Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 December 1, 1952 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 By DEB NLT, Date 9-4-00 SEGRET -35 SECURITY INF ARMATION il SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS KOREA Indian Foreign Office chiet R. K. Nehru has told Embassy New Delhi representatives categorically that there has been no change of any kind in India's policy toward the Korean question in the General Assembly and that India would definitely support its resolution. He said that the delay in Indian action in New York has been entirely due to the aesire of Indian delegate Menon to have more time to prepare his speech and to clear it with New Delhi. The Foreign Office official said that he had given out the information which appeared in the New Delhi press yesterday that India was again in contact with Peiping through diplomatic channels with a view to clari- tying the Indian resolution since India thinks some of China's objections are due to a nisunderstanding. The press statement said that India would continue its efforts in the hope that the rejection by China con- veyed through Vishinsky is not final and that China will give further consideration to the matter. Meanwhile, Ambassador Bowles reports that during the last few days he has personally talked to most chiefs of missions in New Delhi plus Prime Minister Nehru and several officials in the Ministry of External Affairs and that without exception it 1S their belief that the USSR and China have not seen eye to eye on the question of a Korean armistice. The Chinese Communists were originally noncommittal on the Indian resolution and definitely led the Indian Government to believe it might be acceptable. The very violence of Vishinsky's attack has led observers, including the Prime Minister, to believe that, following private talks with the Chinese, the Soviets were attempting further pressure against possible Peiping acceptance of the resolution. In this connection our Ambassador in Tokyo reports that an official of the Indian Embassy there has informed an Embassy Officer that he "knew for a fact" that the Indian formula for a Korean truce would not have been presented to the UN had the Indian Government not had prior assurances from Peiping that its terms were acceptable. The Indian representative predicted that the Chinese rejection would be understood in New Delhi as submission to Soviet pressure and would have much influence on Indian officials as demonstrating Peiping's subservience to Moscow and the fact that Chinese Communists might at any time desert their own best interests for other foreign adventures dictated by Moscow. SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION