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This file contains:
From Glen Olds to Nixon, cc: Haldeman, Garment, Mitchell, Keogh, re: Report on Frank Lindsay's Cambridge Study Group on the transition and tasks of a new administration, 1 pg. [Memo], 9/12/1968
From Bryce Harlow to John Mitchell, re: suggested program development plan for Nixon Administration, 2 pgs. [Memo], 9/21/1968
From Anderson to DC, re: President Johnson's request for representatives on the problems of transition, 1pg. [Memo], 9/12/1968
From Simmons to Higby, concerning The Transition: National Intelligence Mechanics at the White House, 2 pgs. [Memo], 10/11/2016
Handwritten notes on Presidential transition, 4 pgs. [Other Document], 10/11/1968
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26126830
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WHSF: Returned, 32-34
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1
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26126830
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document
title
WHSF: Returned, 32-34
description
This file contains:
From Glen Olds to Nixon, cc: Haldeman, Garment, Mitchell, Keogh, re: Report on Frank Lindsay's Cambridge Study Group on the transition and tasks of a new administration, 1 pg. [Memo], 9/12/1968
From Bryce Harlow to John Mitchell, re: suggested program development plan for Nixon Administration, 2 pgs. [Memo], 9/21/1968
From Anderson to DC, re: President Johnson's request for representatives on the problems of transition, 1pg. [Memo], 9/12/1968
From Simmons to Higby, concerning The Transition: National Intelligence Mechanics at the White House, 2 pgs. [Memo], 10/11/2016
Handwritten notes on Presidential transition, 4 pgs. [Other Document], 10/11/1968
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Returned White House Special Files
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57649ccf65fe0015
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
32
34
09/12/1968
Memo
From Glen Olds to Nixon, cc: Haldeman,
Garment, Mitchell, Keogh, re: Report on
Frank Lindsay's Cambridge Study Group on
the transition and tasks of a new
administration, 1 pg.
32
34
09/21/1968
Memo
From Bryce Harlow to John Mitchell, re:
suggested program development plan for
Nixon Administration, 2 pgs.
32
34
09/12/1968
Memo
From Anderson to DC, re: President
Johnson's request for representatives on the
problems of transition, 1pg.
32
34
10/11
Memo
From Simmons to Higby, concerning The
Transition: National Intelligence Mechanics
at the White House, 2 pgs.
32
34
10/11/1968
Other Document
Handwritten notes on Presidential transition,
4 pgs.
Tuesday, August 05, 2008
Page 1 of 1
N
You have copy
ofthi already.
What was.your
NIXON FOR PRESIDENT COMMITTEE,
P.O. BOX 1968, TIMES SQUARE STATION,
action To
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10036
PHONE (212) 661-6400
Kreenspan
MEMORANDUM
To:
R.N.
Date: September 12, 1968
From: Glenn Olds
Subj: Report on Frank Lindsay's Cambridge Study Group on the transi-
tion and tasks of a new administration
After review of Frank's 30-page analysis of August 15 for R.N., dis-
cussed with R.N. in January, Hal Booth (I now have on loan from State
Farm doing the basic analysis of manpower need, input, and coordina-
tion) and I spent the evening with their group in Cambridge, getting
their recommendations and input. They are willing to continue to work
on this area, drawing on their rather rich resources. I worked out
an agenda of work for them that I need not burden you with now. The
agenda covered the substance of their report on (1) Personnel, (2)
Substantive program, (3) Government organization, and (4) Transitional
arrangements. (Note: see attached notes from meeting)
In the sensitive area of recommendations, however, they would like to
tap discreetly the judgment of unusually broad gauged people in the
area. It would strengthen their study if you were willing to indicate
your interest in their results. They propose the following which I
believe is both innocent, protective of you and the campaign, but use-
ful.
"Mr. Nixon is aware that we are doing this study and has indi-
cated that it could be helpful to him. However, this study
has not been commissioned by him, but rather is entirely 'self-
started' with the hope that advance work will help him and his
advisers meet the urgent problems of staffing a new administra-
tion.
11
Your reaction as to whether you concur or not will help me proceed in
using their help.
cc: Messrs. Haldeman
Garment
Mitchell
Keogh
file
TO:
John Mitchell
FROM:
Bryce Harlow
DATE:
September 21, 1968
RE:
Suggested Program Development Plan
for Nixon Administration
1. Retain Dr. Milton Eisenhower as Honorary Chairman.
2. Retain Dr. Paul McCracken as Operational Chairman.
3. Employ Roger Jones (Special Assistant to Director,
Bureau of the Budget) as*Executive Director to direct entire
effort under McCracken's policy guidance.
4. If Jones declines, Drs. Eisenhower and Arthur Burns
and McCracken should promptly agree on a suitable Executive
Director.
5. Until an Executive Director is employed, no additional
task forces will be activated, but those already in motion
will continue:
(a) Two now functioning -- Budget and Tax.
(b) Five in formation -- State-Federal Relations,
Financial Institutions, International Economic
Policy, Governmental Reorganization, Government-
Business Relations.
(c) Eleven other planned (stopped until Executive
Director is named).
(d) Five Advisory Groups in operation -- Economics,
Defense, Law Enforcement, Agriculture, Foreign
Policy.
6. If RN should desire it, Jones could handle transition,
as well as program development. In any case, RN should meet with
McCracken and Jones, to assure that objectives are clearly defined
and to make Jones know he is RN's specific choice for this work.
John Mitchell
-2-
September 21, 1968
7. Olds and Boothe will supply Jones, as requested,
suggested names for task forces from academic community;
Greenspan, et al will furnish names of others, as requested.
Neither Olds nor Research will be otherwise involved in this
effort.
8. Task force members will be kept entirely confidential;
only fact that the total effort is in progress can be publicized.
9. Jones will function in Washington, Michigan or New York
City, as agreed between McCracken and Jones. He would doubtless
be needed at least to the end of November and possibly until new
Administration takes office. RN might wish to retain him permanently
in a White House administrative role. Suspect his pay would have
to be at roughly a $30,000 a year rate for this interim period,
plus secretarial, etc. backup.
10. I consider this effort a highly important one for RN;
if elected, and if this task is done well, hh will save six
months to a year in getting his new Administration in gear.
Eisenhower lost a year (1953) for the lack of this.
BH/lac
/
La a
Memorandum
Xm
9/12/68
m has memo from Harlow
Indianapolis
wfgin me CC
To:
DC
Roger Jones -enec du -
BH the his 70% sold.
From:
Anderson
Re:
President Johnson's request for representatives
on the problems of transition.
meat get someone on full time basis
President Johnson has invited each of the three
use Jones
major candidates to send representatives to the White as lision
House to work with his representative, Charles Murphy, man.
on the problems of transition.
RN said OK
It would seem that the two men who could handle
this most effectively are Bryce Harlow and Maury Stans.
I have run this idea by Buchanan, Keogh, Greenspan
and Allen. They agree that Harlow and Stans would bring
to this difficult and delicate task an unmatched combination
of seasoned judgment, broad government experience and an
intimate knowledge of the key people in Washington.
Henry Loorris force
arthumBurns- Tom
Frank Lincoln
PRESERVATION COPY
RNC DC
8234616 RMN NY
Transition
MEMO TO LARRY HIGBY FROM SIMMONS
OCTOBER 11
RECEIVED FOLLOWING MEMO TO HALDEMANPFROM JERRY FRIEDHEIM, MILITARY
AFAIRS@ASSISTANT TO SENATOR TOWER, STAFF DIRECTOR, NIXON/AGNEW
KEY ISSUES COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: THE TRANSITION: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MECHANICS AT THE
WHITE HOUSE
A MAJOR FACTOR INFLUENCING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM DURING THE
PEIIOD L964-L967 WAS THE WHITE HOUSE/NATIONAL POLICY MAKING
MACHINERY THAT FOMULATED THE POLICY. TO WHIT: THE PROCESS BY
WHICH NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY MAKING DECISIONS CAME TOEGTHER
IN THE PERSON OF THE PRRSIDENT'S SPECIAL ADVISOR FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS, MR. WALT ROSTOW.
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PLAYED NO SIGNIFIGANT ROLE IN
THE FORMULATION OF VIETNAME POLICY DURING L964-L968. THE DPUESDAY
LUNCJEON C\UB (INFORMAL WEEKLY LUNCHEON MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT
WITH THOSE REGARDED AS HIS KEY ADVISORS: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
MCNAMARA; SECRETARY OF STATE, RSUK) WAS THE VITAL DECISION MAKING
MECHANISM USED BY THE PRESIDENT AND AS SUCH THIS UNOFFICIAL BODY
CONSTITUTED A GROUPING EQUIVALENT TO, OR SUPERIOR TO, THE NSC.
BUT TO FOCUS ATTENTION ONLY AT THAT MECHANISM IS TO OVERLOOK THE
DECISIVE ROLE PLAYED BY THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL ASSISTANT (MR.
ROSTOW) IN STAFFING FOR THOSE MEETINGS AND IN THE DECISIONS ARISING
THEREFROM.
IN PRACTICE, THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR SECURITY AFFAIRS BECAME
UNDER LBJ A SORT OF "CHIEF OF STAFFF" WHO PUT TOGETHER FOR THE
PRESIDENT THE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED BY THE STATE
DEPARTMENT AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. HE ALSO BECAME THE
PRSSIDENT'S PRINCIPAL STAFF "INTELLIGENCE OFFICER" PASSING UPON
AND PASSING UPWARD THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS OF THE ENTIRE
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THIS IS A DANGEROUS COMBINATION.
IT BECAME ALL THE MORE DANGEROUS BECAUSE THE CONSENSUS
PHILOSOPHY WHICH PERVADED THE WHITE HOUSE DURNNG THIS PERIOD,
AND THE LARGE DEGREE OD PERSONAL AGREEMENT ON POLICY BETWEEN
MCNAMARA, RUSK AND HELMS, CONTRIBUTED TO AN ENVIRONMENT WHICH EFFECTIVEL
CLOSED OUT ARGUMENT AGAINST THE GENERAL DRIFTOF THE NATIONAL POLICY
AS IT ALSO CLOSED OUT INTELLIGENCE PRODUTCS WHICH WOULD CONTRADICT
OR AT LEAST UNDERMINE THE VALIDITY OF THE DIRECTION OF THIS NATIONAL
POLICY DRIFT.
ONE OF THE BETTER SPECIFIC EXAMPLESS OF THIS RESTRAINT UPON THE
INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT WAS THE L964 DECISION TO CLOSE THE MILITARY
ATTACHE OFFICES IN SAIGON BECAUSE THEIR REPORTING WAS NOT
CONSISTENT WITH THE VIEW THEN BEING PURSUED IN WASHINGTON. THIS.
EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVED THE MILITARY SERVICES OF ANY MEANINGFUL "CHECK
AND BALANCE" UPON INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION WITHIN THE VITAL DECISION
MAKING CENTERS OF THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT, AND IT RENDERED MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE IN VIETNAM VIRTUALLY SUBSERVIENT TO THE U,S. EMBASSY
THERE, THOUGH INDEPENEENT REPORTING CHANNELS CANTINUED TO EXIST.
IN WASHINGTON MR. ROSTOW BECAME THE FOCAL POINT OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE PRODUCED BY THE CIA, WHIH ALSO UTILIZED THE PRODUTC
as #HSOOTHEROM RAHE
OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. HE
WAS ALSO THE FOCAL POINT OF POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS GP
GENERATED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND DOD.
PRESERVATION COPY
EXPERIENCES SENIOR MILITARY COMMANDERS UNDERSTAND WELL THE RISKS
WHIH
WHICH ARE INHERENT IN HAVING THEIR G-2 IN ANY WAY SUBSERVIENT TO---
OR IN ANY WAY RELATED TO THE PLANNING PROCESS. IN SUCH A SITUATION,
INTELLIGENCE WHCCH IS IN THE BEST OF CONDITIONS NOT EASILY PER-
CEPTIVE OF THE WHOLE "REAL WORLD" TENDS TO BECOME CONTAMINATED.
PRESIDENT NIXON'S STAFF SHOULD INCLUDE A SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WHO WOULD HAVE DIRECT ACCESS TO THE PRESIDENT
AND WOULD BE COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT OF ANY PART OF THE PLANNING OR
DECISION MAKING PROCESS, HE SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING THE
PRESIDENT (AND HIS STAFF) WITH THE "FACTS" IN so FAR AS THEY ARE
KNOWN BY U.S. INTELLIGENCE. WHEN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS
DIFFERENT "ANSWERS" AS FREQUENTLY OCCURS, HE SHOULD BE OBLIGED
TOADVISE THE PRESIDENT THAT DIFFERENCES OF OPINION EXIST ON THE GIVEN
POINT OF ISSUE.
IT IS CMMONLY ASSUMED THAT THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
PERFORMS THE FUNCTION DESCRIBED ABOVE, BUT IN FACT HE NEVER HAS---
MAINLY BECAUSE HE IS A BUSY ADMINISTRATOR INHIS ON RIGHT; AND ALSO
BECAUSE IT IS THE NATURE OF PRSSIDENTIAL STAFFS (ALL STAFFS)
TO PROCEED ALONG WITH THE BEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE AT THE MOMENT
IN SERVICING THEIR BOSS' REQUIREMENTS. THUS THE PRESIDENT'S STAFF
IS APT TOMOVE A GOOD DISTANCE ALONG IN THE FORULATION OF POLICY
WITHOUT BENEFIT OF THE BEST INTELLIGENCE SIMPLY BECAUSE THE DCI IS
NOT A PART OF THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL STAFF. AN INTELLIGENCE
SPECIALIST, WHO KNOWS THE TRADE AND THE ENTIRE COMMUNITY CAPABILITIES,
LIMITATIONS, VESTED INTERESTS, ETC., WOULD GREATLY IMPRIOVE THE
HUREIHOUSESTHEFINTELLIGENCE PRODUCT BEING UTILIZED BY THE
MR. ROSTOW ABLE SCHOLAR AND PERCEPTIVE STRATEGIST THAT HE IS,
WAS NOT SUCH AN "INDEPENDENT AGENT." FROM THIS LACK OF INDEPEN-
DENCE FLOWED MANY OF THE LAST ADMINISTRATION'S VIETNAM MISTAKES,
VACILLATIONS, PROCRASTINATION AND "CREDIBILIT
@
Please Call see
tonight.
Piro 10/11/68
Transition
2,500 bey people.
CS. - Can be transferred.
- Problem of in formation.
- Put togother small org.
1. Top Bus for Scaroned talent.
What do you ask for? Man that
could run company some day.
- Start top down.
1. duterview then ched around.
Must learn how to interview.
Train there in volved in campaign
kendell, 'Donnell.
Transition
3 levels of priority.
25
I Top: : Cabinet Commin head.
Kas
2. Top insider. - by plants for
key post.
z
the administration.
3. Top Man gower pool.
1.
What types of pegale. -
Defense Dept. - young Officers.
Rools
Service.
Buriness - Door to Door.
Orientation
What & Where we aregoing.
Use advanement for recreting
young Presidents Ong.
Recripting UPO - Bus.
Pool
AcAdemic Pool
Computton.
Service has list of outstanding officen they would like to
keep. Hot young guys.
What are the amountants top ? Underse Category.
are they Civil Source or.
Piro < will put together a plan.
White home Staff.
3 levels. -1. top wisidem.
2. Top. people.
3. Top pool.
& Salary levels in While house
E - Problem of the "Mranbook"
Ambanador's Plums to fair degree-
M- N: Possible funined arangement
for Canpaign
Foundation.
Seate for Pero