Notes on a Meeting of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Adrian Fisher, and Lucius D. Battle
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OCR Page 1 of 2*NATIONAL
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ARCHIVES AND
RECORDS
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SERVICE
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Notes on meeting of - secretary - acheson, with fisher 5/25/51 f Battle
on mac arthur hearing testimony
Formosa
Let me state in two minutes exactly what Formosan
policy was, because it was simple and clear.Exax
From the fall of 1948, before I came to the State
Department, until the day the Korean war started the
policy of the entire Government, agreed in by everybody,
was that Formosa had. strategic importance for the
United States. That importance lay in the danger which
it would present if occupied by hostile parties, rather
than in any need for it to belong to or be occupied by
the United States. Also it was the fundamental policy
agreed in by all parties that no armed forces of the
United States could be committed or used in the defense
of Formosa because of the limited amount of our forces
and other positions of greater strategic importance which had
to be the first concern of those forces.
On those principles, there was never any change
from the time the matter was first considered until
June, 1950. It was unanimous and complete on all sides.
(Next possible approach)
In the very closing days of 1949 the Joint Chiefs
of Staff recommended sending limited amounts of
aid in addition to what was being furnished under the
$125 million and sending a military mission. That
question came up for discussion at the end of 1949 and
opening days of 1950. At that time it was decided not
to do this. I was opposed to doing it and so were the
others for the reason that the fundamental decisions,
being as we have stated, that we could not and would
not use US forces to defend Formosa, and, since it could
not be held indefinitely without those forces, to
commit US prestige through renewal of aid and renewal of
a mission was to court disaster. That was the view
I expressed at the time and the view I still think was
right. After considering a 1 aspects the President decided
that was the way it was going to be and that led to the
statement of January 5.
DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and S(D) or (E)
SECRE
Dept. of State letter, Aug. 9, 1973
Bar MLE- HC NARS Date 6-25-76
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