Copy of New York Times Newspaper Article, "General MacArthur's Statement Indicating Military Stalemate Unless Conditions Change," with Attachment

NATIONAS GEN. MACARTHUR'S STATEMENT INDICATING MILITARY STALEMATE ARCHIVES ARLD RECORDS UNLESS CONDITIONS CHANGE, and March 7, 1951 Progress of the campaign continues to be satisfactory, with all three services -- Army, Navy and Air -- performing well their completely coor- dinated tactical missions. Designed to meet abnormal military inhibitions, our strategic plan, involving constant movement to keep the enemy off balance with a corresponding limitation upon his initiative, remains unaltered. Our selection of the battle area furthermore has forced him into the military disadvantage of fi ghting far from his base and permitted greater employment of our air and sea arms against which he has little defense. There has been a resultant continuing and exhausting attrition upon both his manpower and supplies. There should be no illusions in this matter, however. In such a campaign of maneuver, as our battle lines shift north the supply position of the enemy will progressively improve, just as in- versely the effectiveness of our air potential will progressively diminish, thus in turn causing his numerical ground superiority to become of in- creasing battlefield significance. Assuming no diminution of the enemy's flow of ground forces and material to the Korean battle area, a continuation of the existing limita- tion upon our freedom of counter-offensive action, and no major additions to our orgadizational strength, the battle lines cannot fail in time to reach a point of theoretical military stalemate. Thereafter our further advance would militarily benefit the enemy more than it would ourselves. The exact place of stabilization is of necessity a fluctuating vari- able dependent upon the shifting relative strengths of forces committed and will constantly move up or down. Even now there are indications that the enemy is attempting to build up from China a new and massive offensive for the spring. These are the salient factors which must continue to delimit strategical thinking and planning as the campaign proceeds. This does not alter the fact, however, that the heavy toll we have taken of the enemy's military power since its commitment to war in Korea cannot fail to weaken his hold upon the Chinese nation and people and materially dampen his ardor for engaging in other aggressive adventures in Asia. Even under our existing conditions of restraint it should be clearly evident to the Communist foes now committed against us that they cannot hope to impose their will in Korea by military force. They have failed twice -- once through North Korean forces, and now through the military might of the army of Communist China. Theirs was the aggression in both cases. Theirs has been the double failure. That they should continue this savage slaughter despite an almost hopeless chance of ultimate mili- tary success is a measure of wanton disregard of international decencies and restraints and displays a complete contempt for the sanctity of human life. No longer is there even a shallow pretense of concern for the welfare of the Korean nation and people, now being so ruthlessly and senselessly sacrificed. Through endless blood it is apparently hoped to enforce either international banditry or blackmail. Vital decisions hove yet to be made -- decisions far beyond the scope of the authority vested in me as the military commander, decisions which are neither solely political nor solely military, but which must provide on the highest international levels an answer to the obscurities which now becloud the unsolved problems raised by Red China's undeclared war in Korea. -- The New York Times, March 8, 1951