Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT(Nduel cendual Aide) 366 R OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE DECLASSIFIED WASHINGTON State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 June 19, 1952 By DEB NLT, Date 7-29-85 TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS KOREAN TRUCE TALKS: The British Foreign Office has relayed to our Embassy in London a report that on June 15 the Indian Ambassador to Peiping had a conversation with Chou En-lai, Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, from which it appeared that the Chinese Communists are willing to consider two alternative proposals for a solution of the issue of prisoners of war in Korea. The first proposal would return to the Communists the round figure of 20,000 Chinese and 90,000 Korean prisoners (or per - haps a total of 100,000, provided 20,000 Chinese are included). This proposal is to the Communists the preferable one of the two. Under the second proposal, the UN Command would accept in principle that all prisoners, on conclusion of an armistice, could return to their homes; those who elected otherwise could be brought to Panmunjom not under military escort and interviewed there by a committee from "neutral states agreed upon" plus Red Cross representatives from both sides. The Chinese and North Koreans would abide by the views of the prisoners as expressed in these interviews. The Communists would be willing to discuss such a proposal if the UN Command agreed that prima facie all prisoners must be assumed to desire repatriation and only those who oppose should be interviewed. The British Foreign Office has commented to our Embassy that the first proposal appears to be a Chinese attempt to bridge the gap between the figure of 116,000, which the Communists have demanded for repatriation, and the 70,000 suggested by the UN Command as a result of screening. The British consider this pro- posal unacceptable but interesting in that it suggests the Chinese are prepared to compromise. The British regard the second proposal as a great step forward and one which may provide a basis for agreement. However, they feel it would be wise to seek confirmation of this sur- prising development before proceeding further and note that these pro- posals must be regarded with caution due to the Indian Ambassador's un- reliability as a reporter. On the other hand, the British think this may be a genuine feeler and that it should be followed up cautiously but promptly. TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION