NSDD 33 United States Approach to Stategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) Negotiations

TOP 8ECRET CHRON FILE m TOP SECRET 2 At the same time, the U.S. will propose separate constraints on slow-flying systems. The differences in treatment of bombers and cruise missiles will provide us a means of maintaining suffi- cient nuclear force to meet U.S. security requirements, even while significantly reducing our ballistic missile capability. It should also encourage the Soviet Union to turn to less destabilizing systems to meet its deterrent requirements. The United States will propose a phased approach to the START negotiations. During the first phase, as in the INF negotiations, we will focus on the most threatening systems, in this case ballis- tic missiles. Elements of the U.S. position during Phase I will include: -- Limit ballistic missile warheads to 5,000 for each side. Limit ICBM warheads to one-half the overall warhead total. - Limit total deployed ballistic missiles to 850 for each side. -- Establish an internal U.S. negotiating goal of ensuring a reduction of Soviet throw weight as a result of Phase I to below 2.5 Mkg, using indirect limits. Hold this goal as sensitive information on a strict need-to-know basis and not for public release. -- Direct throw-weight limits will not be demanded of the Soviets during the first phase. However, we will clearly lay down the principle with the Soviets that we expect the limits on mis- siles and missile warheads to result, in effect, in a sig- nificant reduction in the total missile throw weight to either side as a result of Phase I. Building on this, we intend to negotiate direct limits on throw weight at equal and further reduced levels as a major portion of the second phase of negotiations. -- Explain our intent to focus on ballistic systems during the first phase. Stress the basic difference between ballistic systems and slow-flying, clearly second-strike systems. -- Agree to equal limits on bombers at roughly current levels with BACKFIRE included, but defer further reductions or discussion of constraints on slow-flying systems (i.e., bombers and cruise missiles) until the second phase. TOP SECRET cy 1A of 18 copies TOP SECRET NSC