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OCR Page 1 of 3City
OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
V 12065, Sec. 3-402
WASHINGTON
Dept. E.O. Guidelines, March 9-10-85 6, 1982
State By DEB NLT, Date
August 5, 1952
SECRETSECURIT INF ORMA TION
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
EGYPT
British Ambassador Stevenson gave Ambassador Caffery
yesterday the following account of his meeting on Sunday night
with Prime Minister Ali Maher, held at the latter's request. Maher told
Stevenson that certain police officers, with the enthusiastic backing of the
army, were insisting on a purge in the police similar to that which the army
carried out. They had submitted a list of 97 police officers in all ranks
for immediate removal. Maher said he would go along with this purge.
Maher asked Stevenson what was the meaning of the British maneuvers in
Libya. Stevenson replied that as the Prime Minister knew, the British
forces in the area were in a state of alert and he inquired what assurances
the present Egyptian Government could give as to the maintenance of
security. Stevenson said that to recommend to his government a stand-down
was a very grave responsibility and he would wish to see how the situation
developed in the next few days after the Regency Council had assumed office.
Maher said that when the provisional Regency Council takes its oath before
the Cabinet Maher will issue a statement of policy and after that the military
in Egypt will assume a position subordinate to the civil government. Steven-
son says that Maher seemed "not unhappy' 'that Stevenson would postpone
recommendation of any change in the state of alert of the British forces for
the time being.
Stevenson will see the Prime Minister tomorrow to have the
latter's definite word on the question of recognition. Stevenson suggested
that letters could be exchanged merely between Elizabeth and Fouad Ahmed
II
without mentioning any title, or that, preferably, the British Government
would merely recognize the Provisional Regency Council, with no titles or
names being mentioned. Maher seemed to like the latter alternative.
Maher confirmed to Stevenson his unwillingness to resume con-
versations on the Sudan for two months. Stevenson agreed but suggested the
possibility of military conversations meanwhile to ascertain the equipment
requirements of the Egyptian army. Maher replied that he preferred not to
establish a bipartite military committee for this purpose and said he thought
it would be wiser for Stevenson and himself to handle these questions alone.
SECRET SECURITY INF ORMA TION