT SET IN THE
USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 8266
US NATIONAL COUNCIL ON RADIATION PROTECTION MEASUREMENT
REPORT 39 FOR RADIATION WORKERS AS "A RETROSPECTIVE ANNUAL
CONF ENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 03 WARSAW 04476
DOSE FOR DOSE INCREMENTS WELL DISTRIBUTED OVER TIME."
END COMMENT.)
HE CHOSE NOT TO TELL THE VIEWERS THAT THE RECOMMENDED
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
LIMIT ON ABSORBED DOSE FOR THE GENERAL POPULATION
TAGS: ENRG, SENV, CASC, UR, PL
IS ONLY 0.17 REM, PRESUMABLY SINCE THE QUOTE AVERAGE
SUBJECT: CHERNOBYL' NUCLEAR DISASTER: GOP INFORMS POLISH
PUBLIC CONCERNING RADIATION LEVELS AND PROPHYLACTIC MEASURES
UNQUOTE ACCUMULATED DOSE WAS ALREADY 0. 10 REM. IN EFFECT
HE WAS ENLISTING THE WHOLE POPULATION OF POLAND INTO THE
REF: WARSAW 4452 (NOTAL)
FRATERNITY OF RADIATION WORKERS, AN HONOR FOR WHICH THEY
WERE NOT PREPARED. HAVING SELECTED THE 10 REM LIMIT,
JAWOROWSKI THEN ATTEMPTED A REDUCTION (#) AD ABSURDUM OF
1. ENTIRE TEXT.
CONCERN ABOUT POTENTIAL ABSORBED DOSE LEVELS BY
POINTING OUT THAT EVEN IF THE MAXIMUM RADIATION LEVELS
PERSISTED FOR 100 DAYS--A PROPOSITION WHICH HE REJECTED
2. SUMMARY. A TELEVISION APPEARANCE OF SIX MEMBERS OF THE
AS RIDICULOUS--THE TOTAL ABOSRBED DOSE WOULD
GOP CHERNOBYL' EMERGENCY PANEL PROVIDED THE FIRST
BE BELOW THE 10 REM LEVEL.
OFFICIAL FIGURES OF RADIATION LEVELS IN POL AND FOLLOWING
THE SOVIET NUCLEAR DISASTER. ACCORDING TO THEM, THE
MAXIMUM ABSORBED DOSE RATE ENCOUNTERED (IN NORTHEAST
5. JAWOROWSKI SAID THAT THE RADIATION WAS FIRST DETECTED
POL AND) WAS ABOUT 150 TIMES BACKGROUND; THE MINIMUM
IN POLAND DURING SUNDAY NIGHT, APRIL 27; SOWINSKI HASTENED
ABOUT THREE TIMES BACKGROUND. THE AVERAGE WAS ABOUT 0.1
TO ADD THAT THIS FIRST DETECTION OCCURRED IN NORTHEAST
REM. THE POPULATION WAS ASSURED THAT THIS LEVEL OF
POLAND. SOWINSKI ALSO SAID THAT THE RADIATION LEVEL
EXPOSURE POSED NO HEALTH HAZARD. THE PANEL EXPLAINED
"STABILIZED" (READ PEAKED) ON APRIL 29 AND THAT THE
THE ODINE DISTRIBUTION PROGRAM (WHICH THEY EMPHASIZED AS
QUOTE AVERAGE UNQUOTE HAS BEEN DROPPING SINCE THEN.
BEING NECESSARY) WHICH CONTINUES TO PROVIDE THE IODINE
BT
PREPARATION FOR CHILDREN BELOW AGE 16 EVEN ON THE MAY
DAY HOLIDAY. IT REPEATED EARLIER PUBLISHED CAUTIONARY
MEASURES CONCERNING MILK FROM COWS GRAZING ON OPEN PASTURE.
IT RECOMMENDED WASHING ALL FRESH FRUITS AND VEGETABLES.
THE TELECAST ALSO SHOWED AN OFFICIAL SOVIET REPORT ON
CHERNOBYL' ALONG WITH A PURPORTED STILL SHOT OF THE
REACTOR AFTER THE DISASTER. END SUMMARY.
DECLASSIFIED
3. ON THE EVENING OF APRIL 30, POLISH TFLFVIEWERS WERE
NLRR F06-114/8410412
TREATED TO A REMARKABLE DISPLAY OF CANDOR (OR AT LEAST
OF SIMULATED CANDOR) BY MEMBERS OF THE BLUE-RIBBON
PANEL HASTILY ASSEMBLED BY THE GOP ON MONDAY IN THE WAKE
BY LOJ NARA DATE 9/30/08
OF THE CHERNOBYL' NUCLEAR DISASTER. SIX MEMBERS OF THE
PANEL PARTICIPATED IN THE FIFTEEN-MINUTE "MEET THE
PRESS" SESSION FOLLOWED BY PANEL RESPONSES TO
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
39
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 01
WARSAW 4476
DTG:011257Z MAY 86 PSN:015530
EOB151
AN002899
TOR: 121/1441Z
CSN:HCE509
WERE IN DANGER FROM THE RADIATION. RATHER, SHE SAID, THEY
WERE IN GREATER DANGER FROM THE MOTHER-TO-BE GETTING
DISTRIBUTION: MAN-01 DOBR-01 KRAM-01 SOMM-01 LENC-01 MAT-01
UPSET AND GENERATING INTERNAL STRESS. IODINE TREATMENT
/006 A2
WAS NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PREGNANT WOMEN.
8. IT RAINED A BIT THE AFTERNOON OF APRIL 30. IN RESPONSE
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
TO A QUESTION, JAWOROWSKI WELCOMED THE RAIN AND WISHED THAT
SIT: VP SIT
MORE WOULD FALL ESPECIALLY FROM HIGH ALTITUDE CLOUDS.
EOB:
THIS, HE SAID, WOULD PRECIPITATE THE RADIOACTIVE PARTICLES,
WASH PLANTS, PASTURES, ETC AND WOULD HASTEN THE RETURN
OF THE RADIATION LEVEL TO BACKGROUND LEVELS.
OP IMMED /PRIORITY
UTS9451
9. CYBULSKI REPORTED ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
DE RUDKRW #4476/02 1211320
INCIDENT INFORMATION CENTERS IN EACH REGION VOYEVOD
0 P 011257Z MAY 86
HEALTH OFFICE AND URGED THE POPULATION TO MAKE USE OF
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
THESE CENTERS. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE PANEL WOULD REPEAT
A TELEVISION APPEARACHE SHOULD THE SITUATION WARRANT.
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0758
10. THE SAME NEWSCAST WHICH TELEVISTED THIS SESSION WITH
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS PRIORITY
THE PANEL ALSO BROADCAST THE OFFICIAL SOVIET TELEVISION
AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 3038
REPORT ON CHERNOBYL. IT INCLUDED A STILL PICTURE OF THE
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 1837
REACTOR WHICH SHOWED HALF THE BUILDING SEVERELY DAMAGED,
AMEMBASY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 0743
THE OTHER HALF APPARENTLY INTACT. THE NEWSCASTER SAID
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 0529
THAT A) THE SITUATION WAS UNDER CONTROL, B) ONLY TWO
AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0388
PEOPLE HAD DIED, C) WESTERN MEDIA WERE EXAGGERATING THE
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 0035
MAGNITUDE OF THE ACCIDENT, AND D) ABOUT 170 PEOPLE WERE
USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 8267
HOSPITALIZED AND 49 RELEASED.
CONF ENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 03 WARSAW 04476
11. COMMENT: DATA PROVIDED BY JAWOROWSKI IMPLY THAT THE
PEAK ABSORBED DOES RATE LEVEL OBSERVED IN POLAND WAS ABOUT
HE CONCEDED THAT LOCAL INCREASES ARE BEING OBSERVED
2.3 MILLIREM PER HOUR. ASSUMING A BACKGROUND LEVEL OF 130
BECAUSE OF WEATHER PATTERN VARIATIONS, BUT HE REPEATED
MILLIREM PER YEAR, THIS MEANS THAT THE MAXIMUM ABSORBED
THAT THE OVERALL LEVEL IS DROPPING. CYBULSKI URGED THAT
DOES LEVEL WAS ABOUT 150 TIMES BACKGROUND. THIS DATA ALSO
ALL GREEN VEGETABLES BE WASHED THOROUGHLY BEFORE CONSUMPTION
IMPLY A LOW END ABSORBED DOSE LEVEL OF ABOUT 3 TIMES
AND REPEATED THE RECOMMENDATION CONTAINED IN THE PRESS
BACKGROUND.
THAT MILK FROM COWS GRAZING ON OPEN PASTURES NOT BE CONSUMED.
HE APPEALED TO THE FARMER'S SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY TO
SOCIETY TO STOP DELIVERING SUCH MILK TO PICK-UP POINTS.
12. THE GOP SHOULD RECEIVE HIGH MARKS FOR TRYING TO
RESPOND TO SOCIETAL CONCERNS. HOWEVER, SCICOUNS WATCHED
THE PROGRAM IN THE COMPANY OF AN QUOTE ORDINARY UNQUOTE
6. PROFESSOR BOZEK DESCRIBED THE IODINE DISTRIBUTION
POLE WHOSE COMMENT WAS THAT THEY WERE LYING. SCICOUNS'
PROGRAM WHOSE PURPOSE WAS PROPHYLACTIC. JOZWIAK ASSURED
ASSURANCES THAT THERE WERE DISTINGUISHED SCIENTISTS
THE PUBLIC THAT THERE WAS NOT A SHORTAGE OF IODINE SOLUTION
DID NOT CONVINCE HIS POLISH COMPANION. THAT THE
AND THAT CLINICS WOULD ADMINISTER THE DOESE THROUGHOUT
POLISH PERSON-IN-THE-STREET DOESN'T BELIEVE THE GOP
THE MAY 1 HOLIDAY. (COMMENT: POTASSIUM IODINE IS AN
WAS EVIDENCED BY THE NEAR PANIC BUYING OF BUTTER, POWDERED
ABUNDANT CHEMICAL PRESUMABLY AVAILABLE IN POLAND IN
MILK, BREAD, ETC IN ANTICIPATION OF SHORTAGES WHICH
SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES FOR THIS PROGRAM. AS IS WELL KNOWN
BT
MEDICINES ARE CONTINUALLY IN SHORT SUPPLY IN POLAND; VITAMIN
PILLS AND ASPIRINS ARE INFORMALLY RATIONED. THE GOP MUST
BE PLEASED TO HAVE ENCOUNTERED A PUBLIC HEALTH PROBLEM
FOR WHICH THEY CAN SUPPLY THE PRESCRIBED QUOTE CURE
UNQUOTE. END COMMENT.) THE IODINE TREATMENT WAS RECOMMENDED
FOR CHILDREN BELOW 16 YEARS OF AGE ALL OVER POLAND.
(COMMENT: NO DATA ON IODINE 131 CONCENTRATION WAS PRESENTED.
JAWOROWSKI SAID IN EFFECT THAT THE RADIATION EXPOSURE
OVER THE COUNTRY VARIED BY A FACTOR OF ABOUT FIFTY. WHILE
IODINE TREATMENT MAY HAVE MADE SENSE FOR CHILDREN IN
THE HIGHEST EXPOSURE AREAS, IT CANNOT MAKE SENSE
FOR THOSE IN THE LOW EXPOSED AREAS WHERE HIS DATA IMPLIES
SUPPLIES SUBSTANTIALLY LOWER ABSORBED DOSES. END
COMMENT.) BOZEK DID NOT THINK THAT DAILY WASHING OF
DECLASSIFIED
CHILDREN'S HAIR AND CLOTHING WAS DEMANDED BY THE RADIATION
SITUATION BUT SHE ALLOWED THAT SUCH A PRACTICE WAS
COMMENDABLE EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF A RADIATION EMERGENCY.
NLRR F06-114/8#104129
7. BOZEK ALSO ADDRESSED THE CONCERNS OF PREGNANT WOMEN.
BY LOJ NARA DATE 9/30/08
SHE ASSURED THEM THAT NE ITHER THEY NOR THEIR UNBORN CHILDREN
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
40
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 01
WARSAW 4476
DTG: 011257Z MAY 86 PSN: 015531
EOB152
AN002898
TOR: 121/1441Z
CSN: HCE510
DISTRIBUTION: MAN-01 DOBR-01 kram-ø1 SOMM-01 LENC-01 MAT-01
/006 A2
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: VP SIT
EOB:
OP IMMED /PRIORITY
UTS9457
DE RUDKRW #4476/03 1211345
O P 011257Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0759
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 3039
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 1838
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 0744
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 0530
AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0389
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 0036
USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 8268
Z
I
E
N
I
A
SECTION 03 OF 03 WARSAW 04476
CAN NOW BE BLAMED ON RADIATION CONTAMINATION. THE
IODINE DISTRIBUTION PROGRAM SHOULD WIN KUDOS FOR THE
GOP; THEY HAVE ACTED QUICKLY, FORCEFULLY, WITH SEMMING
CONCERN FOR THE POEPLE AS ITS OVERRIDING GOAL, A STROKE OF
GENIUS. OF COURSE, THEY HAVE OTHER MOTIVES FOR THEIR ACTION.
THEY MUST AVERT PANIC, REDUCE A FURTHER BUILD-UP OF ANTI-
SOVIET SENTIMENT, AND PRESERVE THEIR ABILITY TO CONTINUE
THEIR OWN NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM.
13. ADDITIONAL UNEVALUATED DATA. IN CONVERSATION LAST
NIGHT, THE RECTOR OF WARSAW UNIVERSITY (STRICTLY PROTECT)
WHO IS HIMSELF A PHYSICIST, TOLD THE CHARGE THAT RADIATION
LEVELS IN WARSAW ON APRIL 30 WERE 15 TO 30 TIMES
BACKGROUND AT VARIOUS TIMES DURING THE DAY, THAT A SAMPLE
OF DUST FROM AN AUTOMOBIL JUST RETURNED FROM THE NORTHEAST
HAD BEEN ANALYZED AND SHOWED RADIATION AT 300 TIMES NORMAL
LEVELS, AND THAT AIRCRAFT MEASUREMENTS IN THE HIGH ALTITUDE
CLOUD OVER NORTHEAST POLAND (DATE NOT SPECIFIED)
REGISTERED RADIATION AT 1000 TIMES BACKGROUND. HE
DESCRIBED NORMAL BACKGROUND RADIATION IN WARSAW AS ABOUT
100 C. P.M. ON A GEIGER COUNTER.
DAVIS
BT
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
41
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 01
MOSCOW 7457
DTG: 011737Z MAY 86 PSN: 015790
EOB628
AN003019
TOR: 121/1759Z
CSN:HCE571
NUCLEAR ACCIDENT ISSUE, IT WOULD NOT RECEIVE THE
DUTCH, AND DEPFONMIN KOVALEV WAS "OUT OF TOWN."
DISTRIBUTION: MAN-01 DOBR-01 KRAM-01 SOMM-01 RODM-01 LENC-01
THEY REFERRED THE DUTCH TO THE STATE COMMITTEE FOR
MAT-01 /007 A2
ATOMIC ENERGY'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT.
LATER, THE DUTCH PASSED ON TO NIKIFOROV OF MFA
PROTOCOL THE EC'S APPEAL THAT THE USSR HELP EC
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
CITIZENS WHO WANTED TO LEAVE THE AREA. LATE AT
SIT: SIT
NIGHT, HOWEVER, THE MFA CALLED IN AT LEAST UK,
EOB:
FRENCH, AUSTRIAN, FINNISH AND DUTCH, AND PERHAPS
OTHERS, TO ADDRESS THE NUCLEAR ACCIDENT.
DUTCH READOUT:
OP IMMED
STU0657
DE RUEHMO #7457/01 1211739
5. KOVALEV HAD WITH HIM A.M. PETROSYANTS, (CHAIRMAN,
0 011737Z MAY 86
STATE COMMITTEE FOR THE UTILIZATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY)
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMBASSADOR VLADIMIR PETROVSKIY, AND AN MFA OFFICIAL.
KOVALEV OPENED WITH A STATEMENT SIMILAR TO THE ONE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4291
READ TO THE UK AMBASSADOR (SEPTEL). IT SAID THE
USSR UNDERSTOOD THE DISQUIET OF OTHER COUNTRIES,
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE 7223
WHICH THE USSR SHARED, BUT THE SOVIET UNION WISHED
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4562
TO PROVIDE AS FULL INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER
USDOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
TO ALLEVIATE THESE ANXIETIES. THE USSR APPRECIATED
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 2391
THE VARIOUS OFFERS OF HELP BUT THEY WERE NOT
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST IMMEDIATE 1452
NECESSARY SINCE THE USSR HAD ALL THE SCIENTIFIC
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0261
AND TECHNICAL MEANS NECESSARY.
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 2814
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 5170
CURRENT STATUS:
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1108
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 2415
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 3491
6. KOVALEV THEN ADDRESSED REACTOR NO. 4, STATING
AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE 3691
THAT THE LEAKAGE HAD STOPPED, THE REACTOR WAS NOT
UNVIE MISSION VIENNA IMMEDIATE
WORKING, AND THERE WERE NO FURTHER POLLUTING
EMISSIONS. THE THREE OTHER PLANTS WERE ON "RESERVE"
SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 07457
(STANDBY BASIS), AND ALL ATTENTION WAS DIRECTED AT
PLANT NO. 4, INCLUDING LIQUIDATING THE CONSEQUENCES
PASS S/NP: AMBASSADOR KENNEDY
OF THE INCIDENT.
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
WESTERN PRESS COMPLAINT:
TAGS: KSCA, TRGY, SENV, CASC, UR
SUBJECT: CHERNOBYL' NUCLEAR ACCIDENT: REPORT NO. 7,
AS OF 1430 GMT MAY 1
7. KOVALEV PROTESTED WESTERN PRESS COVERAGE WHICH
HE SAID EXAGGERATED THE EVENT, CAUSING "EMOTIONAL
REF: MOSCOW 7427
REACTIONS" IN THE WEST. HE SAID HE HOPED THE
INFORMATION PROVIDED WOULD DO AWAY WITH THESE
EMOTIONAL REACTIONS.
1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.
DUTCH RESPONSE:
SUMMARY:
8. AFTER REPEATING PRIOR EXPRESSIONS OF SYMPATHY AND
2. THE SOVIETS HAVE PROVIDED THE DUTCH AND OTHER
OFFERS OF ASSISTANCE, THE DUTCH REAFFIRMED THEIR
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WITH MINIMAL INFORMATION ON THE
APPEAL FOR THE SOVIETS TO ASSIST EC NATIONALS WHO
CHERNOBYL' DISASTER IN A POSSIBLE ATTEMPT TO
BT
DISCOURAGE EVACUATION OF TOURISTS. EC COUNTRIES
CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR FULLER INFORMATION.
END SUMMARY
DECLASSIFIED
3. THE DUTCH DCM (PROTECT) GAVE POLCOUNS THE FOLLOWING
READOUT ON AN APRIL 30 MEETING THEIR AMBASSADOR HAD
NLRR F06-114/8# 10413
WITH THE SOVIETS.
TURNAROUND:
BY LOJ NARA DATE 9/30/08
4. AS OF LATE AFTERNOON APRIL 30, THE MFA OFFICIALLY
WAS STATING IT WAS NOT COMPETENT TO ADDRESS THE
CONF IDENTIAL
42
CONF IDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 01
MOSCOW 7457
DTG: 011737Z MAY 86 PSN: 015794
EOB629
AN003018
TOR: 121/1800Z
CSN: HCE572
THE EFFECT THAT CONTAMINATION RATES SEVEN TIMES
NORMAL WERE NOT THREATENING. HE SAID KIEV' NORMAL
DISTRIBUTION: MAN-01 DOBR-01 KRAM-01 SOMM-01 RODM-01 LENC-01
READING WAS ZERO WHILE ITS CURRENT READING WAS
MAT-01 /007 A2
0.075 MILLIREMS PER HOUR; THIS WAS NOTHING TO BE
WORRIED ABOUT. IN CONCLUSION, HE SAW NO NEED FOR
TOURISTS TO EVACUATE. HE SAID THE DUTCH NOW HAD
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
ALL THE INFORMATION ON WHICH THE SOVIET COUNCIL
SIT: SIT
OF MINISTERS HAD DECIDED EARLIER THE SAME DAY NOT TO
EOB:
HAVE A SECOND EVACUATION. (SEE SEPTEL ON PETROSYANTS'
COMMENTS TO THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR.)
HEALTH SERVICE FOR FOREIGNERS:
OP IMMED
STU0660
DE RUEHMO #7457/02 1211741
11. KOVALEV ADDED THAT THE UKRAINIAN AND BYLEORUSSIAN
0 011737Z MAY 86
MINISTRIES OF PUBLIC HEALTH HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS OF FOREIGNERS CONCERNED ABOUT
THE HEALTH ASPECT. AS OF THE MORNING OF APRIL 30, A
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4292
CLINIC HAD ALSO BEEN OPENED IN MOSCOW TO CHECK
FOREIGNERS AS WELL. THE SOVIETS WOULD ALSO BE
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE 7224
HAVING MORE CONTACT ON THIS MATTER, so IT WAS
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4563
GROUNDLESS TO ADVISE TOURISTS TO EVACUATE. THE
USDOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
DUTCH UNDERTOOK TO FORWARD THE SOVIET INFORMATION
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 2392
FOR ANALYSIS. HARTMAN
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST IMMEDIATE 1453
BT
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0262
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN MMEDIATE 2815
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 5171
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1109
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 2416
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 3492
AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE 3692
UNVIE MISSION VIENNA IMMEDIATE
CONF DENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 07457
PASS S/NP: AMBASSADOR KENNEDY
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KSCA, TRGY, SENV, CASC, UR
SUBJECT: CHERNOBYL' NUCLEAR ACCIDENT: REPORT NO. 7,
DESIRED TO LEAVE, AND CALLED FOR A FULLER AND MORE
PROMPT SOVIET PROVISION OF INFORMATION.
PETROSYANTS INTERVENTION:
9. KOVALEV ASKED PETROSYANTS TO PROVIDE MORE
INFORMATION. PETROSYANTS REVIEWED SOVIET PUBLIC
DATA ON DEATHS, HOSPITALIZATIONS AND RELEASES.
HE THEN ADDED THAT THE INCIDENT HAD BEEN "VERY
COMPLICATED." HE SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO BELITTLE
THE MATTER, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT STATE WHAT THE
COMPLICATIONS WERE. A "LONG TIME" WOULD BE
REQUIRED TO LIQUIDATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE
INCIDENT. THE CLOUD WHICH FORMED "ORIGINALLY" HAD
BEEN DANGEROUS: IT CONTAINED NOBLE GASES
("BLAGORODNIYE GAZI") LIKE KRYPTON, BUT ALSO
STRONTIUM 90 AND OTHERS, ALTHOUGH THESE WERE ONLY
A MINOR PART OF THE TOTAL EMISSION.
10. SINCE THE LEAKAGE HAD STOPPED, THE SITUATION
WAS IMPROVING, PETROSYANTS ADDED. HOWEVER, HE
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT LOCAL CLIMATE COULD BE AFFECTED.
HE SAID THE CURRENT READING FOR VILNIUS WAS 0.04
MILLIREMS PER HOUR, BUT THIS COULD RISE TO 0.07
MILLIREMS PER HOUR. HE CITED SWEDISH SOURCES TO
CONF IDENTIAL
43
CONF IDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 01
MOSCOW 7456
DTG: 011732Z MAY 86 PSN: 015774
EOB574
AN002953
TOR: 121/1746Z
CSN:HCE569
4. AN AUSTRALIAN EMBOFF WAS RETURNING TO MOSCOW
FRIDAY NIGHT BY TRAIN, WHICH WAS STOPPED FOR 3 HOURS
DISTRIBUTION: MAN-01 DOBR-01 KRAM-01 SOMM-01 RODM-01 LENC-01
JUST OUTSIDE KIEV, SUPPOSEDLY BECAUSE A FREIGHT
MAT-01 /007 A2
TRAIN HAD DERAILED. WHEN THEY GOT TO KIEV AT 0300
WHSR COMMENT: FOR NOTE
SATURDAY MORNING, HE SAW AN UNUSUALLY LARGE NUMBER
OF PEOPLE MILLING AROUND THE STATION, INCLUDING A
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
LOT OF YOUNG SOLDIERS.
SIT: VP SIT
EOB:
5. ACCORDING TO A NORWEGIAN EMBOFF, THE EC AMBASSADORS
HAVE BEEN CALLED TO A MEETING AT THE MFA TODAY AT
1600 MOSCOW TIME. WE HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED A READOUT.
OP IMMED
STU0643
6. CONTRARY TO RUMORS WHICH ARE WORKING THEIR WAY
DE RUEHMO #7456 1211733
INTO WESTERN PRESS REPORTS, NEITHER THE BRITISH NOR
0 0117327 MAY 86
THE SWEDISH EMBASSIES ARE OFFERING TO EVACUATE THEIR
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
DEPENDENTS.
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4290
7. EMBOFFS TALKED WITH AMERICAN STUDENTS IN THE
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE 7222
PROGRESSIVE TOUR GROUP WHICH RETURNED THIS MORNING
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4561
FROM KIEV AND DEPARTED THIS AFTERNOON FOR LONDON.
USDOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
KIEV, IN THEIR VIEW, HAD A SURFACE CALM ABOUT IT
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 2390
WHICH BELIED A DEVELOPING UNEASINESS. WHEN FIRST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST IMMEDIATE 1451
TOLD BY THE STUDENTS ABOUT WESTERN RADIO STORIES
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0260
OF A MAJOR DISASTER AT THE CHERNOBYL' NUCLEAR
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 2813
POWER PLANT, THEIR UKRAINIAN FRIENDS WERE HIGHLY
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 5169
SKEPTICAL. AS THE STUDENTS BECAME CONCERNED TO
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1107
THE POINT OF DRINKING ONLY BOTTLED WATER, THEIR
AMEMBASSY OSL 0 IMMEDIATE 2414
CONTACTS BEGAN TO ACCEPT THE NOTION THAT CLEARLY
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 3490
SOMETHING HAD GONE WRONG UP THERE, BUT TRIED TO
AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE 3690
RECONCILE IT AGAINST OFFICIAL SOVIET STATEMENTS
BY SAYING, " IF THERE IS ACTUALLY A SERIOUS PROBLEM,
CONFIDENTIALMOSCOW 07456
WOULDN'T THEY' (I.E., THE GOVERNMENT) BE DOING
SOMETING ABOUT KIEV - EVACUATING, AT LEAST, THE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
WOMEN AND CHILDREN, OR WARNING US, OR TAKING SOME
TAGS: KSCA, TRGY, SENV, CASC, UR
PRECAUTIONS?" THE BRITISH EMBASSY REPORTS THAT THE
SUBJECT: CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR ACCIDENT: REPORT NO. 6,
GROUP WAS TOLD BY BRITISH AIRWAYS THAT, BESIDES THE
-
AS OF 1300 GMT MAY 1
PHYSICAL EXAM REQUIRED BY SOVIET AUTHORITIES BEFORE
DEPARTURE, AIRLINES' DOCTOR WOULD ADMINISTER ANOTHER
REF: MOSCOW 7427
EXAM AND, IN ADDITION, PROVIDE CLEAN TRACK SUITS
FOR THE STUDENTS TO WEAR ABOARD THE PLANE.
1. CONF IDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.
8. THREE BRITISH STUDENTS, TWO FROM KIEV AND ONE
FROM MINSK, ECHOED REPORTS OF CALM, BUT THE TWO FROM
2. A WEST GERMAN BUSINESSMAN, EQUIPPED WITH A
KIEV ADDED THAT THERE WAS INCREASED ROAD TRAFFIC
GEIGER COUNTER AND WITH EXPERIENCE IN ITS USE,
OUTSIDE OF THE CITY. THEY DID NOT NOTE AN OVERLY
ARRIVED IN KIEV YESTERDAY FROM MOSCOW. IN A PHONE
LARGE PERCENTAGE OF EMERGENCY VEHICLES IN THE TRAFFIC,
CONVERSATION WITH THE FRG EMBASSY THIS AFTERNOON,
DESCRIBING IT AS ESSENTIALLY THE USUAL, BUT MORE OF
THE BUSINESSMAN REPORTED MEASURING A RADIATION LEVEL
IT. HARTMAN
IN THE STREETS OF KIEV OF 0.8 MILLIREMS PER HOUR;
BT
WITHIN HIS HOTEL ROOM, HE RECORDED 0.22 MILLIREMS
PER HOUR, UP FROM ZERO AT ARRIVAL. THE WIND IN
KIEV IS NOW BLOWING NORTH-TO-SOUTH.
3. IN A RECEPTION HONORING THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT
OF PAN AM SERVICE, THE AMBASSADOR POINTEDLY TOLD
THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF AVIATION HOW BADLY THE SOVIET
GOVERNMENT IS HANDLING THE CHERNOBYL' CRISIS AND TO
DECLASSIFIED
INFORM THE LEADERSHIP, OR THIS REVIVED TOURIST
LINK WILL SUFFER BECAUSE OF TRAVELLERS' WELL-FOUNDED
CONCERNS. INTERESTINGLY, A CHICAGO TOUR REPRESENTATIVE
NLRR F06-114/8# 10414
TOLD THE 10 THAT AN INTOURIST OFFICIAL COMPLAINED THAT
THEY HAD SPENT ALL DAY APRIL 29 TAKING CANCELLATIONS
LOT
NARA
LAVO
9/30/08
OF TOURS.
CONF IDENTIAL
CONF DENTIAL
44
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 01
MOSCOW 7452
DTG:011352Z MAY 86 PSN:015473
E0B065
AN002824
TOR: 121/1406Z
CSN:HCE500
5. WE URGE DEPARTMENT INSURE THAT STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED
TO SOVIET SPOKESMEN WERE IN FACT ISSUED IN AN OFFICIAL
DISTRIBUTION: MAN-01 DOBR-01 KRAM-01 SOMM-01 RODM-01 LENC-01
CAPACITY. HARTMAN
MAT-01 /007 A2
BT
WHSR COMMENT: -CHERNOBYL FIRE UPDATE--
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT:
SIT
E OB:
OP IMMED
UTS9424
DE RUEHMO #7452 1211353
0 011352Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4286
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE 7219
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4560
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 2389
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST IMMEDIATE 1450
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0259
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 2812
Cent
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 5168
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1106
AMEMBASSY OSL 0 IMMEDIATE 2413
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 3489
AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE 3689
CONF BENTIAL MOSCOW 07452
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KSCA, TRGY, SENV, CASC, OPRC, UR
SUBJECT: CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR ACCIDENT: REPORT NO. 5
REF: (A) STATE 135824, (B) MOSCOW 07291,
-
(C) MOSCOW 07317
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. PRESS GUIDENCE OF APRIL 30 (REFTEL A) NOTES
STATEMENT BY SOVIET SPOKESMAN THAT TRAVEL TO KIEV
"MAY BE DANGEROUS." EMBASSY BECAME AWARE OF AP
STORY WITH THIS QUOTE AT ABOUT 1500 MOSCOW TIME ON
APRIL 30 (REFTEL B). 10 VERNER CALLED SAZANOV
IMMEDIATELY, BUT WAS NOT ABLE TO REACH HIM FOR MORE
THAN AN HOUR. WHEN CONTACT WAS MADE VERNER READ THE
AP QUOTE TO SAZANOV AND ASKED HIM TO CONFIRM THE
STATEMENT.
3. SAZANOV ADMITTED SAYING THAT IT MIGHT BE DANGEROUS
IN KIEV, BUT HE SAID THIS WAS INTENDED AS A REPLY TO
A QUESTION ON TRAVEL AND NOT AS AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT
DECLASSIFIED
ON THE SITUATION IN THAT CITY. HE WAS UPSET AT BEING
QUOTED (REFTEL C). WHEN VERNER ASKED WHETHER EMBASSY
PERSONNEL OR JOURNALISTS COULD TRAVEL TO KIEV, SAZANOV
NLRR F06-114/8#10415
REPLIED, QUOTE NO, KIEV HAS BEEN CLOSED END QUOTE.
BY LOJ NARA DATE 9/30/08
4. A SUBSEQUENT CALL TO THE TRAVEL OFFICE AT THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY DREW THE REPLY QUOTE KIEV IS CLOSED FOR
REASONS OF A TEMPORARY NATURE END QUOTE. THE SAME
REPLY WAS RECEIVED THIS AFTERNOON.
CONF IDENTIAL