Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT (Naval Aide) 122 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE the DECLASSIFIED WASHINGTON 7 Dept. E.O. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 12065, Sec. 3-402 November 22, 1950 State By DEB NLT, Date 6-12-85 TOPSECRET SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS KOREA In view of the possibility that Jebb, UK delegate to the UN, may be instructed to present to the Security Council UK proposals for a demilitarized zone in northern Korea, we have instructed our Charge in London to see Foreign Minister Bevin immediately and to urge upon him in the strongest terms our belief that it would be most harmful for Jebb to put forward the UK proposal in the immediate future. Our reasons for opposing this action are: 1) with the offensive about to start in Korea, it would be most confusing to General MacArthur and his forces; 2) before the Chinese Communist representatives have arrived in New York and their attitude explored, such a proposal would constitute a commitment which they mightregard as a starting point for bargaining for something more; 3) that the terms of the proposal would present grave military problems and dangers which have not been explored adequately; and 4) until the results of the forthcoming offensive in Korea are known, it is impossible to ascertain what course safely can and should be adopted. Since we would be compelled to oppose such proposals if made, we hope that we can avoid a disclosure of US-UK divergence in this matter and that Bevin will not proceed with this proposal pending further US-UK consultations. NEPAL We have instructed Ambassador Henderson to present to Indian Prime Minister Nehru our strong views that the Government of India should refrain from embarking on politico-military intervention in Nepal but should continue to explore peaceful means of solving the situation presented by the flight of the King of Nepal and the subsequent designation of the King's young son as successor to the throne by the prevailing Nepalese Government. These instructions, reinforcing the repeated urging for the exercise of restraint by the Indian Government on the part of Ambassador Henderson and the UK High Commissioner in India, followed closely upon the expressed intent of the Indian Government to recognize the old King and an apparent intent to give him political and military support in the contest for head of the Nepalese state. In the meantime, the UK High Commissioner has requested that he be instructed to ask Nehru to TOP SECRET