NSDD 160 Preparing for Negotiations with Soviet Union

SECRET ESECRET UNCLASSIFIED 3 Verification. The national security of the United States also The Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Arms requires the effective verification of arms control agreements. Control and Disarmament Agency, and other senior officials, have expressed concern about the process by which verification considerations are factored into the development of U.S. arms control policy and specific U.S. positions. In consideration of the above, it is directed that the following actions be taken: -- As the instructions for the upcoming negotiating round are developed, and subsequently as U.S. arms control are considered, the SACG will assure that are issues The Arms Control Verification Committee and the appropriate Interdepartmental Groups will support the SACG in this effort. These assessment should address the overall effectiveness of verification, U.S. monitoring capability (to include Soviet cheating scenarios) and the possibility will of safeguards. The Arms Control Verification Committee work with the appropriate Interdepartmental Groups and advise the SACG on the verifiability of the general approaches and the specific positions recommended to me by the SACG for approval as part of the instructions to the U.S. delegation. Additionally, the Director of Central Intelligence and -- the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, working with other Departments and Agencies as appropriate, requested to forward to the Natio; al Security Advisor a are report providing: (1) a more detailed assessment of the handling of verification issues in the policy development the process; and, (2) specific recommendations as to how available for my review by March 15. 18) process can be strengthened. This report should be UNCLASSIFIED SECRET SECRFT-