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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Executive Secretariat, National Security Council:
Agency File: Records
Folder Title: State INR Morning Summary
(12/23/1983-12/24/1983)
Box: RAC Box 8
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: AGENCY FILE
Withdrawer
CAS 12/3/2008
File Folder
STATE INR MORNING SUMMARY VOL. I 11/22-12/31/83
FOIA
[12/23/83-12/24/83]
M08-099
Box Number
8
STOCKER
11
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
1. 57287 LIST
RE 12/24/83 DOCUMENTS (W/NOTATIONS)
1 12/24/1983 B1
R
1/17/2001
NLSF97-044 #8
2. 57288 REPORT
CURRENT REPORTS
3 12/24/1983 B1
D
1/17/2001
F97-044 #9; PAR 5/7/2010 M08-
099/1 #57288
3 57289 REPORT
RE ANALYSIS
3 12/24/1983 B1
PAR 5/10/2001
NLSF97-044 10; R 9/16/2010
M08-099/1 #57289
4.
57290 LIST
RE 12/23/83 DOCUMENTS (WITH
1 12/23/1983 B1
NOTATIONS)
R
1/17/2001
NLSF97-044 #11
5.
57291 REPORT
CURRENT REPORTS
3 12/23/1983 B1
PAR 1/17/2001
F97-044 #12; PAR 5/7/2010 M08-
090/1 #57291
6.
57292 REPORT
RE ANALYSIS
3 12/23/1983 B1
R
5/10/2001
NLSF97-044 #13
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified Information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose Internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical Information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
MORNING SUMMARY
December 24, 1983
Current Reports
1. Terrorism
A. More Reports of Lebanese Shia Threats
B. Threat to US and other Embassies in Saudi Arabia
2. Italy: Pertini Calls for Withdrawal of MNF Troops
3. Lebanon: INR Military Update
4. PLO: Arafat Sees Need for a Government-in-Exile
5. Israel: Shamir Maintains Shaky Coalition
6. USSR/PRC: An End to Euphoria
7. USSR: Tough Posture on INF
8. Nicaragua: Withdrawal of Cubans a Ploy
9. Vietnam: Reshuffling of High-Level Officials
Analysis
1. Kuwait: More Trouble Ahead
2. SPD Foreign Relations: Western Fence-Mending, Eastern Dialogue
3. El Salvador: A Decisive Political Phase Begins
NLS F97-044 DECLASSIFIED #8 #
BY CA, NARA, DATE '/17/01'
Classified by: M. Charles Hill and
Hugh Montgomery
Declassify on:
Originating Agency's
Determination Required
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
E.0.12958
57280
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(6)(1),
CURRENT REPORTS
3.5(c)
1.4(c)
December 24, 1983
2. ITALY: PERTINI CALLS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF MNF TROOPS
Italian President Pertini told journalists December 23 the departure
of Arafat and the PLO fighters fulfilled the requirement for the
withdrawal of the Italian MNF contingent from Beirut, Embassy Rome
reports. A senior foreign ministry official said that Pertini made
the remark, but the official Italian position on the MNF remains the
same--no unilateral withdrawal. He said Italy will continue to work
with the other MNF members for the earliest possible withdrawal.
INR Comment: Pertini's comments will embarass the Craxi government
and further weaken support for the MNF commitment. Nonetheless,
government leaders will not want to be seen in hasty retreat from the
MNF. Pertini and key aides earlier had suggested privately that a
change in the status of Arafat and the PLO would present Rome with
adequate rationale for extricating itself an argument Pertini
emphasized in his comments yesterday.
(SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR M08-049#57288
BY RW NARA DATE 5-7-10
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/
- 2 -
4. PLO: ARAFAT SEES NEED FOR A GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE
In an interview with a Saudi newspaper, Arafat reportedly said he is
"convinced more than ever following the recent events in Beirut and
Tripoli of the need to form a Palestinian government-in-exile." He
said that he will submit his proposal to the Palestinian National
Council at its February meeting in Algiers.
INR Comment: The creation of a Palestinian government-in-exile has
long been urged by Egypt but resisted by Arafat. If correct, this
report would suggest that Arafat now counts on the creation of this
government, his selection as its head, and its recognition by the
moderate Arab governments to maintain his leadership of the
Palestinians and to discredit his Syrian-supported rivals.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
5. ISRAEL: SHAMIR MAINTAINS SHAKY COALITION
PM Shamir's low-key leadership and his successful Washington visit
have bolstered his prospects for maintaining his coalition throughout
the winter Knesset session, Embassy Tel Aviv reports. Nonetheless,
political maneuvering within the coalition and deep public concern
about the economy still threaten his government. Labor Party
leaders, muting their own rivalries, are confidently attacking the
government's economic policy while the government trails in public
opinion polls.
Embassy Comment: Shamir does not have much time remaining to
demonstrate progress on economic issues. Unless he does so, the
public will lose confidence in his government. (CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS)
6. USSR/PRC: AN END TO EUPHORIA
Sino-Soviet relations failed to progress during 1983 at the pace
foreshadowed in the last months of the Brezhnev regime, Embassy
Moscow reports. The Soviets are increasingly disillusioned with
China's policy of "equidistance" between the superpowers, seeing
China tilt westward on key issues like INF. Moreover, the growth of
US-Japanese-South Korean military cooperation has convinced the
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/
- 3 -
Soviets that they must reinforce their military capability in the Far
East and bolster their Vietnamese ally, to the detriment of
Sino-Soviet relations. Finally, Andropov has a more skeptical and
ideological view of China than Brezhnev. Thus the Soviets, while
pursuing cooperation with the PRC in areas that serve Soviet
interests, will show new willingness to criticize Chinese policies.
The possibility of substantive Soviet concessions on important
bilateral issues is more remote than ever. (CONFIDENTIAL)
7. USSR: TOUGH POSTURE ON INF
Four Soviet political-military specialists told French Embassy
officers that the INF talks are dead, Embassy Moscow reports. Soviet
security is now the paramount issue, according to these specialists,
and the Soviet Union will match new US INF missiles one-for-one. The
Soviets carefully differentiated between INF and START and spoke of
the need to reevaluate the Soviet position on strategic arms. They
gave the impression that the delay in resuming START talks might be
lengthy, lasting until the US election or longer. (CONFIDENTIAL)
TOP SECRET/EXDIS
SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
57289
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - DECEMBER 24, 1983
1. KUWAIT: MORE TROUBLE AHEAD
The Kuwaiti government believes the December 12 bombings were
part of a broader threat to its survival. It is implementing
strong security measures, but they are not likely to prevent
further trouble. The government needs a lull to assimilate the
lessons of the first round, but the Shia militants and their
foreign sponsors will probably keep up the pressure.
*
*
*
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M08-D94#57889
NARA DATE1/16/10
The bombings targeted not only foreign embassies, but also
facilities critical to the operation of the state. While the
attacks on power, desalinization, and oil installations largely
BY RW
misfired, the bombing of the airport tower disrupted radar cover-
age for the air-defense system, as well as for civilian traffic.
Arrests since then have uncovered Shia "Da'wa" party cells
possessing large quantities of small arms apparently brought in
from Iran.
The government believes it faces a continuing threat to its
survival. It is implementing a get-tough policy long advocated
by security officials. Suspected troublemakers face arrest and
summary deportation.
The government's ability to carry out this policy effec-
tively is questionable. While most residents have a stake in its
survival, Kuwait is not a well-integrated society with a leader-
ship enjoying broad and unquestioning loyalty. Government
suspicions focus on the 30 percent (290,000) of Kuwaiti citizens
who are Shia, as well as on the 105,000 expatriate Shia (65,000
Iranians and 40,000 Iraqis and others). Most of the Shia who are
Kuwaiti citizens are reportedly sympathetic to Khomeini, and a
government clean-up of Shia troublemakers would probably increase
that propensity.
Some 60 percent of the population and about 78 percent of
the labor force are expatriates. Most of the 350,000 Pales-
tinians are quiescent, fearing deportation. Recent arrests of
PLO members, however, could provoke retaliation by Syrian- or
Libyan-backed groups.
The security forces are hobbled by concern about the many
Shia in their ranks (rarely in command positions). Evidence of
treason by one or more senior military officers has already
surfaced. Army ranks are 80 percent or more composed of Saudi
and Iraqi Bedouin whose loyalty is nearly exclusively to self,
family, and tribe.
Facing these problems, the leadership above all needs time
to make realistic security adjustments and recover its confi-
dence. We believe, however, that the Shia militants and their
foreign sponsors scent the government's weakness and will press
ahead to keep it off balance.
SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
- 2 -
2. SPD FOREIGN RELATIONS: WESTERN FENCE-MENDING,
EASTERN DIALOGUE
SPD leaders agree they must cultivate ties to other social-
ists and to ruling communist parties if they are to influence
world affairs, maintain pressure on Kohl, and recoup electoral
support. The SPD agenda now is to better contacts with the
Soviet, East German and Polish parties, mend fences with the
French socialists, and strengthen the Socialist International.
*
*
*
INF has cost the SPD dearly--as much for associating with
communists to oppose deployment as for the policy turnabout.
Clandestine reporting reveals a very concerned SPD inner-
circle: critics warn of the party's isolation over INF and
demand renewal of ideological tension with communism; they see
Willy Brandt looming over an ineffectual Vogel. With French
alienation rising, SPD leaders have met with Mitterrand and the
PSF several times since November--with little agreement on
security or EC issues. Egon Bahr winced when the PSF hinted it
was seeking a security dialogue with southern European social-
ists commensurate with that of the SPD in the north. The SPD
has sought Swiss and other assistance in ameliorating party-to-
party tensions.
The small European socialist parties, often taking their
cue from the SPD on security issues, are alarmed over the
party's INF flip-flop and its potential damage to overall
socialist credibility. Their concern is borne out by the
Italian communists' positive assessment of the SPD's and
Brandt's role in the peace movement as a way to rid it of its
communist stigma.
In the East, the SPD fuels Ostpolitik through its own con-
duits. Within the SI it hopes to revitalize East-West dialogue
by having socialist prime ministers lobby the superpowers to
resume arms talks and by endorsing Palme's nuclear-free-zone
proposal. The party's pessimism in the security arena--and
Brandt's own gloom--make them ideal targets for Soviet wooing.
Moscow couples prophecies of doom with its high-level courtship
of Brandt and deliberately contrasts its red-carpet treatment of
SPD leaders with that which the US accords.
A recent internal SPD study concludes that SPD ties with
East German and Polish parties are second only to those with the
CPSU, but ties with the Romanian and Czech parties are virtually
useless. Embryonic ties with the PRC are to be aided by a
Brandt visit next year. In its informal exchanges with Havana,
the Cubans--like the Soviets--play on the SPD's SI role. Prior
to last month's SI meeting, Havana made its case on Central
America and Grenada to a Brandt aide--paralleling Moscow's
warning to Brandt of an imminent US invasion of Nicaragua.
SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
- 3 -
3. EL SALVADOR: A DECISIVE POLITICAL PHASE BEGINS
With the promulgation of the new constitution and the selec-
tion of a spate of presidential candidates, El Salvador enters
into a decisive political phase. No candidate has the strength
to capture the presidency in a first ballot, and coalitions are
expected to form for a run-off election among the top two vote-
getters. The plans of the guerrillas for disrupting or discred-
iting the elections remain unclear.
*
After an 18-month gestation, El Salvador's new constitution
entered into force on December 20. Its mandate achieved, the
constituent assembly transformed itself into a legislative
assembly which will sit until April 1985. Coincident with the
new constitution, three political parties nominated presidential
candidates, bringing the total number of aspirants to five.
There are no surprises in the candidates selected; each party's
titular leader received the nod. The two leading candidates are
Jose Napoleon Duarte for the center-left Christian Democratic
Party (PDC), and Roberto D'Aubuisson for the rightist Nation-
alist Republican Alliance (ARENA). Party members and
Salvadorans abroad reportedly attempted unsuccessfully to derail
'Aubuisson's candidacy on account of his poor international
reputation.
None of the parties has selected a vice-presidential candi-
date, probably in anticipation of coalition offers from rivals.
However, it is unlikely that coalitions will coalesce before
each party has tested its strength with the electorate in the
first round of a presidential contest, and vice-presidential
candidates will probably be initially selected from the ranks of
each party. The only such candidate bruited so far is Foreign
Minister Fidel Chavez Mena, who has been reluctant to accept his
selection by a PDC nominating convention.
Specific actions the guerrillas may take to discredit the
election remain uncertain. Their experience in March 1982
probably has convinced them that they cannot stop the balloting
on a country-wide basis. Guerrilla forces, however, are likely
to continue to intensify military operations in eastern El
Salvador in order to render the electoral climate there
extremely tenuous. In a September meeting, Cuban President
Castro reportedly urged such an intensification on guerrilla
leaders, according to a clandestine report. In addition,
insurgent military successes might prompt the long-rumored
proclamation of a "liberated zone under insurgent control" as a
means to discredit the voting.
SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
MORNING SUMMARY
December 23, 1983
Current Reports
PR
1. Lebanon: INR Military Update
2. Jordan: Preparing To Deal with a Post-Tripoli Arafat
3. Egypt: Arafat's Visit
4. Kuwait: Arrests of Palestinians
5. Greece: Progress Possible toward Cyprus Settlement
6. France: Planning Rapprochement with Soviet Union
7. USSR: Dobrynin To Skip Party Plenum
8. Afghanistan
A. Mujahidin Abandon Border Post
B. Soviets Lukewarm about Cordovez Mission
9. Bulgaria/USSR: Differences Grow during Andropov Era
10. Nicaragua/El Salvador: Arms Traffic Continues
Analysis
1. South Africa/Angola: Few Risks in the Military Withdrawal
2. USSR: Waiting for Andropov
3. Argentina: Fast Start for Alfonsin
DECLASSIFIED
NLS F97-044 #11
Classified by: M. Charles Hill and
Hugh Montgomery
BY Co NARA, DATE 1/17/11 Declassify on: Originating Determination
Agency's
Required
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR M08-099 #57291
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
57291
BY
3
NARA
DATE
5-7-10
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
E.O. 12958
CURRENT REPORTS
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(1) 3.5(c).1.4(e)
December 23, 1983
1.
LEBANON: INR MILITARY UPDATE
There was a brief exchange of gunfire yesterday involving the
Marines. The evacuation of the Christian enclave of Dayr al Qamar
continued with only one incident when a motar round struck a vehicle,
causing one injury. Most of the Phalange personnel have now
departed, but an estimated 2,000-3,000 civilian refugees are still to
leave. Before leaving Tripoli on Monday, Fatah forces turned over
most of their heavy weapons to the Islamic Unification Movement, a
Lebanese Sunni group. Five hundred Fatah evacuees are in Iraq, and
the majority of Arafat's forces are en route to North Yemen, with a
smaller contingent destined for Tunisia.
2.
JORDAN: PREPARING TO DEAL WITH A POST-TRIPOLI ARAFAT
Arafat's willingness to cooperate with King Hussein to revive the
peace process will have a profound effect on Jordan's future, Embassy
Amman reports. Hussein had hoped either to co-opt Arafat in his
present weakened state or to circumvent a Syrian-dominated PLO by
enlisting non-PLO Palestinian representatives in talks with Israel.
Hussein must prevent a PLO-Syrian rapprochement which could destroy
the chance of Arafat's joining his peace effort. The king will
therefore try to resume the dialogue with Arafat, seeking the
Palestinian cover he needs to go forward in the peace process. If
Hussein fails, he will have to explore other options regarding the
West Bank and Gaza. (CONFIDENTIAL)
3. EGYPT: ARAFAT'S VISIT
Arafat's visit to Cairo and meeting with President Mubarak was
formally denounced by the PLO's Executive Committee in a statement
issued in Tunis. The PFLP, DFLP, PFLP-GC, and Fatah dissidents also
condemned the move.
INR Comment: Arafat's decision to meet with Mubarak, after his
military defeat in Tripoli, may be meant to counterbalance the
Syrians and reassert his importance as a key player in inter-Arab
politics. He also has alerted his Palestinian colleagues that, on
some issues, he is ready to take a more independent line in the
post-Lebanon political environment. (CONFIDENTIAL)
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/
- 2 -
5. GREECE: PROGRESS POSSIBLE TOWARD CYPRUS SETTLEMENT
Prime Minister Papandreou told Ambassador Stearns December 22 that
movement is possible toward a Cyprus settlement despite the tense
situation there. UN Secretary General de Cuellar must take the
initiative, Papandreou said, because Turkey's recognition of Northern
Cyprus prevents useful discussions among the guarantor powers.
Papandreou, who is preparing for discussions with Cypriot President
Kyprianou, said the essential elements of a settlement should be:
departure of Turkish and Greek forces, reduction of the land area
controlled by Turkish Cypriots to perhaps 25 percent of the island,
and a government with a loose federal structure.
Ambassador Stearns' Comment: Papandreou is aware that most observers
believe he exerts pressure on Kyprianou not to compromise. It is
possible that Papandreou wished to record his "flexibility" in
advance of Kyprianou's arrival. (SECRET/EXDIS)
6. FRANCE: PLANNING RAPPROCHEMENT WITH SOVIET UNION
France plans to strengthen political contacts with the Soviet Union,
inviting First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Arkhipov
to visit France early next year, Embassy Paris reports. In a number
of recent statements, President Mitterrand has signaled a desire for
improved dialogue with the Soviets. The INF debate and the explusion
of 47 Soviet diplomats weakened the ties that Paris formerly main-
tained with Moscow. Now that the first deployments have taken place,
the French have decided to move. The government does not want to let
the FRG take the lead in promoting East-West dialogue.
Embassy Comment: The rapprochement will be limited, at least for the
time being. INF and the question of UK/French forces will not go
away, and the Mitterrand government's tough-minded view about dealing
with the Soviets is unlikely to change. (CONFIDENTIAL)
7. USSR: DOBRYNIN TO SKIP PARTY PLENUM
The Soviet Embassy has requested the customary VIP arrangements for
Dobrynin's arrival at Dulles Airport on December 23.
INR Comment: Dobrynin has missed the year-end plenum and Supreme
Soviet session several times in the past. During his month in
Moscow, he presumably reviewed US-Soviet relations with his
principals and may have contributed to the drafting of a Gromyko
speech for the Supreme Soviet session which begins on December 28.
(SECRET)
8.
AFGHANISTAN
A. Mujahidin Abandon Border Post
Reports from Peshawar indicate that Afghan mujahidin have departed
SECRET/EXDIS/
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/
- 3 -
the Afghan border complex at Torkham. Reportedly, Pakistan--which
now holds a number of Afghan soldiers from Torkham, deposited by the
mujahidin--pressured the mujahidin to leave the town.
INR Comment: The mujahidin's departure will relieve Pakistan, which
feared that insurgent action so close to its border would invite
direct Soviet retaliation against its territory. (CONFIDENTIAL)
B. Soviets Lukewarm about Cordovez Mission
The Soviet Union sees limited prospects for success in the resumption
of UN representative Cordovez's mission, a foreign ministry official
told. Embassy Moscow. Middle Eastern Department Counselor Ozhegov
blamed Pakistan for hampering Cordovez's effort by continuing to
provide a "haven for bandits" against the Karmal regime.
Embassy Comment: Ozhegov's emphasis upon Pakistan's role in blocking
Cordovez is a departure from past Soviet statements which held the US
responsible for Pakistan's unwillingness to compromise. The Soviets
may have concluded that President Zia is not, as they had earlier
hoped, prepared to come to terms with Karmal. Moscow does not seem
inclined to encourage Cordovez to undertake a new round of talks.
(CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS)
9.
BULGARIA/USSR: DIFFERENCES GROW DURING ANDROPOV ERA
The Soviet-Bulgarian differences which existed at the time of
Brezhnev's death have become more evident under Andropov, Embassy
Sofia reports. The Bulgarians are trying to fend off Soviet requests
for INF counterdeployments on Bulgarian soil, and President Zhivkov
has shown interest in closer ties with the West at a time when the
USSR is stressing the negative impact of NATO deployments on
East-West relations. This trend toward more independent action may
continue, though not at the cost of Bulgaria's loyalty to central
aspects of the Moscow line. Ultimately, Bulgaria remains dependent
on the USSR. (CONFIDENTIAL)
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/
SECRET/NOFORN
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - DECEMBER 23, 1983
1. SOUTH AFRICA/ANGOLA: FEW RISKS IN THE MILITARY WITHDRAWAL
South Africa has little to lose by withdrawing its military
forces from southern Angola for 30 days. In putting forward this
proposal, it is trying to be responsive to US insistence that
Pretoria move to higher diplomatic ground. Its choice of March
1984 as the provisional limit of "disengagement" further reduces
the small risk the move entails.
*
*
*
The South African proposal is similar to proposals dis-
cussed by Angolan and South African negotiators at Cape Verde in
December 1982 and February 1983, and comes at a time when South
African forces are engaged in deep air and ground penetrations in
southern Angola. The extent of their present operations is not
yet clear: they have moved well outside the salient occupied
since 1981 and may be attempting to destroy the remaining SWAPO
bases in the area or to drive SWAPO (and Angolan) forces farther
north. The operations coincide with UNITA'S move into parts of
the South African salient where UNITA is not normally present.
The South African proposal to withdraw does not address the UNITA
problem, but a withdrawal of South African troops to northern
Namibia would leave UNITA elements in the salient, with resupply
bases across the border.
The South African stipulation that "disengagement" begin on
January 31 and last for 30 days means that the SADF is being
given six to eight weeks to wrap up its ongoing military cam-
paign. This corresponds roughly to the duration of previous
South African cross-border operations of similar magnitude. It
is possible that civilian policy makers in Pretoria agreed to
allow the present operation to run its course to secure South
African military acquiescence to the proposal.
With UNITA forces serving as a tripwire, the SADF is not
risking a quick Angolan/Cuban occupation of the salient. Also,
by warning that remaining outside Angola for 30 days will be con-
tingent on the FAPLA not exploiting its absence, the South
Africans have left the door open for reentry. They can deploy
quickly from their bases just across the Namibian border.
Finally, the present rainy season, which favors SWAPO's guerrilla
warfare and restricts vehicular movement, will end in March in
time for preparations for a new cycle of incursions, if needed.
Whether the Angolans accept or reject the South African
overtures, there is no way they can exploit them to South
Africa's disadvantage. In the meantime, South Africa continues
to hold a clear strategic advantage and now has advanced a
diplomatic pawn as well.
DECLASSIFIED
NLS F97-044 #13
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 6/18/01
SECRET/NOFORN
SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
- 2 -
2. USSR: WAITING FOR ANDROPOV
Andropov is expected to chair next week's party plenum and
to appear at the Supreme Soviet session opening on December 28.
Both meetings will approve the 1984 plan and budget, and Gromyko
probably will address the legislature on foreign affairs. If
there are personnel changes, they will most likely involve
junior politburo members and party secretaries.
*
*
*
The latest indications of Andropov's ability to function in
public are mixed. He has reportedly postponed meetings with
Trudeau and Armand Hammer. The continuing police purge of
corrupt officials and several honorable retirements recently of
aged local party leaders suggest, however, that his programs are
being implemented under his supervision. But Andropov must
chair the party plenum (opening next Monday or Tuesday), or
grave doubts will be cast on his ability to function in office.
Because of his prolonged absence, he may already be less able to
manipulate the current party elections in his favor. To date,
no personnel changes have occurred at the oblast party-election
meetings now in progress.
The prospects seem poor for leadership changes at the
plenum. The new Uzbek party boss could be given a candidate
membership on the politburo, although recent precedent argues
against it. Andropov's choice to head the party personnel
department, Ligachev, might rise to the rank of CPSU secretary
at the expense of Ivan Kapitonov, but Chernenko is not likely to
move from his job as ideology secretary despite the December 15
attack on him via party criticism of his former bailiwick in
Moldavia.
Andropov's duties at the three-day legislative session are
less demanding; he could skip some of the sessions at which the
plan and budget are discussed. However, he will be expected to
attend opening day, when Gosplan chief Baybakov and Finance
Minister Garbuzov speak and Gromyko surveys the international
scene.
Garbuzov's announcement of the 1984 defense budget may con-
tain a message: the formal figure of 17.05 billion rubles has
held steady for the last three budgets; if raised now, as some
Soviet spokesmen have threatened, it would constitute a symbolic
response to US defense spending without saying anything about
actual Soviet outlays.
Andropov's attendence at the closing day of the session
(probably December 30) is also expected. After that, he has no
more scheduled public duties until January 27, when he should
attend the Moscow city party elections.
SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
3. ARGENTINA: FAST START FOR ALFONSIN
Backed by a strong electoral mandate, President Alfonsin
has moved quickly to fulfill promises on human rights, military
restructuring, and labor-union reform. The armed forces are in
no position to resist Alfonsin's attempts to curb their internal-
security role and assert civilian dominance. Economic recovery
remains Alfonsin's biggest challenge. Announced austerity
measures would probably satisfy IMF negotiators, but appear at
odds with other facets of the government's program.
*
*
*
Alfonsin moved swiftly and dramatically against the
military--retiring generals and admirals, cutting budgets,
subjecting former junta members to trial for human rights
abuses, and altering the hierarchical structure of the services.
There has been no forceful response from the armed forces. Many
younger officers probably sympathize with measures against their
erstwhile commanders, whom they hold responsible for the sad
state of the military. Also, Alfonsin has acted with relative
moderation. He retired about 25 army generals, but rumors had
it that he would axe twice that many. Moreover, while nine
former junta members will be tried, the vast majority of
officers guilty of abuses during the "dirty war" against
terrorism will almost certainly escape penalties.
Organized labor is a more likely source of near-term oppo-
sition than the military. Not only are policy differences
likely, but Alfonsin's promise to democratize the unions poses a
personal and political threat to the long-time Peronist bosses
who dominate the national labor scene. By demanding court-
supervised union elections, Alfonsin is gambling that his
electoral support from labor will surface on the factory floor.
The government's early economic measures suggest internal
inconsistency. Intended dramatic reduction of the fiscal
deficit, primarily through increasing and improving tax collec-
tions, conflicts with a projected five-percent growth rate and
reduced unemployment. Only a surge in foreign investment or
capital repatriation--unlikely over the next six months at
least--could balance the deflationary impact on consumers of the
taxes. Full implementation of the announced Alfonsin program
will bring contraction rather than the promised expansion.
Government spokesmen, including Alfonsin, have promised to
honor Argentina's international obligations. However, Economics
Minister Bernardo Grinspun has asked the country's commercial-
bank creditors for a moratorium until mid-1984 on payments on
public sector debt. It is unclear whether the moratorium would
cover interest as well as principal payments.
CONFIDENTIAL