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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 March 30, 1951 By DEB NLT, Date 9-4-85 SECRE T SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS FOUR POWER Ambassador Jessup feels that any posi- EXPLORATORY TALKS tive action in today's quadripartite meeting on the new Soviet proposal would probably result in a split in the Western position, and he proposes therefore, pending further talks at Government level in Washington today, that today's Paris meeting should be handled as follows: 1) It would be a closed session (i.e. no press briefing); 2) Discussion would be confined to testing the Soviet position on the actual wording by comparing their March 28th proposal with our March 15th proposal; and 3) We would not introduce the French proposal (the divided agenda) today. Jessup adds that point 3 seems to him not a question of choice but an essential recog- nition of the fact that there is no chance of a tripartite acceptance of the idea of submitting the French formula in time for this afternoon's meeting. SPAIN A Foreign Office official has given Embassy London the following informa- - tion on British policy toward Spain. Consideration is being given to the desirability of associating Spain in Western defense arrangements. The Cabinet may possibly examine the substance of this question next week and instructions may then be sent to Washington. However, the British Em- bassy in Washington has been instructed to inform the State Department as soon as possible that the UK could not agree with the US in the matter of a unilateral approach to Franco, and hoped that there would be no further publicity from the US. The British want it to be unmistakably clear to Franco that the American approach was unilateral, and they want to avoid the impression that British and French silence implied their acquiescence. The Foreign Office official said that the British position would probably have to be made public in London after Parliament reassembles on April 3rd, if not before. He expressed the personal view that arrangements with Spain should go beyond an exchange of arms for bases, and should include economic assistance, which, however, should not be granted unless Franco agreed to measures of liberalization. SECRET