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OCR Page 1 of 2NCT/NAVALAIDE) 448
DECLASSIFIED
OFFICE OF
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
WASHINGTON
By DEB NLT, Date 9-11-85
December 22,1952
TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
IRAN
During a conversation with Ambassador Dunn in Paris, British
Foreign Secretary Eden referred to the reports that the
Export-Import Bank might take some action today on a $25 million loan
to Iran. He strongly urged that any action on this loan be postponed at
least for the present. He said that although this loan, as he understands
it, would not make any liquid funds available to Iran, it would be impossible
to explain that to the British public. The general impression, he said,
would be that this loan would make Mosadeq's position more rigid
and enable him to hold out in any negotiations undertaken as a result
of the recent Anglo-American conversations.
Ambassador Gifford has independently stated that he
doubts if this loan, which initially will have "no early benefit to the
Iranian economy", will improve the psychological atmosphere in Iran
sufficiently for Mosadeq to adopt a reasonable approach to an oil
settlement. In view of these opinions, the decision has been made to
cancel today's meeting of the Bank and defer consideration of the loan.
Ambassador Henderson will carry through the effort to persuade Mosadeq
to accept the principle of arbitration as contemplated in the Paris
discussions with Eden. However, we have made clear to the British
that it may be necessary to move quickly following Henderson's approach
and we wish to be kept informed on any further British views regarding
a lump sum settlement.
GERMANY
During a conversation with Socialist opposition chairman
Ollenhauer, Acting High Commissioner Reber strongly
emphasized the growing anxiety in US and NATO circles over the lagging
European initiative on ratifying the EDC and contractual agreements.
Reber made it quite clear that the US was firmly convinced that the EDC
was the most workable and feasible solution to an effective European
defense and that any other plans would only mean an interminable and
even dangerous delay.
TOP SECREI SECURITI INF ORMATIO