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City OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE V 12065, Sec. 3-402 WASHINGTON Dept. E.O. Guidelines, March 9-10-85 6, 1982 State By DEB NLT, Date August 5, 1952 SECRETSECURIT INF ORMA TION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS EGYPT British Ambassador Stevenson gave Ambassador Caffery yesterday the following account of his meeting on Sunday night with Prime Minister Ali Maher, held at the latter's request. Maher told Stevenson that certain police officers, with the enthusiastic backing of the army, were insisting on a purge in the police similar to that which the army carried out. They had submitted a list of 97 police officers in all ranks for immediate removal. Maher said he would go along with this purge. Maher asked Stevenson what was the meaning of the British maneuvers in Libya. Stevenson replied that as the Prime Minister knew, the British forces in the area were in a state of alert and he inquired what assurances the present Egyptian Government could give as to the maintenance of security. Stevenson said that to recommend to his government a stand-down was a very grave responsibility and he would wish to see how the situation developed in the next few days after the Regency Council had assumed office. Maher said that when the provisional Regency Council takes its oath before the Cabinet Maher will issue a statement of policy and after that the military in Egypt will assume a position subordinate to the civil government. Steven- son says that Maher seemed "not unhappy' 'that Stevenson would postpone recommendation of any change in the state of alert of the British forces for the time being. Stevenson will see the Prime Minister tomorrow to have the latter's definite word on the question of recognition. Stevenson suggested that letters could be exchanged merely between Elizabeth and Fouad Ahmed II without mentioning any title, or that, preferably, the British Government would merely recognize the Provisional Regency Council, with no titles or names being mentioned. Maher seemed to like the latter alternative. Maher confirmed to Stevenson his unwillingness to resume con- versations on the Sudan for two months. Stevenson agreed but suggested the possibility of military conversations meanwhile to ascertain the equipment requirements of the Egyptian army. Maher replied that he preferred not to establish a bipartite military committee for this purpose and said he thought it would be wiser for Stevenson and himself to handle these questions alone. SECRET SECURITY INF ORMA TION