NSDD 102 United States Response to Soviet Destruction of Korean Air Lines (KAL) Airliner

SEARE SECRET impline 4 governments of other countries with citizens on the aircraft to dramatize the USSR's responsibility for its actions. (U) Reaffirm the existing U.S. sanctions. against Aeroflot that predate the Soviet attack on KAL. (U) Regional -- Recognize that this act occurs in a theater where the Soviets have increasingly sought to intimidate our friends and -discourage them from expanding security cooperation with the United States. (s) -- Continue to consult actively with our Asian friends to develop measures we can take to further bolster their confidence. Provide tangible signals to the Soviets through this allied cooperation that the USSR's campaign of intimidation will only accelerate, not retard, our support for friends. (s) Actions taken to advance this objective need not be directly linked to the aircraft tragedy, but should stand as a quiet, independent signal to the Soviets of our resolve to resist their intimidation. ($) IMPLEMENTATION The Secretary .of State, in concert with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Transportation, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the JCS, the Director of USIA, and the Administrator of the FAA, will develop a coordinated action plan to implement the provisions of this Directive. This pran should include a legislative, public affairs, and diplomatic strategy and be forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by Wednesday, September 7, 1983. (U) Under the direction of the Secretary of State, an interagency group will continue to evaluate and explore additional possibilities for international and U.S. actions consistent with this Directive. The first report on this continuing effort should be forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by September 14, 1983. (U) Rould Regan SECRET COPY 8do-9 OF COPIES SECRET USIA