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OCR Page 1 of 158
party attacked so that they can be largely anticipated by an
aggressor. Facing no defenses, there can be little doubt that,
if ballistic missiles function reliably, they will arrive on
target. Finally, predicting the specif@ levels of damage they
can inflict on a target is largely a mater pf physics. Their
effectiveness does not depend on the skfll, courage or training
of men in the loop. It depends on the echtological reliability
of the system which dan be tested and measured in peacetime.
(U)
If such systems were eliminated, the uncertäinty in the mind of
an aggressor must incruase because of thents of their unique
characteristics. Provided that we take steps to ensure that
other forms of attack are not permitted to rebuild that certainty
over time, the result can be a significant net gain in terms of
the quality of deterrence and, in turn, in our security and that
of our allies. In considering the requirements for maintaining
deterrence in such a future world, a high premium should be
placed on identifying, determining the feasibility of, and taking
such steps. (U)
Measuring the Impact on terrence. In mes aring our ability to
deter in an alternati ture, we must ake into account the
elimination of the ntri ution of 1 illistic missiles and
the corresponding élativ increase the egree of our
uncertainty in the effectiveness of our retaliatory
strike, should deter Ince fail. Buthar the same time, we must
also properly reflect in jur measurement the contribution that
this same inherent untert linty makes in letGring an aggressor.
We should also consid r the even more fi adarental contribution
that is made to our should we Fice an aggressor who is
not rational or finds hin Self placed trational situation
by events that have beyond his but who is armed
only with systems agannt which we can build a reasonable defense
should we choose to do so. We must also weigh the real and
immediate benefits of removing an immense, existing threat to the
United States that is literally only thirty minutes away. Nor
can we forget that, unlike Soviet stated policy, US strategic and
nuclear forces are intended to make an explicitly identified
contribution to the deterrence of conventional attack on our
Allies and our forces deployed in support of our Allies. (U)
In accomplishing this surement, to the tent practical, we
should attempt to app bach the problem om the point of view of
a net assessment bnsiderationsé Invo ved. Our present
analytic tools will falleshort of Iving all the questions
such an alternat We presents There pre, until new
methods adapted e challenges por unities of this
alternative futureva e fi tly developed, we ill have to depend
heavily on the exper; enci expertise, risou cefulness,
creativity, and judgment bf our profess onal military and defense
community. I believi that this, too, pl ay si into a significant
aspect of our streng n. (U)
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