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Memorandum of Conversation with Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett

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  • Része ennek Dean Acheson Papers, Secretary of State Files

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69 TOP BECRE 5 ARCHIVES RECORDS AND 79 "NATIONAL E SERVICE** March 24, 1951 Mr. Lovett telephoned the Secretary at 9:20 this morning and said that he had been with the Joint Chiefs of Staff for about an hour discussing the MacArthur statement. The JCS had divided the problem into three parts. The first part related to the embarrassment with the 13 countries occasioned by MacArthur's statement at the time this Government was negotiating with the 13 countries to agree on a proposed statement by President Truman. The second problem which this statement created was its effect in complicating any US proposals looking toward a settlement. It brought up the question again of how many negotiators there are; i.e., whether the State Department, the United Nations or MacArthur was the negotiator. The third problem was the matter of military discipline. The JCS had decided to a ddress themselves solely to that question at the present. They were considering it in the light of the directive of December 5 which had been sent to MacArthur, among others. That directive specifically requires the Commander in the field to clear any statements, speeches, or anything else relating to political matters with Washington. They were also considering it in connection with the March 20 announcement of the President's intentions with relation to Korea (which Mr. Lovett said he thought was a remarkably fine succinet pronouncement. In the light of these two clear statements, it would be perfectly obvious if it were anybody else who^had made the statement which MacArthur made yesterday, he would be relieved of his command at once. However, the JSC recognized that the consequences of relieving MacArthur are startling. It would have its effect at once in the field and it would probably prejutice the success of the Japanese peace treaty negotiations. He said there were other compelling considerations also. On the other hand, they do not feel that they can just let this slide by. DECLASSIFIED E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 1(D) or (B) 5-12-26 Dept. of State letter, Aug.9.1973 TOP Bz NLT- He NARS Date 6-24-26