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OCR Page 1 of 4SECRET
ESECRET
UNCLASSIFIED
3
Verification. The national security of the United States also
The Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Arms
requires the effective verification of arms control agreements.
Control and Disarmament Agency, and other senior officials, have
expressed concern about the process by which verification
considerations are factored into the development of U.S. arms
control policy and specific U.S. positions. In consideration of
the above, it is directed that the following actions be taken:
-- As the instructions for the upcoming negotiating round
are developed, and subsequently as U.S. arms control
are considered, the SACG will assure that
are issues
The Arms
Control Verification Committee and the appropriate
Interdepartmental Groups will support the SACG in this
effort. These assessment should address the overall
effectiveness of verification, U.S. monitoring capability
(to include Soviet cheating scenarios) and the possibility will
of safeguards. The Arms Control Verification Committee
work with the appropriate Interdepartmental Groups and
advise the SACG on the verifiability of the general
approaches and the specific positions recommended to me by
the SACG for approval as part of the instructions to the
U.S. delegation.
Additionally, the Director of Central Intelligence and
-- the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
working with other Departments and Agencies as appropriate,
requested to forward to the Natio; al Security Advisor
a are report providing: (1) a more detailed assessment of the
handling of verification issues in the policy development the
process; and, (2) specific recommendations as to how
available for my review by March 15. 18)
process can be strengthened. This report should be
UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET
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