NSDD 137 United States Nuclear Arms Control Strategy for 1984

As a result of this Soviet failure, the Soviet Union is now in the difficult position of seeking means to avoid their clear responsibility for walking away from both the START and INF negotiations. However, no matter what they now choose to do, the legacy of their actions will continue to haunt them and the mantle of responsibility will sit heavy on their shoulders. let Given this situation, I believe that the United States should stay firmly on the high road that it has traveled thus far in pursuit of meaningful, equitable, verifiable arms control involving significant reductions in nuclear arsenals. This means that we will not compromise our principles by chasing expedient agreement. We will not entertain proposals which involve preemptive concessions to attempt to entice the Soviets back into negotiations before they sincerely wish to sit with us and solve problems. And, we will not reward Soviet intransigence, thus turning their policy failure into victory and dissipating the strength we have accumulated due to the principled, yet flexible stance that we have taken over the last three years. LET On the other hand, maintaining the high road does mean that, while we avoid the pitfalls cited above, we will continue vigorously to conduct a sincere, positive effort to reach agreement with the Soviet Union. While encouraging the Soviets to return to the START and INF tables in Geneva, we will remain ready to talk at any time and in any place without preconditions. We will take every appropriate opportunity to explain patiently the virtue of our sound, flexible positions in both START and INF. We will use every appropriate avenue to explore ways of finding appropriate ways to bridge the distance between the requirements of our principled positions and the legitimate concerns of the Soviet Union. We will remain prepared to discuss means of trading areas of U.S. advantage of concern to the Soviet Union for areas of Soviet advantage of concern to the United States and our Allies. And, we will make full use of time during which we wait for a positive Soviet response to fully prepare ourselves to exploit opportunities that may present themselves for making progress towards meaningful agreements that meet our criteria. 1st Toward this goal, the Senior Arms Control Policy Group (SACPG) will complete, on a priority basis, its current efforts toward identifying and evaluating for me the full range of potential U.S. options in the START and INF areas under likely alternative scenarios. This work should address options which flesh out and enhance our current position. However, it should also identify the key differences between the U.S. and Soviet positions, and identify options that could, under certain conditions, bridge those differences. I do not intend nor will I permit us to repeat the mistakes made by previous arms control agreements. However, if elements of previous agreements put in the right context meet our needs, we should not ignore them. Finally, the SACPG work should also address likely Soviet initiatives and prepare us to appropriately respond to them. (5) In OF 10 cen UNCLASSIFIED